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Abstract 
This study attempts to describe lexical and aspectual properties of Turkish and English denominal 
verbs. Using Clark & Clark’s (1979) semantic classes for denominal verbs, the study limits its data 
with  location,  locatum and goal  denominal verbs whose nominal bases denote a thing. In 
considering the analogy between mass/count distinction in the spatial dimension displayed by 
nouns and telic/atelic distinction in the temporal dimension exhibited by events, present study 
discusses the effect of inherent semantic features of base nouns in determining the aspectual 
properties of  location,  locatum and goal verbs in Turkish and in English. This study also focuses 
on the variable aspectual nature of locatum verbs with mass noun bases and explains this 
variability by using the means of scalar semantics. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Denominal verbs are simply nouns that have come to be used as verbs. Denominal verb 
formation via zero morphology (boxN→ boxV) is extremely productive in English compared 
with any other language like Turkish. Turkish uses the suffix {-lA} (kutu N ‘box’ → kutu+lAV 
‘to box’) most of the time, and frequently zero morphology (boya N ‘paint’→  boya-Ø V ‘to 
paint’) to produce noun based verbs. The preponderance of denominal verbs in English has 
inspired not only morphologists but also syntacticians and semanticians to make inquiries into 
their peculiar properties. That's why we can observe various different approaches to the same  
today. 
Studies in morphology question basically the suffixation process in denominal verb 
formation: how far is zero derivation different from any other type of derivations? (Marchand, 
1969, Lieber, 1992). Syntacticans like Hale and Keyser (1993, 1998) discuss the noun-verb 
conversion, and they have develop a syntactic theory of denominal verb formation on the 
basis of Lexical Relational Structure.  Semanticians like Pinker (1989), Jackendoff (1990, 
1991), Kageyama (1997), and  Labelle (2000) propose different templates or semantic 
primitives for conceptual structures of denominal verbs. Pragmatic elucidation on denominal 
verb formation is posed by Clark & Clark (1979), who furnished the most comprehensive data 
of both lexicalized and innovative denominal verbs in English. They claim that denominal 
verbs as lexical items — contrary to denotational or indexical ones— can change their 
referents and senses in countless number of ways. Since their senses  depend on the context in 
which they occur, they argue that denominal verbs should be called contextuals.  
Clark & Clark (1979) classify English denominal verbs into 8 semantic categories as follows: 
location  (shelve the book), locatum  (spice the food), goal (group the actors), source  (word 
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the sentence), instrument (mop the floor), duration  (summer in  the France), agent  (nurse the 
patient), miscellaneous (bandage his ankle). This study will carry out its analyses on the basis 
of these major categories, specifically on location, locatum  and goal . It is noteworthy that 
Turkish has all these semantic classes in its denominal verb classification with different 
degrees of productivity except for the semantic category of agent,. 
The aims of the present study can be summarized as follows:  
(1) to explicate lexical conceptual structure of location, locatum and goal denominal verbs in 
Turkish and in English; (2) to demonstrate that aspectual nature of location, locatum and goal 
verbs can be identified via inherent semantic features of the base noun. Particularly, we 
expect to find a correlation between the (non)boundedness of the base nominal and the 
(a)telicity of the derived verb; (3) to illustrate that Turkish and English locatum denominal 
verbs with nonbounded nominal base provide evidence which  reinforces the argument of 
scalar semantics that incremental theme by itself is not enough to determine the telicity of the 
predicate.  
The study first determines the lexical properties of so-called denominal verbs. Then it 
presents the aspectual (or Aktionsart) analysis of location, locatum, goal verbs, and questions 
the effect of inherent semantic features of base nouns (i.e., countable nouns) in determining 
telicity of location, locatum and goal denominal verbs. The study will also discuss the 
exceptional cases in locatum verbs derived from countable nouns. It finally focuses on the 
variable aspectual properties of locatum verbs with nonbounded nominal bases (i.e., mass 
nouns), and points out briefly the explanatory power of scalar semantics in ascribing 
(a)telicity interpretations to such verbs.  
 
2 Lexical Conceptual Structure of Location, Locatum, Goal Verbs 
 
The conceptual meaning of verbs are represented in lexical conceptual structure (LCS) which 
structurally organizes finite set of primitive semantic predicates and their arguments. This 
section will of  show that location, goal and locatum verbs are not just different realizations of 
the identical thematic structures as has been hypothesized in previous studies (Jackendoff, 
1990). We claim that these verbs have distinct semantic predicates. For location and goal 
verbs there exists locative predicate; for locatum verbs there is possessional predicate ‘WITH’ 
(Kageyama, 1997, p. 48). 
Location verbs describe an act of ‘putting something in a location’, where the location is 
described by the base noun that is interpreted as thematic goal or place. Location verbs take as 
direct object the entity-theme which is located or moved with respect to the base noun. To 
sum up, the noun describes the final location of an entity in locative verbs. All the following 
representations capture the notion of movement and spatial location inherent in locative verbs.  
 
(1) Ali  bilgisayar-ı kutu-la-dı. 
  Ali computer-ACC box-LA-PAST-Ø 
  ‘Ali boxed the computer.’ 
 
Clark & Clark (1979): Ali did something to cause it to come about that [the computer was in 
the box] 
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Jackendoff (1990): CAUSE ([Thing ∀ ], [Event GO ([([Thing ∃], [path TO ([place IN ([Thing 
BOX])])])])])  
Kageyama (1997):[  ]Bx
B CAUSE [BECOME [ [  ]By
B BE AT- [N]Bz
B]]  
    Ali CAUSE [BECOME [computer BE AT -IN BOX]] 
 
In goal verbs “ the shape, entity, form, or role denoted by the parent noun come to exist by 
virtue of the action denoted by the verb” (Clark & Clark, 1979, p.774). The base nouns are in 
the goal case.  
 
 
(2)  Deniz     öğrenci-ler-    i   grup-la-dı. 
  Deniz   student-PL-ACC   group-LA-PAST-Ø 
  ‘Deniz grouped the students.’ 
 
Clark &Clark (1979):  Deniz did something to cause to come about that [the students were 
grouped] 
Kageyama (1997): [x CAUSE [BECOME [y BE AT-IN-[property N] 
    [Deniz CAUSE [BECOME [students BE AT-IN-[property GROUP]]]] 
 
Locatum verbs describe an act of ‘putting a theme somewhere’. The theme argument is 
identified by the base noun. Such verbs take as direct object the entity interpreted as the final 
location of the base noun. According to these explanations, for instance, in the predicate 
‘polish the table’, the locatum noun (i.e., theme argument) ‘polish’ goes onto the goal, ‘the 
table’. 
 
(3) Deniz  masa-yı        cila-la-dı. 
  Deniz table-ACC  polish-LA-PAST-Ø 
  ‘Deniz polished the table.’ 
 
Clark & Clark (1979): Deniz did something to cause it to come about that [the table had 
polish on it] 
Jackendoff (1990): CAUSE ([Thing ∀ ], [Event INCH [BE ([Thing BUTTER], [Place ([ON 
([Thing ])])])])]) 
Kageyama (1997):  [  ]x CAUSE [BECOME [ [  ]y BE WITH [NOUN]z ]] 
     [Deniz] CAUSE [BECOME [[table]] BE WITH [POLISH]]] 
 
At this point, Kageyama’s objection to the LCS representation of locatum verbs should be 
noted. Kageyama (1997, pp. 54-55) argues against the movement of locatum nouns and he 
Yes ¸im Aksan Aspectual and Lex. Sem. Properties of Turkish and English Denominal Verbs
114 Yeşim Aksan 
does not find the LCS proposed in this line adequate.T1
T Inherent lexical meaning of these verbs 
reveals that when we spice the food, or saddle the horse it is not just that ‘spice is on the food’ 
or ‘saddle is on the horse’ rather it indicates that ‘spice is mixed with the food and adds spicy 
property to it’or ‘the saddle is fixed on the relevant part of the horse’s body so that the horse 
becomes ready to ride’. Thus, what is crucial in locatum verbs is “the coming together of 
theme and the place in such a way that they essentially form one unit” (Buck, 1993, p.143). 
This is named as “affectedness” by Buck. Yet, if LCS of locatum verbs is hypothesized as in 
Jackendoff’s representation, it is not clear where the affectedness comes from. Hence, 
Kageyama (1997) proposes a new semantic predicate ‘WITH’ which signifies possession in a 
broad sense. For instance, in the predicate spice the food  the semantic predicate WITH 
SPICE is interpreted as the ‘state of being covered with spice’ or in the predicate saddle the 
horse  WITH SADDLE means ‘ready to ride with the saddle on’. Our study sides with 
Kageyama's LCS representation of locatum verbs. 
Briefly, LCS of denominal verbs are constructed on the prototypical schemes motivated for 
basic verb forms of English and Turkish. In this sense, these verbs belong to accomplishment 
verbs classT2
T exhibiting either change of state or change of position. 
 
3 Denominal Verbs and their Aspectual Properties 
 
Second argument of this paper is on the determination of the aspectual, or Akitonsart 
properties of Turkish and English denominal verbs.  First, we shall brifely comment on 
aspectual composition and related aspectual principle. 
 
The relation between the verb and its arguments determine the aspectual classes of the 
predicates which are identified via aspectual feature of telicity. Telicity shows terminativity or 
quantization of the internal contour of an event described. As maintained by Krifka (1989), 
telicity includes a mapping between the structure of an argument of a verb and the structure of 
the event indicated by the verb. The semantic nature of the object argument has a direct effect 
on telicity. Telic interpretation originates when the object or incremental theme argument is 
quantized  as in (4a). Since ‘a plate of rice’ denotes a quantized amount of substance, an  
endpoint for the described event in (4a) can be detected as the point at which all the substance 
in question is consumed. On the other hand, verbs with mass or uncountable objects (4b) do 
not allow a telic interpretation. 
 
(4)   a. Deniz bir tabak pilavı bir saatte yedi. 
   ‘Deniz ate a plate of rice in an hour.’ 
  b. Deniz bir saat boyunca pilav yedi. 
                                                 
T1
T The following points are the counter evidence propsed by Kageyama (1997) against the movement of locatum 
nouns in denominal locatum verbs. If we treat locatum verbs as the movement of the locatum entity, how can 
you explain the locatum nouns  like button hole or dog ear, whose substance does not exist before the action 
carried out? Since buttonholes  can not exist independently of clothes, it is meaningless to say move buttonholes 
on the shirt.  Jackendoff’s interpretation of locatum verbs as “ cause N to come to be all over” does not apply to  
diaper the baby, saddle the horse, tag the box, string the guitar, through which the whole entity in question is 
not covered up. 
T2T  LCS of accomplishment verb class,i.e., [ [ x ACT] CAUSE [ y BECOME [ y BE at-Z]]] properly fits the 
conceptual structure which underlies in location, locatum and goal denominal verbs. 
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  ‘Deniz ate rice for half an hour.’ 
 
This fact about the aspectual interpretation of predicates displays the obvious parallel between 
the nominal meaning and verbal meaning. The mass/count distinction in the spatial dimension 
shown by things is similar to the telic/atelic distinction in the temporal dimension exhibited 
by events (Krifka, 1989, Brinton, 1991, Jackendoff, 1991, Dowty, 1991, Verkuyl, 1993, 
Tenny, 1994 , Jackendoff, 1991,1996 Ramchand, 1997).  
In this line, Jackendoff (1991) proposes the semantic function of boundedness [± 
BOUNDED] to distinguish between count and mass nouns. Count nouns are described as 
[+BOUNDED] and mass nouns as [-BOUNDED]. The basic idea is that count nouns are 
units: if we divide an apple by slicing we do not get further instances of the basic unit. Mass 
nouns are not units and they can be divided into further instances of themselves: if you divide 
a five litre of water into one liter bottles, each of one liter bottle can still be referred as 
‘water’. Apart from the boundedness  feature, Jackendoff also presents the semantic feature of 
[± INTERNAL STRUCTURE] to distinguish between plural count nouns and mass nouns. 
Plural count nouns can be divided into their composite units. It means that they are composed 
of individual units. Thus, mass nouns are [-i], plural count nouns are [+i]. In short, typology 
of semantic classes of nouns according to Jackendoff is as in (5). 
(5)  
count nouns (individuals):   [+b, -i] araba  ‘a car’, muz ‘a banana’ 
collective nouns (groups):   [+b, +i] hükümet ‘government’ 
mass nouns (substances):   [-b,  -i] su‘water’ , oksijen ‘oxygen’ 
plural nouns (aggregates):   [-b, +i] muzlar ‘bananas’ , arabalar ‘cars’ 
 
3.1 Location, Locatum, Goal Verbs and Telicity 
Drawing on the analogy between the nominal and verbal meaning, we argue that aspectual 
(Aktionsart) properties of denominal verbs can be identified via inherent semantic features of 
the base noun.  Following Harley (1999, 2003), we assume that location (kitabı kutula- ‘box 
the books’, belgeyi dosyala-‘file the document’), locatum (atı eyerle- ‘saddle the horse’,yatağı 
çarşafla- ‘sheet the bed’ ) and goal (öğrencileri grupla- ‘group the students’ kitapları sınıfla- 
‘cluster the books’) denominal verbs derived from count nouns (like box, saddle, group) will 
be telic. Thus, they are classified as accomplishment verbs, which is compatible with their 
LCS analysis. On the other hand, the ones derived from mass nouns (like butter, polish, 
cream) will be atelic, hence they belong to activity verb class.   
 
The present study verifies the above mentioned assumptions on data built upon Clark and 
Clark's subcategories of location, locatum and goal verbs. 200 canonical examples of location, 
locatum and goal verbs whose nominal base denote a thing constitute our database. All sorts 
of metaphorical extensions of determined denominal verbs are excluded from the database. To 
test the aspectual well-formedness of the predicates, standard telicity tests, namely temporal 
entailments  T3
T and distribution of temporal adverbs (x-boyunca ‘for x-time’ / x-de ‘in x-time’) 
                                                 
T3
T The entailment test used in identifying aspectual properties of predicates is that: 
(i) If Ø is an accomplishment verb, then x is (now) Øing entails that x has not (yet)Øed. 
(ii) If Ø is an activity verb, then x is (now) Øing entails that x has Øed. 
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are used. One last point about the tendecies of languages in denominal verb formation is that 
Turkish does not lexicalize the same nouns as English does in denominal verb formation and 
English does not have some of the Turkish denominals either. These different lexicalizations 
are given under appropriate subclasses of relevant semantic categories as Tr. and Eng. 
Question mark displays non-occurring denominal verbs. The # notation by the temporal 
adverb testers indicates the unavailability of the produced readings.  
 
• Location verbs  
Storage places (on ‘üstünde’): Tr: sepeti sırtla- ‘?shoulder the basket’, meyvaları tezgahla- 
‘?stand the fruit’...  Eng:  shelve the books ‘?kitapları rafla-’, land the boat ‘?tekneyi kıyıla-
’... 
  
(6)  a. Ali sepeti 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca sırtladı. 
    ‘Ali shouldered the basket in 2 minutes / # for two minutes.’ 
    b. John shelved the book in 2 minutes / # for two minutes. 
 
Storage places (in ‘içinde’): mısırı depola- ‘silo the corn’,  yazıyı dosyala- ‘file the 
document’, telefonu ceple- ‘pocket the cell-phone’... 
  
(7)  a.  Deniz yazıyı 2 dakikada / #  2 dakika boyunca dosyaladı. 
  ‘Deniz  filed  the  report  in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’ 
  b.  Çiftçi  mısırı  bir saatte  / #  bir saat boyunca depoladı. 
    ‘Farmer siloed the corn in an hour / # for  an hour .’ 
 
Containers (in ‘içinde’): şarabı  f ıçıla- ‘barrel the wine’, bilgisayarı kutula- ‘box the 
computer’ şarabı şişele- ‘bottle the wine’... 
  
(8)  a. Ali bilgisayarı 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca kutuladı. 
    ‘Ali boxed the computer in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’ 
  b.Ali  şarabı 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca şişeledi. 
    ‘Ali bottled the wine in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’ 
 
• Locatum verbs  
Coverings ( on ‘üstünde’) 
Temporary: yatağı çarşafla- ‘sheet the bed’, bebeği kundakla-,‘swaddle the baby’, zemini 
keçele- ‘? felt the floor’... 
  
(9)   Deniz yatağı 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca çarşafladı. 
    ‘Deniz sheeted the bed in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’ 
 
Individual objects: dress, animal paraphernalia: bebeği bezle-‘diaper the baby’ yüzünü 
peçele- ‘veil your face’, atı nalla- ‘shoe the horse’, atı eyerle - ‘saddle the horse’... 
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(10) Ali  atı 10 dakikada /  # 10 dakika boyunca nalladı. 
    ‘Ali shoed the horse in 10 minutes / # for 10 minutes.’  
   
Location and locatum verbs derived from countable nouns, which are independent units by 
themselves yield telic interpretations T4
T with respect to standard telicity tests, as seen in the 
example sentences. They are all compatible with a time span adverbial (in-x time) which 
occurs only with telic predicates. 
 
 
• Goal verbs   
Groups: öğrencileri grupla- ‘group the students’, sınıfı sırala-’line up the class ’, kitapları 
sınıfla ‘cluster the books’... 
  
(11)   Deniz öğrencileri grupluyor. DOES NOT ENTAIL Deniz öğrencileri grupladı.  
    ‘Deniz is grouping the students DOES NOT ENTAIL Deniz has grouped the 
  student.’ 
 
Masses: kağıtları destele- ‘bundle the papers’, giyisileri kümele-‘pile the clothes’, çiçekleri 
demetle- ‘bouquet the flowers’... 
  
 (12)   Ali kağıtları desteliyor.≠> Ali kağıtları desteledi. 
    ‘Ali is bundling the papers. ≠> Ali has bundled the papers.’  
 
Shapes: ipi düğümle- ‘knot the string’ Eng: loop the rope ‘?ipi ilmekle-’, coil the rope ‘??ipi 
kangalla-’, braid her hair ‘?saçını örgüle-’... 
  
(13)   Ali ipi düğümlüyor. ≠>  Ali ipi düğümledi. 
  ‘Ali is knotting the string. ≠>  Ali has knotted the string.’ 
 
Goal verbs have either collective (group) or countable (bundle,  cluster,  pile,  mass) base 
nominals. Under Jackendoff’s account, countable nouns are units, so they are bounded; 
collective nouns contain individual units like bare plurals, so they have [+i]. However, if we 
divide a group into smaller segments, we can not name each of the results as a ‘group’. Thus, 
such nouns are also [+bounded]. As is expected, goal denonimal verbs derived from collective 
nouns and countable nouns are bounded in time. With respect to entailment tests, they give 
                                                 
T4
T One could argue that the telicity of these events described by denomial location and locatum verbs (in 6-10) 
derives from the boundedness of their object arguments. When compared with the indeterminate nature of the 
predicate eat, the events denoted by these verbs have inherent endpoints. To put it in other words, the telicity 
inherent in the events described by the location and locatum verbs themselves is “intuitively obvious” (Harley, 
1999: p.77, see also Tenny, 1994, p. 212). This explanation becomes more meaningful when we analyse the 
telicity  status of denomial locatum verbs whose nominal bases are mass nouns (like polish, butter) in section 
3.4. The activites illustrated by these verbs have no inherent endpoints, thus both telic and atelic readings are 
equally possible. 
Yes ¸im Aksan Aspectual and Lex. Sem. Properties of Turkish and English Denominal Verbs
158 Yeşim Aksan 
rise to telic interpretations. As is seen in (11-13), telic predicates are not entailed by their 
progressive forms. Due to this principle, for instance in (11) ‘Deniz is grouping the students’ 
entails that ‘Deniz has not yet grouped the students’. 
  
3. 2 Aspect Shift: Repeated Event 
 
A change in the semantic properties of object noun in telic location and locatum  verbs affects 
the aspectual interpretation of the verb. When a bare plural appears in the direct object 
position of telic verbs like saddle or box, the event receives the interpretation of repeated 
instances of saddling or boxing, i.e, each repeated event is completed. 
 
(14)  a.  Ali # bir saatte / bir saat boyunca at eyerledi. 
  ‘Ali saddled  horses # in an hour / for an hour.’ 
  b. Ali # bir saatte / bir saat boyunca bilgisayar kutuladı. 
   ‘Ali boxed  computers # in an hour / for an hour.’   
 
Bare plurals bear a high potential for creating ambiguity. Many of them can be understood 
either as denoting  a collection of individuals or quantifiying over the members of that 
collection, and thus they give rise to collective / distributive ambiguity. In our case, speakers 
resolve such ambiguity by relying on their world knowledge or generic knowledge. In (14 a, 
b), by virtue of generic knowledge saddle the horses would normally mean there was one 
saddle for each horse (distributive reading), not that there was one or more saddles for the 
horses taken as a set (collective reading). On the other hand, box the computers can be taken 
either way: it could be collective (15 a) when one or more boxes for the computers is 
understood as a set or it could be distributive (15b) when one box is assigned for each 
computer.  
(15)   a. Ali bilgisayarların tümünü bir kutuya koydu.  
  ‘Ali put all the computers in a box.’ 
  b.  Ali bilgisayarları ayrı ayrı kutulara koydu.  
  ‘Ali put each computer in a different box.’ 
 
3. 3 Exceptional Data  in Locatum Verbs 
 
Verbs categorized under the semantic classes of symbols çeki imzala- ‘sign the check’, çeki 
tarihle- ‘date the check’ pasaportu damgala- ‘stamp the passport’ and labels kavanozu 
etiketle- ‘label the jar’ , mektubu mühürle- ‘seal the letter’ have exceptional cases in terms of 
telic interpretation. Although these locatum verbs have bounded nominal bases, like sign, 
label, stamp which give rise to telic predicates, our world knowledge tells us that the event of 
labeling, stamping, signing, sealing can be carried out more than once on a particular entity. 
Given the appropriate context, events described by such denominal verbs can have an atelic 
interpretation as well as the more usual telic interpretation.T5
T  
                                                 
 
T5
T Regarding the contextual explanation developed for subcategories of symbol and label locatum verbs, one can 
claim that under appropriate context, locatum verbs from semantic subclasses of temporary dress (like diaper  
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(16)  a. Ali 5 dakika boyunca / 5 dakikada belgeyi imzaladı. 
  ‘Ali signed the document for 5 minutes / in 5 minutes.’ 
Possible interpretations:  
  Ali signed different places of the same document for 5 minutes. 
  Ali signed one particular place of the document in 5 minutes. 
 
  b. Ali 5 dakika boyunca / 5 dakikada kavanozu etiketledi. 
  ‘Ali labelled the jar for 5 minutes / in 5 minutes.’ 
Possible interpretations:  
  Ali labelled different sides of the same jar for 5 minutes. 
  Ali labelled one particular side of the jar in 5 minutes. 
 
Locatum verbs categorized under the semantic class of decoration constitute another group of 
exception. Again, the locatum verbs in this category derived from count nouns like resim 
‘picture’, desen ‘pattern’, süs ‘ornament’ are supposed to be telic. Yet, it is very likely to 
interpret the event described by these verbs as atelic, simply because nominal bases of 
locatum verbs of decoration class are plural in their inherent lexical senses.T6
T For instance, 
resimle- ‘picture’ means “draw, paint or print on a surface a lot of pictures”. This inherent 
plural sense of these derived verbs enforces us to make undelimited, or atelic readings. When 
we utter ‘Deniz pictured the book’, the process of picturing the book involves drawing more 
than one picture ( or a series of pictures) in a book.  
 
  (17)   Deniz kitabı bir saatte/ bir saat boyunca resimledi. 
    ‘Deniz pictured the book in an hour/for an hour.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
the baby) and animal paraphernalia (like saddle the horse)  may allow atelic interpretations. However, such a 
claim does not hold for the above mentioned  subcategories. In the same vein, denominal location verbs with 
countable nomial bases do not have such a tendency since they are inherently telic . The only way to change their 
telicity is to manipulate the boundedness feature of their arguments. On the other hand, our world knowledge 
naturally triggers the relevant context which makes atelic reading possible with locatum verbs from the semantic 
subclasses of symbol and label . 
T6
T Followings are inherent lexical meaning of locatum verbs categorized under the semantic class of decoration : 
 desenle- ‘pattern’: a pattern is an arrangement of lines or shapes, especially a design in which the same shape is 
repeated at regular intervals over a surface. 
süsle- ‘festoon ’ (n-count, usually plural): If sth. is festooned with -eg. lights, balloons or flowers-, a large 
number of things are hung from it or wrapped around it, especially in order to decorate it. 
işle- ‘garland ’ (n -count, usually plural): circular decoration made from flowers and leaves. 
pulla-  ‘sequin ’ (n-count, usually plural): sequins are small shiny discs that are sewn on clothes to decorate 
them. 
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Again the well known collective / distributive interpretation occurs with the plural sense of 
the predicate resimle- ‘to picture’. Telic reading of sentence (17) considers pictures in a book 
as a set, whereas atelic reading views each picture in the book separately . 
 
3. 4 Aspectual Vagueness in Locatum Verbs  
 
Final part of this study focuses on the aspectual vagueness of locatum verbs in Turkish and in 
English derived from mass nouns. Most of the locatum verbs have mass nouns as nominal 
roots which describe the movement of a spatially unbounded substance. According to our 
assumption, these locatum denominals should be atelic. However aspectual tests illustrate that 
locatum verbs derived from mass nouns allow both telic and atelic readings.  
 
i. Coverings (on ‘üstünde’) 
Permanent: rafı kağıtla- ‘paper the shelf’, mobilyayı vernikle-’varnish the furniture’, duvarı 
kireçle- ‘lime the wall’ Tr:  tarlayı  ilaçla-’?medicine the field’, dolabı naftalinle- 
‘?naphthalene the wardrobe’... 
  
(18)   Deniz masayı 10 dakikada/ 10 dakika boyunca cilaladı. 
    ‘Deniz polished the table in 10 minutes / for 10 minutes.’  
 
Permanent solid: Tr: zemini ziftle- ‘?pitch the floor’, yolu katranla- ‘?tar the road’... Eng: 
roof the house ‘?evi çatıla-’, tile the floor ‘?zemini karola-’, seed the lawn ‘?bahçeyi 
tohumla-’... 
  
(19)   İşçiler yolu 2 günde / 2 gün boyunca asfaltladı. 
    ‘Workmen asphalted the road in 2 days / for 2days.’  
 
Viscous:  ekmeği yağla- ‘butter the bread’, yüzünü kremle- ‘cream your face’, yarayı 
merhemle- ‘balm the wound ’,  Tr: vazoyu tutkalla-‘?glue the vase’... 
  
(20)    Deniz yüzünü 10 dakikada / 10 dakika boyunca kremledi. 
    ‘Deniz creamed her face in 10 minutes /  for 10 minutes.’ 
 
Powdery: yüzünü pudrala- ‘powder your face,’ balığı unla-‘flour the fish’... 
  
(21)   Deniz balığı 5 dakikada / 5 dakika boyunca unladı. 
    ‘Deniz floured the fish in 5 minutes /  for 5 minutes.’ 
 
ii. Coverings (in ‘içinde’) 
Condiments yemeği biberle-‘pepper the food’, salatayı limonla- ‘lemon the salad’...  
  
(22) Deniz  salatayı  2 dakikada / 2 dakika boyunca limonladı. 
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    ‘Deniz lemoned the salad in 2 minutes / for 2 minutes.’ 
 
As we maintained before, what is crucial in locatum verbs is the semantic relation of WITH 
possession which signifies addition of a relevant property to the object.  For instance, the 
locatum verb polish in the predicate polish the table implies ‘polish is mixed with the surface 
of the table and adds polished property to it’. Thus, these verbs are change of state verbs 
which display variable telicity along the line of other change of state verbs as in degree 
achievements (e.g, cool, lengthen, widen). 
Finally, our study paves the way to a discussion of telicity interpretation in the verb classes 
which display variable telicity. What is crucial in the sample sentences (18-22) is that they 
involve incremental theme arguments, but these arguments do not affect telicity of the 
predicates, which is quite contrary to the claims of Krifka (1989) and Dowty (1991).  
We explicate this fact by using the means of scalar semantics which reanalyzes and extends 
the notion of incremental theme in terms of scalar representation. Scalar semantics elucidates 
the grading relations in lexical categories, basically adjectives and verbs, whose canonical 
examples involve grading. For instance, consider the verb build, which describes a kind of 
“process of creation”, and therefore supports an ordering of objects according to how far 
along in a scale of completion they are (Kennedy, 2000). 
Locatum verbs with mass noun bases displaying a variable telicity describe an event in which 
direct object arguments undergo a gradual change. This is characterized in a scalar 
representation as a change in the degree to which the direct object arguments possess some 
gradable property. For instance, with the predicate  polish the table two scales are possible: 
1. Intensity scale: brightness of the table. The desired result may be the brightest table, with 
the scale being one of brightness. 
2. Quantity scale: extent / surface area of the table. The process of polishing is conceived to 
be complete when the act of polishing has covered the entire table. 
As stated in Kennedy & Levin (2000), if any identifiable degree of change is assigned to one 
of the above scales, this immediately determines the telicity of the predicate. That is to say: 
(i) When the degree of change has a quantized scalar structure, an endpoint to the event can 
be identified, and the predicate is telic.   
  
Intensity scale: scale of brightness 
(23)  a. Deniz masayı 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca pırıl pırıl cilaladı. 
  Deniz table-ACC two minute-LOC / # 2 minute long brightly polish-PAST-Ø 
  ‘Deniz polished the table smooth in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’    
  
Quantitiy scale: scale of extent 
  b. Deniz masanın tamamını 2 dakikada / # 2 dakika boyunca cilaladı.    
Deniz table-ACC completely  two minute-LOC / # 2 minute long polish-PAST Ø  
 ‘Deniz  polished up the table in 2 minutes / # for 2 minutes.’ 
 
(ii)  When the degree of change does not have a quantized scalar structure as in ‘Deniz 
polished the table’, an endpoint to the event can not be identified, and the predicate is atelic. 
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In short, telicity corresponds to the degree of change which is a scalar property of verb 
meaning. It is determined in terms of mapping between the “structure of the degree of change 
and the structure of the event” (Kennedy & Levin, 2000). On the other hand, incremental 
theme argument itself does not directly determine telicity.T7
T As is pointed out in Hay et. al. 
(1999) and in Kennedy & Levin (2000) “incremental theme indirectly determines telicity to 
the extent that its structure affects possible values of the degree of change. ” Briefly, on their 
view, incremental theme is seen as a measure of a property of an argument of a verb, not 
actual argument.  
When we attempt to formalize the notion of “gradual change” observed in denominal locatum 
verbs, the formula developed by Kennedy & Levin (2000) in (24) displays the proposed 
underlying semantics for these verbs. V∆ illustrates the verbs of gradual change , where Pv is 
gradable property associated with the verb. 
 
(24) a.  V∆ = λxλ dλtλe. CHANGE (Pv (x) (t)) (d) (e) 
b. [CHANGE (P (x) (t)) (d) (e)] = 1 iff P (x) (BEG (e)) + d= P (x) (END (e)) 
 
In prose, CHANGE a gradable property P of an object x  to degree d  is ture of an event e just 
in the case to which the degree to which  x  possesses property P at the beginning of an event 
plus d equals the degree to which  x  possesses property P at the end of an event. 
 
By applying this formula to the predicates in (23), one can represent the lexical semantics of 
verbs  of gradual  change as such. Note that the following representations ignore the external   
arguments. 
 
(25)    [polish (d-much of) x]= λe. CHANGE (POLISHED (x) (t)) (d) (e) 
  a. Deniz polished the table smooth. 
  λe. CHANGE (POLISHED (table) (t)) (smooth) (e) 
  b. Deniz polished up the table. 
  λe. CHANGE (POLISHED (table) (t)) (entire) (e) 
  
A last word is on the telic reading of the sentences without a delimiter. Although the degree of 
change does not have quantized scalar structure in atelic interpretations of locatum verbs with 
mass nouns, we can still assign telic interpretations to such predicates. This is imposed by our 
world knowledge of the specific process (e.g., polishing) and the object involved (e.g., table). 
In other words, context supports the inference of a quantized degree of change. That is to say,  
real world knowledge tells us that  there is conventional  maximal  degree of brightness / of 
being covered up with polish for tables. In the sentence ‘Deniz polished the table in 10 
minutes’, the event is considered to have been completed when the table reaches to a point 
which would conventionally be considered “polished” (Hay et.al., 1999, Smollett, 2001 and 
Ramchand, 2001).  
                                                 
T7
T Such an account clarifies the relationship between telicity and the incremental theme argument. It is implicitly 
assumed that only telic events have incremental themes (see Dowty, 1991). However, scalar representation of 
denominal locatum verbs demonstrates that telicity and incremental theme are independent, which is something 
parallel with the proposals in Krifka (1992), Jackendoff (1996), Ramchand (1997, 2001), Levin (2000), Smollett 
(2001). 
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Here, we see the role of conversational implicatures in generating telic interpretations in verbs 
of gradual change, which are compatiable with both durative and time span adverbials (recall 
the sentences in 18-22). On Hay et.al.’s account, such an adverb duality occurs when the 
degree of change is inferred, because only then the principles of conversational implicature 
are employed. According to the principle of informativity, the sentence ‘Deniz polished the 
table’ is most informative in a telic interpretation: Deniz polished the table until it reaches to a  
conventionally specified degree of brighthess. This “degree of brighthess” has some sort of a 
bound; it is not indefinitly unbounded. Since a telic reading is the most informative one, a 
time span adverbial is acceptable, as ‘Deniz polished the table in 10 mintues’. On the other 
hand, we see that the same predicate, 'polish the table' can be felicitous with a durative 
adverbial, ‘Deniz polished the table for 10 mintues’. This is also acceptable because “ the 
durative adverbial has the effect of cancelling the telicity implicature” (Hay et.al, 1999). As a 
result, the sentence is interpreted as such, the table gradually becomes polished, but only to 
some unspecified degree. We should keep in mind that adverbial duality immediately 
disappears when the degree of change has a quantized scalar structure as illustrated in (23). 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
•  It is possible  to determine the aspectual properties of derived denominal verbs in Turkish 
and in English by regarding the semantic features of the base nominal to some extent. As is 
discussed, denominal location, locatum and goal verbs derived from countable base nouns are 
most of the time telic, quite contrary to Harley’s (1999, 2003) remark that they are 
"necessarily" telic. We exemplified that each class of denominals involve exceptions to the 
telicity claim, e.g., plural senses of decoration denominals. Moreover, collective / distributive 
interpretations caused by plural arguments of the verbs easily affect the aspectual properties 
of location, locatum and goal verbs. Consequently, generalizations about the semantic effect 
of the base noun on the related verb’s telicity is not as straightforward as Harley suggests. 
 
• Our data from Turkish provide evidence for 
(i) Levin’s (2000) claim that verb classes sharing the same lexical conceptual structure do not 
display unification in terms of aspectual properties. For example, locatum denominals belong 
to  either accomplishment or change of state verb classes. In other words, locatum verbs 
constitute a grammatically-relevant, semantically-coherent verb class that nevertheless 
contains some verbs that are necessarily telic, and  others display variable telicity. 
(ii) Scalar  representation of predicates displaying variable telicity.  
 
• The discussion in our study emphasizes that world knowledge and contextual conditions are 
very influential in carrying out effective interpretations on the aspectual nature of predicates. 
In other words, we have illustrated that telicity is not strictly determined by linguistic means, 
whereas contextual cues take their place in the speaker’s interpretations of predicates. 
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Abstract 
This paper proposes a semantic analysis of intervention effects in wh-constructions. Wh-
phrases are assumed to use the same interpretive mechanism as focus. Similar to a focus sensitive 
operator evaluating the contribution of focus, a question operator evaluates the contribution of a 
wh-phrase. An intervening focus sensitive operator interferes with this evaluation and renders the 
structure uninterpretable. Crosslinguistic variation in the appearance of intervention effects arises 
due to variation in the Logical Form of questions and of focus evaluation.  
1  Introduction 
The sentences in (1) exemplify a set of data referred to as intervention effects: the 
combination of a wh-phrase with a quantificational or focusing element leads to 
ungrammaticality in certain configurations.  
 
(1)  a.   *  Minsu-man  nuku-lûl   po-ass-ni?        (Korean) 
  Minsu-only  who-Acc  see-Past-Q 
    ‘Who did only Minsu see?’ 
 b.      ??  koi  nahiiN  kyaa  paRhaa     (Hindi) 
  anyone  not    what  read-Perf.M 
    ‘What did no one read?’ 
 
Until now, there have been syntactic (Beck (1996), Beck & Kim (1997), Hagstrom (1998), 
Kim (2002), among others) as well as semantic (Honcoop (1998)) explanations of this 
phenomenon.1 This paper proposes yet another approach to intervention effects, which is 
semantic in the sense that intervention effects are made to follow from the component of the 
grammar that compositionally interprets interrogative sentences. The proposal identifies a 
core case of intervention, in which a focusing operator interferes with the interpretation of a 
wh-phrase in situ. Compositional interpretation proceeds in such a way that both focus and 
wh-phrase make use of the same interpretational mechanism. The way the framework is 
designed, a wh-phrase interpreted within the scope of a focussing operator leads to 
uninterpretabilty of the structure as a whole. 
 Motivation for this strategy comes from the fact that research over the past several years has 
shown intervention effects to exist in a wide variety of typologically unrelated languages. 
Moreover, the most stable intervention effect crosslinguistically appears to be that of 
focussing elements like only,  even and also. This suggests that the cause of intervention 
effects is relatively fundamental, anchored in rather basic properties of the grammar. These 
properties plausibly concern focus interpretation. Further support for the idea comes from the 
observation that other focus-related constructions also show intervention effects.  
                                                 
1There is also a proposal by Lee and Tomioka (presented at the 2001 Japanese/Korean Linguistics conference) 
which suggests to derive intervention effects from information structure. Unfortunately, the paper is not yet 
available in a form that would enable me to comment in an informed way. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 builds the empirical picture, leading to a 
characterisation of the universal as well as (some of) the variable properties of intervention 
effects in wh-constructions. In section 3 I develop the framework of focus interpretation and 
question interpretation that derives the core intervention effect. I address in section 4 some of 
the aspects of intervention effects that are variable crosslinguistically, specifically under what 
syntactic circumstances an intervention effect arises. Section 5 is devoted to the question of 
what a problematic intervener is. Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
2  Data 
Subsection 2.1. introduces and defines intervention effects as they will be understood in this 
paper. In 2.2. we construct a crosslinguistic picture of intervention effects, identifying a core 
intervention effect that is crosslinguistically stable, as well as some parameters of variation. I 
lay out the strategy pursued in the paper for dealing with these facts. 
2.1  Intervention Effects 
A wh-in-situ language like Korean allows us to construct the simplest examples for 
intervention effects. Observe that (2a) is ungrammatical, even though the sentence is what we 
would expect in Korean for the question 'who did only Minsu see?'. Responsible for the 
ungrammaticality is the element 'only', as shown by the acceptable (2b). Moreover, the 
structural relationship between the wh-phrase and 'only' is relevant: in the well-formed (2c), 
the wh-phrase has moved past 'only' and is no longer c-commanded by this element. A 
preliminary characterisation of the effect is given in (3).2  
 
(2)  a.    *  Minsu-man  nuku-lûl   po-ass-ni?        (Korean) 
  Minsu-only  who-Acc  see-Past-Q 
    Who did only Minsu see? 
 b.  Minsu-nun  nuku-lûl    po-ass-ni?   
  Minsu-Top  who-Acc  see-Past-Q 
    Who did Minsu see? 
 c.    nuku-lûl    Minsu-man  po-ass-ni?   
  who-Acc  Minsu-only  see-Past-Q 
    Who did only Minsu see? 
 
(3)  A wh-phrase in situ may not be c-commanded by a focussing or quantificational  
 element. 
 
Data ruled out by the generalisation in (3) will be referred to as intervention effects. The set of 
focussing and quantificational elements contains (counterparts of) the following items: 
 
(4)  only, even, also, not, (almost) every, no, most, few (and other nominal quantifiers),  
  always, often, never (and other adverbial quantifiers).  
 
These items will be referred to as interveners. There will be more discussion of the nature of 
interveners below.  
                                                 
2The judgments described are the ones from Beck & Kim (1997). It has since come to my attention that, while 
most people agree with the data reported there, some speakers of Korean do not perceive as strong an 
intervention effect with these data. I have convinced myself that the variation is genuine, but won't offer an 
analysis of the more liberal dialect. I am espescially grateful to Sei-Rang Oh for helping me to clarify this point. 
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In a language with overt wh-movement, like German, relevant examples are necessarily more 
complex, because it is harder to successfully place a wh-phrase in situ. Still, German provides 
further illustration of (3), for example in the multiple question in (5a). 
  
(5)  a.   *  Wen   hat   niemand   wo   gesehen? 
  whom  has    nobody    where  seen 
  'Where  did  nobody  see  whom?’ 
  b.  Wen  hat Luise    wo gesehen? 
  whom  has  Luise  where  seen 
    'Where did Luise see whom?’ 
  c.  Wen    hat   wo   niemand    gesehen? 
  whom  has    where  nobody    seen 
  'Where  did  nobody  see  whom?’ 
 
In (5a), the wh-phrase 'where' is in situ and c-commanded by 'nobody'. The sentence is 
ungrammatical. Clearly, the element 'nobody' is responsible, cf. the well-formed (5b). Finally, 
it is once more the structural relation between the quantifier and the wh-phrase that 
determines acceptability: in the well-formed (5c), the wh-phrase has moved past the 
intervener. 
I refer the reader to Beck (1996) and Beck and Kim (1997) for more Korean and German data 
illustrating (3), and move on to data that require a refinement of (3) - the example in (6). 
 
(6)  a.   *  Was   glaubt    niemand   wen   Karl   gesehen  hat? 
    what  believes   nobody   whom  Karl    seen      has 
    'Who does nobody believe that Karl saw?’ 
 b.  Was    glaubt   Luise  wen Karl    gesehen  hat? 
    what   believes   Luise   whom  Karl   seen    has 
    'Who does Luise believe that Karl saw?’ 
  c.  %  Wen  glaubt    niemand  daß  Karl  gesehen  hat? 
    whom  believes   niemand   that   Karl  seen      has 
    'Who does nobody believe that Karl saw?’ 
 
(6a) is a scope marking construction (compare Lutz et al. (2000) and references therein). 
Informally speaking, the element 'was' marks the scope of the wh-phrase 'wen', and the entire 
sentence is a non-multiple question. In (6a), the intervener 'nobody' makes the sentence 
ungrammatical, as witnessed by the acceptable (6b). In (6c), the wh-phrase has moved past 
the intervener. In those dialects of German that accept movement of this kind, there is a 
contrast between (6a) and (6c) in that (6c) is acceptable in an appropriate context while (6a) is 
bad. The point of (6a) is that 'wen' is not in situ. It has moved to the SpecCP of the embedded 
clause. Still, the intervention effect in (6) is quite parallel to (5). I will therefore adopt (7) 
(closely following Kim (2002)) as a more appropriate generalisation: 
 
(7)  A quantificational or focusing element may not intervene between a wh-phrase and its  
  licensing complementizer.  
 
By 'A intervenes between B and C' I mean that A c-commands B, and C c-commands both A 
and B, as illustrated in (8). I will refer to the licensing complementizer of a wh-phrase, for the 
moment informally, as the complementizer of the clause in which intuitively the wh-phrase 
takes scope.  The instantiation of the schema in (8) that we are interested in is thus (9) - the 
intervention effect. 
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(8)  [ C [ ... [ A [ ... B ... ]]]] 
(9)   *  [ Qi [ ... [ intervener [ ... wh-phrasei ... ]]]] 
 
2.2  Crosslinguistic data 
It has become clear over the past few years that intervention effects are a fairly widespread 
phenomenon among the world's languages. According to my knowledge, they have been 
claimed to exist in Dutch, English, German, French, Hindi/Urdu, Japanese, Korean, 
Malayalam, Mandarin, Passamaquaddy, Persian, Thai and Turkish. Below is a sample of 
relevant data from other wh-in-situ languages besides Korean.  
 
(10)  Hindi (Beck (1996)): 
  a.   ??  koi  nahiiN kyaa  paRhaa 
  anyone  not    what  read-Perf.M 
 b.  kyaa  koi  nahiiN  paRhaa 
  what  anyone  not    read-Perf.M 
    ‘What did no one read?’ 
 
(11)  Japanese (from Pesetsky (2000) who cites Miyagawa (1998)): 
  a.   *  Hotondo   dono hito-mo  nani-o    yonda  no? 
  almost   every  person    what-Acc    read    Q 
  b.  Nani-o   hotondo  dono hito-mo  yonda  no? 
    what-Acc   almost    every person   read   Q 
    'what did almost every person read?' 
 
(12) Mandarin  (Kim  (2002): 
 a.  ?*  zhiyou  Lili  kan-le     na-ben    shu? 
    only   Lili    read-ASP   which-CL   book 
 b.  na-ben    shu    zhiyou  Lili  kan-le? 
    which-CL   book  only   Lili read-ASP  
    Which book did only Lili read? 
 
(13)   Malayalam (Kim (2002)): 
  a.     *  Lili-maatram  eete   pustakam-aane   waayikk-ate 
  Lili-only    which    book-be     read-Nom 
 b.  eete    pustakam-aane    Lili-maatram    waayikk-ate 
  which    book-be     Lili-only    read-Nom 
    Which book did only Lili read? 
 
(14)   Turkish (Beck (1996)): 
  a.   *  Kimse kimi    görmedi? 
  anyone  who-Acc  see-Neg-Past? 
 b.  Kimi   kimse   görmedi? 
  Who-Acc  anyone  see-Neg-Past 
    Whom did nobody see? 
 
See Hagstrom (1998), Pesetsky (2000) and Lee & Tomioka (2001) for more Japanese data, 
Kim (2002) for Malayalam and Mandarin, and Beck (1996) for Hindi/Urdu and Turkish. 
French allows wh-in-situ normally ((15a)), but not after an intervener ((15b)): 
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(15)  French (from Pesetsky (2000) who cites Chang (1997) & Boskovic (to appear)): 
  a.  Ils   ont   rencontré   qui? 
  they    have    met     who 
    'Whom did they meet?' 
  b.  #  Il   n'a     pas   rencontré   qui? 
    he   Neg has   Neg   met     who 
    Whom did he not meet?        [only as echo question] 
 
(16)-(177) illustrate effects parallel to German intervention effects for the wh-movement 
languages Dutch and English.  
 
(16)   Dutch (van den Born, p.c.): 
  *  Wie   heeft   niemand   aan   wie   voorgesteld? 
    Who  has   nobody   to   who   introduced 
    'Who did nobody introduce to whom?' 
 
(17)  English (Pesetsky (2000)): 
  a. ??  Which diplomat should I not discuss which issue with _? 
  b. ??  Which book did almost everyone write to which newspaper about _ ? 
 
Finally, the following examples from Passamaquaddy and Thai, respectively, have been 
brought forth by Bruening and Lin (2001) and by Ruangjaroon (2002) as examples of 
intervention effects in those languages. The Passamaquaddy example is a scope marking 
construction similar to German (6) above. 
 
(18)  Passamaquaddy (Bruening and Lin (2001)): 
 *  Keq(sey)    skat  itom-uhk  Tihitiyas [CP  wen wenatomine-t] 
    What Neg   say-3ConjNeg Tihitiyas   who IC.be.crazy-3Conj 
    Who didn't Tihitiyas say was crazy? 
 
(19)  Thai (Ruangjaroon (2002)):  
           *  mâymiikhray  chôop  ?àan   nangsii   lêmnay 
  nobody like    read  book     which 
    Which books does nobody like to read? 
 
This short list of data should suffice to show that intervention effects plausibly exist in these 
languages. Persian has been claimed to have intervention effects in Megerdoomian and 
Ganjavi (2000), who unfortunately do not provide actual examples.  
 
Beyond the mere fact that all these languages seem to have intervention effects, it has become 
clear that the way the effect manifests itself is subject to some crosslinguistic variation. This 
variation concerns (i) the syntactic circumstances under which intervention effects arise, and 
(ii) the set of problematic interveners. I discuss them in turn. 
Pesetsky (2000) observes that intervention effects exist in English, contrary to fist 
appearances, but they occur only under rather special circumstances - namely, in otherwise 
permissible violations of superiority. So, in contrast to German, many potential intervention 
constellations are grammatical, cf. (20).  
 
(20)  a.  Who did only John introduce to whom? 
  b.  Which children didn't buy which book? 
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An intervention effect in English is constructed as follows. Take a multiple question with 
which-phrases like (21a). Now, instead of the strucurally higher wh-phrase, overtly front the 
structurally lower wh-phrase, as in (21b). Normally, this by itself would make the example 
ungrammatical; compare the contrast in (22a) vs. (22b): a superiority violation. In the case of 
which-phrases, though, a superiority violation does not induce ungrammaticality (compare 
Pesetsky (1982)). However, if you now add an intervener, as in (21c), the example becomes 
unacceptable. Thus, wh-phrases in situ that successfully defy superiority are sensitive to 
intervention effects.  
 
(21)  a.  Which girl did (only) Mary introduce _ to which boy? 
  b.  Which boy did Mary introduce which girl to _ ? 
  c. ??  Which boy did only Mary introduce which girl to _?    [Pesetsky] 
 
(22)  a.  Who did Mary introduce _ to who? 
  b.    *  Who did Mary introduce who to _ ? 
 
Pesetsky accounts for the contrast between English and German, and the English facts in 
particular, by claiming that the inventory of covert movement operations differs between the 
two languages. We will come back to these data and to Pesetsky's analysis in section 4. 
 
Moving on to (ii): variation regarding the set of problematic interveners, compare (23) and 
(24):  
 
(23)  Korean (Beck & Kim (1997)): 
 Minsu-nûn  chachu  nuku-lûl  p’ati-e   teliko  ka-ss-ni? 
 Minsu-Top  often  who-Acc  party-Dir  take-Past-Q 
  ‘Who did Minsu often take to the party?’ 
 
(24) German:3 
   a.   *  Luise zaehlt auf, welche Uni    oft   welche Linguisten eingeladen hat. 
    Luise enumerates which university   often   which linguists invited has 
  b.  Luise zaehlt auf, welche Uni    welche Linguisten   oft eingeladen hat.  
    Luise enumerates which university   which linguists   often invited has 
    'Luise enumerates which university often invited which linguists.' 
 
While the adverb 'often' is a problematic intervener in German, it is not in Korean (cf. Beck & 
Kim (1997)). Even more striking is the contrast (25) vs. (26): 'not' is an intervener in many 
languages, but apparently not in Thai (Ruangjaroon (2002)).  
 
(25)  Thai (Ruangjaroon (2002)): 
 Nít    mây    síi    ?aray 
  Nit   not   buy   what 
  What didn't Nit buy? 
 
(26)  a.  Which diplomat should I discuss which issue with _ ? 
  a. ??  Which diplomat should I not discuss which issue with _ ?    [Pesetsky] 
 
                                                 
3I have chosen to embed the question under the verb 'enumerate' in order to avoid a single-pair interpretation, 
which may sometimes be possible with such questions. I do not know why that is. 
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Kim (2002) proposes that the core set of interveners, which is crosslinguistically stable, 
consists of the focussing operators 'only', 'even' and 'also'. Other elements may or may not be 
problematic interveners. Section 5 discusses this variation.  
 
In sum, we have seen that intervention effects exist in a wide variety of languages. I 
conjecture that the effect itself may well be universal, while its exact appearance is subject to 
crosslinguistic variation. The question is how to account for the hypothesised universality of 
intervention effects, as well as the variation in their appearance. My strategy in this paper is to 
identify a core case of intervention, and to develop a semantic analysis for that. I follow Kim 
(2002) who identifies the core intervention effect as in (27),(28): 
 
(27) *[  Qi [ ... [ FocP [ ... wh-phrasei ... ]]]]    (Kim (2002)) 
(28)  A focused phrase (e.g. only+NP) may not intervene between a wh-phrase and its  
 licensing  complementizer. 
 
Note that the structure in (27) is the syntactic level that is the input to compositional 
interpretation, Logical Form. Section 3 presents an analysis of the core case in terms of focus 
interpretation. The topic of sections 4 and 5 are the other data introduced above: the frequent 
lack of intervention effects in English, and the additional quantifier interveners in English, 
German etc. 
 
3  Focus Interpretation 
Subsection 3.1. motivates the suggestion that wh-questions are interpreted by the same 
mechanism as focus. The framework for focus and question interpretation is introduced in 
section 3.2. Section 3.3. shows how the framework derives the core intervention effect. 
3.1  Motivation and Idea 
The sentence in (29), in which the subject NP 'John' is focused, is standardly (Rooth (1885, 
1992)) associated with two semantic objects: On the one hand, there is the proposition 
expressed by the sentence - the set of possible worlds in (30a). Alternatively, I will talk about 
this proposition informally as in (30b). 
 
(29) [John]F left. 
 
(30) a.  λw.John left in w 
 b.    that John left 
 
Besides this proposition, the ordinary semantic value of (29), the sentence makes salient a set 
of alternative propositions - for example the set in (31a), which contains alternative 
propositions to the proposition that John left. This is the focus semantic value of the sentence, 
rendered more generally in (31b), and in the form of a (semi-) logical expression in (31c). 
 
(31)  a.  {that John left, that Bill left, that Amelie left,...} 
  b.  {that x left | x is an individual} 
 c.  λp∃x[p= λw.x left in w] 
 
Turning now to the interrogative in (32), according to the standard semantic theory of 
questions (Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977)) the denotation of a question is the set of 
answers to the question - for example (33a). More generally, this is the set of propositions in 
(33b) (rendered in more formal terms in (33c)).  
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(32) Who  left? 
 
(33)  a.  {that John left, that Bill left, that Amelie left,...} 
  b.  {that x left | x is an individual} 
 c.  λp∃x[p= λw.x left in w] 
 
It is obvious that the focus semantic value of example (29) is the same as the ordinary 
meaning of the question in (32). Questions, like focus, introduce a set of alternatives. Unlike a 
focused phrase, introducing alternatives seems to be the only semantic role of a wh-phrase. It 
is not surprising that this parallel has inspired semanticists to derive the interpretations of 
questions and focus in the same way; relevant references include for example Hamblin 
(1973), Ramchand (1997) Rullmann & Beck (1998), and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002). I 
will develop a particular way of doing that in the next subsection.  
Before I move on to the technicalities, I give the reader an informal idea of the plot. I follow 
Rooth in attributing a twofold semantic contribution to focused phrases: their ordinary 
semantic value on the one hand, and a set of alternatives of the same type on the other. A wh-
phrase shares with focus the second role. Unlike focus, the wh-phrase makes no ordinary 
semantic contribution. I propose that the ordinary semantics of the wh-phrase is in fact 
undefined. Since wh-phrases occur in expressions that have a perfectly well-defined ordinary 
semantic value, something must rescue the structure as a whole from undefinedness. This is 
the role of the question operator. Thus I propose that the LF of (33) is (34), and that the 
semantics of Q lets it ignore the ordinary semantic value of its sister, and elevate its focus 
semantic value to the ordinary semantics. 
 
(34)  [Q [ who left]] 
 
Things go wrong when there is in addition a focus in the question whose contribution is 
evaluated within the question, i.e. within the scope of the Q operator. This situation is 
schematized in (35). 
 
(35)  [Q ... [Op [φ ... XPF ... wh ...]]] 
 
For the focus on XP to be evaluated within the scope of the Q operator means that there is a 
focus sensitive operator, here: Op, which uses the semantic contribution of the focus. Op 
could be 'only' or 'even' or the like, or, in Rooth's (1992) more indirect framework for 
association with focus, it could be the ~ operator. We know that when focus is evaluated at 
the level of a phrase φ, focus semantic values enter into ordinary semantics. For example, in 
order to derive the semantics of "only John left", we need to consider both the proposition that 
John left, and alternative propositions 'that x left for alternatives x to John. 
This means that with all focus sensitive operators (other than the question ooperator), we use 
the ordinary as well as the focus semantic value of φ. Moreover, the effect of focus is 
neutralized, i.e. for external purposes the expression φ behaves as if all foci had been reset to 
their ordinary semantics. The problem that arises in (35) is that the wh-phrase has no ordinary 
semantics. Thus the ordinary semantics of φ is undefined. This undefinedness is inherited by 
the larger structure. But since the focus semantic value has been reset to the ordinary semantic 
value, the sister of the Q operator has neither a well-defined ordinary nor a well defined focus 
semantic value. Not even the Q operator can save the structure from undefinedness. This, I 
claim, is why structures like (35) are unacceptable. We now move on to the explicit proposal.  
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3.2  Framework 
It should be noted that to my knowledge, none of the available frameworks for the 
compositional interpretation of wh-questions predicts uninterpretability of the intervention 
effect data. Therefore a new framework is developed below that achieves that. This 
framework is based on Wold's (1996) implementation of Kratzer's (1991) version of Rooth's 
(1992) theory of focus. Each Logical Form α is associated with an ordinary semantic 
interpretation [[α]]g and a focus semantic interpretation [[α]]g,h. The focus feature is indexed 
and functions as a variable from a set of distinguished variables. A second variable 
assignment function h interprets distinguished variables. The ordinary semantic value of a 
focused constituent is the same as the interpretation of that consituent without a focus feature. 
The focus semantic interpretation is the value assigned to the distinguished variable by the 
variable assignment h. The focus semantic value of an unfocused item is the same as its 
ordinary semantic value. Both g ang h can be partial.  
 
(36) a.  [[JohnF1]]g  =  john    b.  [[JohnF1]]g,h = h(1)  4 
(37) a.  [[John]]g = john      b.  [[John]]g,h = john 
(38) a.  [[left]]g = [λx.λw.x left in w]  b.  [[left]]g,h = [λx.λw.x left in w] 
 
Translations of complex expressions are constructed from the translations of their parts in the 
usual way. (39) below gives the relevant version of Function Application. 
 
(39) Function  Application: 
  If X=[Y Z] then for any g,h: [[X]]g = [[Y]]g ([[Z]]g) and [[X]]g,h =[[Y]]g,h ([[Z]]g,h) 
 
(40) a.  [[JohnF1 left]]g = λw.john left in w 
 b.  [[JohnF1 left]]g,h = λw.h(1) left in w 
 
Focus sensitive operators evaluate the contribution of focus. In this framework, they bind the 
distinguished variables. The two focus sensitive operators I will use are the ~ and the question 
operator. We begin with the ~ operator and a translation of Rooth's theory of focus evaluation 
into our framework. According to this theory, the LF of (41a) is (41b). (42) specifies the 
semantics of the ~ and (43) the semantics of 'only'. 
 
(41)  a.  Only John left.  
  b.  [ only C [ ~C [ JohnF1 left ]]] 
 
(42)  If X=[ ~C Y] then [[X]]g = [[Y]]g if g(C) ≤ {[[Y]]g,h' : h'∈H}, undefined otherwise,  
   a n d   [ [ X ] ] g,h = [[X]]g. 
 
(43) [[only]]  (α)(β)(w) = 1 iff for all p such that p(w)=1 and p∈α, p=β.  
 
Putting things together, we compositionally intepret (41b) as in (44). This results in the 
desired truth conditions (45).  
 
                                                 
4More precisely: [[JohnF1]]g,h = h(1) if 1￿dom(h), =john otherwise. The more precise version is relevant for 
data like "I only wondered who JOHN invited", which I will not discuss in this paper.  
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(44)  [[ [ only C [ ~C [ JohnF1 left ]]] ]]g (w) = 1 iff 
  [[only]] (g(C)) (λw. john left in w) (w) =1 iff 
  for all p such that p(w)=1 and p∈g(C), p=λw. john left in w 
  if  g(C)  ⊆ {[[ [JohnF1 left] ]]g,h' : h'∈H} 
  i.e.  g(C) ⊆ { λw. x left in w: x∈D} 
 
(45)  for all p such that p(w)=1 and p∈{λw. x left in w: x∈D}, p=λw. john left in w 
 
To this system we add wh-questions. Wh-phrases use the same mechanism of distinguished 
variables. This reflects the fact that they introduce alternatives. In contrast to focus, they make 
no ordinary semantic contribution - introducing alternatives is their only semantic function.  
 
(46) a.  [[who1]]g is undefined 
 b.  [[who1]]g,h = h(1) 5 
 
(47) a.  [[who1 left]]g is undefined 
 b.  [[who1 left]]g,h = λw.h(1) left in w 
 
The second focus sensitive operator that is relevant for our purposes, recall, is the question 
operator. Similar to Berman's (1991) and Shimoyama's (2002) interpretations, the question 
operator is a variable binder. In contrast to their proposals, the variables bound by this 
operator are distinguished variables. I assume that a wh-question like (48a) has the Logical 
Form in (48b). The semantic effect of the question operator is specified in (49) (for the case of 
one wh-phrase) and in (51) (the general case). The translation of our example in (48) is given 
in (50).   
 
(48) a.  Who  left? 
 b.  [Q1 [who1 left]] 
 
(49) If  X=[Qi Y]   then [[X]]g = λp∃x[p=[[Y]]g,{}[x/i] ]  
   a n d   [ [ X ] ] g,h =λp∃x[p=[[Y]]g,h[x/i] ] 
 
(50) [[  [Q1 [who1 left]] ]]g   = λp∃x[p=[[ [who1 left] ]]g,{}[x/1] ] 
     =   λp∃x[p=λw.x left in w] 
 
(51) If  X=[Qi1,...in Y]   then [[X]]g = λp∃x1...xn[p=[[Y]]g,{}[xk/ik] ]  
    a n d   [ [ X ] ] g,h =λp∃x1...xn[p=[[Y]]g,h[xk/ik] ] 
 
We will say that a structure is uninterpretable if it does not have a well-defined ordinary 
semantic value.  
 
                                                 
5More precisely: [[who1]]g,h = h(1) if 1￿ dom(h), undefined otherwise. The more precise version is relevant for 
the multiple question reading of Baker sentences like "Who knows where we bought which book?", which I will 
not discuss in this paper. 
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3.3  Deriving Intervention Effects 
We are now in a position to explain intervention effects. I will consider (52a), a prototype of 
an intervention effect. The relevant LF is (52b), in which the Q operator is associated with the 
wh-phrase, JohnF wants to associate with only via the ~ operator, and the Q operator takes 
scope over only.  
 
(52)  a.   *  Only JOHN saw who? 
 b.  [CP Q2 [IP3 onlyC [IP2 ~C [IP1JohnF1 saw who2]]]]] 
 
Crucially, [[IP1]]g  is undefined for any g, since the wh-phrase's ordinary translation is 
undefined. Accordingly, [[IP2]]g is undefined; but then [[IP2]]g,h is also undefined, for any 
g,h. So are both [[IP3]]g and [[IP3]]g,h. But since [[IP3]]g,h is not defined, neither is [[CP]]g. 
The structure in (53b) is therefore uninterpretable, and hence ungrammatical.  
 
In more general terms, the system I have introduced requires a wh-phrase to be immediately 
c-commanded by a coindexed Q operator. A wh-phrase not c-commanded by a Q operator 
will be uninterpretable, since the expression it is contained in can never have a well-defined 
ordinary interpretation. A wh-phrase c-commanded by an intervening focus sensitive operator 
(here: the ~ operator) will lead to uninterpretability despite a c-commanding Q operator, 
because the ~ operator makes use of both the ordinary interpretation and the focus semantic 
interpretation. The Q operator is the only binder for distinguished variables that uses just the 
focus semantic interpretation. We thus exclude structures like (53b). This is very close to the 
generalization advanced by Kim that we are trying to capture. 
 
(53) a.  *[  Qi [ ...[ FocP [ ... wh-phrasei ... ]]]]    (Kim (2002)) 
 b.  *[  Qi [ ... [~C [ ... wh-phrasei ... ]]]]  
 
(54)  Generalization: A wh-phrase may not have a ~ operator as its closest c-commanding  
  potential binder.  
 
The crucial ingredients for this analysis are that both focus and wh-phrases are interpreted via 
the mechanism of distinguished variables; in contrast to focus, wh-phrases make no ordinary 
contribution, and can therefore only be evaluated by the question operator.  
Prima facie, we now expect that a focus sensitive operator can never intervene between a wh-
phrase and its associated question operator. To the extent that I am aware of the relevant data, 
Hindi, Korean, Turkish and Malayalam transparently meet our prediction. In a lot of other 
languages, the set of available data is unfortunately too small to permit firm conclusions. 
Further predictions are examined in the next sections.  
 
4  Movement Issues 
We know from section 2 that the way intervention effects manifest themselves varies from 
one language to another. We will first addresse the role of overt movement. Then we look at 
crosslinguistic variation that can be reduced to the inventory of movement operations that a 
language has. 
German presents a small complication over Korean etc. in terms of the availability of overt 
wh-movement. The trace this leaves must be an ordinary variable. Other than that, German 
transparently meets the prediction. I go over two relevant examples below. In the simple 
question (55), the crucial category is the one labeled X.  X is where we are done with 
evaluating the contribution of focus. This category has a perfectly well-defined ordinary and 
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focus semantic interpretation containing an ordinary variable bound from the outside. The 
calculation proceeds in the usual way, and the question is associated with the semantics in 
(55c). 
 
(55)  a.  Wen   hat   nur   der   Dirk   gesehen? 
    whom  has   only   the   Dirk   seen 
    'Whom did only Dirk see?' 
 b.  [Z Q3 [Y   wen3 [ 1 [X   nurC [ ~C [ [der Dirk]F2 t1   gesehen hat ]]]]] 
    who   only  the  Dirk     seen      has 
 c.  [[Z]]g  = λp∃x[p=[[Y]]g,{}[x/3] ]  
    =   λp∃x[p=[[ [1[X]]]]g,{}[x/3]  ([[wen3]]g,{}[x/3] )]  
    =   λp∃x[p=[λz.[[X]]g[z/1],{}[x/3]  ](x)] 
  [ [ X ] ] g[z/1],{}[x/3]  = [[only]] (g(C))([λw.Dirk saw z in w]) 
   i f   g ( C )  ⊆ {[[ [DirkF1 hat t1 gesehen] ]]g[z/1],h' : h'∈H} 
   i.e.  g(C)  ⊆ {[λw.y saw z in w]:y∈D} 
  [[Z]]g = {that only Dirk saw x | x an individual} 
 
The calculation will proceed in a parallel way for other examples with overt movement of a 
wh-phrase (e.g. scrambling). By contrast, addition of an in situ wh-phrase as in (56) leads to 
uninterpretability. The crucial category is once more X, which indeed does not have a well-
defined interpretation. Undefinedness is inherited by the rest of the tree.  
 
(56)  a.    *  Wen   hat   nur   der   Dirk   wo   gesehen?   
    whom  has   only   the   Dirk   where  seen 
    Who did only Dirk see where? 
 b.  [Z Q3,4 [Y  wen3 [1 [X nurC [~C [[der Dirk]F2   wo4 t1 gesehen hat ]]]]] 
              who    only    the Dirk  where  seen     has 
 c.  [[X]]g and [[X]]g,h are undefined ==> [[Z]]g is undefined. 
 
These facts indicate that a wh-phrase is interpreted in its moved position - here: where it 
shows up overtly.  
A different and more serious complication arises once we look at the contrast between 
English and German. Recall that a lot of prospective intervention effects are actually fine in 
English, and that intervention effects only show up in otherwise permissible superiority 
violations like (57) (as observed by Pesetsky (2000)).   
 
(57)  a.  Which girl did (only) Mary introduce _ to which boy? 
  b.  Which boy did Mary introduce which girl to _ ? 
  c. ??  Which boy did only Mary introduce which girl to _?    [Pesetsky] 
 
This looks like a genuine problem for my analysis of intervention effects. Interestingly, 
however, one option open to me is to simply persue Pesetsky's analysis of these data.  
According to Pesetsky (2000), wh-phrases in situ in English generally undergo LF wh-
movement ("covert phrasal movement"). Superiority effects are an indicator of such 
movement, and those wh-phrases that are sensitive to superiority constraints therefore must 
undergo phrasal movement. Conversely, wh-phrases that are not sensitive to superiority 
thereby show that they do not move. This is true of which-phrases. A which-phrase that has 
successfully violated superiority thus doesn't undergo phrasal movement. According to 
Pesetsky, such a wh-phrase is 'interpreted' via the alternative strategy of feature movement. 
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The above English data show us that feature movement is sensitive to intervention effects, 
and that covert phrasal movement is not.  
I propose to view my focus related interpretation mechanism as the interpretational strategy 
that underlies the term 'feature movement' - i.e. what I do in the previous section is to provide 
an interpretation of the notion of feature movement as used by Pesetsky. I further propose to 
adopt the part of his analysis that has wh-phrases insensitive to interveners move covertly, i.e. 
at LF, past the intervener. My suggestions are illustrated for the relevant English examples 
below.  
Sentence (58a) is an ordinary multiple question with the kind of wh-phrase sensitive to 
superiority. Pesetsky shows us that the LF for the sentence (i.e. the structure that is the input 
to compositional interpretation) must look as in (58b). The in-situ wh-phrase has moved 
covertly. Consequently, adding an intervener as in (59a) is harmless: the structure we interpret 
does not include an intervention configuration. The crucial category  X has a well-defined 
interpretation.  
 
(58)  a.  Who did John introduce to whom? 
 b.  [  Q1,2 [ who1 [4 [whom2 [5 [ did [ John introduce t4 to t5 ]]]]]] 
 
(59)  a.  Who did only John introduce to whom? 
 b.  [Z Q1,2 [ who1 [4[whom2 [5[ did [X onlyC [~C[ JohnF3 introduce t4 to t5]]]]] 
 c.  [[X]]g=[[X]]g,h= [[only]](g(C))(λw. John intro. g(4) to g(5)) 
  [[Z]]g,h = { that only John intoduced x to y | x, y individuals} 
 
Matters are different in (60), a multiple question containing a which-phrase that defies 
superiority. This wh-phrase does not move, and the input to the interpretation component 
looks as in (60b). While things work out fine in this example, addition of an intervener as in 
(61a) now leads to ungrammaticality, since we find the familiar intervention configuration in 
(61b). 
 
(60)  a.   Which boy did Mary introduce which girl to _? 
 b.  [  Q1,2[ [which boy]1 [4[ did [ Mary introduce [which girl]2 to t4 ]]]]]]] 
 
(61)  a. ??  Which boy did only Mary introduce which girl to _? 
 b.  [Z Q1,2[[which boy]1 [4[ did [X onlyC [~C[MaryF3 int. [which girl]2 to t1]]]] 
 c.  [[X]]g and [[X]]g,h are undefined ==> [[Z]]g is undefined 
 
Essentially, there is no intervention effect in many English data because at the relevant level, 
Logical Form, there is no intervention configuration. Pesetsky's account thus works well with 
the present analysis. It should be pointed out that it leads to a few non-trivial further 
expectations. For one thing, covert phrasal movement of the kind assumed for regular English 
wh-phrases must be unavailable in all those languages that reliably show intervention effects 
in multiple questions (e.g. Japanese, Korean, German etc.). One wonders what kind of 
movement this is: what triggers it, and how it is parametrized. See Pesetsky for discussion. A 
general prediction is that in languages that have superiority effects, we expect the limited 
English-type intervention effects. In languages without superiority effects (or any other 
indication that wh-phrases must move phrasally) we expect general intervention effects of the 
German, Korean etc type. I.e., the analysis predicts a correlation of limited vs. general 
intervention effects and superiority vs. no superiority effects. Further research will have to 
show if this is borne out.  
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5  Focus Issues 
5.1  Variable Interveners 
We observed in section 2 that the set of problematic interveners varies between languages. In 
particular, in English and German quantified expressions in general cause an intervention 
effect - not just focusing operators like 'only', 'even' and 'also' (compare Beck (1996) and 
Pesetsky (2000) for more data illustrating this). Let us first consider what could, in principle, 
be said about the intervention effect caused by items such as 'always', 'often', 'every' etc. under 
the present analysis.  
Intervention effects arise through focus sensitive operators. The relevant one so far is 
ultimately the ~ operator. In Rooth's (1992) theory, which I have followed, the ~ operator 
evaluates the contribution of focus. In the data relevant for us, it derives association with 
focus via the focus anaphor C, shared by the ~ operator and whatever operator is supposed to 
associate with focus. If we can argue that there is a ~ operator present in structures with 
quantifiers, then we expect an intervention effect to arise. A ~ operator is plausibly present if 
we can find association with focus. 
It is well-known that quantifiers do associate with focus. Some relevant examples are given 
below.  
 
(62)  a.  Mary always takes John to the MOVIES.        [Rooth] 
  ≈ If Mary takes John anywhere, she takes him to the movies.  
  b.  Mary always takes JOHN to the movies.  
  ≈ If Mary takes anyone to the movies, she takes John to the movies. 
 
(63)  Most ships passed through the  lock  at  NIGHT.     [Krifka] 
  ≈ Most ships that passed through the lock passed through the lock at night. 
 
The structures for (62) are given in (64). 
 
(64) a.  [always∪C [~C [Mary takes John to [the movies]F1]]] 
 b.  [always∪C [~C [Mary takes [John]F1 to the movies]]] 
 
Assuming the simplified interpretation of always given in (65), it is easy to see that (66) will 
lead to the appropriate interpretations of (64a,b) depending on the value of the focus anaphor 
C. 
 
(65) [[always]] (p)(q)(w)=1 iff for all s such that s≤w & p(s)=1, q(s)=1 
(66) [[always]] (g(∪C))(λw.john takes mary to the movies in w) 
 
Thus it seems clear that a ~ operator can be part of structures with quantifiers (see for 
example Rooth (1996)). This, however, is not quite good enough for my purposes: the 
intervention effect in English, German etc. does not depend on association with focus. That is, 
intervention effects arise without any indication that the intervening quantifier in that 
structure associates with focus. Therefore I have to claim that there is always a ~ operator 
present in quantified structures in languages in which those quantifiers cause an intervention 
effect.  
At first, this seems problematic. It has been observed (Buering (1996), Beaver and Clark 
(2002)) that quantifiers do not necessarily associate with focus. A relevant example is given 
in below. Lack of association in (67a) excludes the structure in (67b). 
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(67)   a.  Mary always managed to complete [her exams]F    [Beaver & Clark] 
 b.  [always∪C [~C [Mary managed to complete [her exames]F1]]] 
 
Note, however, that nothing precludes the structure in (68), in which there is a ~ operator, but 
the focus anaphor is not coindexed with the resource domain variable of the quantifier. All 
that is required for my purposes is that focus is obligatorily evaluated in the scope of the 
quantifier - not that the quantifier obligatorily associates with focus. (This could be viewed as 
an argument for the indirect approach to association with focus represented by Rooth's ~.)  
 
(68) [alwaysC1 [~C2 [Mary managed to complete [her exames]F1]]] 
 
Let us ask ourselves, then, what predictions obligatory evaluation of focus in the domain of a 
quantifier makes. This question, it turns out, is not easy to answer.  
Note that the ~ operator unselectively evaluates all foci in its syntactic scope. The Roothian 
definition in (42) binds all distinguished variables in the scope of the ~. It also makes those 
variables inaccessible from the outside by setting the new focus semantic value to the 
ordinary semantic value. An obvious hypothesis would be that since any foci in the scope of a 
quantifier have to be evaluated within the scope of that quantifier, they cannot be evaluated 
higher up, outside its scope. Thus we would expect (69a) to be impossible on the 
interpretation in (69b), where I may have lent other things besides Harry Potter to students, 
but the only thing I lent EVERYONE is Harry Potter.  
 
(69)  a.  I only lent every student HARRY POTTER. 
  b.  Harry Potter is the only thing that I lent every student. 
 
(70) [  onlyC1 [~C1 [ [everyC2 student] [~C3 [5[I lent t5 [Harry Potter]F1]]]]]] 
 
Under our current assumptions, (69) is associated with the Logical Form in (70). The 
definition of the ~ operator makes '~C3' in the above structure evaluate the focus on 'Harry 
Potter' and neutralize that focus. Hence association of 'Harry Potter' with 'only' (via the higher 
'~C1') is precluded. It turns out that in fact, reading (69b) is impossible - so far, so good.  
 
However, it it is claimed in the literature (e.g. Krifka (1991), Rooth (1996)) that a focus can 
skip one focus sensitive operator and associate with a higher one. An example of this kind is 
given in (71b).  
 
(71)  a.  I only introduced MARILYN to John Kennedy.      [Rooth] 
  b.  I also only introduced Marilyn to BOB Kennedy. 
    = Bob Kennedy is another person that I introduced only Marilyn to. 
 
We know that the focus on 'Bob Kennedy' skips a focus sensitive operator because 'only' 
obligatorily associates with focus (here: Marilyn), but 'Bob Kennedy' associates with the 
structurally higher 'also'. Given our current assumptions, (71b) would be associated with the 
Logical Form in (72).  
 
(72) [  alsoC [~C [ onlyD [~D [I introduced MarilynF2 to [Bob Kennedy]F1]]]] 
 
(72) runs into the same problem as (70) above: association should be impossible. This means 
that what we have just said about (69) can't be the whole story. I will come back to the issue 
of multiple focus, and to possible analyses of (71), in section 5.2. As far as our empirical 
predictions are concerned, a more realistic expectation is (73).  
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(73)   If an element Y is an intervener in language X, then any focus contained in the scope 
of Y should have the same options of focus evaluation as a focus contained in the 
scope of an obligatorily focus sensitive item (like 'only') in X. If Y is not an intervener 
in X, then Y does not have to come with a ~ operator, and a focus contained in the 
scope of Y should be completely free in its evaluation.  
 
We have yet to determine concretely what the options of focus evaluations are for a focus 
contained in the scope of an focus sensitive item, as opposed to some other focus. Only then 
can we examine the predictions made by my proposal.  
 
5.2  Multiple Focus 
We are already in the process of examining a second 'intervention' constellation structurally 
parallel to the wh-intervention effect (74a) - multiple focus in (74b). If multiple focus were 
empirically parallel, the association depicted in (74b) should be impossible.  
 
(74)  a.   *  [Qi ...  [  ~C   [ ... whi  ...]]  ...]    Intervention  effects 
 d.  [~i D...[ ~jC   [ ... Fj ...  Fi ...]] ...]      Multiple Focus 
 
We have already seen that the LF in (72) does not allow us to capture that reading of (69), 
since the ~ under 'only' already evaluates the focus on 'Bob', and leaves nothing for 'also' to 
associate with.  
Such examples have received much attention in the literature. Let us briefly review the 
discussion. Rooth (1996) considers the alternative LF in (75) for the example. Here, 'Bob 
Kennedy' has moved out of the c-command domain of 'only' at LF and is now free to associate 
with 'also'. Since we know independently that phrases can move at LF, nothing precludes (75) 
as a possible LF of (69), and we do after all derive the relevant reading (so Rooth argues). 
Note that the suggestion mirrors what happens in English multiple questions without 
intervention effects. 
 
(75) [  alsoC [~C [ [Bob Kennedy]F1 [3[ onlyD [~D [I introduced MarilynF2 to t3]]]] 
 
This makes the prediction that skipping an intervening focus sensitive operator should be 
possible only when movement can come to the rescue. Rooth tests this prediction with (76), 
where the focus is embedded inside a relative clause (an island for movement). 
 
(76)   a.   We only recovered the diary entries that MARILYN made about John. 
  b.  We also only recovered [the diary entries [that Marilyn made about BOBBY]] 
 
Rooth reports that association with 'also' is still possible, and leaves the example as a problem 
for a restrictive theory of movement.  
Wold (1996), on the other hand, is led to the suggestion that the ~ operator is not, after all, 
truly unselective in that it evaluates all foci in its scope. He develops a version of the theory in 
which the ~ operator itself bears an index, and evaluates only the contribution of coindexed 
foci. A representation of (69) would then look as in (77). 
 
(77) [  alsoC [~1C [ onlyD [~2D [I introduced MarilynF2 to [Bob Kennedy]F1]]]] 
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I will not provide a detailed semantics for (77). See Wold (1996). Suffice it to say that the 
indexed ~ is a binder for only those variables that bear the same index. This predicts that 
association of focus across intervening focus sensitive operators is completely free.  
On the other hand, von Fintel (1994, p.49, Fn 44) observes that when the order of 'only' and 
'also' is reversed, the relevant reading is completely impossible. His example is (78;B2). This 
is not what we expect under either Rooth's movement theory or Wold's theory. 
 
(78)  A:  I know that John drank water at the party. What else did he drink? 
  B1:  Besides water he only drank [CARrot juice]F. 
  B2:  #He only also drank [CARrot juice]F. 
 
In the same vein, Heck and Sauerland (2003) note that in (79) focus on 'bike' does not seem to 
be able to skip the intervening universal quantifier. This example is parallel to the Harry 
Potter example from section 5.1., where association across a universal quantifier was 
similarly impossible.  
 
(79)   #   Tina hat nur   jedem Kind  ein FAHRRAD gegeben.  [Heck & Sauerland] 
     Tina has only  every child   a bike      given  
       *   The only thing Tina gave to every child was a bike.  
 
The empirical situation thus seems to be less clear than one would like.  
Let us consider the relevance of this problem for the purposes of this paper. The immediate 
issue is the semantics of the ~ operator. The derivation of the intervention effect in section 3 
relies on the fact that the ~ operator evaluates the contribution of all foci in its syntactic scope, 
and neutralizes their contribution. A selective version of the ~ operator like Wold's is 
incompatible with that explanation. On a more conceptual level, intervention effects are 
supposed to follow from the mechanism responsible for evaluating the contribution of focus. 
This leads us to expect that they might show up in other constructions that use an alternative 
semantics. Specifically, under the present assumptions, the ~ operator should lead to an 
intervention effect for the binding of distinguished variables, through being unselective and 
through the closure effect. The effect need not show up as one of grammaticality (as in the 
case of wh-phrases), but it should be detectable (as an interpretational effect concerning 
possibility of association with focus, or circumstances under which such association is 
possible). 
It follows that both the empirical issue of multiple focus and its theoretical implications are 
extremely important for the present purposes. 
 
In order to contribute to the empirical picture, I have conducted a small survey that tests 
association with focus across an intervening focus sensitive operator. My results are 
summarized in the table below. The first column reports the judgments collected for 
association of 'only' with focus across intervening 'nobody', the second column for association 
across intervening 'nobody' in an island condition. The third column reports the judgments of 
association of 'also' (English) or 'sogar' ('even'; German) across intervening 'only', the fourth 
column adds an island condition to that. The last two columns are test sentences without 
intervener. I obtained judgments for seven native speakers of English and ten native speakers 
of German. The actual data used in the survey are reported in the appendix. The last three 
rows in the table are the theoretical predictions made by Wold's theory, and by Rooth's theory 
including/not including the movement option. In the 'nobody' condition, there is also the 
question of whether Rooth would go along with my claim that 'nobody' requires a ~ operator 
(the unbracketed judgment) or not (the judgment in brackets). 
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(80)    negation  negation,  Is  only   only  Is   T  T  Is 
 
EnglLiberal        *         *      ok       ok    ok   ok 
EnglRestr.        *         *       *        *    ok   ok 
GerLiberal        ok        ok       *        *    ok   ok 
GerRestr.        *         *        *        *     ok   ok 
 
PredWold       ok        ok      ok       ok    ok   ok 
PredRooth+M      ok      * (ok)      ok        *    ok   ok 
PredRooth-M      * (ok)    * (ok)       *        *    ok   ok 
 
I found considerable variation in the judgments collected, both within and across the two 
languages. In English, there is a dialect in which 'nobody' is a problematic intervener for 
association with focus, but 'only' is not. There is a second dialect in which both 'nobody' and 
'only' are problematic interveners. The German judgments reveal a dialect in which 'nobody' 
is not a harmful intervener, but 'only' is, and a second dialect in which both 'nobody' and 'only' 
are problematic interveners. It seems fair to say the following:  
 
(i)   Association across intervening operators is not freely possible. There are intervention  
  effects for association with focus. A theory like Wold's in which anything ought to be  
  possible does not seem to be on the right track.  
(ii)   Movement constraints do not play a role. Movement does not seem to be able to  
rescue bad cases of intervention, and movement constraints don't seem to block  
unproblematic cases of association. It looks as if focus never moves. 
(iii)   Rooth's theory without the option of movement, and agreeing with me on the role of  
  'nobody', makes good predictions for the two restrictive dialects. But the two liberal  
  dialects are fairly mysterious. 
(iv)   The class of problematic interveners for association with focus seems to vary from one  
  language/dialect to another.  
 
Beyond these points, I hesitate to base definitive conclusions on the nature of association with 
focus and focus evaluation on the data I have collected. For one thing, a larger set of data 
ought to be tested than the ones I have looked at, where more interveners are considered as 
well as other focus sensitive items. For another, one ought to test similar data in a different 
experimental/contextual set-up to make sure there are no side effects from that.  
At this point, I conclude that we have no theory of focus evaluation that completely covers the 
available data. It is possible that we have to revise the theory of the ~ operator that I have 
used, but it is unclear exactly how. One should also explore, alternatively, the possibility of 
leaving the theory of focus evaluation intact and finding a different explanation for the liberal 
dialects. In the case of association with 'also', one could consider association with Topic 
alternatives (suggested e.g. in Krifka (1998)). If that were plausible, the 'also' data would turn 
out to be a garden path for testing association with focus. I must leave the issue unresolved. 
Importantly, for the present purposes, we do not want a theory of focus evaluation without the 
'closure' effect of Rooth's ~ operator. And it is this 'closure' that my explanation of 
intervention effect relies upon. 
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6  Conclusions 
6.1  Summary and Literature 
I have developed an analysis of intervention effects that ties them to the evaluation of focus. 
Wh-phrases are interpreted via the same mechanism that also interprets focus. In the case of 
intervention effects, the semantic properties of wh-phrases interfere with focus evaluation. 
Focus evaluation unselectively applies to all foci and neutralizes their contribution, i.e. 
reduces their contribution to their unfocused semantics. Since wh-phrases do not have an 
'unfocused' semantics, this leads to uninterpretability of the structure as a whole. Thus a wh-
phrase may never have a focus sensitive operator other than the Q operator as its closest c-
commmanding potential binder.  
I propose this view of intervention effects as an alternative to previous accounts, which 
analyse them either as a violation of a movement constraint (Beck (1996), Hagstrom (1998), 
Kim (2002), among others), or as a consequence of restrictions on variable binding in general 
(Honcoop (1998)). I will discuss these two types of analysis in turn.  
 
The basic idea of a movement analysis is that something prohibits the structure indicated in 
(M); that is, movement of a wh-phrase may not (under certain circumstances) cross an 
intervener.6 
 
(M) [CP    __  [ ... [ Interv [ ... wh-phrase ... ]]]] 
  ↑_______x__________|     
 
It is irrelevant for our purposes what exactly the constraint on movement is. I think there are 
several reasons to be sceptical of this kind of explanation. First, we know that movement 
constraints (or, more generally, constraints on when a syntactic connection like the one above 
can be made) vary considerably from language to language. There is no reason to expect that 
the one that rules out (M) is universal. On the whole, the constraint is something that is 
stipulated rather superficially on top of a grammar that would actually permit a grammatical 
derivation of the intervention data. Now, as laid out in section 2, it seems likely that 
intervention effects per se are in fact universal. It would be desirable to derive their existence 
more profoundly from the structure of the grammar. The present proposal tries to do so on the 
basis of the specific semantic contribution of wh-phrases, in interaction with what we know 
about focus evaluation.  
Secondly, recent years have brought to light a number of arguments against moving wh-
phrases in situ, as well as ways of interpreting them in their surface position (see in particular 
Reinhart (1992)). This should make us cautious of designing an analysis of intervention 
effects that crucially relies on such movement. 
Then, there are, for English wh-questions in particular, the arguments by Pesetsky (2000) that 
the wh-phrases that are sensitive to intervention are just the ones of which we would like to 
                                                 
6The analyses I subsume under movement accounts differ from each other and deviate from the concrete picture 
in (M) in ways I will not address. In Kim's (2002) proposal the syntactic connection between the wh-phrase and 
the "landing site" could be, but doesn't have to be, made by movement. For Hagstrom (1998) it is not the wh-
phrase that moves but an abstract Q morpheme/operator (which, however, originates from the vicinity of the wh-
phrase). My comments as they are phrased below apply to movement accounts such as the one proposed in Beck 
(1996), although the more general considerations are relevant for other syntactic accounts as well.   
I do not include Pesetsky (2000) under the movement accounts I comment on here, because I propose to give a 
reconstruction of his notion of feature movement - not to argue against it. Pesetsky does not actually say why 
interveners block feature movement. He refers to Honcoop (1998) for a semantic explanation. I comment on 
Honcoops analysis below. I think for Pesetsky's purposes, the reference to Honcoop could be replaced by a 
reference to the present proposal without problem.  
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say that they do NOT move. The connection between superiority and intervention discovered 
by Pesetsky argues against a movement analysis of intervention.  
These would be good reasons to look for a theory of intervention effects that does not rely on 
movement. Conversely, let's think about what an explanation in terms of alternative semantics 
buys us, compared to a movement analysis. The focus-related analysis leads to different 
expectations regarding where intervention effects should surface. Now, we expect them to 
(potentially) show up when semantics makes use of alternatives. The data on multiple focus 
make this look like a good prediction. Additioinal motivation comes from intervention effects 
in NPI licensing and from alternative questions, both of which very likely involve the 
construction of alternative sets. An example for a plausible intervention effect in alternative 
questions is given in (81).  
 
(81) a.  Hat   Peter    MariaF oder SusanneF   eingeladen? 
    has   Peter   Maria or Susanne     invited 
    'Did Peter invite Maria or Susanne?' 
  b.    *  Hat   nur   Peter   MariaF oder SusanneF   eingeladen? 
  has    only    Peter    Maria or Susanne     invited 
    'Did only Peter invite Maria or Susanne?' 
 
NPI intervention is exemplified in (82) (data discovered by Linebarger (1987)). 
 
(82)  a.  Mary didn't wear any earrings to every party.   
    * NOT >> every >> any 
  b.  I didn't give Joe/*most people a red cent. 
 
The effect is obviously strongly reminiscent of the wh-intervention effect, and it has been 
suggested in Beck (1996), Honcoop (1998), Kim (2002) and Guerzoni (in preparation) that it 
should be viewed as kin to intervention in questions. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
give an explanation of intervention effects in negative polarity licensing; see in particular 
Honcoop and Guerzoni (as well as Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2001), discussed in 
Guerzoni) for such accounts.  
Note that a movement analysis is not plausible for intervention in NPI licensing. If we said 
that (82b) is bad because the NPI obligatorily moves (i.e. undergoes covert phrasal 
movement) to its licenser, we would wrongly predict that (83a) doesn't have the reading in 
(83b).  
 
(83)  a.  Peter didn't need to eat any cherries. 
  b.  NOT >> need >> any 
 
Similarly, a movement analysis is not attractive for intervention with multiple focus, because 
it would make us posit a movement analysis of focus in cases that violate island constraints.  
There is also the reverse type of case in which a movement analysis leads us to expect an 
intervention effect, but alternatives don't seem to play a role. Scope rigidity is such a case. 
Heck and Sauerland (2003) observe that a movement analysis can capture the lack of an 
inversely linked reading in (84), while a focus analysis has no way of doing so.  
 
(84)  Kein   Produkt   aus   jedem  EU-Land   verkauft sich   gut.  
  No   product   from   every   EC country   sells   Refl.   well 
  No product from every EC-country sells  well.      [from  Beck  (1996)] 
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I concur with Heck and Sauerland that we lose the connection between intervention and scope 
rigidity by giving up a movement analysis. However, I believe that this is the right move, in 
view of the fact that English, for example, does not have scope rigidity, but it does show 
intervention effects. In sum, I have come to the conclusion that the bigger picture fits an 
alternative semantic analysis of intervention better than a movement analysis.  
 
A competitor of the movement analysis of intervention effects has been Honcoop (1998), who 
argues that intervention effects are the consequence of general constraints on the binding of 
variables, as they are reflected in particular by the possibility of anaphora. Under this view, 
the intervention effect caused by negation, for example, would be linked to the fact that 
negation also blocks an anaphoric connection in (85). 
 
(85)   #  There wasn't a man in the garden. He was smoking.  
 
Honcoop suggests that weak islands, as well as intervention effects, are caused by intervening 
operators that create inaccessible domains for anaphora - more technically: interveners in his 
sense are operators across which variable binding is prohibited.  
First it should be noted that there is some similarity between Honcoop's suggestion and my 
present proposal, in that binding of a certain variable is blocked by an intervener. The main 
difference I see is that my proposal applies in an empirically overlapping, but ultimately 
rather different domain. On my account, binding is affected of those variables that are used in 
the construction of alternative sets: wh-phrases, focused phrases, probably NPIs. This happens 
at the level of focus semantic values. On Honcoop's account, it is the binding of ordinary 
variables that is affected, in the calculation of ordinary semantic values. The two proposals 
'overlap' where a given variable could be taken to be either an ordinary or a distinguished 
variable, as e.g. in the case of wh-phrases. But let's look at the empirical consequences of this 
difference. 
There is a large set of data that fall under Honcoop's analysis but not mine. This specifically 
includes weak islands and anaphora. Honcoop claims that problematic interveners are just 
those elements that block anaphora. I think that the crosslinguistic picture makes such a 
general claim unsustainable. Recall that there is variation between languages with respect to 
what is a problematic intervener. In Thai, negation is not an intervener in (86), but of course, 
the Thai version (87) no more permits anaphora than English (85). Korean (88) vs. (89) 
makes a similar point.  
 
(86)  Thai (Ruangjaroon (2002)): 
 Nít    mây    síi    ?aray 
  Nit   not   buy   what 
  What didn't Nit buy? 
 
(87)  #   mây   mee   phuuchay   yuu   nay   su:an.       khao su:p   buri: 
          Neg   have    man         be     in      garden     he      smoke cigarette 
        #  There isn't a man in the garden.  He is smoking. 
 
(88)  Korean (Beck & Kim (1997)): 
 Minsu-nûn  chachu  nuku-lûl  p’ati-e   teliko  ka-ss-ni? 
 Minsu-Top  often  who-Acc  party-Dir  take-Past-Q 
  ‘Who did Minsu often take to the party?’ 
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(89)    #  wuli-nun  chachu   oypwu yensa-lul   chotayha-n-ta. 
  we-Top often     outside  speaker-Acc invite-Pres-Decl 
  ku-nun   tokilin-i-ta. 
  he-Top  German-be-Decl 
      #  We often invite an outside speaker. He is German. 
 
Quite generally, I would be exceedingly surprised if anaphoric possibilities across languages 
mirrored wh-intervention effects. While I have not collected extensive crosslinguistic data, I 
would conjecture that anaphoric accessibility is fairly stable. On the other hand, we know that 
there is considerable variation with both weak islands and intervention effects. I do not think 
that Honcoop's analogy can be maintained.  
Moreover, I believe that it is necessary to make a distinction between weak islands and 
intervention effects. Recall for example the contrast between (6a) and (6c) from section 2. 
Overt wh-movement is possible in cases where an intervention effect arises. Hence we cannot 
use one and the same mechanism (constraints on variable binding) to exclude both. See also 
Beck (1996, chapter 4) for discussion.  
Conversely, there are two kinds of data that fall more naturally under my proposal than 
Honcoop's: intervention effects with multiple focus and NPI licensing. Honcoop does provide 
an analysis of NPI licensing within his framework, but it is somewhat roundabout, as he 
acknowledges. And while an analysis of focus is possible in which there is binding of 
ordinary variables, this is not the standard assumption.  
I conclude that there are empirical reasons to favour an analysis in terms of focus semantics.  
  
6.2  Consequences 
The theory of intervention effects I have proposed identifies a set of constructions in natural 
language as 'focus related' in that they all employ a particular interpretational mechanism: the 
one that constructs alternatives. The proposal is that not only do all these constructions 
involve the same semantic object - alternative sets -, but that that semantic object is derived 
by the grammar in the same way as well. I have chosen distinguished variables for that 
mechanism. Thus wh-phrases, focused phrases and NPIs all correspond to distinguished 
variables. Alternative formation is binding of those variables. The choice of variable binding 
for this purpose is guided by the fact that we need an evaluation of these expressions that is to 
some extent selective (for example, a focus inside a question is not affected by the Q 
operator); thus the mechanism of alternative formation in Rooth (1985) would not work.  
In addition to the obvious semantic support for a uniform analysis, there is some 
morphological support for making this connection between wh-phrases, NPIs and focus. In 
Japanese, NPIs like 'anyone' are literally 'who also': 
 
(90)   Japanese:  dare-mo    =anyone 
   who-also/even 
 
We expect this tie since the semantic function of 'who' is the same in a wh-phrase and an NPI. 
Such morphology should be recurring crosslinguistically, which seems correct (compare also 
Kim (2002)). A further expectation is that other contexts in which this morphology shows up 
should also involve an alternative semantics. The work of Shimoyama (2001) and Kratzer and 
Shimoyama (2002) explores this connection. They examine in particular Japanese wh-
pronouns in mo- and ka- constructions (as well as a German free choice indefinite) and 
provide an analysis in terms of alternative semantics. Mo and ka are operators evaluating the 
contribution of the alternatives. Among other things, this semantics explains intervention 
effects such as the following: 
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(91)  *  [ ... [ ... whi ... mo/kaj] ... ]-mo/kai 
 
A wh-pronoun must associate with the closest potential binder. This effect is thus another 
example of an intervention effect in a focus related construction. Kratzer and Shimoyama's 
work converges with my suggestions.7  
My proposal raises further questions. The most important empirical question concerns 
multiple foci. It needs to be clarified to what extent focus association is possible across 
intervening operators, and why there is variation w.r.t. to which intervener is harmful. Only 
then can we decide whether the semantics of the focus evaluation needs to be revised, and if 
so how. This is a theoretical question concerning the evaluation of focus, here done by the ~ 
operator. There is also the claim implied by my analysis that the grammar may require the 
presence of a ~ in certain domains (the scope of quantifiers) without any apparent semantic 
necessity for this (i.e. there is no association with focus). Finally I find it puzzling that focus 
may not move. I see no reason for this. I can only hope that it will turn out to be a virtue of 
the present proposal that it raises these questions, and that it may lead to a better 
understanding of how the grammar of natural language constructs and uses alternative sets.  
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Appendix: the Survey 
The sentences I report judgements for in the table in (80) are the B-sentences of the first six 
dialogues for English and the next six dialogues for German. The bracketed material is the 
overall context for the examples, which I also gave to the native speakers I consulted.  
 
[Sally, Maria, Bill, A and B are all training to become spies. It is very important in a spy 
network that personal contact between spies is controlled. If you meet another spy in person, 
for example, you are establishing a connection that may give away the whole network. That's 
what the fuss below is about.] 
 
(Neg)    A:   You told nobody that Maria met Sally. 
          B:   No - I only told nobody that Maria met BILL. 
                                                 
7Although it should be pointed out that their technical implementation, strictly Roothian, is not compatible with 
mine. This stems from the fact that they have a different empirical focus. In the mo- and ka- constructions, focus 
sensitive operators invariably cause an intervention effect. This is not generally the case. Accordingly, Kratzer 
and Shimoyama do not extend their analysis to standard wh-intervention effects. They propose to adopt 
Pesetsky's analysis in terms of feature movement for those data, where feature movement is blocked by an 
intervener, for reasons unknown. My proposal is to find a semantic source for the blocking of feature movement, 
and to trace the Japanese data and the standard wh-intervention effects both to that source. I think this is in the 
spirit of their work, even though we make different specific claims here.  
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(NegIs)  A.   You told nobody that Sally met Bill. 
         B:   No - I only told nobody that MARIA met Bill. 
(only)    A:   You only told THE BOSS thst Maria met Sally 
          B:   Right. I also only told the boss that Maria met BILL. 
(onlyIs)  A:   You only told THE BOSS that Sally met Bill. 
          B:   Right. I also only told the boss that MARIA met Bill. 
(T)    A:   You told the boss that Maria met Sally. 
          B:   No - I only told the boss that Maria met BILL. 
(TIs)    A:   You told the boss that Sally met Bill. 
          B:   No - I only told the boss that MARIA met Bill. 
 
[A and B are talking about the annual company excursion ('Betriebsausflug') of their 
company, which took place a few days ago. By now photos are circulating that have created a 
certain amount of discussion.] 
 
(Neg)    A:   Du hast also keine Photos auf Karls Schreibtisch gelegt. 
      So you didn't put any photos on Karl's desk. 
    B:   Das stimmt nicht. Ich hab nur keine Photos auf die REZEPTION gelegt. 
      That's not true. I only didn't put any photos on the reception desk.  
(NegIs)  A:   Du hast also niemandem ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der Karl nackt ist. 
      So you didn't show anybody a picture on which Karl is naked. 
    B:   Nee - ich hab nur niemandem ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der CHEF nackt  
   ist. 
      No - I only didn't show anybody a picture on which the boss is naked. 
(only)    A:   Du hast also gestern nur 2 Abzuege auf Karls Schreibtisch gelegt. 
      So you only put 2 prints on Karl's desk yesterday. 
    B:   Stimmt. Ich hab sogar gestern nur 2 Abzuege auf die REZEPTION  
   gelegt. 
      Right. I even only put 2 prints on the reception desk yesterday.  
(onlyIs)  A:   Du hast also nur dem Otto ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der Chef nackt ist. 
      So you only showed Otto a picture on which the boss is naked. 
    B:   Stimmt. Ich hab sogar nur dem Otto ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der KARL  
   nackt  ist. 
      Right. I even only showed Otto a picture on which Karl is naked.  
(T)    A:   Hast Du Photos auf Karls Schreibtisch gelegt? 
      Did you put photos on Karl's desk? 
    B:   Nein. Ich hab nur Photos auf die REZEPTION gelegt. 
      No. I only put photos on the reception desk. 
(TIs)    A:   Du hast also dem Otto ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der Chef nackt ist. 
      So you showed Otto a picture on which the boss is naked. 
    B:   Nee- ich hab dem Otto nur ein Bild gezeigt, in dem der KARL nackt ist. 
      No - I only showed Otto a picture on which Karl is naked.  
 
A few comments on the choice of the examples: I tested intervening negation because that is a 
fairly solid and reliable intervener for English and German wh-constructions. I used 
association with 'only' for this case, which seems the most canonical example of association 
with focus. I tested intervening 'only' for association with 'also' in English because those are 
the data reported in the literature on multiple focus. I changed to German 'sogar' ('even') in 
this condition because German 'auch' ('also') is known to be able to so strange things.  
The syntax of the English examples is taken directly from Guerzoni (in preparation), who 
uses those same data in NPI-intervention. Her tests show that the subject position of an 
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embedded clause is an island for covert phrasal movement (of the relevant kind - we used to 
call it QR), while the object position is not an island. These particular island- vs. non-island-
configurations differ minimally and have exactly the same complexity, so I judged them to be 
an interesting test case - especially in view of Guerzoni's data.  
The German constructions were chosen to make sure that we really have a non-island-
configuration for covert phrasal movement vs. an island configuration. The example in (92) 
naturally permits inverse scope, and relative clauses are pretty solid scope islands.  
 
(92)  Ich   habe   eine   Karte   auf   jeden   Tisch   gelegt. 
  I   have   a   menu   on   every   table   put 
  I have put a menu on every table.  
 
The English and the German test items thus differ in several important ways. A lot of 
empirical work remains to be done. 
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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to derive a measure of utility for questions and answers from
a game theoretic model of communication. We apply this measure to account for a number
of judgements about the appropriateness of partial and mention–some answers, e.g. that a
partial answers to a question can be as appropriate as a strongly exhaustive answer. Un-
der the assumption that interlocutors are Bayesian utility optimisers we see questioning and
answering as a two-person sequential decision problem with complete coordination of pref-
erences. Our approach builds up on the work of A. Merin and R. v. Rooy on measures of
relevance. We will compare it in detail with their ideas.
1 Introduction
Given a question ?x.f(x), what is the most useful answer? This question becomes especially
interesting in connection with the problem of partial and mention–some answers. There are a
number of judgments about the appropriateness of partial answers that seem to be due to their
utility in a speciﬁc pragmatic context. In our examples, we write ‘I’ for the inquirer, and ‘E’
for the answering expert:
(1) I: Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
In addition to requesting for information, this reveals a future plan of the inquirer, namely to buy
an Italian newspaper. Lets assume that it doesn’t matter for him where to buy it. The following
answers are equally useful with respect to informativity:
(2) E: There are Italian newspapers at the station and at the Palace but nowhere else. (GS)
There are Italian newspapers at the station. (A)
There are Italian newspapers at the Palace. (B)
A and B are example for mention–some answers. All three seem to be equally useful.
Answer A is not inferior to answer A∧¬B:
E: There are Italian newspapers at the station but none at the Palace.
If E knows only that ¬A, then ¬A is an optimal partial1 answer:
E: There are no Italian newspapers at the station.
∗This paper presents ongoing work that was done in part during my time at the ZAS Berlin; most of it at
Syddansk Universitet in Kolding.
1Henceforth, I use partial answer as a cover term for both, mention-some and partially resolving answers.
1
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2 Anton Benz
The fact that the answers GS, A and B are equally useful for pursuing the inquirer’s plan of
buying an Italian newspaper seems to account for their being equally appropriate as answers.
Our problem is to ﬁnd a game theoretic model for the communication situation that provides for
a measure of utility of answers and can account for our intuitive judgments about their quality.
If a question or answer is to be called useful, then there must be an end to which it can contribute
as a means. Hence, we see the activity of asking and answering as embedded in a pragmatic
situation where the inquirer follows a plan that speciﬁes his ends. Under the assumption that
interlocutors are Bayesian utility optimisers we see questioning and answering as a two-person
sequential decision problem with complete coordination of preferences. The goal of our in-
vestigation is to derive an appropriate measure of usefulness from this game theoretic model
of communication. There may be additional pragmatic principles that rule out some of the an-
swers; e.g. the Gricean principle of manner would lead to a preference for A and B over GS. We
concentrate on the aspect of utility only. This aspect is linguistically important as it captures
at least a substantial part of what is called relevance. We don’t discuss whether the Bayesian
principle of optimising expected utility explicates the Gricean principle of relevance or not. Nor
do we claim that it provides an explanation for the different uses of the adjective ‘relevant’.
But, of course, our investigation is closely related to some game and decision theoretic explica-
tions of relevance, and indeed deeply indebted to them. We build up on the work of A. Merin
(1999) and especially R. v. Rooy (2001; 2003; 2003a; 2003b). Merin measures the relevance of
a proposition E by its ability to make us believe that a certain hypothesis H holds. The appro-
priate pragmatic situation is one where a speaker wants to convince his addressee of the truth
of H and seeks for evidence that is most effective for this purpose. According to van Rooy,
the basic pragmatic situation is one where an inquirer faces a decision problem and seeks for
information to resolve it. This type of problem has been well studied in decision theory and
van Rooy derives a measure for the relevance of answers in terms of their ability to inﬂuence
the inquirer’s decision. We build up on van Rooy but in contrast we consider questioning and
answering as a sequential two–person game and use backward induction for deriving a solution
for the expert’s and inquirer’s decision problems.
2 Partial Answers — Pragmatic Background Assumptions
What counts as an answer to a question? Does the set of answers depend only on the question
itself or does it also depend on the inquirer’s underlying reasons for asking the question? There
has been a controversial debate about these questions and we don’t intent to decide them here2.
This section should make clear our background assumptions and our main motives for adopting
them. Little depends on these assumptions in our formal model, and whatever does so can easily
be reformulated such that it ﬁts to other assumptions.
Following Gronendijk & Stokhof (1984) we identify the set of answers to a question ?x.f(x)
with the set of all strongly exhaustive answers. E.g. if the question is ‘Who came to the party
yesterday?’, and only John, Jane and Jeff came, then the strongly exhaustive answer states that
exactly they and nobody else came. If W is a set of possible worlds with the same domain
D, and [[f]]
v denotes the extension of predicate f in v, then a strongly exhaustive answer to
question ?x.f(x) is a proposition of the form [v]f := {w ∈ W|[[f]]
w = [[f]]
v}; i.e. it collects all
worlds where predicate f has the same extension. In our example, it collects all worlds where
exactly John, Jane and Jeff came to the party. The set of all possible answers is then given by
2See (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1997)[Sec. 6.2.3] for a short survey of positions regarding mention–some inter-
pretations.
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[[?x.f(x)]]
GS := {[v]f|v ∈ W}. This approach poses a problem for partial answers: They are not
elements of [[?x.f(x)]]
GS, hence no answers at all.
We don’t try to show that this is the best approach; we just state our main motivations for
following Groenengijk & Stokhof. It has been noted that partial answers are possible only if
the question is embedded in a situation where they are subordinated to an inquirer’s goal. If a
question is asked only for gathering information, i.e. in a pragmatically neutral context, then a
strongly exhaustive answer is expected:
(3) a) Which animals have a good sense of hearing?
b) Where do coral reefs grow?
c) When do bacteria form endospores?
Without an explanation for the possibility of partial answers, this observation alone would not
sufﬁce to justify an identiﬁcation of the set of answers with the set of strongly exhaustive an-
swers. So, we need in addition a pragmatic explanation for partial answers. Let us consider a
situation where asking a question is subordinated to further ends:
(4) Somewhere in the streets of Berlin...
I: I want to take the next train to Potsdam. Where can I buy a ticket?
a) E: Lists all places where to buy a ticket/At the main station/At this shop over there.
b) E: Come with me! (Takes him to the next ticket-shop)
c) E: (Hands him a ticket)
d) E: There are no controllers on the trains today.
The responses in a) are partial answers. The response in b) contributes to a goal (Get to a ticket–
shop (G2)) immediately super–ordinated to the goal of getting to know a shop that sells tickets
(G1). The third option in c) contributes to a goal (Getting a ticket (G3)) which is again super–
ordinated to the plan of buying a ticket. The response in c) contributes to a project (G4) that is
again super-ordinated to getting a ticket. We wouldn’t call the responses in b) and c) answers.
A more appropriate name is probably reaction. In b) it is a mixture of a verbal command and
an action, in c) a pure action. But we may replace both by pure assertions, e.g.:
(4) b’) E: I go to a ticket–shop right now.
c’) E: I’ve already bought a ticket for you.
We assume that a question ?x.f(x) itself introduces the immediate goal of providing the strongly
exhaustive answer (G0). Writing the sub-ordination relation as < we ﬁnd in Example (4) that
this immediate goal is embedded in a hierarchy of goals G0 < G1 < G2 < G3 < G4. We might
call such a hierarchy a plan. The basic assumption that explains the possibility of responses
as in (4) is: Super-ordinated goals can override the immediate goal of providing a strongly
exhaustive answer. Partial answers differ from other verbal responses by the relative distance
of their goal from the basic goal G0. They contribute to a goal that is directly super–ordinated
to it. Hence there is only a gradual difference in how good the responses in (4) b’), c’) and d)
are if we evaluate them as answers. This is our main motivation for identifying the set of proper
answers with the set of strongly exhaustive answers.
3
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As we address only the case of partial answers, we concentrate on situations where there is only
one goal super–ordinated to the goal of providing the strongly exhaustive answer. The goals are
represented by an utility function. A natural way to do this is by settingU(v,a) := 1 if we reach
the goal in situation v after execution of action a, and U(v,a) = 0 if we don’t reach it. If in
Example (1) a is the act of going to the station and v a world where there are Italian newspapers
at the station, then act a leads to success, and henceU(v,a) = 1. Of course, utility measures can
represent more ﬁne–grained preferences over the outcomes of actions; e.g. if the inquirer wants
to buy an Italian newspaper but prefers to buy it at the Palace because it’s closer to his place,
then this can be represented by different values for buying Italian newspapers at the station and
at the Palace.
3 Merin’s Measure of Relevance
Before I go to present my model of questioning and answering that puts the principle of optimis-
ing utility in its centre, I ﬁrst discuss two approaches that introduce game and decision theoretic
explications of the Gricean principle of relevance. In addition to utility, relevance measures the
(psychological) impact of an assertion on the addressees believes. The Gricean principle of rel-
evance is, of course, a natural candidate for explaining our judgments about the appropriateness
of various partial answers. Hence, game and decision theoretic explications of this principle are
of immediate relevance to our investigation.
Merin derives his measure of relevance of assertions from measures of the relevance of exper-
imental data in empirical science. The fact that the barometer is rising (E) provides evidence
that the weather is becoming sunny. We can see the situation as a competition between two
hypotheses: (H) The weather will be sunny, and (H) The weather will be rainy. For simplicity
we may assume that H and H are mutually exclusive and cover all possibilities. E, the rising
of the barometer, does not necessarily imply that H, but our expectations that the weather will
be sunny are much higher after learning E than before. This change of degree of belief can be
captured by conditional probabilities. Let Pi represent the given expectations before learning
E, i.e. Pi is a probability distribution over possible states of the world (in context i). Let Pi0
represent the expectations obtained from epistemic context i when E, and nothing else but E, is
learned. Modelling learning by conditional probabilities we ﬁnd that Pi0
(H) = Pi(H|E), where
P(H|E) := P(H ∩E)/P(E) for P(E) 6= 0, the probability of H given E. With Bayes’ rule we
get:
Pi0
(H) = Pi(H|E) = Pi(H)·(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E)). (e.1)
H denotes the complement of H. Then learning E inﬂuences our beliefs about H in the same
way as it inﬂuences our beliefs about H: Pi0
(H) = Pi(H|E). We ﬁnd:
Pi0
(H)/Pi0
(H) = Pi(H|E)/Pi(H|E) = (Pi(H)/Pi(H))·(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)). (e.2)
Hence, log(Pi0
(H)/Pi0
(H))=log(Pi(H)/Pi(H))+log(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)). Wecanseetheterm
log(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)) as a measure for the ability of E to make us believe H.
Merin (1999) transfers this measure from empirical sciences to the communication situation.
In its new domain we can see log(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)) as the (possibly negative) argumentative
force of E to make the addressee believe that H. Consider a situation where the speaker wants
to convince the hearer that H is the case. If Pi represents the epistemic state of the hearer, then
an assertion E is the more effective, or relevant, the bigger log(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)).
Merin deﬁnes relevance as a relation between a probability function P representing expectations
4
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in some given epistemic context i and two propositions: a proposition H, the hypothesis, and a
proposition E, the evidence. This leads to the following deﬁnition3:
Deﬁnition 1 (Relevance, Merin) The relevance ri
H(E) of proposition E to proposition H in an
epistemic context i represented by a conditional probability function Pi(.|.) is given by ri
H(E):=
log(Pi(E|H)/Pi(E|H)).
Relevance can be positive or negative according to whether E inﬂuences the addressee to believe
or disbelieve H. In the same way it favours H it disfavours H, i.e. ri
H(E) = −ri
H(E). Hence,
we can model the situation as a zero–sum game between hypotheses H and H. This ﬁts into
Merin’s outlook that sees competition and the aim to convince the communication partner of
some fact H as the dominant features of conversation.
We don’t follow Merin in this respect. For the situations described in Example (1) it seems
to be more appropriate to model it by a game of complete coordination, i.e. a game where
the inquirer’s and expert’s payoffs completely coincide. But this does not decide about Merin’s
generalattitude, andadiscussionofwhetherweshouldseeconﬂictorcoordinationatthebottom
of conversation needs more care and space than is available here. What is of more immediate
importance is the fact that Merin measures relevance from the perspective of the receiver of the
information. We will argue below that we need to switch to the provider’s perspective in order
to get the appropriate measure of the utility of answers.
Who’s probability is P? It is the purpose of an assertion to inﬂuence the expectations of the
addressee, hence P must represent the subjective probabilities of the receiver of information,
or if the measure is used by the speaker, it must be the subjective probability that the speaker
ascribes to the hearer. Approximately, we can identify the addressee’s perspective with the
common ground. In experimentation, the speaker is nature and the scientist performing the
experiment is the hearer. Hence, in both cases, in scientiﬁc experimentation and in commu-
nication, relevance is deﬁned from the receiver’s perspective, i.e. information E is the more
relevant the more it inﬂuences the receiver’s expectations about some hypothesis H. We will
argue that in answering a question the dominant goal is not to change the inquirer’s, i.e. the
receiver’s, expectations but to provide information that maximises the expert’s, i.e. provider’s,
expectations about how much E increases the chances of I’s success. We will see that van Rooy,
who directly addresses questioning and answering using a decision theoretic model, too mea-
sures the relevance of an answer from the receiver’s perspective. We think that this is the main
reason for its inadequateness.
4 Van Rooy’s Measure of Relevance
Why do we ask questions? Because we want to resolve a decision problem! That is van Rooy’s
answer4. Wewillfollowhiminouranalysisofsituationslike(1)whichallowforpartialanswers
in Section 6.
Let us ﬁrst consider whether we can apply Merin’s measure for the relevance of assertions
to questioning and answering situations. If the inquirer I asks whether f, then we can set
H := {v ∈ W|v |= f}, and H := {v ∈ W|v 6|= f}. Assuming that the answering expert applies
Grice’principlesandselectsapropositionwithmaximalrelevance, hehastoselectaproposition
A as answer that maximally affects the inquirer’s expectations5. Of course, such an answer may
3(Merin, 1999), Deﬁnition 4.
4(v. Rooy, 2003a, p. 727)
5Where we measure an answer’s pure relevance by the absolute of ri
H(A); compare Merin (1999), Deﬁnition 5.
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be highly misleading, even if it has to be truthful. In case of a question like ‘Who came to
the party yesterday’, we have to consider many competing hypotheses, in fact, all the strongly
exhaustive answers in the sense of Groenendijk & Stokhof. It should be possible to generalise
Merins approach as long as the set of answers is countable. It becomes more of a problem if
the questioning is embedded in a decision problem where the inquirer has to choose between
several alternative actions with results that bear different value for him. In this case we can’t
just measure the amount of information provided by an assertion; we also need to consider
the expected gain of proﬁt. Van Rooy’s idea was to look at the communicative situation as a
problem of decision theory and thereby to derive a criterion for the relevance of questions and
answers.
Lets consider an example. An oil company has to decide where to build a new oil production
platform. Given the current information it would invest the money and build the platform at
a place off the shores of Alaska. An alternative would be to build it off the coast of Brazil.
So the ultimate decision problem is to decide whether to take action a and build a platform
off the shores of Alaska, or take action b and build it off the shores of Brazil. Now, should
the company invest time and explore the off shore ﬁelds of Alaska and Brazil more thoroughly
before deciding about its actions? If yes, then the company has to ﬁnd the most efﬁcient way
to do it. This type of situation has been thoroughly studied in statistical decision theory6. Lets
simplify the situation and assume that investigating the oil ﬁelds goes without costs. We can
capture the essentials of the situation by the following model:
Let W be a set of states, A a set of actions, U : W×A −→ R an utility measure, and P a
probability measure for W. Then, the expected utility of an action a given P is deﬁned by:
EU(a) = å
v∈W
P(v)×U(v,a). (e.3)
The effect of learning a proposition A is again modelled by conditional probabilities. The ex-
pected utility after learning A is given by:
EU(a,A) = å
v∈W
P(v|A)×U(v,a). (e.4)
What a manager wants to have is a criterion that tells him whether or not it is reasonable to
investigate the off shore ﬁelds before ﬁnally deciding the question where to build the platform.
As he is a Bayesian utility maximiser, additional explorations are only rational if he can expect
that they lead him to choose an action with higher payoff than the action that he would choose
now. It can only be higher if newly learned information can induce him to change his decision
to build the oil platform off the shores of Alaska, i.e. if it changes his decision for action a. This
leads to the following deﬁnitions of relevance: A proposition A is relevant if learning A induces
the inquirer to change his decision about which action a to take. Let a∗ denote the action where
the expected payoff relative to information represented by P is maximal. Then the utility value7
of proposition A is deﬁned as:
UV(A) = max
a∈A
EU(a,A)−EU(a∗,A). (e.5)
A is relevant for the decision problem if UV(A) > 0. Exactly then the inquirer has a decisive
reason to choose another action than a∗. The expected utility value of an investigation is then
deﬁned by:
EUV(Q) = å
q∈Q
P(q)×UV(q); (e.6)
6See e.g. (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961, Ch. 4), (Pratt et. al., 1995, Ch. 14).
7Compare e.g. (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961, Sec. 4.5) and (Pratt et. al., 1995).
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where Q is the set of all possible results of the investigation. It is reasonable to do additional
investigations before ﬁnally deciding if EUV(Q) is positive. So we can say that investigating is
relevant if EUV(Q) > 0. Utility valueUV and expected utility value EUV are deﬁned from the
investigator’s perspective. Metaphorically speaking, we can call an experiment a question, and
a result an answer to it. The answering person, nature, is not providing information with respect
to the investigator’s decision problem. There is only one real person involved in this decision
model, namely the inquirer. Nature shows oil, or doesn’t show oil, according to whether there is
oil where the exploration drilling takes place. It does not show it in order to contribute to a de-
cision problem, or because it thinks that this is relevant. The model does not predict that nature
will only give relevant answers, and it does not even say that this were desirable. E.g. assume
that there is indeed a very large oil ﬁeld in the area near Alaska where the company wanted to
build the platform given its old information, and a very small oil ﬁeld in the Brazilian area. If
the exploration drilling conﬁrms that the original decision was right, then this is, according to
our criterion, irrelevant. Only if by some bad luck the drilling in the Brazilian area gives rise to
the hope that there is more oil than in Alaska, we got relevant information.
In (2001; 2001a) van Rooy introduced (e.5) as a measure for the relevance of answers8. I
hope it became clear, that I don’t follow him here. The whole model is a model for a one–
person decision problem. The relevance of information is evaluated only from the inquirer’s
perspective. Hence it is not a trivial claim that this approach provides a measure that can be
used by the answering expert E to select the best answer. But, of course, we may try to turn the
model into a model for a two-person game. This makes it necessary to reinterpret the formulas
above. So we ask: Who’s probability could P be? There are three possibilities:
1. It is the inquirer’s subjective probability.
2. It is the expert’s subjective probability.
3. It is the subjective probability that E assigns to I.
Alternatives 1. and 2. are unsatisfactory. If 1., then (e.7) cannot be applied by E. If we assume
that (a) the expert can only give answers that he believes to be true, and if we deﬁne (b) ‘Expert
believes q’ by PE(q) = 1, then 2. implies that any answer will do as long as E believes it to
be true. In order to turn the model into a model for a two-person game we have to choose
interpretation 3.9. In this case (e.5) advises the answering expert only to choose answers that
can make I change his decision.
(5) Assume that it is common knowledge between I and E that there are Italian newspapers
at the station with probability 2/3, and at the Palace with probability 1/3. What should
E answer if he is asked (1): Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? According to the
initial epistemic state, I decided to go to the station. Lets consider three possible answers:
(A) There are Italian newspapers at the station; (B) There are Italian newspapers at the
Palace, and (A∧B). All three should turn out to be equally relevant but some calculation
shows that B is the only relevant answer according to (e.5).
8“And indeed, it seems natural to say that a cooperative participant of the dialogue only makes a relevant
assertion in case it makes John change his mind with respect to which action he should take. It also seems not
unreasonable to claim that in a cooperative dialogue one assertion, A, is ‘better’ than another, B, just in case the
utility value of the former is higher than the utility value of the latter, UV(A) >UV(B).” (v. Rooy, 2001a, p. 78),
emphasises are van Rooy’s. ‘John’ refers to an inquirer in a previous example.
9Of course, that’s van Rooy’s intended interpretation.
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This is clearly not intuitive. The point here is the same as in the oil-drilling example. Van Rooy
therefore10 replaces (e.5) by (e.7) in his later papers:
UV(A) = max
a∈A
EU(a,A)−max
a∈A
EU(a). (e.7)
(e.7) gives the advice: ‘Increase the hopes of the inquirer as much as you can!’ This ﬁxes the
problem with Example (5) but it’s easy to see that we run into a similar problem with negative
information: Assume that in the scenario of Example (5) E knows that there are no Italian
newspapers at the station (¬A); in this case (e.7) implies that ¬A is not relevant because it does
not increase the inquirer’s expectations. This seems to be quite unintuitive. But the problem can
be easily ﬁxed again by taking the absolute || of the right side of (e.7). And again, this runs into
problems. An answer that increases, or changes, the hopes of the inquirer as much as possible
is not necessarily a good answer:
(6) Assume a scenario like that in (5). There is a strike in Amsterdam and therefore the supply
with foreign newspapers is a problem. It is common knowledge between I and E that the
probability that there are Italian newspapers at the station is slightly higher than the prob-
ability that there are Italian newspapers at the Palace. Now E learns that the Palace has
been supplied with British newspapers but not with Italian ones. In general, it is known
that the probability that Italian newspapers are available at a shop increases signiﬁcantly if
the shop has been supplied with foreign newspapers. What should E answer when asked:
Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
Some calculation shows that, according to (e.7), E should answer that the Palace has been
supplied with foreign newspapers. The same holds for the improved version of (e.7) with the
absolute difference. As the probability that there are Italian newspaper at the Palace, given
that the Palace has been supplied with foreign newspaper, is much higher than the assumed
probability for there being Italian newspapers at the station, this answer should lead the inquirer
to go to the Palace. But this is the wrong choice as there are no Italian newspapers at the Palace.
A good answer should maximise the inquirer’s chances for real success, and not maximally
increase or change his expectations about success.
In its form of (e.7) the criterion is very close to Merin’s criterion of relevance. It may be
the proper generalisation of Merin’s approach for cases where the speaker does not only want
to inﬂuence the hearer subjective probabilities but also his expectations about payoffs. So it
should be better understood as a measure of the argumentative force of an assertion.
As indicated above, I see the main methodological ﬂaw of this approach in its attempt to apply
a model for a one-person decision problem to a real communication situation involving two
persons. The expectations of the answering expert about the real state of affairs are treated as
irrelevant. Of course, this is understandable as the model is derived from a theory that accounts
for the value of experimental data where questions are directed to nature and where answers can
only be evaluated from the experimentator’s perspective.
10See (v. Rooy, 2001a, Sec. 4.3) for a comparable example; but this phenomenon has nothing to do with whether
or not we see the situation as a game of complete coordination or of conﬂict. In (2001) van Rooy considers only
scenarios with trivial probability distribution, i.e. where all possible states of affairs have equal probability. See
also (v. Rooy, 2003, Sec. 3.1) and (v. Rooy, 2003a, Sec. 3.3).
8
Anton Benz Questions, Plans, and the Utility of Answers
58Utility of Answers 9
5 Van Rooy’s Order of Relevance
In (v. Rooy, 2003a, Sec. 3.1) van Rooy introduces an order of relevance as a simpliﬁed version
of the measure of relevance introduced before. It is used to deﬁne the set of answers to a
question. This is necessary in order to provide the semantics for embedded interrogatives as
in John knew who came to the party, or John knew where to buy an Italian newspaper. In (v.
Rooy, 2003b) this approach is generalised such that arbitrary orders of relevance are covered;
i.e. it provides for the deﬁnitions of optimal propositions and set of answers for arbitrary orders
of relevance. We restrict our discussion here to (v. Rooy, 2003a, Sec. 5.2)11, and we discuss it
only in as far as to whether it provides a justiﬁcation of our judgments on appropriateness of
partial and strongly exhaustive answers. Although the new order of relevance is introduced as a
special case of the order of relevance deﬁned by (e.7), I think that it is interesting on its own. It
has an independent intuitive basis and prefers answers that eliminate more possible choices of
actions in the inquirer’s decision problem.
As mentioned before, Groenendijk & Stokhof deﬁne the set of answers to be the set of strongly
exhaustive answers:
[[?x.f(x)]]
GS = {{v ∈ W|[[f]]
v = [[f]]
w}|w ∈ W}.
Van Rooy identiﬁes the set of answers with the set of relevant answers. One answer is more
relevant than another if it helps more to resolve the inquirer’s decision problem (v. Rooy, 2003a,
p. 753). The decision problem consists in choosing an action from a set of actions A. For each
a ∈A we can deﬁne the set of worlds where a is optimal:
• a∗ = {v ∈ W|¬∃b ∈A U(v,a) <U(v,b)};
• A∗ = {a∗|a ∈A}.
As v. Rooy writes, the ordering relation on propositions induced by their utility value under cer-
tain conditions comes down to the claim that a proposition A is better to learn than a proposition
B if A eliminates more cells from A∗ than B. For some special cases this leads to the following
order of relevance:
f(g0) >A∗ f(g) iff {a∗ ∈A∗|a∗∩[[f(g0)]] 6= / 0} ⊂ {a∗ ∈A∗|a∗∩[[f(g)]] 6= / 0}. (e.8)
Here, f has two arguments: f(v)(g) means that group g is such that ‘f(g)’ holds in v. Lets
consider our question: Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? We can consider an answer as
specifying a group of places where it is possible to buy them; e.g. the answer ‘At the palace
and at the station’ says that the group {Palace,Station} is in the actual world in the extension
of the predicate Place-where-Inquirer-can-buy-Italian-newspapers (f). With help of the order
of relevance deﬁned in (e.8) the most relevant group in each world is determined by:
[[Op(f)]] = {hv,gi |f(v)(g)&¬∃g0(f(v)(g0)&f(g0) >A∗ f(g))}. (e.9)
This leads van Rooy to deﬁne the set of answers as:
[[?x.f(x)]]
R = {{v ∈ W|g ∈ Op(f)[v]}|∃w ∈ W g ∈ Op(f)[w]}. (e.10)
I.e. a proposition is a possible answer if it is a set of worlds v such that there exists a world w
and an optimal group g for w such that g is also optimal in v.
11This is mainly because (v. Rooy, 2003b) is only available as preprint. The reader is encouraged to check
Section 3 there.
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(7) My decision problem might be, for example, to ﬁnd out which way is best for me to go
to get an Italian newspaper. It could be, for instance, that the best way to buy an Italian
newspaper is at the station in u, at the palace in v, and that buying one at the station and
at the palace is equally good in w. (v. Rooy, 2003a, p.753)
In this case we get Op(f)(w) = {Palace,Station}12. The answer set for ‘Where can I buy an
Italian newspaper?’ is then: [[?x.f(x)]]
R = {{u,w},{v,w}}13. We are here only concerned
with whether or not this provides a justiﬁcation for the judgment that the partial answers ‘At
the station’ (A) and ‘At the Palace’ (B) are equally relevant with respect to information as
the exhaustive answer ‘At the station and at the Palace’ (A∧B). Intuitively, all three answers
should be equally good. A∧B is more complex, so A or B should be preferred, but this needs an
additional pragmatic principle, Grice’ Principle of Manner. If [[?x.f(x)]]
R is the set of answers
the addressee of the question can choose from, then A∧B is not even an answer. But this point
may turn out to be not important. What is more relevant for our concerns is whether or not there
is a way to extend the order of relevance in order to cover answers that include negations as in
‘At the station but not at the Palace’. As soon as an answer entails the negation of A or B it
eliminates more possibilities than either A or B. Hence, it should turn out that A∧¬B is more
relevant than A, B or A∧B. But this contradicts our initial judgment that all these answers are
equally good with respect to utility. Given the intuitions that underlie (e.8) this generalisation
would be natural. This shows that it is not so much important to eliminate unsuccessful options
in order to solve a decision problem but to show actions that are successful.
6 Measuring the Utility of Answers and Questions
As the discussion of Merin’s and van Rooy’s approaches did show, it is essential to take into
account the perspectives of the interlocutors. As there are two interlocutors involved in ques-
tioning and answering, the inquirer and the addressee of the question, we conclude that we need
to model it as a two person game. Under the assumption that interlocutors are Bayesian utility
optimisers we see questioning and answering as a two-person sequential decision problem with
complete coordination of preferences. This ﬁts well within a dialogue theory that sees collabo-
ration towards joint goals at the heart of communication. The best known such theory is that of
Herbert H. Clark (1996). He predominantly analyses dialogue in terms of joint projects. This
implies that knowledge about each other, and especially the notion of common ground, gets
some prominence. Fortunately, we don’t need mutual knowledge in our communication model,
but we represent some knowledge about the knowledge of others. We follow van Rooy and see
questioning and answering situations that allow for partial answers as subordinated to a ﬁnal
decision problem of the inquirer. Hence, we ﬁnd three successive decision problems:
Inquirer I Expert E I decides Evaluation
Asks answers for action
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
•
Q?
−−→ •
A
−−→ •
a
−−→ •
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
subject. subject. subject. utility
expectations expectations expectations measure
of I of E of I
hWI,PIi hWE,PEi hW,Pi U(v,a)
12This is van Rooy (2003a, p. 753).
13This is again van Rooy’s calculation.
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We denote the inquirer again by I, and the answering person by E. As before, let W be a ﬁxed
set of states of the environment, A a set of actions, U : W×A −→ R an utility measure. The
model will represent (a) I’s ﬁnal beliefs about the world, (b) expectations of E about I’s beliefs
about the state of the environment, and (c) expectations of I about E’s answering situation.
Why do we want to represent E’s expectations about I’s beliefs? Consider again a scenario like
that in (6).
(8) There is a strike in Amsterdam and therefore the supply with foreign newspapers is a
problem. It is common knowledge between I and E that I has a clear preference to buy
his newspapers at the station. Now E learns that the Palace has been supplied with Italian
newspapers and he knows that both, the station and the Palace, get their newspapers from
the same supplier. As the supplier favours none of his customers, the probability that the
station too got Italian newspapers is quite high. Now, E knows that I thinks that the Palace
and the station probably get their Italian newspapers from different sources, hence the fact
that the Palace got them does not indicate to I that the station got them too. We assume
that E should only say what he believes to be true, i.e. we assume that only propositions
A with PE(A) = 1 are admissible as answers. If he does not take into account I’s beliefs,
then it seems the best answer he can give to the question ‘Where can I buy an Italian
newspaper?’ is ‘The Palace got Italian newspapers today’. But this would induce I to go
to the Palace, although E knows that I’s expected utility is higher if he goes to the station.
(a) The inquirer I has to decide in the ﬁnal situation about which action a to take according to
his expectations about the actual states of affairs. We assume that his decision does not depend
on what he believes that the expert E believes. Hence we can represent his epistemic state by a
pair hW,Pi, where P represents his knowledge about the actual world.
I’s Decision Situation: It is given by a probability space hW,Pi and an utility measure U.
(b) We assume that the answering expert E wants to maximise I’s ﬁnal success. Hence, E’s
payoffisidenticalwithI’s. E hastochoosehisanswerinsuchawaythatitoptimallycontributes
towards I’s decision. In general, he has to calculate how I will decide if he provides him with
some information A. Therefore, our model must take into account what E expects about what
I knows. Hence, we represent the possible states of affairs in E’s decision situation by pairs
hv,hW,Pii, where v ∈ W is a possible state of the environment and hW,Pi a possible information
state of I. The states hW,Pi are intended to represent I’s knowledge before he learned E’s
answer. I assume that all probability spaces that I will introduce are ﬁnite.
E’s Answering Situation:
• WE := {hv,hW,Pii |v ∈ W, P a probability measure on W}.
• PE is a probability measure on WE.
Note that any probability measure PE on WE induces a probability measure on W by PE(v) :=
PE({hu,hW,Pii ∈ WE |v = u}).
(c) The inquirer I in his initial situation may take into account what he believes that E believes.
Hence we represent the possible states in I’s initial decision situation by pairs hv,hWE,PEii,
where hWE,PEi is a possible information state of E.
I’s Questioning Situation:
• WI := {hv,hWE,PEii |v ∈ W, PE a probability measure on WE}.
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• PI is a probability measure on WI.
Again, we get a probability measure on W by PI(v) := PI({hu,hWE,PEii ∈ WI |v = u}).
How to determine the utility of answers? The idea is to calculate backward from the ﬁnal evalu-
ation situation, i.e. by backward induction. This is indeed the most natural and straightforward
solution to our decision problems.
Calculating Backward Expected Utilities
The ﬁnal Decision Situation: The expected utility of an action a ∈ A is calculated according
to (e.3):
EUhW,Pi(a) := å
v∈W
P(v)×U(v,a). (e.11)
Hence E calculates I’s expected utilities in situation v = hw,hW,Pvii after learning A by:
EUhW,Pvi(a,A) = å
u∈W
Pv(u|A)×U(u,a). (e.12)
Let av
A := indmaxa∈A EUhW,Pvi(a,A). If it is not unique, we assume some mutually known tie
breaking rule. According to our assumption, E’s payoff function is identical with I’s payoff
function U, i.e. questioning and answering is a game with complete coordination. In order to
maximise his own payoff, E has to choose an answer such that it induces I to take an action that
maximises their common payoff.
The Answering situation: We use again (e.3) for calculating the expected utility of an answer
A ⊆ W:
EUhWE,PEi(A) := å
v∈WE
PE(v)×U(v,av
A). (e.13)
We add here a pragmatic constraint: An answer is admissible only if PE(A) = 1. This means
that we only allow for answers that the expert E believes to be true. For v = hw,hWE,Pv
Eii ∈ WI
let Adm(v) := {A ⊆ W|Pv
E(A) = 1}, the set of admissible, i.e. true, answers. This leads to the
following deﬁnition of the set of optimal answers in situation v:
Op(v) = {A ∈ Adm(v)|∀B ∈ Adm(v)EUhWE,Pv
Ei(B) ≤ EUhWE,Pv
Ei(A)}. (e.14)
If there are several optimal answers, then we assume again that E’s choice from Op(v) is deter-
mined (in a mutually known way). We denote this unique answer by Av.
Going back to I’s initial querying situation, we have to switch perspectives again. In order to
calculate his expected utilities for questions, I has to take into account which action he would
choose if he gets some information A. We denote this action by aA. I can calculate for all
possibilities v = hu,hWE,PEii ∈ WI the answer Av that is optimal from E’s perspective given
by hWE,PEi. Hence, he can conclude that in situation v he will be led to take action aAv =
indmaxa∈A EUhW,PIi(a,Av), where PI is the probability measure induced on W and where we
have to use the tie braking rule if aAv is not unique.
The Querying situation: The expected utility of a question Q can then be calculated by:
EUhWI,PIi(Q) := å
v∈WI
PI(v)×U(v,aAv). (e.15)
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EUhWI,PIi(Q) does not depend on Q. This is a consequence of calculating utilities with respect
to a ﬁxed decision problem. This is the point where our pragmatic backgrounds assumptions of
Section 2 enter. There we claimed that a question introduces the immediate goal of providing
a strongly exhaustive answer; this goal may be subordinated to further ends that provide for
additional targets that can override the immediate goal of exhaustively resolving the question.
These further ends may be given in the background, or they may be inferred from the question
by help of some plan recognition mechanism. All these goals and further ends have to be
represented in our model by the utility function U. Hence, in (e.15), U should have a subscript
Q. Lets consider e.g.:
(9) a) Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? (Q)
b) Are there Italian newspapers at the station? (Q0)
Let A = {a,b}, the actions of going to the station and going to the Palace. We can represent the
difference between Q and Q0 by the assumption that UQ(w,a) =UQ0(w,a) and UQ(w,a) = 1 iff
in w there are Italian newspapers at the station;UQ(w,b)=1 iff in w there are Italian newspapers
at the Palace andUQ0(w,b)=0 for all w. HowUQ has to be deﬁned in general given the common
background and the inquirer’s question lies outside of our investigation.
The Examples Reconsidered
Let us ﬁrst consider the answers of Example (2). Let A = {a,b}, the actions of going to the
station and going to the Palace. Let A ⊆ W be the set of worlds where there are Italian newspa-
pers at the station, and B ⊆ W where they are at the Palace. Let A and B denote the respective
complements. We represent the payoffs as follows: U(w,a)=1 iff w∈A,U(w,b)=1 iff w∈B.
If E knows that A, then A is an optimal answer:
EUhWE,PEi(A) = å
v∈WE
PE(v)×U(v,av
A) = å
v∈A
PE(v)×U(v,a) = 1
No other answer can yield a higher payoff14. In the same way it follows that B is optimal if E
knows that B. The same holds for A∧B and the strongly exhaustive answer.
If E knows only ¬A, hence PE(A) = 1, then ¬A is an optimal answer:
EUhWE,PEi(A) = å
v∈WE
PE(v)×U(v,av
A) = å
v∈A
PE(v)×U(v,b) = PE(A∩B) = PE(B).
If PE(C) = 1, then for v ∈ WE either av
C = a or av
C = b. Let BC := {v ∈ WE |av
C = b}. Then
EUhWE,PEi(C) = å
v∈BC
PE(v)×U(v,b) = PE(BC∩B) ≤ PE(B).
Here enters: PE(C) = 1 ⇒ PE(C∩A) = 0. Hence, no other answer than ¬A can be better15.
Lets consider Example (6). We use the same utility function as before. Let N denote the set of
all u ∈ W where the Palace has been supplied with British newspapers. We model the epistemic
states described in (6) by the following condition: For all v = hu,hW,Pii ∈ WE it holds that:
14There could be a problem if I believes that B and E has evidence that B is unlikely. Hence, the result stated
above holds in full generality only if we assume in addition e.g. that E believes that I can’t be convinced of B.
In all calculations there are additional pragmatic assumptions that should be made explicit in a more rigorous
presentation. E.g. we repeatedly have to assume that for conditional probabilities P(u|A) it holds that P(A) > 0.
15It is important that I can only choose between actions a and b. The result holds even ifC = B.
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1. P(A) > P(B) and P(B∩N) > P(A∩N);
2. PE(A) > PE(B), PE(A∩N) = PE(A) and PE(B∩N) = PE(B).
Is N a good answer? Let v ∈ WE:
EUhW,Pvi(a,N) = å
u∈N
Pv(u|N)×U(u,a) = P(A∩N).
and
EUhW,Pvi(b,N) = å
u∈N
Pv(u|N)×U(u,b) = P(B∩N).
Hence av
N = b. We get
EUhWE,PEi(N) = å
v∈N
PE(v)×U(v,b) = PE(N∩B) = PE(B) < PE(A)
It is easy to see that EUhWE,PEi(W) = PE(A). Hence, N cannot be the best answer. LetC be such
that PE(C) = 1. Let AC := {v ∈ WE |av
C = a} and BC := {v ∈ WE |av
C = b}. Then:
EUhWE,PEi(C) = å
v∈AC
PE(v)×U(v,a)+ å
v∈BC
PE(v)×U(v,b) = PE(AC∩A)+PE(BC∩B) (e.16)
Is it possible that E has a better answer than saying nothing although he does not know more
about A and B than the inquirer? Well, it is.
(10) Imagine that there is a causal relation between who is delivering Italian newspapers this
morning and whether or not there are newspapers at the station and Palace. E knows that
a man named van den Berg16 delivered them this morning. Assume that E knows that I
can infer from who delivered the newspapers whether there are Italian newspapers at the
station or at the Palace. In this case E has a better answer than saying nothing:
I: Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
E: A man named ‘van den Berg’ delivered the newspapers this morning. (C)
In addition, this example shows that our theory does not say that the relevance measured from
the receiver’s perspective, i.e. the inquirer’s, is irrelevant for determining the best answer. C
carries no information for E, only for I. It only says that, in general, the inquirer’s perspective
is not enough. It takes two for communicating.
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Abstract
This paper argues that though will and be going to both involve a future modal, their
meanings differ aspectually. Be going to includes a progressive-like aspectual operator that
takes scope over the future modal. Will, on the other hand, is ambiguous between a reading
that is the future modal alone, and a reading that has a generic-like aspectual operator
over the modal. The evidence for these logical forms consists primarily of modal effects
caused by aspectual operation on the temporal argument of the future modal’s accessibility
relation. Similar evidence motivates a proposal that future modals in conditionals can have
scope either over or under the antecedent of the conditional. These ﬁndings argue against
analyses that treat futures as a kind of tense, and suggest possible directions for theories of
aspect, modals, and conditionals.
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to provide a better understanding of futures in general, through compar-
ison of will with another future, namely be going to. Will and be going to, I will argue, contain
the same future modal, differing only in aspect. Be going to has a progressive-like operator
located just under tense and over the future modal, while will initially at least seems to have no
aspectual component. Will, however, is later argued to be ambiguous between an aspect-free
reading and a reading with a generic-like aspectual operator. In all these cases, the aspect, or
lack thereof, has detectable effects on the temporal argument of the future modal’s accessibility
relation.1. However, since we know that higher tense has an effect on the temporal argument of
accessibility relations, perhaps we should not be too surprised to see aspectual effects as well. A
class of apparent counterexamples to the be going to proposal is shown to have a different scope
for be going to, and a class of apparent counterexamples to the will proposal is accounted for via
a reading of will with generic aspect. Subsequently the evidence for scope distinctions among
will conditionals is examined. We are left with a fairly varied picture of future conditionals.
2 Aspect of be going to
In this section I offer a puzzle about offering, and solve the puzzle by proposing an aspectual
difference between be going to and will. The puzzle is this: Why can will be used to make an
offer, while be going to seemingly cannot be? The eventual solution is that be going to consists
∗This research was supported in part by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship and a Kosciuszko Foundation
Tuition Scholarship. The author also wishes to thank Sabine Iatridou, Norvin Richards, Jennifer Cunningham, Kai
von Fintel, Irene Heim, Elena Guerzoni, Noam Chomsky, and Joseph ‘Joﬁsh’ Kaye.
1The effect of higher aspect on modals has not been much remarked upon; in fact, the very existence of aspect
in that position has not been much remarked upon (Cinque (2002), Tenny (2000)
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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of a progressive-like aspectual operator on top of a future modal, and that this combination
conﬂicts with a pragmatic requirement on acts of offering.
As a ﬁrst step in the argument that will and be going to differ aspectually, it is necessary to
demonstrate that will and be going to do in fact differ in meaning. It is not immediately obvious
that they do; in some contexts, as in (1), they seem almost interchangeable.
(1) a. It will be sunny tomorrow
b. It’s going to be sunny tomorrow.
Certain contexts, however, bring out clear assertability differences. Consider the sentence in
(2a), seen outside Madera, California, on a billboard advertising a mechanic’s shop. The sen-
tence in (2b) was not on the billboard, and in fact could not felicitously have been used there.
(2) a. We’ll change your oil in Madera.
√
offer
b. We’re going to change your oil in Madera. #offer
Thus here is a difference between will and be going to. Intuitively, (2a) is used to make an offer
that you can take or leave. But the sentence in (2b), in the context given, is not an offer. Rather,
it is somewhat bullying. The threatening nature of (2b) seems to stem from the intuition that
there is no chance for you to have a say in the matter.
Suppose we consider in more depth what it is to make an offer. First, the contribution of the
speaker. It seems clear that only someone who believes they can say whether an eventuality
happens or not can felicitously make an offer for that eventuality to happen. I cannot felici-
tously offer for it to rain tomorrow, for instance, because I have no power over the weather,
and I know it. So in order for an individual s (“speaker”) to be able to make a valid offer to
carry out a q-eventuality (an eventuality of which a predicate q holds), s must have power over
whether a q-eventuality holds occurs. Let’s call this ability (without going into a precise modal
characterization of ability) direction (Copley 2002b).
(3) An individual s directs q just in case s has the ability to determine whether q happens.
The one to whom the offer is made, whom I will refer to as h (“hearer”), also seems to have
some control over whether the q-eventuality occurs. It should happen if h wants it to happen,
and, equally importantly, it should not happen if h wants it not to happen. It would certainly be
rude for someone to make an assertion that entails that in some cases where you do not want
them to change your oil, they do it anyway. For an utterance to count as an act of offering,
the speaker’s carrying out of the offered eventuality has to be contingent on the interlocutor’s
preferences.
Let’s treat a sentence of offering as a conditional with an elided antecedent if you want q, an
overt consequent will q, and a presupposition that d has power over whether a q-eventuality
occurs. The offerer s, in uttering that sentence in good faith, asserts the truth of that conditional.
On a Lewis-Kratzer-style account of conditionals (Lewis (1986), Kratzer (1986)), s asserts that
in all worlds where h wants q, a q-eventuality happens. And let us further agree that in making a
valid offer, s is also committed to the truth of the proposition expressed by the conditional If you
don’t want q, won’t q (where don’t want = want not). This commitment reﬂects our intuition
that the hearer’s desires have an effect on whether a q-eventuality happens; it happens only if the
hearer wants it to. Note that this commitment is not required by anything about the semantics
of the conditional, but rather is just a pragmatic requirement on offers.
We also need a condition on offers. (I have abbreviated the intensional verbs want and be-
2
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lieve; w-t-believe, for instance, is short for “believes in w at t,” with the usual possible world
semantics.)
(4) Condition on offers: A person s offers in w at t to bring about a q-eventuality for h only
if s w-t-believes that: ∀w0 that agree with w up to t: [∃t0 such that s directs q in w0 at t0:
[h w0-t0-wants q ⇔ ∀w00 that agree with w0 up to t0: [∃t00 > t0 : [q(w00)(t00)]]]]
Now let’s see how this characterization of offering intuitively conﬂicts with the semantics of be
going to. According to our assumption, an offering utterance is interpreted with a certain kind
of antecedent, whether or not it is pronounced. In that case, the billboard utterances actually
have the meaning of the conditionals given in (5):
(5) Revision of the billboard utterances
a. (If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we will change your oil in Madera.
b. #(If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we are going to change your oil in
Madera.
The problem with (5b) seems to be a conﬂict with part (b) of the offering condition in (4),
instantiated in this case as follows:
(6) If you don’t want us to change your oil in Madera, we won’t change your oil in Madera.
While (6) feels consistent with (5a), it feels inconsistent with (5b). This intuition is what is
responsible for the feeling noted earlier: Felicitous offering requires the offerer to take the
hearer’s desires into account, but using be going to feels like a decision has already been made,
without prior consultation with the hearer.
The question we have arrived at is this: What is it about the meaning of be going to that causes
(5b) to contradict (6)? The answer to this question, I propose, is that be going to consists of
a progressive-like aspectual operator scoping over a future modal. The proposed structure is
as in (7a) below. Tense is marked on the progressive auxiliary, yielding was/were going to.2
Note that (7a) is minimally different from a proposal for the logical form of will and would
(Abusch 1985), shown in (7b).
(7) a. Be going to (Copley 2001, 2002a, b)
TP
PPPP P
    
T ASPP XXXX X
    
ASP
be -ing FUTP
HH H
  
FUT
go [to?] vP
@ @    
b. TP
b
b b
"
" "
T FUTP
Q Q  
FUT vP
@ @    
Two considerations motivate the proposed structure in (7a). The ﬁrst is morphological. Be -ing
often marks progressives; perhaps it does just that, or something quite like that, in be going
to. English is notorious for reusing morphology, but the presence of be -ing should at least
2To is not separable from going (Copley 2001), giving the impression that be going to is something of an idiom.
It is not unusual for constructions to lose transparency as they progress from main verb to tense/aspect marking
(Dahl 1985).
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prompt an investigation into the possibility of progressive semantics. And if we decide to take
the morphology seriously, and if we believe in the Mirror Principle (Baker 1985), the future
projection, presumably go, ought to be lower than the aspectual head, which is itself lower than
the tense head.
The second consideration is semantic in nature. The core meaning of progressives involves a
kind of “ongoingness;” if John was singing, then at the time under discussion, the John-singing
eventuality was already ongoing. Recall the intuition about why be going to q is not a felicitous
offer: It’s already true that a q-eventuality will happen, so the hearer has no chance to say yea
or nay. We may understand this fact as reﬂecting a kind of “ongoingness,” not of the eventuality
itself, but of the futurity of the eventuality. If so, this intuition is another reason to give serious
attention to the idea that there is something like a progressive scoping over the future element.
To evaluate the hypothesis, we need to ﬂesh it out with speciﬁc future and progressive elements
from among the existing literature: a version of Thomason’s (1970) future operator, and a very
simple progressive operator ﬁrst proposed by Bennett and Partee (1978). Thomason’s operator
is deﬁned as follows:
(8) (Thomason 1970): For any time t and world w, FUT(w)(t)(q)
= 1 if ∀ w0 that agree with w up to t: ∃t0: t < t0 and q(w0)(t0) = 1;
= 0 if ∀ w0 that agree with w up to t: ¬∃t0: t < t0and q(w0)(t0) = 1;
and is undeﬁned otherwise.
The deﬁnition in (8) says that for any instant t and world w, FUT(w)(t)(q) is deﬁned just in case
all the worlds share a truth value for q at the time in question. Then, if FUT(w)(t)(q) is deﬁned,
it is true if on all worlds that agree with w up to t, there is some time t0 that is later than t,
at which q is true; and it is false if on all worlds that agree with w up to t, there is no time t0
that is later than t at which q is true. The ﬁgure in (9) represents graphically a case in which
FUT(w)(t)(q) is true: The horizontal line in the diagram below represents the actual world, and
the lines branching off represent the set of accessible worlds at time t.
(9) A case in which FUT(w)(t)(q) is true
 
HHHHHHH H
HH H
 
q
q
q
q
t
The Bennett and Partee progressive operator, which I will call ”P”, is a very simple one; it is
true at a world and a time just in case its propositional argument is true at a superinterval of that
time, in that world.3
(10) P(w)(t)(p) = 1 iff ∃t0 ⊃ t: p(w)(t0)
Let us assume that present tense is null, and that will is just Thomason’s modal FUT, while
3This denotation of progressive aspect (Bennett and Partee 1978) runs afoul of the imperfective paradox, as
noted by (Dowty 1979). Thus P cannot be the denotation of a “real” progressive. In Copley (2002b), I argue,
following Dowty and practically everyone since (e.g., Landman (1992), Portner (1998), Cipria and Roberts (2000))
that “real” progressives have a modal component as well as this temporal component. I diverge from earlier
accounts by pointing out a number of similarities between the modal component of “real” progressives and the
future modal.
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be going to has the proposed structure, with a Bennett and Partee progressive scoping over the
Thomason modal, as expanded below.
(11) P(w)(t)(FUT(q)) = 1 iff ∃t0 ⊃ t: [FUT(w)(t0)(q) = 1]
P(w)(t)(FUT(q)) = 1 if ∃t0 ⊃ t: [∀ w0 that agree with w up to t0: [∃t00: t0< t00 and
q(w0)(t00) = 1]]
How can we characterize the set of worlds quantiﬁed over by this denotation of be going to? P,
evaluated at t, w, and p, yields a truth value of 1 just in case p holds over a superinterval t0 of t
in w, where t is an internal interval of t0. Be going to represents a case where p is FUT(q)(w)(t0)
(for some q).4
The worlds be going to quantiﬁes over are not just the set of worlds FUT(q)(w)(t) quantiﬁes
over, i.e., those that branch off during t, but a larger set of worlds: the worlds that branch off
during some interval t0 that surrounds t. We would represent the worlds be going to quantiﬁes
over as below in (12). If [[be going to]](q)(w)(t) is true, that entails that all the worlds pictured
branching off during some t0 are q worlds, as shown in (12).
(12) A case in which P (FUT(q))(w)(t) is true
 
HHHHHHH H
HH H
 
q
q
q
q
 
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q Q
[ ]
t0
q
q
q
q
[]
t
H H
 
Be going to therefore quantiﬁes over not only the worlds that FUT would quantify over given the
same arguments, but also over additional worlds — those that branch off during t0 but before
the beginning of t — as long as t is not an initial interval of t0. While we could explicitly deﬁne
the relation between t and t0 to exclude such a possibility, there is no need to do so if we adopt a
common5 assumption that the actual world only exists up to the time of utterance; equivalently,
that future world-time pairs are not available except via modal means.
We are now in a position to return to the puzzle about offering, and explain why the speaker of
((13)a) (i.e., the billboard be going to utterance with the elided antecedent made explicit) cannot
also consistently assert ((13)b), part of the offering condition.
(13) a. #If you want us to change your oil in Madera, we’re going to change your oil in
Madera.
b. If you don’t want us to change your oil in Madera, we won’t change your oil in
Madera.
Let p = the proposition expressed by you want us to change your oil in Madera (in the context
in question); q = the proposition expressed by we change your oil in Madera (in the context in
4Thomason’s original operator must be altered slightly so that it takes intervals rather than instants. The change
is to substitute “agree with w up to the beginning of t” for “agree with w up to t” in the denotation of FUT.
Intuitively, we can speak of branching worlds that branch off during an interval, rather than at an instant.
5See, among others, Prior (1967) and Abusch (1998) for independent justiﬁcation of this assumption.
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question); and t = a time at or after the reading of the billboard (i.e., the time when it matters
whether the hearer wants q, and at which the offerer is prepared to bring about a q-eventuality).
Then ((13)a) and ((13)b), the incompatible utterances from the puzzle, turn out as follows.
(14) a. all worlds w such that p(w)(t) = 1 are worlds in which P(w)(t)(FUT(q)) = 1
b. no worlds w such that p(w)(t) = 1 are worlds in which FUT(w)(t)(q) = 1
Now we will see how the current proposal derives the intuition that (14a) and (14b) are incom-
patible, solving the puzzle. Suppose now we consider one of the worlds in which p is true at t.
We can imagine possible worlds in which p is not true at t (i.e., worlds in which not-p is true
at t, assuming contradictory negation for the sake of simplicity). These worlds would have to
branch off from the p world before t. Of course, not all of the worlds that branch off before t
are worlds that have not-p true at t; some of the worlds that branch off before t make p true at t.
In general, for any interval t0 which properly includes t, there will be some worlds that branch
off from the actual world during t0 such that not-p is true at t (given, again, that t cannot be an
initial interval of t0). Now, let us further suppose that (14a) is true. Therefore on any world that
makes p true at t, there is an interval t0 such that all the worlds that branch off during t0 make q
true at some later interval. This state of affairs is given below in (15).
(15)
 
HHHHHHH H
HH H
 
q
q
q
q
 
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q Q
[ ]
t0
q
q
q
q
[p] t
H H
 
[¬p ] t
[p] t
But now notice that in a situation in which (14a) is true — that is, in which there is an interval
t0 including t such that all worlds branching off during t0 have q true at some later time — there
can still be not-p worlds among these q worlds. Two such worlds in the diagram above are
those with boldface, larger q. The existence of such worlds is inconsistent with the condition in
(14b) that all not-p worlds are worlds in which not-q will happen (assuming that q and not-q are
inconsistent). That, then, is why the be going to sentence can’t be used to make an offer. This
incompatibility with a condition on offering explains the infelicity of be going to in this context,
and is the correct characterization of the puzzle.
That this is the right approach to the puzzle becomes clear when we consider contexts in which
not-p worlds are assumed to be non-existent. In these contexts, be going to sentences don’t
sound so rude. Consider, for example, another possible billboard (you are already in Madera):
(16) We’re going to make you happy in Madera.
The sentence in (16) isn’t exactly an offer, but neither is it entirely rude. The reason it is not so
rude is that it is safe for the speaker to assume that there are no not-p worlds; that is, conceivably,
if you are already in Madera, there are no possible worlds in which you don’t want to be happy
in Madera. The utterance of (16) thus doesn’t entail that any not-p worlds are q worlds. Hence
no conﬂict emerges.
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The puzzle we began with, i.e., that be going to cannot be used to make an offer, provided
empirical support to the proposal that this construction involves two ingredients: progressive-
like aspect and a future modal. Indeed the semantic result of composing these two operators is
apparently incompatible with what it means to make an offer.
Thus we have seen that an aspectual difference between will and be going to can account for
modal differences between them. The modal semantics, we suppose, are indistinguishable,
but because there is a temporal input to the accessibility relation, a difference in aspect means
a difference in the set of worlds quantiﬁed over by the modal. In this case we saw that a
progressive future conditional If p, be going to q will typically entail that some6 not-p worlds
are q worlds, while a will conditional will not have such an entailment.
Let’s call the entailment triggered by be going to the anyway entailment, since what is conveyed
is that a q-eventuality will happen anyway whether a p-eventuality happens or not.
(17) anyway entailment: Some not-p worlds are q worlds
Conditionals that entail the anyway entailment I will term “anyway-entailing;” those that con-
ﬂict with it I will call “anyway-conﬂicting”.7
3 Scope of be going to
In this section we will see that the aspectual component of be going to provides a way to detect
scope differences among be going to conditionals. To do this, we ﬁrst need to get a bit more
precise about the logical form of the future modal. The presence of the aspectual element P
makes it clear that P, and also FUT, must be part of the consequent of the conditional. For what
drives the argument of the preceding section is the idea that all p worlds are “be going to q”
worlds at the time at which p is evaluated. That is, the antecedent p and the constituent be going
to q (= ASP FUT q) must get the same temporal argument. This is possible in a structure such
as (18a), where be going to q is a constituent. This is not possible in a structure such as (18b)
where be going to q is not a constituent, as be going to has scope over both p and q.8
(18) a. MODP
aaa a
! ! ! !
MOD
l l , ,
MOD p
ASPP
HH H
  
ASP FUTP
@ @    
FUT q
b. ASPP
PPP P
   
ASP FUTP
PPP P
   
FUT MOD
Z Z  
MOD
l l , ,
MOD p
q
narrow scope reading wide scope reading
6Actually, no other not-p worlds are accessible, so all not-p worlds under consideration are q worlds.
7Again, it will be important to remember that the semantics of conditionals, by assumption, has nothing to say
about the not-p worlds; i.e., there is nothing inherently wrong with be going to in conditionals per se. Whether a
conditional conﬂicts with the anyway entailment has rather to do with the pragmatics of the particular conditional.
8As we begin to construct trees for future conditionals, we have an immediate choice to make: Does the future
modal take two (overt) propositional arguments, as is frequently proposed for modals, or does it take only one, as
we have been assuming along with Thomason? We have no need for FUT to take two overt propositional arguments
in this case; if it needed two arguments we would have to put a null argument in. As this is unwieldy, I will continue
to assume that FUT has only one propositional argument seen by the syntax. Of course I do not mean to rule out
contextually-supplied, syntactically invisible restrictions on FUT.
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The informal meanings associated with the structures in (18) are given in (19); again, it is clear
that the reading in which be going to has narrow scope is the one we want.
(19) a. if p, q is going to happen narrow scope
b. it’s going to be like this: if p, q wide scope
To give a formal denotation for narrow scope be going to conditionals, let us assume a very
bland modal semantics for the null modal:9
(20) MOD(w)(t)(p)(q) = 1 iff ∀ w0 such that w0 is accessible from w,t and p(w0)(t):
[∃t0 ≥ q t: [q(w0)(t0) = 1]]
The denotation of a narrow be going to conditional is given in (21), and that of a wide scope be
going to conditional in (22).
(21) Narrow be going to: For any time t and world w,
= MOD(w)(t)(p)(P(FUT(q)))
= 1 if ∀w0 s.t. w0 is accessible from w,t and p(w0)(t):
[∃t0 ⊃ t: [∀ w00 s.t. w00 is accessible from w0, t0:
[∃t00> t0: [q(w00)(t00) = 1]]]]
(22) Wide be going to: For any time t and world w,
= ( P(w)(t)(FUT(MOD(p)(q)))
= 1 if ∀w0 is accessible from w,t: [∃t0 ⊃ t:
[∀ w00 s.t. w00 is accessible from w0, t0:
[∃t00> t00: [∀ w00 accessible from w0, t00
& p(w00)(t00): [∃ t000 ≥ q t00: q(w00)(t000) = 1]]]]]
Narrow scope bgt, as we have seen, does trigger the anyway entailment: worlds that branch
off during t0 may or may not be p worlds, and must be q worlds. However, wide scope bgt,
if it exists, would not trigger the anyway entailment, as it says nothing about not-p worlds. A
branching diagram for a case where a wide scope be going to if p, be going to q is given below
in (23).
(23)
 
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 
t00[p]
q
q
¬q
¬q
 
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q Q
[ ]
t0
q
q
¬q
¬q
[ ] t
H H
 
t00[p]
But is the wide scope be going to conditional reading attested anywhere? It appears that it is.
Under certain circumstances, it is in fact possible to use a be going to conditional to make an
offer, as in (24).
9≥ q, brieﬂy, would be a relation such that: if q is stative, t0 = t; if q is not stative, t0 > t. It is an old idea, in
one version or another; c.f., e.g., Condoravdi (2002).
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(24) We’re going to take good care of you before your defense.
a. If you want a manicure, we’re going to give you a manicure.
b. If you want an oil change, we’re going to give you an oil change.
These conditionals do present the manicure and the oil change as contingent on the hearer’s de-
sires. Therestillissomethingthatdoesnotdependonthehearer’sdesires; whatisnotnegotiable
in ((24)) is the idea that the speaker is going to take care of the hearer.
In addition to speaker intuitions that (24a,b)involve be going to scoping over the entire condi-
tional, there is other evidence that (24a,b) are wide scope be going to conditionals. Since an
offering reading is possible, it follows immediately that the anyway entailment is not triggered,
just as we would predict for a wide scope reading. Furthermore, the offering reading disappears
under already:
(25) If you want a manicure, we’re already going to give you a manicure. #offer
Supposing that already only takes a stative argument (Michaelis 1996), and further supposing
that our simple progressive P counts as a stativizer, already forces P to be interpreted in situ,
i.e., a narrow scope reading. Forcing the narrow scope reading causes the offering reading to
disappear; therefore the offering reading must be associated with the wide scope reading.
4 Aspect of will
So far, I have argued that will and be going to differ in the presence or absence of an aspectual
operator on the modal, and that be going to in conditionals exhibits two different scope-taking
positions. The evidence for these claims rests on the idea that an aspectual operator, located
higher than the future modal in be going to, triggers an entailment in a certain conﬁguration.
Of course we do not want to stop here; ideally we would use the same means to determine
whether will, like be going to, has two possible scope-taking positions in conditionals. We will
begin such an investigation in section 5 below, but ﬁrst it will be useful to re-examine the idea
that will has no aspectual operator. Contrary to prediction, as we will see, some will conditionals
are anyway-entailing. To explain these facts, I will posit a generic-like aspectual operator for
these instances of will.
The anyway-entailing context that will prove surprising is furnished by relevance conditionals.
Relevance conditionals are conditionals in which the antecedent seems to be a condition on
the relevance to the hearer of the information in the consequent. Two examples of relevance
conditionals are given in (26).
(26) a. If you want to know, there’s some beer in the fridge.
b. If I may be frank, Frank is not looking good.
Unlike offering contexts, relevance contexts are anyway-entailing. We can see immediately
that relevance conditionals are at least consistent with the anyway entailment; for example, the
speaker of (26a) is not committed to (27a), nor is the speaker of (26b) committed to (27b).
(27) a. If you don’t want to know, there is no beer in the fridge.
b. If I may not be frank, Frank is looking good.
Therefore, in the context in which a relevance conditional If p, q is truthfully uttered, not all not-
p worlds are not-q worlds. That is, some not-p worlds are q worlds. So relevance conditionals
9
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are anyway-entailing.
(28) Condition on relevance conditions. If p is a relevance condition on q, some not-p
worlds are q worlds.
We predict that be going to should be possible in the consequent of relevance conditionals, and
will should be impossible. While it initially may seem that a will conditional if p, will q has
nothing to say about the not-p worlds, this is not strictly true. Worlds that branch off before
the present (or in the case of be going to, before the relevant superinterval of the present) are
simply not accessible. So in a narrow scope will conditional, there will be no not-p worlds under
consideration. We might, then, expect will conditionals to trigger a presupposition failure with
respect to (28).10
The prediction seems at ﬁrst to be borne out. While the conditional in (29a), using will, is not a
good relevance conditional (but makes a ﬁne offer), the conditional in (29b), using be going to,
is a good relevance conditional (and as expected, is not a particularly good offer).
(29) a. If you want to know, we’ll go get some beer. #relevance,
√
offer
b. If you want to know, we’re going to go get some beer.
√
relevance, #offer
Interestingly, however, some will clauses are good in the consequent of relevance conditionals.
(30) a. If you really want to know, John will win.
b. If you really want to know, this comet will next be visible in 22 years.
What is responsible for these facts?
It does seem that there is something special about the felicitous anyway-entailing will condi-
tionals in (30) that wants addressing. In order for a will conditional to be anyway-entailing, the
eventuality must be viewed by the speaker as a necessary outcome of forces that have already
been set in motion and cannot be deﬂected. The same is true for will sentences that are not
conditionals, as in (31).
(31) a. Oh, she’ll show up, all right.
b. Don’t worry, the Red Sox will win.
c. It’ll work. Trust me. I know about these things.
There seems to be some ﬂavor of strong speaker certainty in these examples, though at this point
it is hard to say what exactly. That is, we would not want to say that the corresponding be going
to examples in (32) reﬂect some lesser level of certainty. In these examples, too, the speaker is
absolutely sure.
(32) a. Oh, she’s going to show up, all right.
b. Don’t worry, the Red Sox are going to win.
c. It’s going to work. Trust me. I know about these things.
Yet, nonetheless, there is a clear intuition that something about the will sentences is stronger;
somehow that they require more or better or more general evidence, or more strongly inevitable
conclusions.
10For reasons of space I have had to abbreviate this point; what is important is the idea that, contrary to any
homogeneous prediction, some will conditionals are anyway-entailing and some are anyway-conﬂicting.
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I would like to propose the hypothesis that an aspectual difference between will and be going
to is responsible for this intuition. Where be going to has an existential quantiﬁer over times,
the anyway-entailing version of will has universal quantiﬁcation. In both cases the times thus
picked out represent the times from which the worlds branch. If we suppose in this case that
the branching is epistemic branching, then we can explain why the will sentences feel stronger.
They require q to be true on epistemically accessible worlds branching off not merely from
some time overlapping the present, but from all (realis) times that overlap the present.11 This
amounts to a requirement that the evidence for the statement be of relatively long standing.
Before addressing additional evidence for this idea, some formal details. We will proceed en-
tirely in parallel to the be going to analysis, the only difference being the force of quantiﬁcation.
Theproposed“dumb”aspectualcomponentofanyway-entailingorG-willisgivenin(33), along
with a timeline diagram illustrating the set of times that p(w) must hold of for G(w)(t)(p) to be
true.12
(33) G(w)(t)(p) = 1 iff ∀t0 ⊃ t: p(w)(t0)
Combining G with FUT, our future modal, yields the following denotation.
(34) P(w)(t)(FUT(q)) = 1 iff ∀t0 ⊃ t: [FUT(w)(t0)(q) = 1]
P(w)(t)(FUT(q))= 1 if ∀t0 ⊃ t: [∀ w0 that agree with w up to t0:
[∃t00: t0< t00 and q(w0)(t00) = 1]]
And (35) represents a state of affairs in which G (w)(t)(FUT q) is true.
(35)
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As with be going to conditionals, we expect that all not-p worlds under consideration are q
worlds (shown as worlds with boldface q), thus deriving the anyway entailment for narrow
scope generic will. Why narrow scope? Again, the branching of the conditional modal MOD is
not depicted. (35) represents a single p-world on which G (FUT q) is calculated at t.
This hypothesis seems to be supported by a conﬂict between the use of will q, and the speaker’s
having just found out that q. This would be expected if the will used is G-will, where what
G-will does is universal quantiﬁcation over the contextually salient time, saying that FUT q
11Naturally there will be contextual restriction on the universal quantiﬁcation.
12As with the progressive-like operator P above, I use the single letter G in an attempt to evoke the traditional
aspectual terminology for mnemonic purposes.
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has been known all that time. The data is exempliﬁed in (36). The use of Look! in in these
examples forces a context in which the subsequent claim must follow from evidence that is new
information. (36a) and (37a) show that be going to is ﬁne in such a context; (36b) and (37b)
demonstrate that will is not.
(36) a. Look! It’s going to rain!
b. #Look! It’ll rain!
(37) a. Look! He’s going to jump!
b. #Look! He’ll jump!
When the evidence is of long standing, will is ﬁne.
(38) a. Don’t worry, it’ll rain. It always does eventually.
b. Oh, he’ll jump. He’s just that kind of person.
This is exactly what we would expect if the will in these examples is the G-future version of will.
Buttosummarizewherewearesofar: Wehaveseenthatwilldoesnotbehaveinahomogeneous
way with respect to the anyway entailment. This fact suggests two alternative theories. The
ﬁrst, which I will call the “aspectual theory”, is that will itself is aspectually ambiguous. One
version, the G-future, triggers the anyway entailment by way of universal quantiﬁcation over the
temporalargumentofthefuturemodal’saccessibilityrelation, andtheother, anaspectlessfuture
(“A-future”), has no such aspectual element.13 Both of these contrast with the P-future be going
to, which involves existential quantiﬁcation over the temporal argument of the future modal’s
accessibility relation. The second alternative, which I will call the “structural theory”, is that
there is only one aspectual value of will, namely the G-future reading. As with be going to, the
narrow scope reading is anyway-conﬂicting, and the wide scope reading is anyway-entailing.
We turn now to evaluate that alternative.
5 Scope of will
Recall that be going to, our P-future, has two different scope possibilities when in a conditional;
it can occur either inside the consequent or scoping over the entire conditional.
(39) a. MODP
aaa a
! ! ! !
MOD
l l , ,
MOD p
ASPP
HH H
  
ASP FUTP
@ @    
FUT q
b. ASPP
PPP P
   
ASP FUTP
PPP P
   
FUT MOD
Z Z  
MOD
l l , ,
MOD p
q
narrow scope reading wide scope reading
13Would there be any aspect on “aspectless” will? Semantically there has to be at least a binding off of the
temporal variable, which could be done by an unpronounced aspectual element:
(i) A = lplw . ∃t:[p(w)(t)]
Or it could be done by existential closure. Morphosyntactically, of course, there is no evidence for or against an
aspectual head in either the A cases or the G cases.
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Likewise, we might expect G-will to have these scope possibilities, with G swapped in for P as
the ASP head. Then the narrow scope reading would be anyway-entailing, and the wide scope
reading would be anyway-conﬂicting, as in the be going to conditionals. There would be no
need to posit two different aspectual values for will; G-will could do it all.
As initially satisfying as the structural account seems, there are a couple of reasons not to be
satisﬁed with it. The ﬁrst reason is that this theory has no principled way to explain the fact that
wide scope will is much more natural as an offer than wide scope be going to. If we were to
return to the aspectual theory, with an aspectually ambiguous will, we would at least be able to
say that the aspectual futures be going to and G-will prefer to occur as narrow scope for some
reason, and the aspectless future A-will prefers wide scope. There is still no principled reason,
but at least the data are split into natural classes.
The second reason we should not be satisﬁed with the structural theory is that the wide scope
G-future meaning simply does not seem to correspond to the meaning of will as it is used in
offers. While the G-future semantics requires quantiﬁcation over all the worlds that branch off
within a contextually-speciﬁed interval, offering will seems intuitively to involve a “spur of the
moment” decision. Indeed, will offers contrast with the wide scope be going to offers in that
respect.
Thus it appears that the structural theory is not the one we want. We return to the aspectual
theory, in which will is aspectually ambiguous, to see if that theory can be more satisfying. First
we will develop a way to determine the scope of A-will in offers and G-will in inevitable will
readings, based on whether the antecedent is obligatory or not.
The presence of Mod and its antecedent p is crucial to the wide scope readings. By composi-
tionality, the only antecedentless structure possible should be (40):
(40) ASPP
HH H
  
ASP FUTP
@ @    
FUT q
Semantically this structure should always behave like a narrow scope reading rather than a wide
scope reading in triggering the anyway entailment that all not-p worlds are q worlds, because
for any p, whether or not p, q. Thus narrow scope readings should be able to occur either with or
without an antecedent, while wide scope readings should only be possible with an antecedent.
To detect an antecedent, we can rely on intuitions about whether the consequent is contingent on
some other eventuality happening, or whether it will happen regardless. As per the discussion in
section 1, it looks like offering will is wide scope, with the offer being contingent on the hearer’s
desires. What we might call “inevitable will” must conversely be narrow scope, because the
eventuality’s happening is not contingent on anything.
(41) a. We’ll change your oil in Madera. offering will
b. Don’t worry, it’ll rain. inevitable will
This is the same result the structural theory suggested. But in the structural theory, we expected
wide scope to correlate with anyway-conﬂict, and narrow scope to correlate with anyway-
entailment. In the aspectual theory, we do not expect such a correlation. That is, we expect
to ﬁnd a wide scope G-will conditional, and a narrow scope A-will conditional (or, failing that,
a good reason why one or the other or both do not exist).
In fact there exists a good candidate for a wide scope G-will conditional. Consider the sentence
in (42). It has two readings, paraphrased in (42a) and (42b). One is the familiar inevitable will;
13
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the other is commonly called “dispositional will”. The readings also differ in truth value, as
(42a) is false, while (42b) is true.
(42) Dogs will eat doughnuts.
a. That’s the way dogs are; there’s nothing you can do about it. inevitable will
b. If you give a dog a doughnut, it will eat it. dispositional will
The ﬁrst reading is not contingent upon anything; the second is contingent on something. Thus
the ﬁrst reading (as before) should be narrow scope, and the second reading should be wide
scope. The similarity between offering will and dispositional will conditionals is even more
striking if we interpret (42b) as a kind of dispositional standing offer: Generally, if you want
them to, dogs will happily oblige you and eat doughnuts.
The modal semantics also seems to be appropriate for G-will. (41b) says that generally, these
days, any world where you give the dog a doughnut is one where it eats it. (42) That is, the
quantiﬁcation is over all normal worlds that branch off during a contextually speciﬁed interval
that overlaps the present.
Therefore it appears that we have a good candidate for a wide scope G-will conditional, which
supports the aspectual theory rather than the structural theory. We would also then wonder
whether narrow scope readings of A-will conditionals exist. A reexamination of the data in
(36)a and (37)b above suggests that they may not. For if they did exist, unlike G-will readings,
we would not expect them to be ruled out in the relevant contexts. Hence we would not expect
infelicity in these examples. Since there is infelicity, we conclude that only G-will is possible
with narrow scope. If this is true, we should look for a principled reason why A-will is not
possible in narrow scope conditionals.
6 Conclusions
I have presented evidence that futures such as will and be going to have aspectual components
to their meaning. These aspectual components interact with future modality by modifying the
temporal argument to the modal’s accessibility relation. This has the effect of altering the set
of worlds over which the modal quantiﬁes. These modal differences support a theory in which
there are three different aspectual variations, and two different scope positions for futures in
conditionals. The presence of aspect on modals therefore provides us with a new tool with
which to investigate the logical form of conditionals.
One question deserving of further investigation is whether there are any correlations or depen-
dencies between aspect or scope and the modal base for the future modal. For instance, we saw
in section 4 above that the wide scope G-future apparently has an epistemic modal base. While
this topic is omitted from this paper for reasons of space, it is omitted for reasons of space only;
it would be instructive to see how the choice of aspect or scope constrains the choice of modal
base for the future modal, and why.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the explanations explored here absolutely require a modal
analysis of will and be going to. Central to the explanation of the data is the idea that a higher
aspect affects the temporal argument of the modal’s accessibility relation, If instead we were
to begin from a tense analysis of these futures (see Hornstein (1990), Condoravdi (2001) for
discussion of such an analysis in comparison with modal analyses), it is difﬁcult to see how the
facts presented here could be explained at all.
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Abstract
In this paper we ﬁrst combine and reﬁne the semantics of questions and answers (Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof 1984) and the logic of interrogation (Groenendijk 1999) in order to
deal with topical restriction, constituent answerhood and conditional questions in a compo-
sitional way. The proposal builds on insights from the structured meanings approaches to
questions (von Stechow 1991; Krifka 1991). We next present a global, pragmatic perspec-
tive on the use of such questions and answers, which founds and furthers work of (B¨ uring
1999; Ginzburg 1996; Roberts 1996) on information structure.
1 Introduction
Questions (interrogative utterances) have been studied from both a semantic and a pragmatic
perspective, more than indicative sentences have been, and for good reasons. While the inter-
pretation of questions depends on context as much as the interpretation of assertions does, their
effectsuponthecontextaremoreobvious,ofcourse. A questionnormallywantstobeanswered.
Even so, indicative utterances have also been studied from a combined semantic/pragmatic per-
spective in recent systems of dynamic semantics and discourse representation theory. Clearly,
this suggests a treatment of both types of utterances in tandem.
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984) has already given a ﬁrst, and very appealing, systematic
treatment of the semantics and pragmatics of questions and answers. This approach elaborates
on the idea that the linguistic content of assertions can be speciﬁed in terms of their truth condi-
tions, and the content of questions in terms of their answerhood conditions. Truth conditions are
deﬁned by thesituationsor possibilitiesin which a sentence counts as true, rather than false, and
answerhood conditions are deﬁned by the set of full, and mutually exclusive, possible answers
to a question (the partition theory). Building on (J¨ ager 1996), (Groenendijk 1999) has cast this
approach in a dynamic framework, which elaborates that of (Veltman 1996).
These partition theories, however, fail to account for at least two crucial aspects of the in-
terpretation of questions and subsequent assertions. First, elliptical answers to yes/no-questions
and constituent answers to wh-questions are not really compositionallydealt with. Second, only
direct answers to explicitquestions are fully dealt with, not partial or conditionalreplies, neither
conditional questions or questions which do not stand in need of full replies.
With this paper we want to overcome both limitations. We ﬁrst present a more reﬁned
notion of what are satisfying questions and answers (section 2). Our notion of a satisfying ques-
tion incorporates (empirical) insights from the structured meaning approaches to questions (von
∗The research for this work is supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research
(NWO), which is gratefully acknowledged.
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, GermanyStechow 1991; Krifka1991), whileit preserves the logicaland conceptual meritsof thepartition
theories (section 3). This semantic system is next lifted to a pragmatic setting, which allows for
a contextual deﬁnition of what counts as an optimal discourse and what is a reasonable contri-
bution to a discourse (section 4). Basic notions from theories of information structure like that
of (B¨ uring 1999; Ginzburg 1996; Roberts 1996) will be given a rational pragmatic explanation.
Section 5 winds up the results.
2 Satisfaction Semantics for Questions and Answers
We take our start from a truth-conditional ﬁrst order semantics in the spirit of Frege and Tarski.
Like the latter, we will not say that a formula f denotes 1, or true, relative to some sequence
of parameters like that of a model M, a variable assignment g, a sequence of witnesses~ e, or
a world w, but we will say that such a sequence of parameters satisﬁes f, e.g., M,g,~ e,w |= f.
Since our initial investigations are extensional, we will omit reference to the world parameter w
in the ﬁrst half of the paper. Also, since the treatment of indeﬁnites and pronouns is not directly
relevant for the issues at stake here, we will generally omit the witness parameter~ e.1 In the ﬁrst
part models M thus consist of a domain of individuals D, and an interpretation function V for
the interpretation of the (individual and relational) constants of our language, and we generally
write M(c) forV(c) if M = hD,Vi.
The ﬁrst order language is extended with a question operator ?, which allows us to form
inquisitive expressions ?~ xf which question the value of a possible empty sequence of variables
~ x = x1...xn in a sentential expression f. A true novelty is that our language is fully recursive:
questions may occur in the scope of a negation, conjunction or of other question operators. If
an expression f does not contain any question operator we will call it indicativeand also write it
as !f; otherwise f is inquisitive. Furthermore, if f is indicative, ?f is a polar (yes/no) question;
if ~ x is non-empty, then ?~ xf is a constituent (Wh-) question. The Language of Questions and
Answers LQA is deﬁned in Backus-Naur Form:
• f ::= Rt1...tn | [∃~ xf] | ∼f | f∧y | ?~ xf
Expressionsf ofLQA areevaluatedrelativeto amodelM, an assignmentg and apossiblyempty
sequence of answers~ a to the questions posed in f. The semantics for inquisitive expressions is
built on the classical insight (Hamblin 1958; Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984)
that the meaning of a question is its full and complete answer but we combine this with the
insightfrom thestructuredmeaningsandthedynamicsemanticframeworksthattheseassertions
and answers can be structured objects themselves.
For instance, a question ?~ xf gets satisﬁed by the answer to the question which sequences
of individuals can be the values of~ x in f. If~ x consists of one variable x only, as in ?xCx (Who
come?), it asks for the extension of C; if~ x = xy consists of two variables, as in ?xy(Bx∧(Gy∧
Sxy)) (Which boys saw which girls?), it asks for the set of pairs consisting of a boy and a girl the
boy saw2; if~ x is the empty sequence, as in ?p (Does it rain?) it asks for the truth value of p: it
denotes the set {l} consisting of the empty sequence l = h i only, which is the truth value true
(1) by deﬁnition, or the empty set { }, the truth value false (0). (We use capital L for the empty
sequence of answers, for instance when we specify the satisfaction of indicative expressions.)
As a matter of convention, when we consider the possible answers ~ a = a1,...,an to a
1The basic ingredients of such extensions are discussed in detail in (Dekker 2002a; Dekker 2003).
2As we will argue later in this paper, this is not an entirely accurate renderingof the associated natural language
question, for which-phrases should be taken to presuppose their domain, the denotation of the associated common
noun phrase.
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84question f, we always assume in this paper that f asks n questions q1,...,qn and such that each
ai has the same type as qi. In the semantics we use a product Õ and a complement operator C
and the usual interpretation of (individual and relational) constants c and variables x:
• Õ(a1...an) = a1×...×an (n possibly 0)
C(a1...an) =C(a1)...C(an) (n ≥ 1)
[c]M,g = M(c) and [x]M,g = g(x)
Deﬁnition 1 (Satisfaction Semantics for LQA)
• M,g,L |= Rt1...tn iff h[t1]M,g,...,[tn]M,gi ∈ [R]M,g
M,g,~ a |= ∼f iff ∀ ~ e: if M,g,~ e |= f then~ a =C( ~ e)
[M,g,~ a |= ∃~ xf iff ∃~ e: M,g[~ x/~ e],~ a(~ e) |= f]
M,g, ~ ae |= f∧y iff M,g,~ e |= f and M,g,~ a |= y
M,g,a |= ?~ xf iff a = {~ e·~ e0 | ∃ ~ e: M,g[~ x/~ e],~ e |= f &~ e0 ∈ Õ~ e}
We cannot explain this deﬁnition in full detail here, but we leave it at a few comments. First,
satisfaction of indicative expressions is completely standard, for atomic formulas have their
ordinary satisfaction conditions and this property is preserved under the indicative operators:
Observation 1 (Satisfaction of Indicatives)
• M,g,L |= ∼!f iff M,g,L 6|= !f3
[M,g,L |= ∃x!f iff ∃d: M,g[x/d],L |= !f]
M,g,L |= !f∧!y iff M,g,L |= !f and M,g,L |= !y
The indicative part of our system thus is classical, as it should be. Simple questions are treated
in a fairly standard way as well:
Observation 2 (Satisfaction of Simple Questions)
• M,g,1 |= ?!f iff M,g,L |= !f iff M,g,0 6|= ?!f
M,g,a |= ?x!f iff a = {d | M,g[x/d],L |= !f}
M,g,a |= ?xy!f iff a = {hd,d0i | M,g[x/d][y/d0],L |= !f}
Yes is the true and complete answer to a polar question Does it rain? if and only if it rains.
The true and complete answers to the questions Which boys come? and Which professors failed
which students? consist of a speciﬁcation of the set of boys who come, and the set of professor-
student pairs which stand in the fail relation, respectively.
Indicatives and simple inquisitives are, thus, treated in a standard fashion. What is really new is
that questions can be embedded in questions or under other operators. We brieﬂy discuss two
very useful applications of this phenomenon. Let us deﬁne a conditional ⇒ so that f ⇒ y ≡
∼(f∧∼y), the difference with classical deﬁnitions of material implication residing in the fact
that the expressions f and y can be inquisitive. Now look at conditional questions of the form
!f ⇒ ?~ xy. Applying the above deﬁnition of our satisfaction conditions we get:
Observation 3 (Simple Conditional Questions)
• M,g,a |= (!f ⇒ ?~ xy) iff if M,g,L |= !f then M,g,a |= ?~ xy
3Since L does not exist M,g,L |= ∼!f iff nothing satisﬁes !f.
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(1) If we throw a party tonight, will you come?
Clearly, neither of the answers Yes and No should entail that we throw a party tonight. Intu-
itively, the two replies state that, Yes, if you throw a party tonight I will come and No, if you
throw a party tonight I will not come, respectively. This is precisely what we ﬁnd in observation
(3).4 Something essentially similar goes for conditional constituent questions. Consider:
(2) If it rains, who will come?
(3) John and Mary, but not Dick and Trix.
The answer to the above question should be understood to claim that John and Mary come if it
rains, and that Dick and Trix do not come if it rains. Clearly, the answer can be perfectly ﬁne
when Dick and Trix do show up, and John and Mary don’t, that is, in case it does not rain. The
results are again like those argued for by (Velissaratou 2000). The difference is that they are
obtained in a direct and compositional fashion here.5
The possibilityof embedding questions in questions is another useful application of our system.
If a formula f is already inquisitive, then ?~ xf not only queries the possible values of~ x, but also
the answers to the embedded questions. Thus we ﬁnd for instance that:
Observation 4 (Question Aborption)
• ?~ x?~ yy ⇔ ?~ xyy
• ?~ x(f∧?~ yy) ⇔ ?~ xy(f∧y)
The ﬁrst equation in observation (4) shows that the polyadic question-operator can be deﬁned
compositionally itself, for ?x1...xnf ⇔ ?x1...?xnf. The second equation shows an even more
attractive feature of our system. Question operators absorb embedded questions which is to say
that embedded question operators can be ‘bound’ by embedding ones. This is very attractive.
In previous systems like that of, e.g., (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984), the meaning of example
(4) is relatively adequately speciﬁed as (5) but it is not compositional since (5) does not really
reﬂect the intuitive syntactic structure of (4):
(4) Which boys saw which girls?
(5) ?xy(Bx∧(Gy∧Sxy))
Our system improves on this, since the more compositional analysis of (4) as (6) turns out
equivalent with (5):
(6) ?x(Bx∧?y(Gy∧Sxy))
The fact that we can appropriately analyze (4) as (6) clearly draws from two innovations. First,
we allow questions to ﬁgure in conjunctions and in the scope of other question operators; sec-
4A persistentnumberof authorsclaims that conditionalsentencesoughtto address a strict, ratherthan a weaker,
material, notion of implication. This issue is orthogonal to the present discussion. Even if we favor a strict
interpretation of conditional sentences, saying Yes to question (1) says that our throwing a party tonight strictly
implicates that you will come, whereas saying No says that it strictly entails that you will not come. Replying with
No certainly does not mean that our throwing a party tonight does not strictly implicate that you will come.
5As observedby Velissaratou!f⇒?!y can be answeredby bothYes andNo provided,of course, that !f is false.
As a matter of fact, !f ⇒ ?~ x!y can be answered by any answer a of the right type. This means that a conditional
question becomes totally useless if its antecedent turns out to be false. The truth of the antecedent clause thus is a
pragmatic, and cancelable, presupposition.
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the intended interpretation (5), as observation (4) shows.6
3 Logic and Pragmatics of Questions and Answers
The system discussed in the previous section is innovative because of its successful composi-
tional treatment of conditional and constituent questions, but it still contains all the goodies of
the standard theories of questions. As we will see, all important notions of the standard theory
of questions can be derived. Apart from this, the additional underlying structure which we as-
sume has the type of structure required to solve some basic problems for the classical theories:
the treatment of elliptical and constituent answers.
We build on the relatively standard idea that contents of assertions and information states
can be characterized by means of sets of possibilities, those possibilities compatible with these
assertions or states, and that questions can be taken to (pseudo-)partition these states. The
elements of such partitions indicate the relevant distinctions. Agents are interested in knowing
which of the elements of a partition correspond to the real world, and they are supposed to be
insensitive to differences between possibilities which reside in one block.
Talk about possibilities requires us to generalize the extensional models we used above to
intensional models M = hW,D,Vi consisting of a set of worlds W, a domain of individuals D,
and an interpretation function V for the constants of our language, and such that for any world
w ∈W: M w =hD,Vwi isanextensionalmodel. Structured informationstatesarerendered as sat-
isfaction sets S which consist of sequences of answers~ a plus worlds w such that w is conceived
possible and~ a, in w, provides the complete answers to outstanding questions. Satisfaction sets
allow us to deﬁne relatively standard notions of content, answerhood and indifference:
Deﬁnition 2 (Content, Answerhood, and Indifference)
• [[f]]M,g = {~ aw |Mw,g,~ a |= f} (content of f)
D(S) = {w | ∃~ a: ~ aw ∈ S} (data of S)
A(S) = { {w |~ aw ∈ S} |~ av ∈ S} (possible answers)
I(S) = {hv,wi | ∃~ a: ~ av ∈ S &~ aw ∈ S} (indifference)
The content, or data, D(S) of a satisfaction set S is simply modeled as the set of not (yet)
excluded possibilities. Like in (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984), A(S) groups together possi-
bilities in which the same answer to pertaining questions can be given. Indeed, these groups
themselves constitute the propositions (sets of possible worlds) which count as propositional
answers to these questions. Like in (Groenendijk 1999), I(S) relates any two possibilities in
D(S) the difference between which is considered immaterial.
The classical notions of answerhood and indifference have two major beneﬁts. They
combine a fully straightforward logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984) with a strong intuitive
6Inone respect(5)or(6) donotreally capturethe intuitiveinterpretationof (4),in particularthe presuppositions
associated with which-phrases. In (Dekker 2003)I have shown how to lift the present ﬁrst order system to a system
which hosts generalized quantiﬁers, and which deals with their domain presuppositions. Like all other quantiﬁers,
which-phrases as in WHICH(A)(B) can be said to presuppose a witness domain of A’s, and to question which
individuals in this domain are also B’s. In this way we can easily account for the otherwise problematic difference
between the following two questions (from Heim 1994):
(7) Which males are bachelor?
(8) Which bachelors are male?
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notion of entailment for questions and answers in one gloss:
Deﬁnition 3 (Support)
• f |=M,g y iff I([[fM,g]]) ⊆ I([[yM,g]])
An expression f entails or supports y iff it provides more data and poses more questions. For
two indicative expressions this boils down to classical entailment, and for two inquisitive ex-
pressions f and y we ﬁnd that the former entails the latter iff every complete answer to the ﬁrst
also completely answers the second. But also mixtures as possible. For instance, an indica-
tive expression !f entails an inquisitive expression ?~ xy iff it fully answers the question. The
following observation summarizes the results:
Observation 5 (Answerhood and Entailment)
• p∧q |= p ∀xCx |=Ca
?p∧?q |= ?p ?xCx |= ?Ca
p∧q |= ?p ∀xCx |= ?xCx
(If f is inquisitive, and y indicative, the ﬁrst only entails the latter iff the latter is trivially
true.) Other interesting mixtures involve conditional questions, which again appear to be fully
well-behaved:
Observation 6 (Conditional Entailment)
• ?q |= p ⇒ ?q ?p 6|= p ⇒ ?q
q |= p ⇒ ?q p 6|= p ⇒ ?q
¬q |= p ⇒ ?q ¬p |= p ⇒ ?q
It may be of interest to note that we also have a deduction theorem for conditional questions:
Observation 7 (Deduction Theorem)
• !f |= ?~ xy iff |= !f ⇒ ?~ xy
Not only logically, but also decision-theoretically, answerhood and indifference are intuitively
well-behaved. Suppose you want to cycle to the beach if the sun shines, and go to the cinema
otherwise. Not knowing what the weather is like, you face a decision problem. What to do?
Prepare the bikes or reserve tickets? Indeed, asking whether the sun shines may provide one
way towards solving the decision problem. By means of such a question you indicate you are
interested in the issue whether the world is like those in which the sun shines, or like those in
which it doesn’t. Indeed, as soon as you know which of these two ways the world is like, you
know what to do. The same goes for constituent questions. Your decision to go to the party
tonight may very well depend on who will be there. Some candidate visitors may make it into
a great success, while the attendance of certain others may very well guarantee a safe disaster.
Thus, thequestion Who will visit theparty?—which queries theexact conﬁguration of attending
people—is relevant to your decision to go there yourself.7
7It should be noticed, though, that, strictly speaking,the question shouldbe who would be there if I come, since
I have not yet answered that question myself and since I am not interested in who come if I don’t come. We will
come back to this issue below.
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proaches, but indeed we need, and have, more if we want to come up with a pragmatically
adequate notion of answerhood. Suppose that all of my background knowledge can be sum-
marized by a theory !F, and if, given that background knowledge, I want to know whether q.
In that case, of course, my question is not whether !F∧q or !F∧¬q. My question really is
!F ⇒ ?q, and observation (6) shows that the question ?q, as well as the possible answers q and
¬q, support that question, like, of course, !F ⇒ q and !F ⇒ ¬q do. This naturally follows from
our treatment of conditional questions.
A formal exercise also shows that our notion of content (deﬁnition 2) has more structure
than the standard notions of answerhood and indifference and it can be argued that it has the
additional type of structure which is minimally needed to deal with elliptical or constituent
answers. Consider, for instance, the following questions (the second one from Zeevat, p.c.):
(9) Is Harry there?
Is Harry not there?
(10) Who wants an ice-cream?
Who does not want an ice-cream?
These questions are pairwise equivalent from both a logical and a decision-theoretical perspec-
tive. Any full answer to the ﬁrst (second) question of each pair provides a full answer to the
second (ﬁrst) question of that pair. However, practically or pragmatically these questions are
different. For instance, if the answer to the ﬁrst question of (10) is Rick it will be taken to mean
that Rick wants an ice-cream; as an answer to the second question of (10) it will be taken to
mean that Rick does not want an ice-cream. Quite a difference indeed.8 However, if we use our
richer notion of content, these examples can be adequately dealt with in a straightforward way.
Since our notion of satisfying contents employs the full answers to a pertaining question, it can
be used to constrain the interpretation of subsequent constituent answers. In (Dekker 2002b)
I have given a fully general deﬁnition of topical restriction and constituent answerhood which
uniformly deals with answers to (9) and (10). The only, non-trivial, assumption is that topics,
or questions, are modeled as abstracts in the way they are modeled here. In reply to a question
like (13), the answer (14) can be interpreted fully compositionally as (15):
(13) Who will go to the party?
(14) John.
(15) John will go to the party.
This is certainly not a trivial result, even more, since the very same analysis renders the replies
(17) and (19) to (16) directly equivalent with (18) and (20), respectively.
(16) Does Alice want more sandwiches?
(17) Yes.
(18) Alice wants more sandwiches.
(19) No.
(20) Alice does not want more sandwiches.
8This example indeed shows a striking resemblance with (a variant of) Partee’s famous marble case. While the
following two sentences are logically (truth-conditionally)equivalent, they have different pragmatic ‘overtones’:
(11) Exactly ﬁve of the nine soldiers were killed.
Exactly four of the nine soldiers survived.
The difference shows up when the assertion of any one of these examples is followed by the statement that:
(12) They will be buried.
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Quite a few of the issues discussed above, and certainly the literature about them, directly or
indirectly address the question what is a relevant question or assertion. Most of the formal
semantic literature addresses this issue from a local perspective, by focusing in on the question
what is a direct answer to an explicit question, or on what discourse relations may exist between
two immediately successive utterances. In this section we advocate a global perspective which
more accurately formalizes the pragmatic program initiated by (Grice 1975).
We think it is dubious theoretic practice to try and study any two subsequent utterances,
and deﬁne, in terms of them, what discourse relation holds between the two. Of course, stating
that John comes to the party, and no other students do can be relevant in response to a question
Who will come to the party?, but almost any other utterance (indicative or inquisitive) can be
relevant as well. This has already been noticed in (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984), and (van
Rooy 1999) gives a decision-theoretic explanation of the facts, in quantitative terms. We will
argue here that an intuitive, qualitative explanation can be furthered.
One of Grice’s aims was to show that certain general principles constrain and guide the
intention and interpretation of utterances of (linguistic) agents which are deemed rational and
cooperative. Theassumptionofrationalcooperativebehaviouradvancestheagentsinvolvedina
conservationto obey, orto pretend to obey, the maximsof quality, quantity,relation and manner.
These maxims require a speaker not to say things for which she lacks adequate evidence, not
to say more nor less than is required for the purposes of the conversation, to advance relevant
propositions, and to be well-behaved.
These maxims can be understood and formalized in the following way. A game of in-
formation exchange consist in getting one’s questions answered in a reliable and pleasant way.
Interlocutors are therefore assumed to produce a multi-speaker dialogue F which is deemed
optimal iff F answers their questions, while its contents are supported by the information the
interlocutors have, and F is optimal. Grice’s maxims can be (partly) formalized as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 (Optimal Inquiry) Given a set of interlocutors A with states (s)i∈A a discourse
F = f1,...,fn is optimal iff:
• ∀i ∈ A: D([[F]])∩D(si) |= si (relation) T
i∈AD(si) |= D([[F]]) (quality)
F is minimal (quantity)
F is well-behaved (manner)
The maxim of relation requires an optimal discourse to answer all questions of all interlocutors.
The information provided by F is hoped to answer the questions in any state si. The maxim of
quality requires these answers to be supported by the data which the interlocutors had to begin
with.9 The maxims of quantity and manner are deliberately left underspeciﬁed.10
9Some subtle notes should be added to this maxim. First, of course, in the course of a dialogue things happen
and change, and these facts should be taken into account. For instance, after I told you that it rains, it is a fact that I
have told you so, but it is not a fact I need to report on. Normally I don’t need to tell you that I have told you that it
rains. Second, in principle I could provide information which other people have themselves, but of course it would
be better if they did themselves.
10A discourse can be minimal in the sense of digits produced, or in the sense of processing efforts required to
generate and understand it, etc. In theory, and in practice, we cannot decide on the precise measures, but we have
to negotiateit. For computationalpurposes,of course, we cannotleave this notionunderspeciﬁed,but then we have
to relate it to the maxim of being well-behaved, which crucially relies on the objectives of the implementation.
Paul Dekker Satisfying Questions
90When agents engage in a cooperative conversation, it is reasonable that they make clear
what questions they have, and that they provide information which they have support for. The
above notion of an optimal inquiry accounts for this, but it also serves to guide agents to a
dialoguein which the conditions are not guaranteed to be optimal. Let us ﬁrst look at an optimal
situation. Suppose A wishes to know whether Sue comes to the party (?s), and B wants to know
whether Tim comes to the party (?t), and assume that each of them knows the answer to the
other one’s question. The two information states can be deﬁned as follows:
• s = {[[t]]∩[[s]],[[t]]\[[s]]}
• t = {[[s]]∩[[t]],[[s]]\[[t]]}
The following dialogue is optimal then:
(21) A: Will Sue come?
B: Yes.
Will Tim come?
A: No.
Both questions are answered, by information which was initially there distributed over the two
initial information states.
Example (21) can be used to show that some standard felicity requirements (like informa-
tivity, non-redundancy, consistency, and congruence of answers with questions) can be derived
from the maxims we have stated above. More interestingly, these maxims can also be used to
explain why certain dialogues are perfectly reasonable also if certain expressions are not direct
replies to questions posed just before. The examples which we discuss in the remainder of
this section ﬁt our notion of an optimal discourse, while they do not comply with notions of
relevance or congruence proposed in localistic discourse grammars.
Consider the following sequence of utterances of A through D:
(22) A: Who were at the awards?
...
A: Who of the Bee Gees?
B: Robin and Barry but not Maurice.
A: Who of the Jackson Five?
C: Jackie, Jermain and Michael, but not Marlon and Tito.
A: Who of Kylie Minogue?
D: Kylie Minogue.
A: OK, I know enough!
The main question of our interrogator A cannot be fully answered directly by any of the partici-
pants. But we see it makes sense for her to cut up her question into subquestions in the sense of
(B¨ uring 1999; Ginzburg 1996; Roberts 1996), which, in this case, can be answered. By posing
these subquestions the superquestion may get answered, so it is an orderly way of getting to the
main goal. Interestingly, subquestions are senseless in a framework like that of (Groenendijk
1999), where they are rendered superﬂuous, and, thus, impertinent.
Counterquestions, or ‘side questions’ as Jefferson calls them, also ﬁt neatly in our model. We
do not need discourse or answerhood relations to explain why the sequence of the ﬁrst two of
the following four utterances is sensible:
(23) Waitress: What’ll ya have girls?
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Waitress: Clam chowder.
Customer: I’ll have a bowl of clam chowder and a salad with Russian dressing.
Clearly, the envisaged answer to the customer’s question is needed to help the customer to
answer the waitress’s question. If we take into account what is the information and what are
the interests of the interlocutors, this can be readily explained. But surely there is no linguistic
relation between the ﬁrst two utterances here.
We have already discussed conditional questions, and it should be clear what sense they make.
Consider:
(24) A: Do you like to go to the party?
B: If I go to the party, will prof. Schmull be there?
Clearly, if B poses his question B wants to know about prof. Schmull’s expected attendance in
situations where B also goes. Apparently, B does not presuppose that he is going, assuming that
he asks this question in order to motivate his decision whether to go to the party or not. In the
model presented above this makes perfect sense, because B wants to know whether he is in a
situation where prof. Schmull comes if he comes—in case he decides not to go to the party—,
or in a situation where this is not so—in case he decides to go. This seems very rational, but
indeed it seems very difﬁcult to think of a linguistic or grammatical relation between the two
utterances which could explain the relevance of B’s question as a reply to A’s original invitation.
The most interesting cases are those in which people pose questions which are more speciﬁc
than the ones they personally face. Formally they ask for more information than they need. Out
of the blue one would think that this doesn’t make sense, but the general model sketched above
suggests and covers cases in which this is perfectly reasonable. We sketch two such case, one
more formal, and one more intuitive.
Let the actual world be a simple 2×2 chessboard with agent A at position a1, as in: ￿￿ ￿￿ R .
A knows she is on the chessboard, but she does not care at which position she is, although she
does care whether she is at a black or a white square. Her intentional state can be characterized
as follows: s = { {￿￿ ￿￿ R , ￿￿ ￿￿
I } , {￿￿ ￿￿
￿ , ￿￿ ￿￿￿ } }. Her addressee B does know on which position
A is, but she does not know what the chessboard looks like. Given that B does not have any
questions himself, his intentional state can be characterized as: t = { {￿￿ ￿￿ R , ￿￿ ￿￿ R } }. Now the
following discourse unfolds:
(25) A: Am I on a black square?
B: I don’t know.
A: On which square am I?
B: You’re on a1.
A: Then I am on a black square.
This discourse is perfectly reasonable because A ﬁrst asks what she wants to know, and B indi-
cates he doesn’t know the answer and then A asks something more speciﬁc than she wants to
know, but something which does entail her question. B has a motivated reply to that question,
and indeed this turns out to answer A’s original question.
The previous example is a bit artiﬁcial, and it could be amended. For, as we already
remarked above, A’s ‘real’ question is whether, given that she is right, she is on a black square,
or more precisely whether she is on a1 or b2 if these are the black ﬁelds indeed. By the same
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counterquestion What colour is a1, which is your current position? But in practice it is not
always obvious to see what is the optimal reply or question. The following example will show
this in some more detail.
Consider the following situation. There is a party which may be visited by, apart from
the speaker S, the professors Arms A, Baker B, Charms C, and Dipple D, which gives 24 = 16
conﬁgurations. S’s decision to go or not will be based on the question whether it is useful to
do so, and it is going to be useful if S can speak to professor A or C. So A or C must be there,
but there are some further complications. If, besides A, B is there as well she will absorb A if B
doesn’t absorb C, that is, if C is not absorbed by D; furthermore, if neither B and C are present,
D will absorb A. The following table lists the conﬁgurations under which it is useful for S to go:
• C&D C&¬D ¬C&D ¬C&¬D
A& B - + - -
A&¬B + + - +
¬A& B - - - -
¬A&¬B - + - -
Our speaker S only wants to know if she is in a + or − situation, and she could ask:
(26) Will it be useful to go to the party?
but probably her addressee T does not know about which conﬁguration is useful. So S can
formulate the contents of the above table in the form of a polar question, a positive answer to
which would mean that she is in a + type world, and a negative answer the opposite. Indeed
something like the following yes/no question would do:
(27) (A AND [(B AND C AND ¬D) OR (¬B AND (D →C))]) OR
(C AND ¬B AND ¬D)?
Apparently, this is somewhat cumbersome question. Alternatively it would do to simply ask:
(28) Who come?
Any full answer to this question would answer S’s main question, but notice that this question
(28) is more speciﬁc than the question she has. Nevertheless (28) is a much more efﬁcient
means than (27) for S to solve her decision problem.
Interestingly, if the addressee T understands a question like Who come? as a superques-
tion of the real question Will S have reason to go? he can attune his answer to the real one.
That is, in stead of providing a full (exhaustive) answer to the explicit question, he might give
one which he thinks sufﬁces to solve S’s basic question. This, we suggest, makes up the reason
and rationale for providing non-exhaustive answers, and, therefore, for posing non-exhaustive
questions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a minimal satisfaction semantics for a language with indicatives
and interrogatives. It is new because it is fully recursive and allows us to deal with conditional
questions and elliptical answers in a fully compositional way. We have next indicated how to
employ this system to understand informative or inquisitive dialogues. The main conclusion is
that such dialogues should be apprehended from a global perspective, which takes into account
Paul Dekker Satisfying Questions
93the information and intentions of the dialogue participants, rather than from a local perspective,
which focuses on local discourse relations only.
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Abstract
In recent years it has turned out that only a subclass of indeﬁnites can scope out of
syntactic islands. As data from German suggests, this class corresponds to the class of
quantiﬁers that can be interpreted as topics and therefore it seems to be desirable to corre-
late topicality and speciﬁcity (i.e. wide scope). In this paper, we will argue that the spe-
ciﬁc interpretation of indeﬁnites is the result of the application of an illocutionary operator
TopAssert (Topic Assert) to sentences in order to update a common ground. As a conse-
quence of this operation, the topic-marked constituent receives wide scope and relates to the
rest of the clause in a way that corresponds to the intuitive content of the notion of about-
ness topic. Thus the ability to be a topic and to be interpreted speciﬁcally is reduced to the
application of one and the same operation to the respective constituents. For this reason,
we predict that only those quantiﬁers that can take wide scope out of syntactic islands can
be topics. The observation that wide scope phenomena are restricted to only a subclass of
quantiﬁers (and even indeﬁnites) will be explained by a Topic Condition. This condition
tests the lexical semantics of quantiﬁers and determines the applicability of TopAssert on
the basis of a comparison of the aboutness and familiarity deﬁnitions we propose.
1 Data
In this section we want to show that the class of those quantiﬁers, which can take wide scope
out of islands, and the class of quantiﬁers, which can inhabit topical positions (in German),
coincide.
1.1 Wide Scope Phenomena
Insentencescontainingmultiplequantiﬁcationaldeterminerphrases(DPs)localscopeinversion
is generally possible. The following two sentences have two readings each – one which reﬂects
the surface order and one which reﬂects the inverse order of the quantiﬁers:
(1) 1. Some girl likes every horse. [∃  ∀] [∀  ∃]
2. Every girl likes some horse. [∀  ∃] [∃  ∀]
However, strong and weak quantiﬁers1 seem to behave differently when they occur embedded
in syntactic islands (cf. Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997, Ruys 1999, and many others):
∗We would like to thank Sigrid Beck, Ariel Cohen, Andreas Haida, Stefan Hinterwimmer, Gerhard J¨ ager,
Manfred Krifka, Robert van Rooij, Roger Schwarzschild, Peter Staudacher, and Ede Zimmermann for ongoing
discussions and valuable comments.
1In the following, we will also refer to weak quantiﬁers as indeﬁnites. We take it that they are interpreted as
quantiﬁers which differs from other approaches such as (Kamp and Reyle 1993) or (Heim 1982).
1
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Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2 Christian Ebert & Cornelia Endriss
(2) 1. Some girl will be sad if every horse falls ill. [∃  ∀] [∗∀  ∃]
2. Every girl will be sad if some horse falls ill. [∀  ∃] [∃  ∀]
Here the reading corresponding to the inverse order of quantiﬁers involved is not available for
the ﬁrst sentence whereas it is available for the second. The indeﬁnite some horse seems to able
to take scope out of an island contrary to the strong quantiﬁer every horse.
Ithasbeennotedhoweverthatinthosecaseswherespeciﬁcreadingsarepossiblethedistributive
properties seem to stay local. This is called Ruys’ observation (cf. Ruys 1999).
(3) If three relatives of mine die I will inherit a fortune.
Apart from a narrow distributive and a wide collective reading for three relatives, there is no
wide distributive reading, i.e. (3) does not have the following reading
(4) ∃x1,x2,x3. x1 6= x2∧x1 6= x3∧x2 6= x3∧
V3
i=1rel of mine(xi) ∧
IF
W3
i=1dies(xi) THEN I will inherit a fortune
which may be paraphrased as There are three relatives of mine and if one of them dies I will
inherit a fortune.2
It has been observed that by far not all indeﬁnites show this island-free scope taking behaviour
(cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993, Abusch 1994, Reinhart 1997, among others):
(5) 1. Every girl will be sad if some horse falls ill.
[∀ > ∃] [∃ > ∀]
2. Every girl will be sad if three horses fall ill.
[∀ > 3] [3 > ∀]
3. Every girl will be sad if at least three horses fall ill.
[∀ > at least 3] ??[at least 3 > ∀]
4. Every girl will be sad if exactly three horses fall ill.
[∀ > exactly 3] ??[exactly 3 > ∀]
5. Every girl will be sad if at most three horses fall ill.
[∀ > at most 3] *[at most 3 > ∀]
As the table shows, monotone decreasing and non-monotonic quantiﬁers are excluded from a
wide scope interpretation. This leaves the monotone increasing quantiﬁers, but as the contrast
between three in 2. and at least three in 3. shows, only a subclass of the monotone increas-
ing quantiﬁers can actually take exceptional wide scope. This is particularly puzzling if one
considers that three and at least three are standardly assumed to have the same semantics.
2Abusch (1994) discusses examples where there is a wide scope distributive reading for indeﬁnites. Winter
(1997) on the other hand points out that not only indeﬁnites show distributive wide scope, but that also strong
quantiﬁers can scope out of the syntactic islands in Abusch’s examples. This means that these are no strong islands
in the ﬁrst place. Matthewson (1999) mentions that there are very few speakers who do get wide scope distributive
readings also in cases such as (2). There are further examples in (Kempson and Meyer-Viol 2003) which hint
towards the direction that Ruys’ observation does not always hold. At this point, we have no explanation for these
exceptions.
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1.2 Topicality
In German, there are at least two positions that can host topical constituents only. First, there
is a topic position for left dislocated elements (cf. Frey 2000, Jacobs 2001). The only DPs that
can turn up in this position are referential DPs or speciﬁc indeﬁnites (Jacobs 2001)3.
(7) 1. ∗Jedes / ∗Kein / ??Irgendein / Ein Pferd, das frisst Bananen.
∗Every / ∗No / ??Some (or other) / Some horse it eats bananas
’Every horse / No horse / Some horse (or other) / Some horse eats bananas.’
2. ∗H¨ ochstens drei / ??Mindestens drei / ?Alle / Drei Pferde, die fressen Bananen.
∗At most three / ??At least three / ?All / Three horse they eat bananas
’At most three / At least three / All / Three horses eat bananas.’
Second, there is a topic position in the German middle ﬁeld above the sentence adverbial ac-
cording to Frey (2000). This position can only be targeted by constituents that can be interpreted
as aboutness topics, which are also referential or speciﬁc DPs:
(8) Otto war traurig, weil...
Otto was sad because...
’Otto was sad because...’
1. ∗kein / ??irgendein / ?jedes / ein Pferd ungl¨ ucklicherweise Bananen...
∗no / ??some (or other) / ?every / some horse unfortunately bananas...
’no horse / some horse or other / every horse / some horse has eaten bananas.’
...gefressen hat.
...eaten has
2. ∗h¨ ochstens drei / ??mindestens drei / ?alle / drei Pferde ungl¨ ucklicherweise...
∗at most three / ??at least three / ?all / three horses unfortunately...
’unfortunately at most three / at least three / all / three horses have eaten...
...Bananen gefressen haben.
...bananas eaten have
...bananas.’
Left dislocation (7) and middle ﬁeld topics (8) allow those DPs in topical positions which can
also take exceptional wide scope as indicated in (5). For instance, the DP three horses can
occupy topical positions, whereas at least three horses and at most three horses cannot. This
suggests that there is a strong correlation between the wide scope interpretation and the topical
interpretation of DPs.
2 Existing Approaches
2.1 Wide Scope
Unselective Binding of an Individual Variable A strategy that has been investigated by
Heim (1982) is to explain wide scope phenomena by unselectively binding an individual vari-
3Generically interpreted indeﬁnites are also possible in a left-dislocated position:
(6) Ein Hund, der ist meistens gr¨ un¨ augig.
A dog he is usually green-eyed
’A dog usually has green eyes.’
In this paper, we will not comment on this issue.
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able which is introduced in situ by the DP under consideration. As Heim (1982) pointed out,
this mechanism leads to wrong truth conditions:
(9) 1. Every girl will be sad if some horse falls ill.
2. ∃y.IF horse(y) ∧ ill(y) THEN ∀x.girl(x) → is sad(x)
The problem with this representation is that the selection of any non-horse as witness for the
existential quantiﬁcation makes the formula true, i.e. the formula is true in every model contain-
ing non-horses. This is often referred to as the Donald Duck problem as assigning y to Donald
Duck makes the sentence true.
Choice Functions In the choice function (CF) approach (Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997) the
wide scope readings are derived by unselectively binding a choice function variable which is
introduced in situ by the DP. This circumvents the problem of the previous unselective binding
approach. The problematic reading (9) is represented as follows:
(10) Every girl will be sad if some horse falls ill.
∃f.CF(f)∧IF ill(f(horse)) THEN ∀x.girl(x) → is sad(x)
As the function f is applied to the set of horses, it necessarily picks a member of this set and the
Donald Duck problem cannot arise. Furthermore the CF approach can account for the locality
of distributive properties (cf. (3)) as follows:
(11) ∃f.CF(f)∧ IF f(three relatives of mine) die
THEN I will inherit a fortune
As can be seen, the indeﬁnite gets a wide scope interpretation, but at the same time the dis-
tributive properties stay local – intuitively speaking, because the indeﬁnite is interpreted in situ
and all its properties remain local as well. Still there are several problems with this approach
(cf. Winter 1997, Ruys 1999, Geurts 2000, von Stechow 2000, Endriss 2002), arising from the
decisive feature of the CF approach, namely the in situ-interpretation of certain indeﬁnites.
2.2 Topicality and Wide Scope
Cresti (1995) correlates the topic interpretation of indeﬁnites to their wide scope interpretation.
The same correlation is the basis of (Portner and Yabushita 2001), where speciﬁcity of an in-
deﬁnite arises when the restrictor set forms the topic of the sentence. Building on (Portner and
Yabushita 1998), it is proposed that all information of a sentence is stored under an associated
discourse referent which is the sentence’s topic. This relates to the ideas of Reinhart (1982)
and Vallduv´ ı (1992). Both approaches restrict their attention to singular indeﬁnites (i.e. a and
some).
2.3 Classiﬁcation
The before-mentioned approaches either limit their applicability to a certain subclass of wide
scope indeﬁnites (singular ones) or have to stipulate two different interpretation mechanisms
– one, which applies to the class of wide scope quantiﬁers and another, which applies to the
remaining ones. The following two proposals aim at distinguishing the correct class of wide
scopetakersfromotherquantiﬁersbytakingthesemanticpropertiesoftherespectivequantiﬁers
into consideration:
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Szabolcsi (1997) The main aim of Szabolcsi (1997) is to explain the scope taking behaviour
of different quantiﬁers. While focusing on local scope phenomena, she also makes several
predictions concerning exceptional wide scope. Szabolcsi (1997) assumes that there is a speciﬁc
position (HRefP) which can be regarded as a wide scope position. Due to the interpretative
mechanism at HRefP, only monotone increasing quantiﬁers can inhabit this particular position
(referredtoastheincreasingnessconstraint bytheauthor). Thereforenon-increasingquantiﬁers
are excluded from being interpreted in HRefP, but there is still no explanation for the fact that
it is only a proper subclass of the increasing quantiﬁers that can be interpreted with exceptional
wide scope.
de Swart (1999) The aim of de Swart (1999) is to subdivide weak quantiﬁers into different
groups according to certain properties they share. She distinguishes three different classes of
indeﬁnites, of which one class is the class of wide scope indeﬁnites we are concerned with in
this paper (class II in de Swart 1999). Building on observations of Partee (1987) and by taking
discourse anaphora into account, de Swart (1999) singles out monotone increasing quantiﬁers.
By recurrence to a formal notion of referentiality (i.e. type shifting to type e) she explains the
difference between wide scope and other increasing quantiﬁers: for the former there has to be a
simple identity criterion (cf. de Swart 1999, p. 290ff) on the basis of which a plural individual
can be picked. This explanation crucially hinges on what is regarded as a simple criterion.
In the following we aim at dealing with all of the above-mentioned issues with one uniform
approach: wide scope interpretation, topicality and the correct classiﬁcation based on inherent
semantic properties of the quantiﬁers involved.
3 Technical Preliminaries
We will brieﬂy review the technical preliminaries we build our system upon. At ﬁrst, we
will make use of the concepts of Dynamic Semantics (cf. Staudacher 1987, Groenendijk and
Stokhof 1991, Kamp and Reyle 1993). Thus we will speak of discourse referents (DR in short)
and accessibility concerning anaphoric reference. Although we phrase our approach in terms of
Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991) nothing hinges on this choice. Fur-
thermore we adopt the view that a speaker’s utterance leads to an update of a common ground
(as e.g. Krifka 1992).
3.1 Quantiﬁer Semantics
In this section we review empirical ﬁndings concerning the semantics of generalized quantiﬁers,
which are related to anaphoric possibilities and exhaustivity. We propose a modiﬁcation of the
standardly assumed semantics towards a deﬁnition using plural dynamic effects to accommo-
date the facts in the spirit of Kadmon (1985). The following pair of examples illustrates the
difference regarding anaphoric possibilities between three and at least three – the latter allows
only for exhaustive anaphoric reference (cf. Kadmon 1985, Kamp and Reyle 1993)4:
(12) 1. Yesterday, three men were at the party. They all wore a hat. (not exhaustive).
2. Yesterday, at least three men were at the party. They all wore a hat. (exhaustive)
4Reinhart (1997, p. 385) discusses this phenomenon (and assigns its observation to Kamp and Reyle (1993)),
but she does not come to the conclusion that these ﬁndings should be reﬂected in the semantics of the respective
quantiﬁers.
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The ﬁrst sentence of the statement in (12.1), containing the GQ for three men, agrees with
a situation in which there were more than three men at yesterday’s party. With the second
sentence, the speaker does not assert that more than three men wore a hat: They in the second
sentence refers to a set of three men, irrespective of how many men were at yesterday’s party.
men party-goers
They
The facts are different for the statement in (12.2). The ﬁrst sentence of (12.2) agrees with
exactly the same situation as the ﬁrst sentence of (12.1). However, in contrast to (12.1), the
speaker asserts with the second sentence that more than three men wore a hat, given that more
than three men were at yesterday’s party. To be more precise: if six men were at yesterday’s
party, the anaphor They can only refer to the set of all six men that were at the party and not to
a set of ﬁve or four.
men party-goers
They
Our aim is to account for these ﬁndings directly by changing the semantics of the respective
quantiﬁers5. This has been proposed by (Kadmon 1985). The idea is to deﬁne the quantiﬁers in
a dynamic setting such that they employ existentially quantiﬁed discourse referents which allow
directly for the respective (non-)exhaustive reference. This then yields the following semantics
for a numeral determiner n:
(13) n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| = n∧X ⊆ P∩Q
This deﬁnition contains one existentially bound plural variable (of type he,ti) which will there-
fore be dynamically accessible in further discourse. It refers to a subset of the intersection
of restrictor and nucleus (i.e. to a subset of the set of P which Q) and thus we shall call it a
non-exhaustive quantiﬁer.
For at least n the semantics has to be changed only slightly to account for the exhaustivity
effects seen above:
(14) at least n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| ≥ n∧X = P∩Q
Again one existentially bound plural variable is introduced but this time it refers to the entire
intersection of restrictor and nucleus (i.e. to the entire set of P which Q) and thus we shall call
it an exhaustive quantiﬁer.
This gives us the following quantiﬁer semantics:
5This approach differs from the one proposed in (Kamp and Reyle 1993), where exhaustivity is accounted for
by means of an additional abstraction operation.
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(15) n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| = n∧X ⊆ P∩Q
at least n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| ≥ n∧X = P∩Q
exactly n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| = n∧X = P∩Q
at most n ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| ≤ n∧X = P∩Q
Note that concerning static truth conditions the semantics for n and at least n are equivalent, as
it is commonly assumed. With respect to dynamic semantics however, these deﬁnitions account
for the facts concerning exhaustivity. Together with the following approach to topic/wide scope
interpretation, they allow for the correct classiﬁcation of topic/wide scope quantiﬁers to be
derived.
3.2 Structured Meanings
Following (Krifka 1992) and (von Stechow 1989), we make use of structured meanings. Re-
sembling the treatment of focus in (Krifka 1992) the representation of an expression containing
a topic-marked constituent is structured into a topic component aT (representing the semantics
of the topic-marked constituent) and a comment component aC such that the entire represen-
tation is of the form haT,aCi. The conventional meaning of the expression can be derived by
applying the comment aC to the topic aT.
Thefollowingdeﬁnitionoffunctionalapplicationwithstructuredmeaningsistakenfrom(Krifka
1992):
(16) 1. haT,aCi(b) = haT,lX.[aC(X)(b)]i where X is of the same type as aT
2. b(haT,aCi) = haT,lX.[b(aC(X))]i where X is of the same type as aT
This deﬁnition ensures that the information about topic-marked sub-constituents is inherited to
larger constituents while functional application is carried out.
The following small grammar (together with semantic composition rules) serves as the basis to
derive the syntactic analysis of our example sentences:
Grammar:
S → NP VP
JSK = JNPK(JVPK)
S → IF S1 THEN S2
JSK = lp.lq.(p → q)(JS1K)(JS2K)
NP → Det N
JNPK = JDetK(JNK)
[C]T → C
J[C]TK = hJCK,lX.Xi where X is of the same type as JCK
The last rule states that topic-marked phrases are translated as topic-comment-structures. The
following lexicon uses the new deﬁnition of generalized quantiﬁers as given in the preceding
section.
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Lexicon:
horse ; horse(et)
horses ; horse(et)
sleep ; sleep(et)
three ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ P∩Q
at most three ; lP.lQ.∃X.|X| ≤ 3∧X = P∩Q
every ; lP.lQ.∀x.P(x) → Q(x)
We illustrate the interplay of structured meanings, the grammar and the lexicon with two simple
examples:
(17) [ Three horses ]T sleep.
hlQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q,lR .R i sleep
hlQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q,lR .R (sleep)i
 
P P P P P
As mentioned above the conventional meaning of this sentence can be derived by applying the
comment component to the topic component:
lR .R (sleep)(lQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q) ≡ ∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩sleep
(18) If [ three horses ]T sleep then f.
If hlQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q,lR .R i sleep then f
hlQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q,lR .R (sleep)i
hlQ.∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩Q,lR .(R (sleep) → f)i
 
P P P P P
 
 
 
 
   
P P P P P
Againtheapplicationofthecommentcomponenttothetopiccomponentyieldstheconventional
meaning, which is the narrow scope reading for three horses:
lR .(R (sleep)→f)(lQ.∃X.|X|=3∧X ⊆horse∩Q) ≡ ((∃X.|X|=3∧X ⊆horse∩sleep)→f)
4 A Topic Theory of Wide Scope Phenomena
In our approach, the topical status of the quantiﬁer under consideration is responsible for its
wide scope interpretation. According to (Reinhart 1982), the topic of a sentence can be taken
to be the entity the sentence is about. This is called the aboutness function of a topic. A topic
can then be understood as the address (Jacobs 2001) or the link (Vallduv´ ı 1992) which (sloppily
speaking) points to a place where the information conveyed by the sentence will be stored. This
explains why only certain entities can function as aboutness topics as they have to be able to
provide sensible addresses.
Another concept relating to topics is familiarity. If a topic is familiar it has been introduced
previously. In more formal terms this means that a discourse referent for this topic already exists
in the common ground, which in turn means that the information conveyed by the sentence can
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straightforwardlybeaddedtothecommonground. Thereforethecommongroundcanbesimply
updated with the conventional meaning aC(aT). By this deﬁnition only individuals (and sets)
can be familiar as only they can be referred to by discourse referents. In particular, quantiﬁers
(and other expressions of non-individual and non-set type) cannot be familiar as such.
However, it is known (see (7) and (8)) that certain quantiﬁers can still function as aboutness
topics of a sentence. In this case, we assume that a sensible address/link has to be created. More
formally this comes down to the creation of a sensible discourse referent that stands proxy
for the quantiﬁer in question. Exactly this is the decisive criterion for separating the topical
quantiﬁers from others: while the former allow for the creation of a sensible discourse referent,
the latter fail to do so.
In the following sections we will formally spell out these ideas and intuitions. First we will de-
ﬁne what it means (for a quantiﬁer) to provide a sensible address/discourse referent, which will
lead to a condition on the semantics on quantiﬁers. This Topic Condition will serve to separate
the class of topical/wide scope quantiﬁers from its complement class. Finally an illocutionary
operator TopAssert (Topic Assert) implements the update of the common ground.
4.1 Creating a Topic Discourse Referent
First we will deﬁne what it means for a quantiﬁer to provide a sensible discourse referent, which
can be used as the address in the aboutness topic sense. So let us assume that we have to deal
with a topic marked quantiﬁer such as in example (18), i.e. with a quantiﬁer that ends up as the
topic component aT of the sentence under consideration. Creating a new discourse referent for
the quantiﬁer aT means:
1. to take a sensible witness for the quantiﬁer, then
2. to create a DR P for this witness, and ﬁnally
3. to let this DR function as topic in place of the quantiﬁer aT itself.
This creation of a new topic corresponds to the procedure Szabolcsi (1997) proposes for a DP
in HRefP.6 Formalizing these steps we arrive at the following schema:
(19) ∃P. P is a witness for aT ∧ aC(P)
Here the phrase P is a witness for aT is used to describe the operation in 1., which is needed to
ﬁnd a sensible witness P for the topical quantiﬁer aT. The existential binding of P corresponds
to 2., the creation of a DR for P. Finally 3. is implemented by applying aC to P instead of aT,
which would yield the conventional meaning. A good witness candidate to represent the entire
quantiﬁer aT would be an element of the quantiﬁer which does not contain any ’disturbing’
elements. This is a minimal witness set in the sense of (Barwise and Cooper 1981). For every
set P and generalized quantiﬁer q a predicate min(P,q) can be deﬁned which is true, iff P is a
minimal set7 with respect to the elements of q:
(20) min(P,q) = ∀Q(q(Q) → P ⊆ Q)
6Szabolcsi (1997) speculates that those DPs that can introduce discourse referents over witness sets might be
”topics in some generalized sense” (p. 150). Beghelli and Stowell (1997) take it that ”it is possible that our Spec
of RefP position can be identiﬁed with the topic position” (p. 76). We take these intuitions seriously and build our
proposal on the intuition that topicality and wide scope are closely tied together.
7We actually deﬁne only minimal sets, but it can be shown that for every quantiﬁer minimal and minimal
witness sets coincide.
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Now we can formalize point 2. and replace the phrase P is a witness for aT in (19) by the
formal statement aT(P)∧min(P,aT) saying that P is a minimal (witness) set of aT:
(21) ∃P.aT(P)∧min(P,aT) ∧ aC(P)
As aC is necessarily of a type that can be applied to aT, there will be a type conﬂict whenever
aC is applied to the set P ∈ aT. These type conﬂicts are resolved by type shifting P as follows:
(22) P ; lQ.∀x.P(x) → Q(x)
Note that this type shift corresponds to inherent distribution of P over Q, which will basically
distribute P over the predicate in aC (such as sleep), to which the quantiﬁer aT applies8.
4.2 The Topic Condition
Now that the creation of a discourse referent from a quantiﬁer has been deﬁned by (21) we can
derive a formal condition on the semantics of quantiﬁers which tells us wether this operation
yields a sensible result. This condition is called the Topic Condition (TC), because by checking
for a sensible result it determines wether the quantiﬁer in question (i.e. the quantiﬁer which
is topic-marked and ends up in the topic component aT) can actually function as an aboutness
topic. To achieve this, the aboutness case
∃P.aT(P)∧min(P,aT)∧aC(P)
(i.e. the case where a DR has to be created) is compared to the simpler familiarity case aC(aT)
for certain simple comments. The intuition behind the test is that the aboutness function of
a topic should differ only minimally from the familiarity function, i.e. only in the creation of
an additional address/link/discourse referent which serves to store the information of the sen-
tence. Spelled out more technically, for simple comments the two cases should not at all differ
concerning truth conditions and they should only differ in a non-destructive way concerning
anaphoric potential.
Deﬁnition (Topic Condition)
A quantiﬁer q fulﬁlls the Topic Condition if for all setsY
(23) 1. ∃P.q(P)∧min(P,q)∧
 
lR .R (Y)

(P) ≡
 
lR .R (Y)

(q) and
2. all anaphoric possibilities which are available in c+
 
lR .R (Y)

(q) remain avail-
able in c + ∃P.q(P)∧min(P,q)∧
 
lR .R (Y)

(P).
Here lR .R (Y) takes the place of aC and is what we regard as a simple comment.
According to this deﬁnition a quantiﬁer q fulﬁlls the TC if for certain general simple cases
1., the creation of the DR has no truth conditional effect w.r.t. a standard context update. 2.,
dynamically speaking, the introduction of a new DR does not destroy already existing anaphoric
possibilites, but only adds a new possible topic that can be referred to in subsequent discourse.
8If this was a collective predicate (such as meet) one would not have to shift the type of P and could apply aC
to P in a straightforward manner. In this case however one would have to extend the entire proposal to deal with
plural semantics and the collective/distributive distinctions.
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4.3 Quantiﬁer Classiﬁcation
Note that by this deﬁnition the Topic Condition is a condition on the semantics of a quantiﬁer
and thus is independent of the actual conﬁguration the quantiﬁer appears in. In the following
we will show that the TC is capable of deriving the correct classiﬁcation of quantiﬁers into
topical/wide scope quantiﬁers and their complement class.
Non-increasingQuantiﬁers Monotonedecreasingandnon-monotonicquantiﬁersdonotpass
point 1. of the Topic Condition. After application of the type shift (22) we arrive at the equiva-
lence
(24) ∃P.q(P)∧min(P,q)∧P ⊆Y ≡ q(Y)
which does not hold for all setsY. For instance, taking at most three horses as an example for a
monotone decreasing quantiﬁer q this reduces to
(25) ∃P.P = / 0∧P ⊆Y 6≡ ∃X.|X| ≤ 3∧X = horse∩Y
Here it is obvious that the equivalence does not hold: the left hand side is tautological whereas
the right hand side is the (non-tautological) semantics of at most three horses.
Thisfactaboutnon-increasingquantiﬁersfollowsdirectlyfromﬁndingsin(BarwiseandCooper
1981) where it is shown that the assumed procedure of existential quantiﬁcation over a minimal
witness set has no truth conditional effect only for monotone increasing quantiﬁers. The above
mentioned increasingness constraint of (Szabolcsi 1997) aims at an explanation along the same
lines.
Increasing Quantiﬁers As mentioned before monotone increasing quantiﬁers pass point 1.
of the Topic Condition. However, point 2. is only passed by non-exhaustive quantiﬁers (cf.
section 3.1). Therefore exhaustive quantiﬁers such as at least three horses fail point 2. because
(26) c + ∃P.|P| = 3∧P ⊆ horse∧P ⊆Y
does not have all of the anaphoric possibilies of
(27) c + ∃X.|X| ≥ 3∧X = horse∩Y
The standard quantiﬁers semantics shown in (27) allows X to refer to sets of cardinality greater
than three (cf. 12). Introduction of a topic DR in (26) destroys these anaphoric possibilities for
P. P can only refer to a minimal witness which contains exactly three horses. In this respect, the
introduction of a new topic would be destructive and thus at least three horses fails the Topic
Condition. On the other hand, three horses as a non-exhaustive quantiﬁer passes the TC because
the lexical semantics only allows for reference to sets of three horses, which are the minimal
witness sets of the quantiﬁer.
Thus the Topic Condition rules out monotone decreasing, non-monotonic, and monotone in-
creasing exhaustive quantiﬁers. These quantiﬁers cannot be interpreted as topical quantiﬁers
and therefore the Topic Condition yields the desired classiﬁcation:
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TC failed/non-topical TC passed/topical
at most n n
exactly n some
at least n a
... every
all
It might be surprising that the strong quantiﬁers every and all are classiﬁed as topical quantiﬁers
by the TC, but it will be shown that this assumption does no harm.
4.4 Topic Assert
Eventually we propose an illocutionary operator TopAssert (Topic Assert) which applies to a
common ground c and a structured meaning representation haT,aCi of a sentence. It performs
the update of the common ground by taking the status of the topic marked constituent aT under
consideration as follows9:
(28) TopAssert(haT,aCi)(c)
=

  
  
c + aC(aT) if aT is accessible in c
c + ∃P.aT(P)∧min(P,aT)∧aC(P) if aT fulﬁlls the Topic Condition
undeﬁned else
The ﬁrst case of the TopAssert deﬁnition deals with familiar topics: if the DR for aT is already
accessible in the common ground then an update with the conventional meaning aC(aT) is car-
ried out. The second case formalizes what it means to be an aboutness topic: if the topic-marked
expression aT passes the TC a new DR is created (as explained above) and the appropriate up-
date is performed. Thus the application of TopAssert is only deﬁned if the topic-marked con-
stituent is either familiar or fulﬁlls the Topic Condition. By this deﬁnition only constituents that
pass the Topic Condition can be unfamiliar aboutness topics in this sense. As can be seen the
update in the aboutness case leads to a wide scope reading of the respective quantiﬁer which
will be illustrated in the following section.
5 Deriving Wide Scope via Topicality
To illustrate our proposal let us start with the simple example (17), repeated here as (29).
(29) [ Three horses ]T sleep.
The application of the illocutionary operator TopAssert to the structured meaning representa-
tion, which has been derived in (17), and to some common ground c yields the following update.
TopAssert(hlQ.∃X ...,lR .R (sleep)i)(c)
= c+∃P.(∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩P)∧min(P,lQ.∃X ...)∧lR .R (sleep)(P)
= c+∃P.(∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩P)∧min(P,lQ.∃X ...)∧P ⊆ sleep
9Here, P is a new discourse referent.
Christian Ebert & Cornelia Endriss Wide Scope Indeﬁnites as Aboutness Topics
106Topic Interpretation and Wide Scope Indeﬁnites 13
Inthisexamplethreehorsesisthesentencetopic. Beingaquantiﬁer, threehorsescannotalready
have been established, i.e. cannot be accessible in the common ground. For this reason, the ﬁrst
case of the TopAssert deﬁnition (28) is not applicable. Therefore the second case comes into
play, because three horses is a non-exhaustive, increasing quantiﬁer which passes the TC. Thus
a new discourse referent P which refers to a set of three horses is established and the respective
update is performed.
To see how exceptional wide scope readings of the type discussed in the ﬁrst chapter can be
derived we consider example (18) again, repeated as (30).
(30) If [ three horses ]T sleep then f.
The structured meaning representation of this example has been derived in (18) and the appli-
cation of TopAssert yields the following result:
TopAssert(hlQ.∃X ...,lR .(R (sleep) → f)i)(c)
= c+∃P.(∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩P)∧min(P,lQ.∃X ...)∧lR .(R (sleep) → f)(P)
= c+∃P.(∃X.|X| = 3∧X ⊆ horse∩P)∧min(P,lQ.∃X ...)∧(P ⊆ sleep → f)
Here the reasoning is analogous to the above example (29). However, due to the structure of
the sentence, an interpretation is generated, in which three horses takes wide scope over the
if-clause. The formula the context is updated with can be paraphrased as: there is a minimal
witness set P of three horses (i.e. a set containing exactly three horses) and if each of the
elements in P sleeps, then f. This is the desired wide scope reading, where the distributivity
stays local.
As mentioned above the universal quantiﬁers every and all pass the Topic Condition by deﬁni-
tion. Therefore, in a case like
(31) If [ every horse ]T sleeps then f.
the second (aboutness) case of the TopAssert deﬁnition is applicable10 just as in the case of (30).
The result of the application of TopAssert is as follows:
(32)
TopAssert(hlQ.∀x...,lR .(R (sleep) → f)i)(c)
= c+∃P.(∀x.horse(x) → P(x))∧min(P,lQ.∀x...)∧lR .(R (sleep) → f)(P)
= c+∃P.(∀x.horse(x) → P(x))∧min(P,lQ.∀x...)∧(P ⊆ sleep → f)
The unique minimal witness set of the quantiﬁer every horse is the set of horses. Therefore P
can be replaced by this set in the last conjunct and the existential quantiﬁcation together with
the ﬁrst two conjuncts can be omitted. This yields the following result:
(33) c+(horse ⊆ sleeps) → f
Obviously this represents the narrow scope interpretation of the sentence. Thus we predict that
every horse can be topic marked, but because of the equivalence of the wide scope and the
narrow scope reading, it only seems as if there was no wide scope reading.
In an ill-formed case of topic-marking such as
10(Beghelli and Stowell 1997) as well as (Szabolcsi 1997) also assume that universal quantiﬁers can be inter-
preted in DistP where they pick a witness set from the quantiﬁer.
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(34) If ∗[ at most three horses ]T sleep then f.
the reasoning is as follows. Again at most three horses as a quantiﬁer cannot be familiar as such
and thus the ﬁrst case of TopAssert is not applicable. But in this case the second (aboutness)
case is not applicable either, because at most three horses does not pass the TC (as explained
above). Therefore only the third case remains and the result of any potential update is undeﬁned.
This explains why at most three horses cannot function as topic, i.e. cannot be topic marked and
in turn cannot be interpreted in a wide scope reading.
6 Conclusion
In our system the ability to be a topic and to be interpreted speciﬁcally is reduced to the appli-
cation of one and the same operation to the respective constituents. We are able to 1. simulta-
neously account for the exceptional wide scope behaviour and topicality of certain indeﬁnites
(without assuming in-situ-interpretation as e.g. in the Choice Function approaches), 2. give
a purely semantic criterion (the Topic Condition) to single out this class of indeﬁnites, and 3.
provide a formal deﬁnition of the notion of aboutness topic.
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Abstract
Reichenbach’s event, reference and speech times are interpreted semantically by string-
ing and superposing sets of temporal formulae, structured within regular languages. No-
tions of continuation branches and of inertia, bound (in a precise sense) by reference time,
are developed and applied to the progressive and the perfect.
1 Introduction
The analysis of tense and aspect in terms of an event time E, a reference time R and a speech
time S in Reichenbach (1947) counts (arguably) as one of the classic works in formal natural
language semantics. In view of the prominence there of the notion of time, it is surprising that
Steedman (2000) should claim that
temporal semantics of natural language is not primarily to do with time at all. In-
stead, the formal devices we need are those related to the representation of causality
and goal-directed action.
The present work is an attempt to ﬂesh out the claim above in a ﬁnite-state setting that accounts
for Reichenbach’s basic insights. The main idea is
(∗) to base the account not so much on times but on event-types, construed as regular lan-
guages over an alphabet Pow(F) consisting of subsets of some ﬁnite set F of formulae.
The formulae in F are temporal in that they describe times, including the reference time and
speechtime. Astringa1a2···an in Pow(F)∗ istobereadasachronologicallyorderedsequence
of observations, with every formula in ai understood to hold at the ith point of the sequence.
That is, a1a2···an amounts to a comic strip or movie that begins with the still picture a1,
followedbya2 ...endingwithan. Stringsthatareinstancesofthesameevent-typearecollected
in a language L ⊆ Pow(F)∗, taken below to be regular. The ﬁnite-state machines accepting the
languages provide a vivid image of a causal realm, from which worlds and models arise by
executing the machines in (real) time. The divide between extensional and intensional notions
comes out as follows: regular languages (machines) are intensions, while screenings of movies
(machine runs) in time are extensions. In this sense, the thrust of (∗) above is to treat intensions
as basic, and extensions as derived.
To ground the discussion in English examples, consider (1).
(1) a. Pat crossed the road.
b. Pat was crossing the road.
c. Pat has crossed the road.
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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It is commonly held that the simple sentence (1a) is extensional while its progressive correlate
(1b) is intensional — at least if, as in Dowty (1979) and Landman (1992), possibly unrealized
continuations of the progressive are considered. To keep the semantics of the progressive ex-
tensional, Parsons conﬁnes himself to realized parts (Parsons 1990). The pressure to devise an
extensional account vanishes if (as in the perspective we adopt) extensions are conceived as
being no more basic than intensions. The issue of realized versus unrealized parts does not arise
in the case of the perfect; (1c) puts the entire event of Pat crossing the road safely in the past.
The challenge of the perfect, however, is how to derive its various readings. For instance, three
distinct construction algorithms are provided in Kamp and Reyle (1993) for the perfect: one
for (1c) and two for the stative (2), differing on whether or not Pat-live-in-Vienna is asserted to
continue into the present.
(2) Pat has lived in Vienna for two years.
Portner (2003) has (among others) argued that a uniform analysis of the perfect should be given.
My claim is that the notion of inertia connected to the notorious frame problem of McCarthy and
Hayes (1969) is the key to a uniform analysis of the perfect.1 Inertia, as embodied in worlds, is
applied in Dowty (1979) to the imperfective paradox afﬂicting the progressive. This afﬂiction
is treated below by a ﬁnite-state approach to the stages and continuations in Landman (1992),
under which worlds are not presumed basic, but instead derived by grounding strings in time.
Relating these back now to Reichenbach (1947), the event timed by E is given by the sentence
radical to which the aspectual operator applies. For (1) and (2), the radicals are the un-inﬂected
phrases Pat-cross-the-road and Pat-live-in-Vienna-for-two-years, respectively. Our account be-
low proceeds in three steps, detailed in the next three sections. Section 2 turns the event time E
into a string or better still: a set of strings — that is, a language. Section 3 brings in the reference
time R, and introduces the possibility of branching beyond R. Section 4 imposes inertial laws
before factoring in tense via speech time S. With E, R and S in place, section 5 grounds the
strings in time, constructing worlds and models. Section 6 concludes.
2 E strung out
Consider the un-inﬂected phrase (3) on which aspect and tense operate in (2).
(3) Pat-live-in-Vienna for two-years
Let us assume that we have in F the formula live(p,v) for Pat-live-in-Vienna, and let us as-
sociate with the phrase two-years a movie of a clock t marking an interval of two years. At
the beginning, the clock t is at 0; at the end, two years have elapsed. In the middle, the clock
ticks; but we will not care how often. That is, we allow for an indeterminate (possibly variable)
frequency, reﬂected in the regular expression (4) by non-zero Kleene iteration ·+ on the empty
picture . (We are drawing boxes instead of the usual curly braces {·} to distinguish sets-as-
symbols from say, sets-as-languages, adopting the practice in regular expressions of writing
strings for languages.)
(4) 0(t) + 2years(t)
1Such links with logical AI are advocated broadly in Steedman (2000), and were noted at the inter/multi-
sentential level in Dowty (1986).
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Next, we form a language (5) for the sentence radical (3) from (4) by superposition &, as deﬁned
in (6).
(5) 0(t), live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
2years(t), live(p,v)
= live(p,v)
+
& 0(t) + 2years(t)
(6) L&L0 =
S
n≥1{(a1∪a0
1)···(an∪a0
n) | a1···an ∈ L and a0
1···a0
n ∈ L0}
According to (6), the superposition L&L0 of languages L,L0 ⊆ Pow(F)∗ combines strings from
L and L0 of equal length, forming the componentwise union ai ∪a0
i of symbols. Each of ai
and a0
i is understood to be a partial snapshot at some ith time, so that the effect of & is to
overlay motion pictures with the same duration. A natural form of conjunction, & maps regular
languages to regular languages (Fernando 2003a). (5) associates with two-years the language
(4), and, under pressure from “for”, coerces the formula live(p,v) for Pat-live-in-Vienna to the
language live(p,v)
+
. A systematic treatment of temporal “for”/“in” modiﬁcation is provided
in Fernando (2003b), based roughly on a re-analysis of the Vendler classes in Dowty (1979) and
Naumann (2001) according to Figure 1 (with ∼ as negation).
Vendler Dowty Naumann/F
stat[iv]e P(~ x) j
+
activity Do[x,P(~ x)] Con-BEC(j) = ∼j j
+
achievement Bec[P(~ x)] Min-BEC(j) = ∼j
+ j
accomplishment Cause(Do[x,P(~ x)],Bec[Q(~ y)]) ∼j,∼y j,∼y
∗ j,y
Figure 1
Dowty’sdecompositionofanaccomplishmentintoanactivityandanachievementisre-captured
in the third column of Figure 1 as
Con-BEC(j) & Min-BEC(y) = ∼j,∼y j,∼y
∗ j,y
where ·∗ is Kleene star, L+ = L∗L. A concrete example is provided by the accomplishment Pat-
swim-two-miles with y as swim(pat,a) and j as (∃u  a) swim(pat,u), where u  a says “u is a
non-null part of a” and a is a distance of two miles. To record the last fact, we can superpose
Con-BEC(j) & Min-BEC(y) with the state 2miles(a)
+
to get (7).
(7) ∼j,∼y, 2miles(a) j,∼y, 2miles(a) ∗ j,y, 2miles(a)
The reader concerned about Pat repeatedly swimming two miles might sharpen the formula
swim(x,y) to swimSince(x,y,t), with a temporal argument t marking the beginning of the swim.
Adjusting j and y accordingly, we would then replace (7) by (8), where time(t) is a formula
marking the pictured time as t (Fernando 2003a).
(8) time(t),∼j,∼y, 2miles(a) j,∼y, 2miles(a) ∗ j,y, 2miles(a)
Clearly, our languages may become more complicated than those tabulated in Figure 1.
3 R and continuation branches
A typical Reichenbachian approach to aspect, relating E to R, is summarized in (9).
3
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(9) a. Simple E = R
b. Progressive R @ E
c. Perfect E < R
Having stepped from event time E to a regular language L ⊆ Pow(F)∗ in the previous section,
we can formulate temporal precedence < and containment @ as in (10), construing the reference
time R as a formula in F that marks a position in a string in L.
(10) a. SIMP(L,R) = L & ∗ R
b. PROG(L,R) = L & + R +
c. PERF(L,R) = L∗ R
For the simple aspect, R picks out the end of L (identiﬁed with E); for the progressive, it marks
an intermediate point; and for the perfect, it marks a point after L. To illustrate, if
L = 0(t),live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v), 2years(t)
then
SIMP(L,R) = 0(t),live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v), 2years(t),R
PROG(L,R) = 0(t),live(p,v) live(p,v)
∗
live(p,v),R live(p,v)
∗
live(p,v),2years(t) .
Moving from regular languages to ﬁnite automata, the functions in (10) track the computation
of an automaton for L: SIMP(L,R) says that the automaton has reached completion; PROG(L,R)
that it has not quite gotten there but is on its way; and PERF(L,R) that it is history.2
To develop the account further, some notation is useful. Let us call a string a1···an ∈ Pow(F)∗
R-truncated if for all i ∈ {1,...n},
R ∈ ai implies i = n .
The R-truncation of a string s, denoted sR, is the largest preﬁx of s that is R-truncated. An R-
continuation of s is a string s0 with the same R-truncation, s0
R =sR. Now, the idea is to relativize
the membership relation s ∈ L by existentially quantifying over a (contextually given) set c(s)
of R-continuations of s
s :c L iff (∃s0 ∈ c(s)) s0 ∈ L
so as to allow for an R-continuation s0 of s different from s. To investigate this notion, let us
move the subscript c on : over to L, forming the language
L/c = {s | c(s)∩L 6= / 0}
(with s :c L iff s : Lc). Let us write cR(s) for the set of R-continuations of s
cR(s) = {s0 ∈ Pow(F)∗ | s0
R = sR}
and LR for the set of R-truncations of strings in L
LR = {sR | s ∈ L} .
For the record, we have
Proposition1. LetL⊆Pow(F)∗ and(forparts(iv)to(vi)below)c:Pow(F)∗ →Pow(Pow(F)∗).
2The present account has, in the informal terms just stated, much in common with Narayanan (1997) but differs
from it in emphasizing strings/languages, using superposition & to stay regular.
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(i) L/{·} = L where {·} maps every s ∈ Pow(F)∗ to {s}.
(ii) L/cR = LR Pow(F−{R})∗.
(iii) If L is regular, then so is LR and hence L/cR.
(iv) Given c0 : Pow(F)∗ → Pow(Pow(F))∗ such that c(s) ⊆ c0(s) for all s ∈ Pow(F)∗,
L/c ⊆ L/c0 .
(v) L ⊆ L/c provided
(c1) s ∈ c(s) for every s ∈ Pow(F)∗.
(vi) (L/c)R = LR assuming c satisﬁes (c1) above and
(c2) c(s) ⊆ cR(s) for every s ∈ Pow(F)∗.
Proof. All of the assertions are straightforward, except perhaps for (iii). A ﬁnite automaton for
L is turned into one for LR as follows. For every transition
a → q with R ∈ a, replace its target
state q by a new state that is added to the set of ﬁnal/accepting states. Since such states are new,
no transition may come out of them. a
Conditions (c1) and (c2) from Proposition 1 allow for any number of choices of c(s) between
{s} and cR(s) that can be applied to the imperfective paradox. That is,
s ∈ PROG(L,R)/c need not imply s ∈ PROG(L,R) .
The converse, however, does hold, according to part (v) of Proposition 1, supporting the insight
in Landman (1992) that
if an accomplishment manages to get completed, it is unproblematic to assume (in
retrospect) that the progressive is true during the development stage ... even if the
event gets completed against all odds.
The progressive aside, the exact choice of c satisfying (c1) and (c2) need not matter for the
aspectual functions in (10). To be more precise, let us call a language L R-truncated if LR = L.
Examples include SIMP(L0,R) and PERF(L0,R) for languages L0 that are R-free in that
for every string a1···an ∈ L0, R 6∈
n [
i=1
ai .
For R-truncated L, it follows from Proposition 1 (vi) that (L/c)R = L. As far as R-truncations
are concerned, the construction ·/c is innocuous.
4 S after inertia
A Reichenbachian approach to tense relates R to S as in (11)
(11) a. Past R < S
b. Present R = S
c. Future R > S
5
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To translate (11) in ﬁnite-state terms, it is useful to deﬁne the language 1(R) of strings in which
R occurs at most once
1(R) = Pow(F−{R})∗ Pow(F) Pow(F−{R})∗ .
Intersection with 1(R) is one of the regular operations, with which we can formalize the tenses.
(12) a. PAST(L,S) = (L∗ & ∗ R ∗ S ∗) ∩ 1(R)
b. PRES(L,S) = (L & ∗ R,S ∗) ∩ 1(R)
c. FUTU(L,S) = (∗L & ∗ S ∗ R ∗) ∩ 1(R)
An instructive example is provided by the sentence “Pat has left Vienna,” worked out in (13).3
(13) a. Pat-leave-Vienna
in(p,v) leave(p,v) ∼in(p,v)
b. Perfect(Pat-leave-Vienna)
in(p,v) leave(p,v) ∼in(p,v) ∗ R
c. Present(Perfect(Pat-leave-Vienna))
in(p,v) leave(p,v) ∼in(p,v) ∗ R,S
d. Resultative reading of “Pat has left Vienna”
in(p,v) leave(p,v) ∼in(p,v) ∼in(p,v)
∗
∼in(p,v),R,S
The obvious problem is how to bridge the gap between (13c) and (13d). Evidently, the formula
∼in(p,v) in (13c) must spill over onto R. With this in mind. let us introduce a set Inr ⊆ F of
inertial formulae, forming PERFInr(L,R) with inertial formulae at the end of L persisting
PERFInr(L,R) = {a1···akqn(q∪ R ) | a1···ak ∈ L, q = ak∩Inr and n ≥ 0} .
Assuming ∼in(p,v) ∈ Inr but leave(p,v) 6∈ Inr,
PERFInr((13a),R) = in(p,v) leave(p,v) ∼in(p,v) ∼in(p,v)
∗
∼in(p,v),R
from which (13d) results after applying PRES.
Proposition 2. If L is regular, so is PERFInr(L,R).
Proof. MapaﬁniteautomatonhQ,F,→,q0iforLtotheautomatonhQ,{f},→0,q0ifor PERFInr(L,R)
where the set Q0 of states is
Q0 = Q∪{f}∪Pow(Inr)
with the sets Q,{f} and Pow(Inr) assumed to be mutually disjoint, and transitions →0 equal to
→ ∪ {(q,a,a∩Inr) | q ∈ Q and (∃q0 ∈ F) q
a → q0} ∪
{(q,q,q) | q ⊆ Inr} ∪ {(q,q∪ R , f) | q ⊆ Inr}
That is, whenever q
a → q0 ∈ F, we add arcs q
a → q, q
q → q, q
q[R]
→ f, where q = a∩ Inr and
q[R] = q∪ R . a
3The point to be made presently applies to other choices for (13a) such as in(p,v)
+
leave(p,v),∼in(p,v) .
6
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We can recover PERF(L,R) in (10) by setting Inr to / 0
PERF(L,R) = PERF/ 0(L,R) .
Playing with different choices of Inr, we can account for various readings of the perfect. For
example, consider again the un-inﬂected phrase Pat-live-in-Vienna-for-two-years. Building on
our analysis in (5), we get
PERF((5),R) = 0(t), live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v),2years(t) ∗ R .
If live(p,v) ∈ Inr but 2years(t) 6∈ Inr, then
PERFInr((5),R) = 0(t), live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v), 2years(t) live(p,v)
∗
live(p,v),R
and PRES(PERFInr((5),R),S) is
0(t), live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v), 2years(t) live(p,v)
∗
live(p,v),R,S .
The last language expresses a continuative reading of (2), Pat has lived in Vienna for two years.
What about an existential one that is silent on Pat’s current domicile? The simplest way to block
inertial ﬂow is to restrict Inr, declaring that live(p,v) 6∈ Inr. But how do we justify this move?
One approach is to link existential readings with (possibly implicit) questions or topics that
override default settings for Inr. An existential reading of (2) is, for instance, licensed by
Has Pat ever lived in Vienna for two years?
A further test is (14).
(14) I have lost my key but have found it.
Out of the blue, (14) is odd; but it is a ﬁne reply to
Have you ever lost your key?
Similarly for an existential reading of “Pat has left Vienna.”
An alternative account of existential readings can be based on the observation that PAST(L,S)
does not provide for inertial ﬂow beyond R. That is, S is a barrier to inertial ﬂow when R
temporally precedes S. Inferences from the past to the present fail, such as
Pat was happy 6|= Pat is happy
under (15).
(15) a. Pat-be-happy
happy(p)
+
b. Simple(Pat-be-happy)
happy(p)
∗
happy(p),R
c. Pat was happy.
happy(p)
∗
happy(p),R ∗ S ∗
7
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d. Pat is happy.
happy(p)
∗
happy(p),R,S
The blockage here of inertial ﬂow suggests an alternative mechanism for deriving present exis-
tential readings: rather than manipulating Inr, an ever question might shift temporal perspective,
introducing a displaced speech time S0 <S that yields in the case (for example) of “Pat has lived
in Vienna for two years” the language
0(t),live(p,v) live(p,v)
+
live(p,v), 2years(t) live(p,v)
∗
live(p,v),R,S0 ∗ S .
This analysis would seem to be compatible with an “extended now,” discussed for example in
Portner (2003). It is not clear to me if it is superior to the previous (Inr-revising) approach.
The remainder of this section aims to isolate a general principle underlying PERFInr. Let us
introduce a further parameter S ⊆ Pow(F) specifying a notion of “legal” stills/snaps that is
⊆-closed
(∀a ∈ S)(∀a0 ⊆ a) a0 ∈ S
and free of ∼-pairs
(∀j ∈ F) j,∼ j 6∈ S .
Leaving the exact choice of S open, S regulates inertial ﬂow according to the rules
saa0s0
sa(a0∪ j )s0 j ∈ a∩Inr and a0∪ j ∈ S
and (reversing the ﬂow of time)
saa0s0
s(a∪ j )a0s0 j ∈ a0∩Inr and a∪ j ∈ S .
These rules induce the operator G that maps a language L to the language
G(L) = {sa(a0∪ j )s0 | saa0s0 ∈ L, j ∈ a∩Inr and a0∪ j ∈ S}∪
{s(a∪ j )a0s0 | saa0s0 ∈ L, j ∈ a0∩Inr and a∪ j ∈ S}
(suppressing the subscripts Inr and S to simplify notation). Let us deﬁne L to be (Inr,S)-full if
L ⊆ S∗ and for all s ∈ L, G({s}) ⊆ {s}. Iterating G over the natural numbers, let
G0(L) = L
Gn+1(L) = G(Gn(L))
G¥(L) =
[
n≥0
Gn(L) .
Proposition 3. PERFInr(L,R) is the (Inr,S)-full fragment of G¥(PERF(L,R))
PERFInr(L,R) = {s ∈ G¥(PERF(L,R)) | G({s}) ⊆ {s}}
assuming L is (Inr,S)-full, R 6∈ Inr and for all a ⊆ F−{R},
a ∈ S iff a∪ R ∈ S .
Inertia has, under the same assumptions as in Proposition 3, no effect on the progressive or the
simple of a language L
SIMP(L,R) = {s ∈ G¥(SIMP(L,R)) | G({s}) ⊆ {s}}
PROG(L,R) = {s ∈ G¥(PROG(L,R)) | G({s}) ⊆ {s}} .
8
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5 Background extensions: worlds and models
To interpret the strings in Pow(F)∗ model-theoretically, the basic idea is to apply the formulae
to times for a notion of truth (Fernando 2003a, Fernando 2003b). In this section, we shall take
a piecewise approach in terms of relations p ⊆ Ti×F between a set Ti of times and F, reading
p(t,j) as j holds at t, according to p .
Given a sequence t1···tn ∈ Ti, p induces the string
str(p,t1···tn) = j | p(t1,j) ··· j | p(tn,j) .
Conversely, a time-stamping t1···tn on a string a1···an ∈ Pow(F)∗ determines a relation p
such that for all t ∈ Ti and j ∈ F,
p(t,j) iff (∃i ∈ {1,...,n}) t =ti and j ∈ ai .
Along with Ti, let us ﬁx a binary relation succ ⊆ Ti×Ti such that its transitive closure succ+ is
irreﬂexive, writing ch(succ) for the set of ﬁnite succ-chains
ch(succ) = {t1···tn ∈ Ti+ | succ(ti,ti+1) for 1 ≤ i < n} .
(As will become clear shortly, the intuition is that succ represents a level of granularity for
taking snapshots.) To step from explicit to implicit information, let us assume a background
P ⊆ Pow(Ti×F) of “possible” pieces, deﬁning the forcing relation || −P with domain P so that
for p ∈ P,
p || −P L,t iff p(t,R) and (∃t ∈ ch(succ)) str(p,t) :c L
for some function c : Pow(F)∗ → Pow(Pow(F)∗). The force of P (as background) comes out in
interpreting negation ¬ universally relative to the restriction ⊇P of ⊇ to P
p || −P ¬A iff not (∃p0 ⊇P p) p0 || −P A .
Applying negation ¬ twice, we get our satisfaction relation |=P
p |=P A iff p || −P ¬¬A
iff (∀p0 ⊇P p)(∃p00 ⊇P p0) p00 || −P A .
Worlds for |=P are derived from selections in P that cover all of time and are, at each time,
maximal. More precisely, relative to a set Y of formulas that may occur to the right of || −P
(picking out a subset of Ti, named in Y), we deﬁne a subset G of P to be P-generic if
(i) for all p ∈ G and p0 ∈ P such that p0 ⊆ p, p0 ∈ G
(ii) for all p,p0 ∈ G, there exists p00 ∈ P such that p00 ⊇ p∪ p0
(iii) for all A ∈ Y, there is a p ∈ G such that either p || −P A or p || −P ¬A.
Leaving open exactly what other connectives are available within Y, we may expect to extract
a model M[G] from a P-generic G such that
M[G] |= A iff (∃p ∈ G) p || −P A
9
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and for G(P,p) = {G ⊆ P | G is P-generic and p ∈ G},
p |=P A iff (∀G ∈G(P,p)) M[G] |= A
provided we have suitable || −P-clauses for all A ∈ Y guaranteeing persistence
p0 ⊇P p and p || −P A imply p0 || −P A
(e.g. (Keisler 1973)). It is natural to identify a generic set with a world, and, assuming without
loss of generality that / 0 ∈ P, to associate the common ground G(P, / 0) with P, which a formula
A in Y updates to G(PA, / 0), where
PA = {p ∈ P | p0 || −P A for some p0 ∈ P such that p ⊆ p0} .
What about the function c : Pow(F)∗ → Pow(Pow(F)∗) invoked to determine whether or not
p || −P L,t? For R-truncated L, the exact choice of c satisfying (c1) and (c2) is immaterial to
|| −P, and can be assumed to be the singleton map {·} (so that L/c = L). But for languages that
are not R-truncated, it is natural to investigate c through other approaches to || −P such as
p || −P L,t iff (∃p0 ⊆ p) p0(t,R) and p0 :cb L,t
p :cb L,t iff (∃p0 ∈ cb(p,t))(∃t1···tn ∈ ch(succ))
{t1,...,tn} ⊇ domain(p0) and str(p0,t1···tn) ∈ L
for some function cb : (Pow(Ti×F)×Ti) → Pow(Pow(Ti×F)) satisfying
(a) p ∈ cb(p,t)
(b) for all p0 ∈ cb(p,t), j ∈ F and t0 t, p(t0,j) iff p0(t0,j)
whereisthereﬂexivetransitiveclosureof succ. The“continuationbranch”function cbissim-
ilar to the modal base function Condoravdi (2002) applies for a temporal interpretation of might,
with pieces p ⊆ Ti×F in place of worlds (Fernando 2003c). Conditions (a) and (b) correspond
to (c1) and (c2) respectively, condition (b) building in historical necessity (Thomason 1984).4
That said, there is a gap between c(s) ⊆ Pow(F)∗ and cb(p,t) ⊆ Pow(Ti×F) to be bridged.
The idea is that for all t1···tn ∈ ch(succ) and p ⊆ Ti×F such that
{t1,...,tn} ⊇ domain(p) and for some i ∈ {1,...,n}, p(ti,R) ,
we can identify c(str(p,t1···tn)) with the language
{str(p0,t0
1···t0
k) | p0 ∈ cb(p,ti), t0
1···t0
k ∈ ch(succ),
{t0
1,...,t0
k} ⊇ domain(p0) and t1···ti is a preﬁx of t0
1···t0
k} .
As different choices of p and t1···tn may converge on the same string s = str(p,t1···tn), we
must be prepared to consider different functions c : Pow(F)∗ → Pow(Pow(F)∗) within || −P.
Reference to any one function c is less than optimal in exposing the factors the come into the
choice of continuation branches — but is irresistible when abstracting away these factors (or so
section 3 above suggests).
4The candidate cb(p,t) = {p} is Ockhamist, as opposed to Peircean (in the sense of Prior; page 143 of Thoma-
son (1984)).
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6 Conclusion
The account above reﬁnes traditional Reichenbachian E,R,S analyses of tense and aspect in at
least three ways.
1. Rather than taking event structures (Kamp and Reyle 1993) for granted, certain temporal
formulae are strung together and superposed to form event-types, instantiations of which
may have time E.5
2. The stative/non-stative contrast is traced to a distinction between inertial and non-inertial
formulae, with ramiﬁcations for the perfect.
3. R is construed as a non-inertial formula, marking out a point in an intensional model, up
to which inertia ﬂows and beyond which there is branching.
Theintensionalitydescribed3iseffectedabovenot byrelativizingextensionalnotionstoworlds,
but by working with notions (such as event-type) that are meaningful prior to their extensional
grounding. Worlds are not presumed to be primitive, but rather constructed (via standard tech-
niques recalled in section 5) from runs of machines that may or may not get interrupted. What
emerges is a ﬁnite-state alternative to (Priorian) tense logic, with conjunctive operations &,∩
in place of modal operators P,F,G,H (Fernando 2003a). Relations between E,R and S are kept
simple, with much of the complexities swept over to the context dependence of inertia and
continuation branches. Different choices of inertial formulae induce different readings of the
perfect; the choice of continuations c satisfying (c1) and (c2) shapes the progressive.
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Abstract
The paper investigates four phenomena having to do with the interpretation of Hungarian
sentences with contrastive topics (CTs), including the apparent wide scope as well as narrow scope
readings of CTs, the lack of interpretations for particular, otherwise well-formed sentences with a
CT, and the predictability of collective versus distributive readings for plural NPs in CT position.
Some previous theories are reviewed, and claimed to be unable to handle all of the above
phenomena simultaneously. The paper argues that the first puzzle should be handled along the
lines of Jacobs (1997), the third and the fourth along the lines of Büring (1997), and it proposes a
new approach to explain the second one.
1  Aim
The aim of the paper is to look at the issue of what factors need to be taken into account in
order to be able to determine whether a sentence with a contrastive topic can have an
interpretation at all, and if so, which of some theoretically possible interpretations will be
available for it. Four phenomena from Hungarian will be identified which will be claimed to
cause problems for existing theories concerned with the interpretation of sentences with
contrastive topics, and therefore require a novel prespective.
The four phenomena to be discussed include the availability of a narrow scope reading for
quantificational expressions playing the role of the contrastive topic in the sentence; the lack
of wide scope readings for particular quantificational expressions in the same position, and
the availability of the wide-scope reading for others; the uninterpretability of certain sentences
with monotone decreasing and non-monotonic determiners in the above position; and the lack
of collective readings for particular plural NPs there.
In section 2, the types of data listed above will be illustrated with examples, whereas section 3
will review some relevant claims made by previous theories on related phenomena. section 4
takes a new look at the wide scope phenomena, section 5 makes a proposal about the
treatment of narrow scope readings, sentences with no available interpretation are looked at in
section 6, while section 7 examines the availability of collective/distributive readings. The
paper closes with the conclusions in section 8.
2  The phenomena
Consider the available readings for (1) and (2) below:
(1) [CT  /Két  könyvet] [QP  \minden  gyerek  elolvasott.]
two  book-acc  every  child  VM-read
  a. ‘As for two books, they were read by all children.’
b. ‘As for (at least) two books, so many were read by all children.’
2
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(2) [CT  /Legalább három gyerek] [QP \minden könyvet elolvasott.]
         at least  three  child  every  book-acc  VM-read
a. # ‘As for at least three kids, they read every book. ’
b. ‘As for at least three kids, every book was read by that many. ’
The labeled brackets above refer to the positions of the constituents in the tree in (3),
representing the surface structure of the Hungarian sentence, as proposed in É. Kiss (2002),
irrelevant details aside:
(3) The surface structure of the Hungarian sentence:
S = TopP*
XP QP*
[topic]
XP FP
XP NegP
[focus]
XP VP
Since there are strong arguments supporting the view (discussed more thoroughly in É. Kiss
and Gyuris (2003)) that contrastive topics and topics occupy the same structural positions, the
contrastive topic constituents, marked here with the label CT will also be assumed to be
situated in spec, TopP.
Note that the term ‘contrastive topic’ is used here to refer here to maximal projections and not
to smaller units. This choice follows the tradition of using the terms ‘topic’ and ‘focus’ in the
Hungarian generative literature, cf. É. Kiss (2002). Some part(s) of the contrastive topic
constituent as well as of the constituent following the contrastive topic in the sentence bear a
heavy accent, marked with ‘/’ and ‘\’, respectively, which help to identify the alternative
propositions the sentence is assumed to be contrasted with, to be discussed later.
The fact that the narrow scope interpretation is allowed for the CT in both of the above
examples contradicts the so-called scope-principle for Hungarian (proposed, among others, by
É. Kiss (2002)), according to which quantifiers scope over the domain they c-command,
which needs to be accounted for. A comparison of the available readings of (1) and (2) reveals
another property of contrastive topics, namely, that they sometimes also appear to take widest
scope, although this option is not always available for them.
If we look at the first example, we find that it has no interpretations whatsoever, although it
does not seem to be grammatically defective, particularly in view of the examples in (5) and
(6), which have two and one reading available, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                                   
2 When possible, the English translations try to convey not only the truth conditions of the Hungarian examples
but  also  their  implicatures.  Only  the  truth-conditions  of  the  readings  of  (1)  would  be  conveyed  by  the
paraphrases  ‘Two books are such that they were read by all kids.’ versus ‘All kids have read at least two books.’
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(4) #[CT /Ötnél  kevesebb  vendéggel] [VP  \találkoztam tegnap  délben.]
five-than   fewer  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-at
a. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet them at noon yesterday.’
b. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
(5) [CT /Három  vendéggel] [VP \találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
three  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-in
a. ‘As for three guests, I did met them at noon yesterday.’
b. ‘As for three guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
(6) [CT /Ötnél kevesebb vendéggel] [QP\sokszor [VP (össze)találkoztam.]]
five-than fewer  guest-with  many times  VM-met-1sg
    a. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet them many times.’
    b. ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet that many many times.’
(6) also illustrates that the uninterpretability of (4) should not automatically be attributed to
the fact that ist contrastive topic contains a monotone decreasing determiner.
The fourth phenomenon, which I believe has not been discussed in the literature so far,
concerns the availability of collective readings for plural noun phrases situated in CT position.
Compare the possible readings of the following examples:
(7) [CT /Öt  gyerek] [VP \felemelte  az  asztalt  tegnap  ötkor.]
five  kid  VM-lifted  the  table  yesterday  five-at
a. ‘As for five kids, they did lift the table collectively/individually at five yesterday.’
b.  ‘As for (at least) five children, that many did lift the table #collectively/individually
at five yesterday.'
(8) [CT /Öt  gyerek] [QP  \sok asztalt  felemelt tegnap  ötkor.]
five  kid  many table-acc  VM-lifted  yesterday  five-at
a. ‘As for five kids, they did lift many tables collectively/individually at five 
yesterday.’
b. ‘As for five kids, many tables were lifted collectively/ individually by that many at
five yesterday.’
As illustrated above, both sentences have interpretations according to which the table was
lifted by a group of specific kids collectively or individually (reading a). However, when the
sentences are used for stating that a type of event with non-specific participants did occur
(e.g., as opposed to a previous assumption according to which such an event did not occur),
only (8) allows for the collective reading of the contrastive topic in all circumstances. (7)
allows for the collective reading only in cases where the occurrence of other collective table-
lifting events is presupposed, e.g., in the context of a competition between groups. (Note that,
as pointed out by Szabolcsi (1997), (7) can also have a reading according to which it ascribes
the ability to lift the table to groups, but this will be ignored in the rest of this paper.)
3  Previous approaches
3.1 Büring (1997) on scope
Büring (1997) claims that sentences containing an expression capable of scope-taking in CT
(Büring’s Topic) and another operator following it are potentially ambiguous as to the relative
scope of the operators. The availability of a particular reading is dependent on the availability
of ‘reasonable implicatures’, introduced by the CT. The notion of topic value introduced by
him helps to define more precisely the above implicatures. The topic value of a sentence A,
abbreviated as [[A]]
t, is a set of sets of propositions which differ from the one expressed by A
in that the denotations of the stressed  parts of the contrastive topic and of the focus
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constituents are replaced by type-identical alternatives in them. The sets of propositions
constituting the topic value correspond to a set of questions, in the spirit of Hamblin (1973).
Informally, the questions constituting the topic value of A could be regarded as the questions
which could have been asked in the discourse instead of the one which A answers.
The implicature carried by a sentence A containing a contrastive topic is then defined by him
as follows: there is an element Q (a question) in [[A]]
t such that Q is still under consideration
(or: disputable) after uttering A. Disputability of a question means the following: given a
common ground, there should be at least one element in the set of propositions corresponding
to the question which is informative and non-absurd with respect to the common ground, i.e.,
not included in it and are not in contradiction with it.
For example, the reason why reading b) is not available for (9) below is that the answers to
the questions in its topic value, shown in (10), are all entailed by the truth of the proposition
intended to be expressed with this reading. (In other words, the propositions corresponding to
the possible answers to the relevant questions are all entailed or contradicted by the truth of
the intended reading of the sentence.) (10a) illustrates the structure of the propositions in the
topic  value  of A, where the function ALT associates with the denotation of particular
expressions the set of their type-identical alternatives, (10b) lists some actual members of the
above set in the form of sets of sets of propositions, whereas (10c) lists the questions
corresponding to the sets of propositions in (10b):
(9) /ALLE   Politiker  sind  NICHT\    korrupt.
          all    politicians are    not  corrupt
a. ‘It is not the case that all politicians are corrupt.’
b. # ‘No politician is corrupt.’
(10) a. lP.$Q··e, tÒ, ··e, tÒ, tÒÒ [Q Œ ALT(all) & P = lp.$p·t, tÒ [p Œ ALT(not) & p  =
= Q(politicians)(lx.p(corrupt(x)))]]
b.  {{all(politicians)(lx. ÿcorrupt(x)), all(politicians)(lx.corrupt(x))},
{most(politicians)(lx.ÿcorrupt(x)), most(politicians)(lx.corrupt(x))},
         {some(politicians)(lx. ÿcorrupt(x)), some(politicians)(lx.corrupt(x))},
{one(politician)(lx. ÿcorrupt(x)), one(politician)(lx.corrupt(x))},
         {no(politicians)(lx. ÿcorrupt(x)), no(politicians)(lx.corrupt(x))}º}
c. {Are all politicians corrupt?, Are most politicians corrupt?, Are some
politicians corrupt?, Is one politician corrupt?, Are no politiciants corrupt?…}
Consider now what would happen if we tried to apply the above method to give an account of
why the a) reading is not available for (2). The structure of the propositions in the topic value
associated with the intended reading in the fashion of Büring (1997) is shown in (11a), (11b)
lists some actual sets of propositions in it, and (11c) illustrates the questions corresponding to
them:
(11) a. lP.$Q··e, tÒ, ··e, tÒ, tÒÒ [Q Œ ALT(at least three) &
& P = lp.$R··e, tÒ, ··e, tÒ, tÒÒ [R Œ ALT(every) &
& p = Q(children)(lx.R(book)(ly. read(x,y)))]]
b. {{at least three(children)(lx.every(book)(ly.read(x, y))),
at least three(children)(lx.many(book)(ly.read(x, y))),
at least three(children)(lx.one(book)(ly.read(x, y))), º},
{at least four(children)(lx.every(book)(ly.read(x, y))),
at least  four(children)(lx.many(book)(ly.read(x, y))),
at least four(children)(lx.one(book)(ly.read(x, y))), º},
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{at least five(children)(lx.every(book)(ly.read(x,y))),
at least five(children)(lx.many(book)(ly.read(x, y))),
at least five(children)(lx.one(book)(ly.read(x, y))), º}, º}
c. {How many books were read by at least three children?, How many books
were read by at least four children?, How many books were read by at least
five children?… }
In order to be able to account for the impossibility to assign the a) reading to (2) in Büring’s
framework, we would have to prove that the answers to all questions in the topic value follow
from the truth of the proposition associated with this reading, or, in other words, that all
propositions associated with the questions in the topic value are either entailed or contradicted
by the above proposition.
Note, however, that if the reading (2a) expresses the proposition represented by the first
formula in the set in (11b) then there is no way to prove the unavailability of this reading on
the basis of Büring (1997), since the truth of this proposition does not entail the truth or falsity
of all other propositions corresponding to the formulae in (11b). For example, the fact that
there are at least three kids each of whom read many books does not entail or contradict the
truth of the proposition that there are at least five kids who read every book, corresponding to
the seventh proposition in (11b).
3.2 Jacobs (1997) on the scope of contrastive topics
Jacobs  (1997)  introduces  the  distinction  between  i-specification versus i-topicalization
constructions, illustrated by him with the help of (12) and (13), respectively:
(12) ÷EIn  Werk  von  Grass  hat  Reich-Ranicki  \NICHT  verrissen.
one  work  of  Grass  have  Reich-Ranicki  not  pulled to pieces
‘One work by Grass Reich-Ranicki did not criticize severely.’
(13) ÷ALle Grass-Romane  kann  man  \NICHT  empfehlen.
all  Grass-novels  can  one  not  recommend
‘Not all novels by Grass can be recommended.’
As the notation above shows, both constructions can be uttered with the same intonation
pattern consisting of two accented positions, the first of which bears a so-called root contour,
and the second a falling tone. A characteristic feature of i-specification constructions is that
the constituent with the root contour must refer to a specific individual, this is the reason why
they can be followed by an expression which further specifies the referent, as illustrated in
(12a). (12b) shows that (12) cannot easily be imagined to be contrasted to ist affirmative
variants containing a different determiner:
3
(12) a. ... nämlich  die  “BLECHtrommel”.
namely the tin drum
... ‘namely, The Tin Drum.’
b.  ? ... aber  MANche  Werke  HAT  er  verrissen.
but several works have he pulled to pieces
... ‘but several works he did severely criticize.’
One of the defining characteristics of i-topicalization constructions, however, is that the
constituent with the root contour should be associated with narrow scope with respect to the
constituent bearing the falling tone.
                                                   
3 I believe, however, that there exists an alternative explanation for why (12) cannot easily be continued with
(12b) along the lines of the proposal made in section 6.
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The narrow scope requirement for i-topics is explained by Jacobs in the following way: the
construction introduces an illocutionary operator ASSERT taking widest scope into the
logical representation of the sentence, which then takes the form ASSERT
IT(TOP)(PRED).
Jacobs defines the rule generating the semantic interpretation associated with the above
structure in the following way:
(14) [[ASSERT
IT(TOP)(PRED)]]prop = [[PRED]]([[TOP]])
As (14) shows, the narrow scope of the contrastive topic is due to the fact that it is interpreted
as an argument of the denotation of the predicate part in the particular construction. The
presence of the illocutionary operator ASSERT in the structure is justified by the fact that i-
topicalization is only possible in assertive and directive sentences in German.
One of the problems with trying to adopt this theory to account for the Hungarian data under
consideration would be that in Hungarian, wide-scope contrastive topics are not only possible
in assertive/directive sentences, but also in questions:
(15)  [CT  /Ötnél  több  gyerek] [FP  \mikor [VP  érkezett?]]
five-than  more  kid   when   arrived
‘When did more than five kids arrive?’
We have seen in this section that the proposals made in Büring (1997) and Jacobs (1997)
cannot directly be transferred to account for the possibility of contrastive topics to receive
narrow scope. However, as will be shown in the rest of this paper, some of Büring’s and
Jacobs’ insights are essential for providing the correct interpretation of the sentences under
discussion.
In the next section, we take a closer look at the first phenomenon listed above, namely, the
issue of why the reading in which the contrastive topic appears to take wide scope is available
in certain sentences but not allowed in others.
4  Wide scope or referential interpretation?
Consider again the two potential readings of (1) and (2). I propose that they do not differ from
each other in the scope of the quantificational expressions, but in the fact that in one of them,
the contrastive topic DP is assumed to denote a specific referent, and in the other it is
interpreted non-specifically. In other words, I wish to claim that the difference between the
two readings of (1) is analogous to the difference between the interpretation of Jacobs’ i-
specification and i-topicalization constructions.
The above proposal is supported by the fact that (1) can be complemented on its a) reading
without a change of interpretation by an expression further specifying the intended referent of
the contrastive topic DP, as illustrated below:
(16) [CT /Két könyvet a listán, mégpedig azokat, amelyeket
two  book-acc  the  list-on  namely  those-acc that-acc
Tolsztoj  írt,] [QP \minden  gyerek  elolvasott.]
Tolstoy  wrote  every  child  VM-read
‘As for two books on the list, namely the ones written by Tolstoy, they were read by
all kids.’
Although Jacobs (1997) does not discuss whether sentences with i-specification introduce a
contrast between alternative statements, this does happen in the case of (1a): on this reading
of the sentence, the two specific books read by all kids are set into tacit contrast with other
books, which were read by some other subset of the set of students.
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On this view about the interpretation of contrastive topic DPs, it becomes clear why (2), (4),
or (6) do not have readings a), as opposed to (1) or (5). In the former examples, the
contrastive topic DPs cannot pick out a specific referent (they also cannot stand in the
‘ordinary’ topic position of the Hungarian sentence, which only hosts expressions with a
referential or generic reading), whereas in the latter they can.
With the problem of wide scope readings out of the way, let us turn to the investigation of the
narrow scope readings.
5  Narrow scope readings
5.1 Observations
The possibility for quantificational expressions in the contrastive topic position in Hungarian
to be associated with narrow scope is illustrated by the b) readings of (1), (2), (5), and (6),
among others.
I would propose that the above problem can be tackled on the basis of an observation made in
Kálmán (1985), according to which contrastive topics in Hungarian can only appear in non-
neutral or corrective sentences, where they are obligatorily followed by a constituent bearing
an eradicating stress. (Eradicating stress is defined by Kálmán as a type of stress that removes
the stress from the words following it, unless this stress is also of the eradicating type.) In
previous works, including, for example, Lambrecht (1994), Vallduví and Engdahl (1996), Lee
(1999), von Fintel (1994), Büring (1997), it is claimed that contrastive topics have to be
followed by a focus. In Hungarian, however, as (1), (2), (5), (6), (7) or (8) above illustrate, the
constituent with the eradicating stress following the contrastive topic does not have to be
identical to the constituent for which the term focus has been used in the generative literature
i.e., the constituent sitting in the spec, FP position, as in (17), but can be situated in spec, QP,
as in (1) and (2), in the VP, as in (5) or (7), or in NegP, as in (18):
(17) [CT /Öt  gyerek] [FP  az \asztalt  emelte fel tegnap  ötkor.]
five  kid  the table-acc  lifted VM  yesterday  five-at
a. ‘As for five kids, it was the table they lifted collectively/individually at five
yesterday.’
b. ‘As for five kids, it was the table lifted by that many collectively/individually at five
yesterday.’
(18) [CT /Öt  vendég] [NegP  \nem  érkezett  meg.]
  five  guest  not  arrived  VM
a.  ‘As for five guests, they didn’t arrive. ’
b.  ‘As for five guests, that many did’t arrive. ’
Therefore, in order to avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to the constituent with the
eradicating stress following the contrastive topic as the associate of the contrastive topic.
Let us consider the contribution of the associate expressions to the truth conditions of the
sentence again. I propose that in each case the associate can be seen as an expression
introducing a restricted quantifier into the logical representation of the sentence which takes
widest scope with respect to the other operators. Using a different terminology, we could say
that the associate introduces a tripartite  structure into the logical representation of the
sentence (cf. Heim 1982, Partee 1991, Bach et al. 1995).
For example, in the b) readings of (1) and (2), repeated here as (19), and (20), respectively,
the associate expression introduces a (restricted) universal quantifier over individuals, which
takes widest scope:
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(19) [CT  /Két  könyvet] [QP  \minden  gyerek  elolvasott.]
two  book-acc  every  child  VM-read
  a. ‘As for two books, they were read by all children.’
b. ‘As for (at least) two books, so many were read by all children.’
(20) [CT  /Legalább három gyerek] [QP \minden könyvet elolvasott.]
         at least  three  child  every  book-acc  VM-read
a. # ‘As for at least three kids, they read every book. ’
b. ‘As for at least three kids, every book was read by that many. ’
In the case of (5), repeated as in (21) below, the accented verb (signalling VP focus) appears
to introduce existential quantification over events which happened at a specific time and
place:
(21) [CT /Három  vendéggel] [VP \találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
three  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-in
a. ‘As for three guests, I did met them at noon yesterday.’
b. ‘As for three guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
In (6), repeated here as (22), the adverbial quantifier sitting in the quantifier position of the
sentence introduces quantification over events of the same type happening at different times:
(22) [CT /Ötnél kevesebb vendéggel] [QP\sokszor [VP (össze)találkoztam.]]
five-than fewer  guest-with  many times  VM-met-1sg
    a. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet them many times.’
    b. ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet that many many times.’
In the next subsection we consider the issue of how the above intuitions could be represented
in a more formal manner.
5.2 Steps towards formalization
Although I am not in a position to offer here a full-fledged formalism for handling the data
under consideration, I wish to formulate some proposals which would bring us closer to a
formal account of the relevant examples. I offer (23) as a general representation of the order
of constituents in Hungarian sentences with a contrastive topic. The compulsory elements of
the structure are marked with foldface, the others with italics:
(23) [Topic  ]* [CT  ]* [PrV ]* [AS ] [PrV ]* [PoV/VP ]
(23) says the following. There can be one or possibly more constituents referred to as
contrastive topics in a sentence, situated in one of the spec, TopP positions (although
sentences with more contrastive topics will be ignored here). Contrastive topics can be
preceded by ordinary topics. The presence of a constituent referred to as the associate (marked
as AS in (23)) is obligatory in a structure with a contrastive topic. The associate can be
identical to a maximal projection in one of the preverbal operator positions shown in (3),
except the topic position, as well as to the whole VP or only to the finite verb. (The latter two
instances can only be differentiated on semantic or pragmatic grounds, since in both cases it is
the first constituent of the flat VP assumed here which bears the eradicating stress. The finite
verb alone would play the role of the associate in sentence (5) above, for example, if the
sentence was uttered to contrast the event of meeting the guests with, for example, the event
of speaking to them.) The contrastive topic does not need to be immediately followed by the
associate, although the latest position for the latter is the VP or the verb itself, i.e., the
associate cannot be identical to a postverbal phrase. If the associate does not follow the verb
immediately, it is possible for them to be separated by constituents in the preverbal operator
positions. Also, if the associate is not the last among the preverbal operator positions, it can
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possibly be followed by one or more operators. When the associate is other than the VP, then
it is, naturally, followed by a VP, and when it is identical to the finite verb, then it can be
followed by further post-verbal material. In order to keep the discussion to a manageable size,
in the rest of the paper we will ignore the cases when the associate is identical to spec, FP or
is in NegP.
I wish to propose that in cases under consideration, the meaning of the construction consisting
of a contrastive topic and its associate is calculated as follows. The associate expression
introduces a restricted quantifier over a type of entities determined by its semantic type (e.g.,
DPs -- individuals, adverbs of quantification -- events, VP/V -- existential quantification over
events). The restriction of the quantifier is specified by the rest of the constituent playing the
role of the associate. This restricted quantifier necessarily takes highest scope among the
scope-bearing elements in the logical representation of the meaning of the sentence. The
scope of the restricted quantifier would then be composed of the meaning of the rest of the
sentence, including the contrastive topic itself. Schematically, the meaning of a sentence with
a contrastive topic would be represented in the format for restricted quantification proposed in
Klima (1982) as follows, where Q denotes the quantifier introduced by the associate, x is the
variable quantified over by Q, R stands for the restriction of Q, determined on the basis of the
associate expression, and S stands for the scope of the quantifier, generated from information
in the rest of the sentence:
(24) (Qx. R(x)) S(x)
As an illustration, consider the semantic representation of  reading (19b) in an event semantic
framework (cf. Krifka 1992, for example) in (25). In this sentence, the role of the associate is
played by a DP, the restriction of the universal quantifier introduced by it consists of
individuals which satisfy the property specified by the rest of the DP, i.e. the noun child,
whereas its scope is determined on the basis of the rest of the sentence. The property marked
by two-book is the property of individuals in the denotation of book with at least two atomic
parts. Quantifiers with empty restrictions will be substituted by their unrestricted counterparts:
(25) ("x. child(x)) $e read(e) Ÿ AG(x, e) Ÿ $y (PAT(y, e) Ÿ two-book(y))
(25) thus expresses that for all individuals with the property of being a child the property of
having read two books holds.
The following formula represents the a) reading of (19). Note that the reason why the
contrastive topic meaning does not fall into the scope of the quantifier is that the former is a
constant.  This  formula  thus  shows  that  the  proposal  for  associating  structures  with  a
contrastive topic with the construction meaning proposed above does not contradict intuitions
about the interpretation of the apparent wide-scope readings of sentences:
(26) ("x. child(x)) $e read(e) Ÿ AG(x, e) Ÿ PAT(a ⊕ b, e)
Sentences like (21), with focused VPs, introduce existential quantification over the domain of
events. The meaning of the above sentence could thus be represented as follows:
(27) ($e. meet(e) Ÿ AG(I, e) Ÿ DAY(yesterday, e) Ÿ AT(noon, e)) $x (PAT(x, e) Ÿ
Ÿ three-guest (x))
The above formula expresses that (21) is true if and only if there is an event of me meeting
some  plural  individuals  at  noon  yesterday  and  these  individuals  satisfy  the  property
abbreviated as three-guest above, i.e., consist of at least three atoms and fall into the
extension of the noun guest.
In this section we proposed an approach to account for the narrow scope readings of
contrastive topics. We have claimed on the basis of empirical evidence that the logical
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structure of the construction consisting of a contrastive topic and an associate should always
be represented as one in which the associate introduces a restricted quantifier, together with
its restriction, and the rest of the sentence contributes to defining its scope. This proposal is
based on the assumption that the property of playing the role of the associate in construction
with a contrastive topic provides an expression with certain semantic features which it would
not otherwise have in another sentence. This assumption seems to be further justified by
examples  like  (28),  which  contains  a  contrastive  topic  followed  by  a  quantificational
expression and a focus. Since it is the latter which bears the eradicating stress und thus plays
the role of the associate, the sentence cannot have a reading where the universal quantifier
takes wide scope over the focus, although this would have to follow from the scope principle.
(28) [CT  /Pontosan  két  lány] [QP mindig [FP \Jánost  üdvözölte.]]
exactly  two  girl  always   John  greeted
a.  ‘As for exactly two girls, it is John who was always greeted by that many.’
b.  # ‘As for exactly two girls, it happened always that John was the one greeted by
that many.’
The method suggested above can accounts for the Hungarian data under discussion without
the need to introduce illocutionary operators into the logical structure of sentences, as done in
Jacobs (1997), which would not be justified in the language.
6  Sentences without interpretation
Sentences like (4) above, repeated here as (29), will be regarded, following Büring (1997), not
as grammatically ill-formed, but will be assumed to be lacking an interpretation. The reason
for this choice of terminology is due to the fact they do not seem to contradict any rule of
syntax (cf. (22), with the same expression in contrastive topic position which is perfectly
well-formed in the language). In section 4 above, we have already managed to account for the
lack of reading (4a). We now take a look at the problem of why the sentence and its
counterpart with a non-monotonic determiner in (30) cannot have the b) readings, either.
(29) #[CT /Ötnél  kevesebb  vendéggel] [VP  \találkoztam tegnap  délben.]
five-than   fewer  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-at
a. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet them at noon yesterday.’
b. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
(30) #[CT /Pontosan  öt vendéggel] [VP  \találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
exactly five  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-at
a. # ‘As for exactly five guests, I did meet them at noon yesterday.’
b. # ‘As for exactly five guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
I claim that the truth-conditional interpretation associated with (29b) and (30b) is that I met
fewer than five and exactly five guests at noon yesterday.
4 The same truth conditions are
expressed by the following sentences:
(31) [FP Ötnél  kevesebb  vendéggel] [VP  találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
five-than   fewer  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-at
‘I met fewer than five guests at noon yesterday.’
(32) [FP Pontosan  öt vendéggel] [VP  találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
exactly five  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-at
‘I met exactly five guests at noon yesterday.’
                                                   
4 Since the formalization of these truth conditions in the framework shown in the previous chaper would involve
some complications regarding the meaning of monotone decreasing and non-montonic determiners, discussed in
É. Kiss and Gyuris (2003), it will not be illustrated here.
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The problem with (29)-(30), I believe, is not that they were unable to convey the truth-
conditions associated with readings (29b) and (30b) but that they do not give rise to the
implicatures associated with contrastive topics.
5 Consider the list of some of the questions
which would be contained in the topic value of (29) in Büring’s (1997) framework:
(33) {Did you meet fewer than five guests at noon yesterday?, Did you meet more than five
guests at noon yesterday?, Did you meet exactly five guests at noon yesterday?, …}
We could prove that the reading in (29b) is not available if we could show that the answer to
all alternative questions in the topic value associated with it in fact would follow from the
truth of the proposition expressed, and thus the required implicature would not be fulfilled.
This can be shown in the following manner.
I believe that the verb meet denotes a type of event which distributes down to the subparts of
its patient. In other words, if I met n people on one occassion, then it follows that I also met n-
k people on the same occassion, where n-k ≥ 1. DPs with monotone decreasing and non-
monotonic determiners in Hungarian are associated with a kind of maximality property, in
other words, when I say that I met fewer than five guests, as in (31), it entails that I did not
meet five or more guests on the same occassion. In other words, the expression of the above
proposition equals to a claim about the truth or falsity of propositions of the structure ‘I met k
guests’ for any number k where k refers to a quantity not fewer than five (i.e., where k is an
alternative of fewer than five), or, using Büring’s terminology, the utterance of the above
proposition would answer any alternative questions of the form Did you meet k guests? In the
topic value, thus would leave none debatable. In such a case, however, the implicatures
associated with the contrastive topic would not be fulfilled. This is the reason for the lack of
the reading under discussion.
As opposed to the above case, the sentence in (22), repeated here as (34), does have an
interpretation, since the alternative questions in its topic value would not be yes-no questions
like in the above case but questions of the type Did you meet k guests n times?, where n times
would be an alternative to many  times. The events asked about in these questions are
independent of each other, the occurrence of an event of meeting fewer than five guests on
one particular day cannot influence the occurrence of events of meeting a different number of
guests on different days.
(34) [CT /Ötnél kevesebb vendéggel] [QP\sokszor [VP (össze)találkoztam.]]
five-than fewer  guest-with  many times  VM-met-1sg
    a. # ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet them many times.’
    b. ‘As for fewer than five guests, I did meet that many many times.’
Thus, as the preceding discussion has shown, an explanation for the lack of b) readings for
(29)-(30) can be formulated in Büring’s (1997) framework, provided that the alternative
propositions or questions in their topic values refer to events happening at the same time and
place and that the contributions of montone decreasing and non-montonic determiners to the
menaing of propositions are identified correctly.
The availability of the b) reading for (21), repeated here as (35), also follows from the same
principles:
                                                   
5 The representation of the truth conditions of readings (29b) and (30b) would involve some complications about
the meaning of monotone decreasing and non-monotone determiners, discussed in É. Kiss and Gyuris (2003),
which cannot be elaborated on here.
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(35) [CT /Három  vendéggel] [VP \találkoztam  tegnap  délben.]
three  guest-with  met-1sg  yesterday  noon-in
a. ‘As for three guests, I did met them at noon yesterday.’
b. ‘As for three guests, I did meet that many at noon yesterday.’
The difference between (29)-(30) versus (35) is that the latter allows there to be events of me
meeting a different group of guests than at least three at the same time and place, provided
they stand in a subevent relation to the former. Thus, from the utterance of (35) with the b)
interpretation, the answer to all questions of the form Did you meet k guests at noon
yesterday?  (those contained in the topic value) does not follow, and the implicatures
associated with contrastive topics are fulfilled. In the next section we extend our proposals to
the analysis of collective/distributive readings.
7  Collective versus distributive readings
Consider again the data in (7) and (8) above, repeated here as (36) and (37):
(36) [CT /Öt  gyerek] [VP \felemelte  az  asztalt  tegnap  ötkor.]
five  kid  VM-lifted  the  table  yesterday  five-at
a. ‘As for five kids, they did lift the table collectively/individually at five yesterday.’
b.  ‘As for (at least) five children, that many did lift the table #collectively/individually
at five yesterday.'
(37) [CT /Öt  gyerek] [QP  \sok asztalt  felemelt tegnap  ötkor.]
five  kid  many table-acc  VM-lifted  yesterday  five-at
a. ‘As for five kids, they did lift many tables collectively/individually at five 
yesterday.’
b. ‘As for five kids, many tables were lifted collectively/ individually by that many at
five yesterday.’
I propose that the lack of a collective reading in (36b) can be handled on the basis of the same
assumptions as used in section 6, with one addition. Whenever a sentence predicates the
occurrence of a collective event, the alternative questions in its topic value also have to refer
to collective events of the same type. In other words, the following questions would be found
in the topic value of the collective reading of (36b):
(38) {Did five kids lift the table collectively at five yesterday?, Did four kids lift the table
collectively at five yesterday?, Did six kids lift the table collectively at five
yesterday?...}
Since two collective but otherwise atomic events cannot stand in a subevent relation to each
other (the collective event of lifting the table by five kids has no collective events of, say,
three kids lifting the table as subevents), the utterance of (36b) on its collective reading
automatically answers all other questions in (38) in the negative, if they are assumed to ask
about events taking place at the same time and place, unless the criterion that the events
should occupy the same temporal and physical place is lifted, i.e., when it is allowed that
more events of the same type take place simultaneously.
In this and the preceding section we have thus seen that the application of Büring’s (1997)
theory to the Hungarian case can help to account for the lack of narrow scope readings of
particular contrastive topics, as well as to explain the lack of collective readings of plural
contrastive topic NPs, when special attention is paid on the structure of events whose
occurrence  is  predicated  about  in  these  sentences.  The  next  section  summarizes  the
conclusions of the paper.
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8  Conclusion
The paper looked at four phenomena involving the interpretation of Hungarian sentences with
contrastive  topics:  the  availability  of  what  appear  to  be  wide  scope  readings  for
quantificational expressions in this position, the availability of narrow scope readings for the
same expressions, the issue of why otherwise grammatically well-formed structures with
contrastive topics including monotone decreasing and non-monotonic determiners do not
seem to have an interpretation, and the question of the availability of collective versus
distributive readings for plural contrastive topic NPs.
It was argued that what appear to be wide scope readings are in fact cases where the
contrastive topic receives a referential interpretation, and that the narrow scope readings can
be accounted for by proposing that stuctures with contrastive topics are associated with a
specific construction meaning, in which the expression playing the role of the associate
introduces a restricted quantifier taking widest scope into the logical representation of the
sentence. As regards the lack of interpretations for sentences with CTs involving monotone
decreasing  and  non-monotonic  determiners,  and  the  availability  of  collective  versus
distributive readings, they can be accounted for by means of method proposed by Büring
(1997) to filter out readings of sentences with contrastive topics which do not give rise to the
required implicatures, provided that in sentences expressing existential quantification over
events the alternative questions are also assumed to refer to events happening at the same time
and place.
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Abstract
According to many researchers, the form of referring expressions is connected to the
accessibility/topicality of their referents: The most reduced referring expressions
refer to highly accessible referents, whereas fuller expressions refer to less accessible
referents. Thus, in languages with full and reduced pronouns, full forms are said to
refer to less accessible referents. In this paper, we investigate these claims by looking
at Dutch, which has full and reduced pronouns and demonstratives. We report here
the results of a sentence-completion study as well as an eye-tracking experiment that
we  conducted,  and  argue  that  the  results  are  only  partly  compatible  with  a
straightforward accessibility-based approach to referential form. More specifically,
our results suggest that the full vs. reduced pronoun choice is not triggered by
referent salience,  but  the  choice  of  a  demonstrative over  a  pronoun  is.  Corpus
examples indicate that use of full form of pronouns may in fact be prompted by
contrast. Overall, these results – as well as work on Finnish and Estonian (Kaiser
2003) – show that different anaphoric forms within one language can be sensitive to
different factors, and their referential properties cannot be captured by a unified
notion of salience.
1. Introduction
Many  researchers assume  that  the  referential  forms  of  a  language  follow  a  so-called
accessibility hierarchy, and that the form of a referring expression is connected to the
accessibility/salience of its referent. The claim is that the most reduced referring expressions
refer to the most accessible referents, and less reduced expressions refer to less accessible
referents, as shown in (1) (e.g. Ariel 1990, Givón 1983, Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993).
Thus, in languages with full and reduced pronominal forms, full forms refer to less accessible
referents (see Bresnan 2001, Cardinaletti & Starke 1999). The correlation between referential
form and antecedent salience is claimed to hold even when there is no ‘informational
difference’ between referential forms, i.e.  even when the forms do not differ in the amount of
semantic information they provide about the referent. For example, Ariel (2001) notes that
the English pronoun it and the demonstratives this/that “are indistinguishable with respect to
the description they provide for the intended referent (an inanimate object)” and emphasizes
that  according  to  her  approach,  these  forms  differ  only  “in  terms  of  the  processing
instructions they mark: personal pronouns mark a higher degree of accessibility than
demonstrative pronouns” (Ariel 2001:29).
                                                   
*  Special  thanks  to  Anne  Cutler,  Delphine  Dahan,  Dan  Swingley,  Margret  van  Beuningen  and  Elske
Schoenmakers for making it possible to conduct this work at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics,
Nijmegen. Thanks also to the audience at SuB8 for useful comments and feedback. This research was partially
funded by an NIH grant (1-R01-HD37507) to John Trueswell.
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(1)
null > reduced pronoun > full pronoun > demonstrative > full NP …etc
most salient less salient
referent referent
The questions we would like to address in this paper are whether we can really rank all
referential expressions of a language along a unified salience hierarchy. Might it not be the
case that different referential expressions are sensitive to different kinds of  factors that go
beyond salience? The outline of this paper is as follows: In the remainder of section 1, we
discuss the nature of the Dutch anaphoric paradigm and review existing work on the
referential properties of Dutch anaphors. In section 2, we discuss the sentence completion
experiment and its results, and in section 3 we turn to the eyetracking experiment. Section 4
reports on the results of a preliminary corpus study which we conducted to investigate
whether the notion of contrast guides use of certain anaphoric forms. Section 5 concludes the
paper and also points out some directions for future study and connections to work in other
languages.
1.1 Dutch referential forms
In this section we discuss Dutch third person pronouns and demonstratives, and review
existing work about their referential properties. First, let us consider pronouns. The singular
third person pronouns zij/ze ‘full form/reduced form of she’ and hij/ie ‘full form/reduced
form of he’ show a striking asymmetry. Both the full (zij) and the reduced (ze) form of the
feminine pronoun are used in colloquial and Standard Dutch. However, even though the full
form of the masculine pronoun, hij, is also used in both registers, the reduced form ie is a
clitic that is restricted to the spoken language. Even in spoken Dutch, it only occurs in
particular phonological contexts, especially after [-t] and some other consonants (e.g, Heeft-ie
dat gedaan? ‘Has-he that done?’, see Donaldson 1997:56). Due to its clitic status, ie cannot
occur sentence-initially in subject position, whereas the feminine short form ze can occur
sentence-initially, as illustrated in (2a,b) below.
                                         full form           reduced form
1
(i) Masculine pronoun:    hij (he)            ie (he)
(ii) Feminine pronoun:     zij (she)           ze (she)
(2a)
Hij/*ie gelooft er niets van. (Haeseryn et al. 1997:253).
He-NOM believes there none of
‘He doesn’t believe any of it.’
(2b)
Zij/ze gelooft er niets van. (Haeseryn et al. 1997:253).
She-NOM believes there none of
‘She doesn’t believe any of it.’
                                                   
1 The reduced forms are always unstressed, whereas the full forms are often, but not always, stressed (Haeseryn
et al. 1997:252).
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In sum, in Standard Dutch, there are two pronominal forms that can be used for feminine
referents, ze and zij, but only one form for masculine referents, hij. This brings us to the
question: how do ze and zij differ in their referential properties, if they do? To the best of our
knowledge, relatively little has been said about this distinction in the literature. The best-
known reference grammar of Dutch (Haeseryn et al. 1997:252) notes that the full forms are
used in cases of contrast, and provide ex. (3), with the second person pronoun jou ‘you’.
However, they do not say more about what kind of contrast they mean. Already, however, it
seems that these observations do not fit the assumptions made in some of the accessibility-
hierarchy theories that the full forms of pronouns are used to refer to less salient forms than
the reduced forms.
(3)
Hij bedoelt jou niet, maar Mark. (italics in original)
He means you not, but Mark.
‘He isn’t referring to you, he means Mark.’
In addition to personal pronouns, the demonstrative die (‘that’) is used to refer to human
antecedents in Dutch.
2 According to Haeseryn et al. (1997:306), demonstratives are used for
referents that have just been introduced into the conversation while pronouns are used for
‘old information’. Findings from a corpus study of demonstratives by Rullmann (2001) fit
with these claims. Rullmann analyzes his data using Centering Theory (Grosz, Joshi and
Weinstein 1995), and notes that while pronouns prefer topical or discourse-old antecedents,
demonstratives refer back to antecedents which are not topics or which are new information
(both are low-ranked on the Cf-list, Rullmann claims). Similarly, in another corpus-based
investigation, Comrie (1997) finds that demonstratives have nontopical antecedents.
(3a)
Toen Jani de straat opging, kwam hij een oude vriendj tegen.  Hiji/Diej zeg hallo.
When Jani went into the street, he ran into an old friendj.  Hei/Thatj said hello.
(Rullmann 2001)
(3b)
Marki kwam Arthurj tegen. Diej droeg een regenjas. Hijj huiverde.
Marki ran into Arthurj. Hej was wearing a raincoat. Hej was shivering.  (Rullmann 2001)
In sum, a review of the existing work on the Dutch anaphoric paradigm indicates that the
demonstrative die is used for entities that are new information and/or non-topics, the pronoun
hij is used for salient, topical referents, and according to Haeseryn et al.’s grammar, the
choice of zij over ze has to do with contrast of some kind. However, as mentioned earlier,
accessibility-hierarchy theories make different predictions about the choice of zij vs. ze.
According to these kinds of theories, the most reduced forms are used for the most salient
referents, and less reduced forms for less salient referents. Thus, extending these claims to
Standard Dutch, we would predict that (i) in the masculine paradigm, hij is used for more
salient referents than die (hij >> die), and (ii) in the feminine paradigm, ze is used for more
salient referents than zij, which in turn is used for more salient referents than die (ze >> zij >>
die).
                                                   
2 The proximal demonstrative  deze ‘this’ can also be used in this anaphoric way, but it is felt to be significantly
more formal (Haeseryn 1997:307) and seems  to occur more rarely than die, even in written standard Dutch. As
in English, the demonstratives die and deze can also be used as prenominal modifiers (e.g. this man, that man)
but we will not address that use here. (see Kirsner & van Heuven (1988), Kirsner, van Heuven & Vermeulen
(1987) for the pragmatic properties of die and deze when used in this way).
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Thus, it seems that there exists a fairly clear consensus concerning the referential properties
of hij and die, at least on a basic level, but that there are two competing claims concerning the
choice between ze and zij. Some claim that what matters is salience, whereas others view
contrast as being what triggers use of zij. In the subsequent sections, we investigate these
questions in more detail by means of a sentence completion experiment, an eyetracking
experiment and a corpus study.
2. Sentence completion experiment
In the sentence completion experiment, we investigate the referential properties of hij, die, ze
and zij to see if they are sensitive to the salience of the antecedent. In light of the finding that
subjects are more salient than objects (e.g. Brennan, Friedman & Pollard 1987, and many
others), we predict that hij is more likely to refer to a preceding subject than die (hij >> die),
and ze is more likely to refer to a preceding subject than zij, which is more likely to refer to a
preceding subject than die. (ze >> zij >> die).
Forty native Dutch speakers participated in the experiment, and their task was to provide
continuations for written sentence fragments. The critical stimuli were SVO sentences with
either two clearly masculine or two clearly feminine arguments. Each sentence was followed
by the first word of the next sentence, which was either hij, die, ze or zij (see (4)). Thus, there
were four conditions: (i) masculine with hij, (ii) masculine with die, (iii) feminine with ze and
(iv) feminine with zij.  (We did not test feminine with die, due to reasons of experiment
length.)
(4a)
De brandweerman kneep de bokser speels. Hij/Die…..
The fireman pinched the boxer jokingly. He…
(4b)
De serveerster kneep de onderwijzeres speels. Ze/Zij….
The waitress pinched the teacher
3 (‘teacheress’) jokingly. She….
All verbs used were action/agent-patient verbs (as defined by Stevenson et al. 1994).
Continuations were coded according to which of the referents in the preceding sentence the
participants chose as the referent of the anaphor, i.e. subject or object.
2.1 Sentence completion results
Figure 1 shows the ‘subject-object difference score’ for each of the four referential forms. We
computed, on the basis of the raw numbers of continuations (160 in total for each of the four
forms), how many more subject continuations than object continuations there were.
4 Thus,
positive numbers indicate a subject preference and negative numbers indicate an object
preference.
                                                   
3 The word  onderwijzeres has a feminine suffix and thus clearly morphologically marked as being female. The
nouns were designed to be as clear in their gender properties as possible: either they were morphologically
marked for gender or their gender was otherwise clear (e.g. king vs. queen).
4 However, not all continuations could be clearly coded as referring to the subject or object of the preceding
sentence (they were coded as ‘unclear’ or ‘other’, depending on the type of continuation). As a result, it is never
the case that all 160 data points (per condition) were either subject or object interpretations.
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The continuations reveal that the pronoun hij and the demonstrative die have clear referential
biases. As predicted, hij has a very strong subject bias, and die has an even stronger object
bias. However, the patterns for the feminine pronouns, ze and zij, are somewhat less clear.
Both forms have a preference for the preceding subject rather than the preceding subject.
However, the feminine full form zij clearly does not pattern like the demonstrative die in the
masculine paradigm (which is not surprising, since die also exists in the feminine paradigm).
Moreover, despite sharing a preference for the subject over the object, ze and zij actually
differ significantly in terms of their likelihood of referring to a preceding subject or object:
The short form ze is more likely to refer to a preceding subject than the long form zij  (see
Kaiser 2003 for further analyses and discussion).
98
-129
69
27
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
hij die ze zij
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
-
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
s
c
o
r
e
Figure 1.  Preference for preceding subject vs. preceding object for each anaphoric form.
(Positive numbers reflect a preference for the subject.  Negative numbers reflect a preference
for the object.)
2.2 Discussion
The prediction that pronouns refer to highly salient referents and demonstratives to less
salient ones is supported by the continuation patterns for the masculine pronoun hij and the
demonstrative die. However, the prediction that the choice between full vs. reduced forms is
also salience-driven is not clearly supported. The two feminine forms tested here both show a
preference for subjects over objects, but this preference is stronger for the short form ze than
the long form zij. Zij does not pattern like the demonstrative die, but neither does it act quite
like the short pronoun ze. Clearly, the overall pattern we see for zij is much closer to the
referential properties of ze than those of die.
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How do these results fit with the two claims that have been made regarding the referential
properties of the long pronominal form, namely that (i) it is used for less salient referents than
the short form, or that (ii) it is used in cases of contrast?
Let us first consider the claim that the full form is used for less salient referents than the
reduced form. The sentence completion results do not support a claim that zij refers to
referents that are markedly less salient than the ones that ze refers to, since if this were the
case, we would presumably see a clear object preference with zij, as we see with the
demonstrative die in the masculine conditions. So, perhaps we can uphold a weaker claim
that zij is ranked only slightly below ze on the salience scale? However, as we will see in the
next section, we should not make too much of this purported salience difference between ze
and zij, since it is not replicated in the results of the eye-tracking experiment.
Now, let us turn to the claim that the full form zij is used in cases of contrast. The experiment
here has nothing to say directly about the effects of contrast, since that was not tested here,
and in fact we will return to the topic of contrast at the end of this paper. However, it is worth
pointing out that if contrast is the only relevant factor for zij, then we do not necessarily
expect the antecedents of zij to show any strong bias towards one grammatical role over
another, since entities in any grammatical position can be interpreted as being contrastive.
Thus, the weak subject preference for zij that we see in the sentence completion results is not
incompatible with the contrast hypothesis; we could interpret it as a sign that zij can refer to
either subjects or objects. Moreover, one also should keep in mind that even if contrast is a
relevant factor for the use of zij, there is no reason why, say, grammatical role could not
matter as well.
3. Eyetracking experiment
In this section, we turn to the results of an on-line eyetracking study that investigates the
incremental interpretation of the anaphoric forms in Dutch. The sentence completion study
gives  us  off-line  data  about  people’s  interpretation  of  the  pronouns.  Here,  with  the
eyetracking experiment, we can investigate the same hypotheses as were sketched above for
the sentence completion experiment, but in a highly incremental manner that offers us a
direct measure of the temporal properties of on-line anaphor resolution. The advantage of on-
line methods is that they can provide information that off-line tasks cannot. For example, if
multiple factors contribute to referent choice, we might be able to disentangle them by
looking at reference resolution incrementally.
Sixteen native Dutch-speaking participants, mainly students at the University of Nijmegen,
took part in the experiment. Participants were shown, on  a computer screen, color pictures of
simple scenes involving human or animal characters, and heard a brief pre-recorded story
about the scene. Their task was to look for any mismatches between the story and the picture.
Participants’ eye movements (i.e. where they look in the scene as they listen to the story)
were recorded with a digital video camera. The video tapes were later analyzed to see which
characters in the picture were fixated over time.
A total of 16 target items (i.e., scene-story pairs) were constructed, each with two human
characters. The verbal story for each target item contained a sentence with two masculine or
two feminine human referents, followed by the critical sentence beginning with the anaphor
ze, zij, hij or die. There were four conditions: (1) masculine with hij, (2) masculine with die,
(3) feminine with ze, and (4) feminine with zij.  All verbs were, again, agent-patient verbs.
Neutral intonation was used throughout. A sample item is in (5).
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(5a) Feminine version
Het begon uit de hand te lopen in het klaslokaal.
‘Things were getting out of hand in the classroom.’
De leerlinge stak de lerares speels met een scherp potlood.
‘The student poked the teacher jokingly with a sharp pencil.’
Ze/Zij was gekleed in een groene trui, omdat het buiten koud was.
‘Ze/Zij was wearing a green sweater, because it was cold outside.’
Het lijkt erop dat ze naar de rector moeten.
‘It looks like they will have to go see the principal.’
(5b) Masculine version
Het begon uit de hand te lopen in het klaslokaal.
‘Things were beginning to get out of hand in the classroom.’
De leerling stak de leraar speels met een scherp potlood.
‘The student poked the teacher jokingly with a sharp pencil.’
Hij/Die was gekleed in een groene trui, omdat het buiten koud was.
‘Hij/Die was wearing a green sweater, because it was cold outside.’
Het lijkt erop dat ze naar de rector moeten.
‘It looks like they will have to go see the principal.’
Before moving onto the results, let us consider how we predict people’s eye-movements to
pattern in the different conditions. In accordance with common assumptions in the literature,
we might predict that the most reduced forms (in the masculine paradigm hij, and in the
feminine paradigm ze) are used for the most salient referents, and less reduced forms for less
salient referents (in the masculine paradigm die, and in the feminine paradigm zij)
5. This,
combined with the well-known finding that subjects are more salient than objects (e.g.
Brennan, Friedman & Pollard 1987, and many others), leads to the prediction that hij and ze
are more likely to refer to the subject of a preceding sentence than die and zij. However, if on
the other hand, the referential properties of the full form zij involve contrast and not salience,
then we do not necessarily expect it to show a clear preference for one antecedent over the
other.
3.1 Eye-tracking results
Figure 2 shows ‘subject advantage score’, which refers to the difference between the
proportion of time was spent looking at the subject and the proportion of time that was spent
looking at the object, during three time windows, for the four conditions. Thus, positive
numbers indicate a subject preference, and negative numbers indicate an object preference.
The first time window is 0-19 frames (0-333 milliseconds, where 0 is the onset of the
anaphoric expression), the second time window is 20-39 frames (333-666 ms), and the third
time window is 40-59 frames (666-1000 ms).
We see that, for the masculine pronoun hij, we initially have a slight object preference right
after the onset of the pronoun, but that this develops into a very strong subject preference
over time. The demonstrative die has a clear object preference that becomes stronger over
time. These two forms thus pattern as predicted. For the feminine conditions, however, the
pattern does not fit with the predictions. The reduced form ze initially has a weak object
                                                   
5 As noted earlier, feminine referents can also be referred to with die and thus if we were to test feminine die and
feminine zij, we would not expect them to pattern the same.
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preference right after the onset of the anaphor, but this develops into a subject preference.
Similarly, the full form zij shows a clear subject preference, and does not shows any sign of
being used to refer to less salient referents than ze. On the whole, the graph shows that the
pronouns hij, ze and zij behave in the same way—i.e. they prefer subjects over objects— and
thus differ from the demonstrative die. The finding that hij, ze and zij show increased looks to
the subject, whereas die does not, results in a significant gender-pronoun interaction starting
approximately 400-800 ms after the pronoun. Thus, the eye-movements also show a pattern
incompatible with an accessibility-hierarchy type explanation.
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Figure 2. The difference between the proportion of time spent looking at the subject and the
proportion of time spent looking at the object, during three time windows
(Positive numbers indicate a subject preference, and negative numbers indicate an object
preference. Note: There are 30 frames per second.)
3.2 Discussion
Overall, the results of the eye-tracking study show that the pronoun hij ‘he’ and the
demonstrative die ‘that’ differ in their referential properties: hij is significantly more likely
than die to be interpreted as referring to the subject of the preceding sentence, from which we
can infer that hij is used to refer to more salient referents than die. However, this pattern does
not extend to the long and short form of the feminine pronouns, ze and zij, since both tend to
be interpreted as referring to the subject of the preceding sentence in the eye-tracking
experiment.
Thus, contra accessibility-based approaches, the eyetracking results indicate that the full form
of the feminine pronoun is not used to refer to less salient or less prominent referents than the
reduced form. In other words, it looks like the referential properties of these two forms
cannot be defined in terms of salience. This brings up two important questions. First, how
does the finding that ze and zij both show a subject preference in the eyetracking data square
with the results of the sentence completion study, where ze and zij both showed a subject
preference but ze had a significantly stronger subject preference than zij? Second, we are
inevitably faced with the question of what governs the choice of ze vs zij, if it is not the
salience of the antecedent? To shed some light on this question, we conducted a small corpus
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study which investigates naturally-occurring uses of zij. As we will see in the next section,
many occurrences of zij have to do with contrast, not salience.
4. Preliminary corpus study
Thirty-five occurrences of zij in matrix subject position were analyzed. These tokens are from
a novel by Renate Dorrestein, Het Hemelse Gerecht (Pandora, 1990). Each item was coded
for the following factors:
(i)  grammatical role of the most recent instantiation of the antecedent
(ii)  distance between occurrence of zij and most recent mention of antecedent (e.g., in
same sentence but different clauses; separated by one or more main clauses etc.)
(iii)  whether the referent of zij was being contrasted with other referents
(iv)  whether there were any competing referents present (i.e. singular feminine
referents) between the mention of the antecedent and the pronoun zij.
4.1 Results, discussion
As Figure 3 shows, in our corpus zij prefers preceding subjects over objects, which matches
the eye movement patterns:
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Figure 3. Grammatical role of antecedent of zij
However, what does this corpus study tell us about what prompts use of zij over ze?  If ze is
the most reduced form, what is the referential function of zij? For example, what role does
contrast play? The other factors that were used in the coding reveal that the majority of the
occurrences of zij in our corpus fit into one of the following categories:
(a) The referent of zij is in a contrast relation to other entities in the discourse
(b) If the referent of zij is not in a contrast relation to anything, zij refers to a non-subject
(c) If neither (a) nor (b) holds – i.e. zij refers to a preceding subject that does not contrast
with anything else – then the mention of the antecedent is separated from the pronoun
by at least one main clause.
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First, let us consider some examples where zij is used in cases of contrast. This was the most
common context for zij. In (6a), it is clear that the two sisters who are the main characters in
the novel, Irthe and Ange, are being compared in terms of their hair. Irthe has long hair,
whereas Ange wears hers short. In (6b), Ange contrasts with Gilles in that she cannot see
outside whereas he seems to be able to.
(6a) “...” roept Irthe uit, terwijl ze de lange rode haren over haar schouder zwiert. Anges haar
is eerder rossig, zij dragt het kortgeknipt… (Het Hemelse Gerecht, 19)
“…” Irthe calls out while she tosses her long red hair over her shoulder. Ange’s hair is more
reddish-brown, she wears it short…
(6b) [context: Gilles and Ange are in the kitchen, and Ange notices Gilles looking outside
intently.  She tries to look too, knowing that outside are a garden, a river, the whole world.]
….maar hoe Ange zich ook inspant om van dat alles een glimp te ontwaren, zij ziet in de
donkere ruit slechts de weerspiegeling van haar eigen keuken… (15)
…but no matter how Ange exerts herself trying to catch a glimpse of all that, she sees in the
dark pane nothing but her own kitchen.
However, even though such contrast uses are very common, not all uses of zij can be
interpreted as involving a salient contrastive relation. In some cases, zij is simply used to
refer to a non-subject referent (7a), or to refer to a referent that was realized as the subject
some time ago, as in (7b).
(7a) [Irthe is having a busy night at the restaurant she runs with her sister.]
Om momenten als deze komt hun bedrijf haar voor also een circus, en is zij de leeuw die
door brandende hoepels springt. (46)
At times like this her business seems to her like a circus, and she is the lion that jumps
through the burning hoops.
(7b)
Haast bezwijkt Irthe onder haar bezorgde blik. Ange? Hoor eens? Ik moet je wat vertellen!
Maar dat is immers onmogelijk. Om Anges geluk niet te verstoren heft zij altijd het
stilzwijgen bewaard. (69)
Hastily Irthe gives way under her [Ange’s] worried look. Ange? Listen for once? I have to
tell you something.  But that is impossible, after all. In order to not interfere with Ange’s
happiness she [Irthe] has always kept quiet.
On the whole, these findings reveal that zij is most often used in cases of contrast, but not all
uses of zij can be construed contrastively. In fact, the corpus examples suggest that use of zij
may be driven by a number of different factors. Clearly, more work is needed in order to
better understand the referential properties of zij, but it does seem that contrast plays an
important role.
4.2 Implications for experimental results
Let us now consider how the results of the corpus studies and the two experiments fit
together.  In the sentence completion experiment, we saw that the masculine pronoun hij and
the demonstrative die have clear referential biases: hij prefers subjects and die prefers objects.
The two feminine forms, the reduced form ze  and  the  full  form  zij,  have  less  clear
preferences. Both prefer subjects over objects, but ze has a much stronger preference than zij.
As mentioned earlier, these results are compatible with a view that zij is ranked lower on the
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salience hierarchy than ze, i.e. that zij refers to entities that are slightly less salient than those
that ze refers to. However, this view is not supported by the eyetracking results, which show
that ze and zij both have equally strong subject biases. How can we reconcile these two sets
of results?
We would like to hypothesize that if, as the corpus data and Haeseryn et al’s  grammar
suggest, contrast is relevant for the use of zij, then the seemingly divergent experimental
results  can  be  reconciled.  In  the  sentence  completion  experiment,  participants  could
presumably  construe  zij contrastively if they wanted to, since they could continue the
fragment  any  way  they  wished.  This,  combined  with  the  idea  that  an  entity  in  any
grammatical position can be contrastive, might explain why, in the sentence completion task,
zij does not have as strong a subject preference as ze does: in some cases, perhaps zij is used
to refer back to a contrastively-interpreted object. In the eyetracking experiment, on the other
hand, no contrast is present as the pronouns are not used contrastively in the stories. Maybe,
then, in the absence of contrast people simply defaulted back to the preceding subject as the
referent for  zij. Clearly, further work is needed in this area, and the ideas presented here are
still very speculative. However, this direction seems to us to be a promising avenue for future
work.
5. Conclusions and crosslinguistic patterns
In sum, in this paper we have presented the results of two experiments and a small corpus
study. Our results suggest that the full vs. reduced pronoun choice (zij vs. ze) is not triggered
by referent salience, but the choice of a demonstrative over a pronoun (die vs. hij) is. Corpus
examples indicate that use of full form of pronouns may in fact be prompted by contrast.
Overall, these results suggest the referential properties of different anaphoric forms within
one language cannot be captured by a unified notion of salience.
Crosslinguistic evidence that further corroborates the claim that salience is not enough to
capture the referential properties of different forms comes from Finnish and Estonian (e.g.
Kaiser 2000, 2003, to appear). Finnish has a gender-neutral third person pronoun hän ‘she/he’
as well as a demonstrative tämä ‘this’ that can be used to refer back to humans, similar to
Dutch die ‘that.’ As shown by Kaiser (2003), these two forms differ strikingly in their
sensitivity to the antecedent’s grammatical role and word order, and cannot be mapped onto a
unified salience scale. Interestingly, Estonian has form that is historically related to the
Finnish demonstative tämä, namely tema. In Estonian, tema is the full form of the third
person pronoun, and ta is the reduced form. Pajusalu (1995, 1996, 1997) and Kaiser (2003)
claim that the choice of tema over ta is triggered by contrast. Examples from Kaiser’s corpus
are provided below. In (7a), there is a clear salient opposition between Sir Hartman and
Vendela: she can read whereas he cannot. Similarly, in (7b), tema triggers a contrastive
interpretation: It indicates that there is a salient opposition between Vendela and Father
Henrik because she is the one who will actually take care of the knight.
(7a) [context: Vendela has just told Sir Hartman that she can read and that she even owns a
book, which was quite a rare possession in Finland in the year 1371]
Rüütel Hartman mõtiskles selle üle, lebades mõnusalt laas voodis. Tema ei osanud lugeda,
selleks polnud mingit vajadust – lugemine oli pastorite osa.  (K. Utrio, 1989/1996, Vendela,
107)
‘Sir Hartman thought about this, resting comfortably in the wide bed.  He couldn’t read, there
was no need  for it – reading was for pastors.’
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(7b) [context: Father Henrik wants to come along to take care of Sir Hartman, who is
seriously ill. The head of Sir Hartman’s men explains to him:]
See [...] sõltub täielikult sellest, kas Domina Vendela lubab sul kaasa tulla või mitte. Domina
Vendela on ravitseja. Tema ravib rüütlit... (K. Utrio, 1989/1996, Vendela 94)
’It [...] depends entirely on whether Domina Vendela allows you to come along or not.
Domina Vendela is a healer. She will take care of the knight…’
In conclusion, the Dutch data as well as additional evidence from Finnish and Estonian
indicate that the notion of salience/accessibility is not enough to capture the referential
properties of different referential forms. We need to investigate the role of factors such as
contrast in order to better understand the discourse properties of different anaphoric forms.
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Abstract
This paper presents a new quantificational analysis of the Japanese numeral
quantifier (NQ) construction.  It is proposed that the classifier within the NQ
functions as the domain of quantification for the numeral, denoting a set of
atomic individuals.  This accounts for the predominant distributive reading of
the floating NQ sentence, both with object classifiers and event classifiers, as
a direct consequence of the atomicity condition of the classifier denotation.
The analysis correctly predicts that, unlike the floating NQ, the non-floating
NQ will show a collective/distributive ambiguity because it forms a plural
term, which can always be interpreted as a group individual or as a sum of
individuals.  The analysis also provides a semantic account of the well-known
classifier-NP agreement phenomenon.
1.  The Japanese Numeral Quantifier
The Japanese numeral quantifier (NQ) consists of a numeral and a classifier in that order,
as the following exemplifies:
(1) a. san-nin  b.  san-kumi             c.  ni-hon                d.    ni-hai
    3-CLhuman individual          3-CLgroup                 2-CLlong object              2-CLglass/cup
In semantic interpretation, the NQ is associated with an NP (‘host NP’).  For example,
(1a) san-nin can be construed with a common noun such as gakusei ‘student’ to yield the
meaning ‘three students’.  The Japanese NQ occur either inside the DP that contains its
host NP, i.e. as a ‘DNQ’, or syntactically associated with a predicate, i.e. as an ‘FNQ’.
(2a) and (2b) are sentences with a DNQ construed with a subject NP and an object NP,
respectively.  (3a) and (3b) are sentences with an FNQ construed with a subject NP and
an object NP, respectively:
(2) a. san-nin-no  gakusei-ga     hon-o           katta.         ‘Three students bought a book’
3-CL-GEN  student-NOM book-ACC  bought
      b. John-ga  san-satsu-no hon-o         katta.                 ‘John bought three books.’
J-NOM  3-CL-GEN    book-ACC  bought
(3) a. gakusei-ga     san-nin hon-o          katta.                ‘Three students bought a book.’
student-NOM 3-CL     book-ACC  bought
      b. John-ga hon-o         san-satsu katta.                       ‘John bought three books.’
J-NOM book-ACC 3-CL         bought
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2.  Classifier-Host NP Agreement
As is well-known, the Japanese classifier must agree with the host NP.  This is illustrated
in the following sentences:
 (4) a. gakusei-ga       san-nin     kita. ‘Three individual students came.’
student-NOM   3-CL         came
       b. #gakusei-ga      san-gen    kita    (lit.)‘Three buildings of students came.’
  student-NOM  3-CL        came
       c. gakusei-ga       san-kumi   kita. ‘Three groups of students came.’
student-NOM   3-CL          came
(5) a. John-ga biiru-o        ni-hon   nonda. ‘John drank two bottles of beer.’
J-NOM  beer-ACC   2-CL      drank
      b. #John-ga biiru-o       ni-mai nonda         (lit.)‘John drank two sheets of beer.’
  J-NOM  beer-ACC  2-CL    drank
      c. John-ga biiru-o        ni-hai   nonda. ‘John drank two glasses of beer.’
J-NOM  beer-ACC   2-CL     drank
(4a) is well-formed because nin is the classifier for human beings and gakusei is a kind of
human being.  In contrast, (4b) is ill-formed because ken is the classifier for buildings,
and students cannot easily be taken to have building properties.  Likewise, (5a) is well-
formed because hon is the classifier for long slender objects and a beer bottle fits this
description, but (5b) is ill-formed because mai is the classifier for flat, sheet-like objects
and beer does not usually come in flat, sheet-shaped packages.  Japanese classifier-host
NP agreement is often analyzed as syntactic agreement (e.g. Kitahara 1992).  However,
there are two basic observations that argue strongly against such an analysis.   First,
consider the grammatical minimal pairs (4a)-(4c) and (5a)-(5c).  These contrasts illustrate
a  very  general  fact  about  Japanese  classifier-host NP  agreement,  namely  that  the
classifier has a meaning.  This is not a property of syntactic agreement affixes.  Consider,
for example, a real case of syntactic agreement such as adjective-noun agreement in the
Spanish NP casa  roja  ‘red  house’;  the  agreement  affix  has  no  semantic  content.
Similarly, the syntactic agreement affix in cases of subject-verb agreement, e.g. English
John walks, is completely inert semantically.  Secondly, classifier selection is context-
sensitive and the ill-formedness of a classifier-host NP mismatch is exactly analogous to
a selectional restriction violation.  For example, whether (5a) or (5c) is pragmatically
licensed depends entirely on the speaker’s beliefs about the vessel John used to drink
beer.  Moreover, there are conceivable, albeit unlikely, contexts in which (5b) could be
perfectly well-formed, e.g. aboard a spacecraft where beer was stored in freeze-dried
wafers.  Given these basic observations, Japanese classifier-host NP agreement does not
appear to be syntactic.  Rather, it appears to be semantic.  This raises a first question:
What role does syntax play in this evidently semantic agreement phenomenon?
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3.  Semantic Difference between DNQ and FNQ Sentences
It has been observed that the Japanese FNQ sentence generally requires a distributive
reading.  In contrast, the DNQ sentence is always ambiguous between distributive and
collective readings.
1  This is seen in contrasts such as the following:
(6) a. san-nin-no gakusei-ga     peepaa-o      kaita (DNQ)
3-CL-GEN student-NOM paper-ACC wrote
‘Three students together/each wrote a paper.
      b. gakusei-ga,    san-nin peepaa-o     kaita (FNQ)
student-NOM 3-CL     paper-ACC wrote
‘Three students each wrote a paper.’
(7) a. futa-tsu-no suiso-genshi-ga             kono ondo-de
2-CL-GEN  hydrogen-atom-NOM   this    temperature-at 
hito-tsu-no  suiso-bunshi-o                   tsukuru (DNQ)
1-CL-GEN  hydrogen-molecule-ACC form
‘Two hydrogen atoms form a hydrogen molecule at this temperature.’
      b. #suiso-genshi-ga           kono ondo-de
  hydrogen-atom-NOM  this   temperature-at
futa-tsu  hito-tsu-no  suiso-bunshi-o                   tsukuru (FNQ)
2-CL      1-CL-GEN  hydrogen-molecule-ACC  form
‘(lit.) Two hydrogen atoms each form a hydrogen molecule at this temperature.’
The sentences in (6) contain a mixed predicate peepaa-o kaita ‘wrote a paper’.  The DNQ
sentence (6a) is ambiguous between distributive and collective readings as shown in the
English glosses, while the FNQ sentence (6b) can only be interpreted with a distributive
reading.  The FNQ sentence’s association with a distributive reading is even clearer in (7)
with the predicate hitotsu-no suiso-bunshi-o tsukuru ‘form a (single) hydrogen molecule’.
This collective predicate forces the DNQ sentence (7a) to have a collective reading, but
leads to ill-formedness in (7b) because FNQ requires a distributive reading.
2   The ill-
formedness here is parallel to that of an English sentence such as *Each boy gathered in
the classroom.  Thus, we face a second question: Why does the FNQ sentence generally
require a distributive reading while the DNQ sentence does not.
4. Previous Analyses
Let us look at some previous analyses to see whether they can address these two
questions.   We will focus on the second one first.   Let us begin by considering the
traditional analysis of an English sentence such as (8a):
                                                   
1  To be precise, this ambiguity holds when the DNQ sentence has a mixed predicate.  Needless to say, the
DNQ sentence with a collective predicate must be interpreted under a collective reading, and the DNQ
sentence with a distributive predicate must be interpreted under a distributive reading.
2  There is a special type of collective predicate that can occur with an FNQ.  In such cases, the FNQ
functions as an amount term, rather than an object quantifier.  See Kobuchi-Philip (2003) for details.
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(8) a. Three students wrote a paper.
      b.
c.    [[NP]] « [[VP]]≥ 3
Q A B
Num NP VP
3 student wrote a paper
This sentence can be quantificationally analyzed as in (8b).  The numeral, the host NP,
and the VP function as the quantifier, the domain of quantification, and the nuclear scope,
respectively.   The sentence is analyzed as an assertion that the cardinality of the
intersection of the NP denotation and the VP denotation is three, as shown in (8c).  This
basic approach is what Fukushima (1991) adopts for Japanese.  Fukushima’s analysis of
the Japanese FNQ sentence is illustrated in (9):
(9) a. gakusei-ga,       san-nin  peepaa-o       kaita          ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
student-NOM    3-CL       paper-ACC   wrote
      b.
Q A B
NQ NP VP
3-nin gakusei peepaa-o kaita
3-CL student wrote a paper
c. (lx[gakusei'(x)] « lx[peepaa-o kaita'(x)]≥ 3) Ÿ (lx[gakusei'(x)] Õ lx[nin'(x)])
         student                 wrote a paper                           student                 CL
 | |       |          |
   (NP-denotation)        (VP-denotation)       (NP-denotation)  (CL-denotation)
(9a) is quantificationally analyzed as in (9b).   The NQ san-nin ‘3-CL’, the host NP
gakusei ‘student’, and the VP peepaa-o kaita ‘wrote a paper’ function as the quantifier,
the domain of quantification, and the nuclear scope, respectively.  The meaning of (9a)
under this analysis is represented as (9c).  Notice that (9c) consists of two parts.  The left
conjunct captures the quantification proper, expressing the proposition that the cardinality
of the intersection of the NP denotation and the VP denotation is three.   The right
conjunct  captures  the  relationship  between  the  NP  denotation  and  the  classifier
denotation, describing it as a subset relation, i.e. the former is a subset of the latter.
Fukushima’s analysis works for basic FNQ sentences like (9a).   However, several
objections can be raised.  First, under this analysis the classifier does not participate in
the quantification proper, despite the fact that it is syntactically, if not morphologically,
composed with the numeral.  Thus, we have a mapping problem.  Secondly, the analysis
treats the interpretation of an FNQ sentence on a par with that of a DNQ sentence, failing
to capture the essential semantic difference as regards the unavailability of a collective
reading for the FNQ sentence.  Third, the type of Japanese FNQ sentence containing what
I call an ‘event classifier’ such as hatsu ‘blast/shot’ poses a severe empirical problem.
Consider the application of Fukushima’s analysis to a sentence such as (10a):
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(10) a. John-ga  pisutoru-o, san-patsu  utta. ‘John shot three shots of a pistol.’
J-NOM  pistol-ACC  3-CL          shot
        b. ly[pisutoru'(y)] « lx[utta'(x)(j)]≥ 3 Ÿ ly[pisutoru'(y)] Õ hatsu'
       ‘pistol’                 ‘shot’                       ‘pistol’              CLshot
First, (10b) asserts that there are three pistols which John shot (with).  But this does not
have to be the case: (10a) is also true if John shot a single pistol three times.  Second, the
event classifier hatsu denotes blast/shot units.  This is a type of event rather than a type of
object; consequently, the subset relationship in the right conjunct of (10c) never holds,
making the entire proposition (10c) necessarily false.  Thus, Fukushima’s analysis cannot
capture FNQ sentences with an event classifier, which means that we need a completely
distinct analysis for such sentences.
Let us now consider the Distributivity operator (D-operator) approach.   Link
(1987) argues that an English floating quantifier (FQ) such as all converts a VP
denotation  such  as  (11a)  into  (11b)  with  a  D-operator.   Under  this  analysis,  the
distributive reading of (12a) would be as shown in (12b).
(11) a. VP: lx[VP(x)]        b. 
DVP: lx"y[y
C P Æ VP(y)]
(12) a. Three men all lifted a piano.
        b. $x[(3 men)'(x) Ÿ "y[y
CPx Æ $z[piano'(z) Ÿ lifted'(y,z)]]]
Applying this approach to the Japanese FNQ sentence, modifying it slightly to take into
account the classifier, the logical representation of (13a) would be as shown in (13b):
(13) a. otoko-ga,    san-nin piano-o        hakonda.
man-NOM  3-CL      piano-ACC carried
‘Three men carried a piano.’
        b. $x[(3 nin)'(x) Ÿ otoko'(x) Ÿ "y[y
CAPx Æ$z[piano'(z) Ÿ hakonda'(y,z)]]]
          CL     ‘man’           ‘piano’       ‘carried’
(13b) accurately captures the meaning of (13a).  However, the D-operator approach is not
satisfactory since it only meets the condition of descriptive adequacy.  It does not provide
an explanation of why a D-operator obligatorily occurs with an FNQ sentence but only
optionally with a DNQ sentence.  Furthermore, this analysis faces the same problem as
Fukushima’s analysis with respect to the event classifier sentence.  Under a D-operator
approach, (14a) would be analyzed as (14b):
(14) a. John-ga  pisutoru-o  ni-hatsu utta. ‘John shot two shots of a pistol.’
J-NOM  pistol-ACC  2-CL       shot
       b. $x[(2 hatsu)'(x) Ÿ pisutoru'(x) Ÿ "y[y
CPx Æ [utta'(j,y)]]]
          ‘shot’           ‘pistol’   ‘shot’
The variable x is required to have both the property of being two shots (an event
property) and of being a pistol (an object property).  Since this is semantically incoherent,
(14a) is falsely predicted to be ill-formed.
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Finally, let us consider the analysis recently proposed by Nakanishi (2002a, b).
Nakanishi sheds new light on the semantic difference between Japanese DNQ and FNQ
sentences when this NQ functions as an amount term and is subject to Schwarzschild’s
(2002) ‘monotonicity constraint’.  Generalizing this to all NQs, she attempts to account
for the obligatory distributive reading of the FNQ sentence as a consequence of this
monotonicity constraint.  Consider first the DNQ sentences in (15), in which the DNQ
functions as an amount term rather than quantifying over objects:
(15) a. mizu  san-rittoru-ga    koboreta. ‘Three liters of water spilled.’
water  3-CL-NOM        spilled
       b. *mizu  san-do-ga     koboreta. (intended) ’Water whose temperature is
              water 3-CL-NOM  spilled                  three degrees spilled.’
(15a) is well-formed because it obeys the monotonicity constraint in the nominal domain:
There is a correlation between a subpart of 3 liters and a subpart of water.  In contrast,
(15b) is ill-formed because it violates the monotonicity constraint: It is not the case that a
subpart of water has a lower degree.   On the basis of this kind of data, Nakanishi
persuasively argues that the DNQ functioning as an amount term obeys the monotonicity
constraint in the nominal domain.  Now consider the FNQ sentences in (16), where the
FNQ is also an amount term:
(16) a. yuki-ga         kinoo       san-ton John-no ie-no            yane-ni tsumotta
snow-NOM  yesterday  3-CL     J-GEN   house-GEN roof-on piled up
‘Three tons of snow piled up on the roof of John’s house yesterday.’
        b. *yuki-ga       kinoo       san-ton John-no ie-o              oshitsubushita
 snow-NOM yesterday  3-CL     J-GEN   house-ACC destroyed
(intended) ‘Three tons of snow destroyed John’s house yesterday.’
Here, Nakanishi insightfully observes that well-formedness depends on satisfaction of the
monotonicity constraint with respect to events denoted by the predicate.  (16a) is well-
formed since there is a correlation between a subpart of 3 tons and a subevent of piling-
up-event.  In contrast, (16b) is ill-formed since there is no correlation between a subpart
of 3 tons and a subevent of destroying John’s house.  (The subevents of destroying John’s
house are not themselves events of destroying John’s house.)  This shows, Nakanishi
persuasively argues, that an amount term FNQ is subject to the monotonicity constraint in
the verbal domain.  Given this general observation, Nakanishi then attempts to account
for the obligatory distributive reading of the Japanese FNQ sentence by treating the FNQ
as a kind of amount term.  Consider (17):
(17) a. gakusei-ga,      san-nin     peepaa-o     kaita. ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
student-NOM   3-CLhuman paper-ACC wrote
       b.  e1 = student s1 wrote a paper
       e : e2 = student s2 wrote a paper
e3 = student s3 wrote a paper
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According to Nakanishi, an FNQ sentence such as (17a) can be well-formed only under a
distributive reading because only under a distributive reading is the monotonicity
constraint satisfied in the verbal domain.  That is, assuming that the distributive reading
entails the presupposition of subevents, as represented in (17b), the monotonicity
constraint is obeyed in the verbal domain since a subpart of 3-nin (e.g. s1) can be
correlated with a subevent of e represented in (17b) (e.g. e1).  Under a collective reading,
in contrast, there is only one event so there is no subevent with which a subpart of 3-nin
may be correlated, violating the monotonicity constraint.   Since the monotonicity
constraint can never be violated, the collective reading is ill-formed.
As elegant as it is, Nakanishi’s analysis faces some severe empirical problems.
First,  consider  the  case  of  a  DNQ  sentence  such  as  (18),  which  must  obey  the
monotonicity constraint in the nominal domain, according to Nakanishi’s proposal:
(18) gakusei san-nin-ga   peepaa-o     kaita. ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
student  3-CL-NOM  paper-ACC wrote
To satisfy the monotonicity constraint in the nominal domain, there must be a correlation
between a subpart of 3-nin and a subpart of students.  There is such a correlation under a
distributive reading of (18).  But now the problem is that the monotonicity constraint will
not be obeyed in the nominal domain under a collective reading of (18).  The minute the
students are taken as a group, there are no longer any subparts of students.  A group of
people is an individual object just as much as a collective action is an individual event.
Thus, just as the monotonicity constraint rules out a collective reading for the FNQ
sentence in (17a), it will rule out a collective reading for the DNQ sentence in (18).
Clearly, this is a very false prediction.  Moreover, it is unclear how the theory could be
modified to capture the facts since what is needed seems to be a stipulation that the
monotonicity constraint sometimes need not apply in the nominal domain, in which case,
the theory becomes incoherent.
Another problem for Nakanishi’s analysis derives from its dependence on an
exclusively event-based semantic analysis of FNQ quantification.   This leads to a
problem capturing the fact that the numeral indicates the cardinality of objects rather than
events in sentences such as (19c):
(19) a. e1 =  John danced yesterday at time t1.
e2 =  John danced yesterday at time t2.
e3 =  John danced yesterday at time t3.
        b. gakusei-ga      kinoo       san-kai  odotta.    ‘A student danced three times.’
student-NOM yesterday 3-CLtime danced
        c. gakusei-ga      kinoo       san-nin odotta    ‘Three students danced.’
student-NOM yesterday  3-CL     danced
In the situation represented in (19a), a single student, John, dances on three different
occasions.   (19b) precisely describes this situation.   In contrast, (19c) is false of this
situation.  However, under Nakanishi’s account, (19c) is predicted to be true of (19a).  If
the numeral of (19c) is replaced with a large number, say 300, then it could in principle
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true of a situation similar to (19a) under Krifka’s (1990) event related reading.
 3  (In that
case  the  adverb  kinoo ‘yesterday’ should also be replaced with another adverbial
indicating a longer period of time.)   However, it seems to be extremely difficult to
interpret (19c) under the event related reading, if possible at all.  Apparently, the event
related reading requires the cardinality to be very large, i.e. too large for verification
under an object related reading.
4
5.  An Alternative Analysis
Given the problems of the analyses reviewed in the precious section, I propose an
alternative  quantificational  analysis  which  pays  special  attention  to  the  classifier.
Following the general consensus in the semantics literature on the Japanese FNQ and on
FQs in general (Fukushima 1991, Nakanishi 2002a,b, Dowty and Brody 1984, Link 1987,
Roberts 1986, Doetjes 1997), I will assume that the Japanese FNQ is syntactically an
adverb which forms a constituent with a predicate, while the Japanese DNQ forms a
constituent with the host NP (see Kobuchi-Philip 2003 for a review of the empirical
arguments).   Assuming this simple syntax, I propose that the basic quantificational
structure of the Japanese NQ sentence is  as shown in (20):
(20) a. DNQ b.     FNQ
S         S
VP NP
Num + CL NP Num + CL VP
Q A B Q A B
  |  |  |  |  |  |
san nin gakusei san nin hon-o katta
3 CL student 3 CL bought a book
This analysis receives primary support from conservativity tests, as demonstrated in (21).
In each case, the entailment indicated by an arrow holds:
(21)  Conservativity Tests
a.  subject-oriented FNQ
gakusei-ga,   san-nin peepaa-o     kaita.          3             nin       peepaa-o kaita
student-NOM 3-CL       paper-ACC wrote                          CL        wrote a paper
‘Three students wrote a paper.’         Æ Three nin are nin that wrote a paper.
                                                   
3  For example, an English sentence such as (i) can be interpreted under an ordinary object oriented reading,
as paraphrased in (ii), or under a special event related reading, as paraphrased in (iii):
(i)  4000 ships passed through the lock last year.
(ii)  There were 4000 ships and they passed through the lock.
(iii)  There were 4000 passages of a ship through the lock.
4 The only type of context licensing an event related reading that I can think of is one in which a large
number of dancings are being counted, for example, in some statistical population study.
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b.  object-oriented FNQ
John-ga  piza-o,          ni-mai  tabeta.          2             mai      John-ga tabeta
J-NOM    pizza-ACC  2-CL    ate    CL       John ate
‘John ate two slices of pizza.’ Æ Two mai are mai that John ate.
c.  event classifier (FNQ only)
pisutoru-ga,  ni-hatsu utareta.                       2           hatsu       utareta
pistol-NOM   2-CL      was shot  CL         was shot
‘A pistol was shot twice.’        Æ Two hatsu are hatsu that were shot.
A crucial aspect of this proposal is a special semantic constraint on the classifier
denotation which I call the ATOMICITY CONDITION.  This is a requirement that the lexical
denotation of a classifier only consist of a set of atoms.  Unlike ordinary nouns, it cannot
also contain sums.  To clarify what is intended here, let us first look more closely at the
Japanese common noun.  I will assume that a Japanese common noun such as gakusei
‘student’ denotes a set containing both sums and atoms.  The basic motivation for this is
the fact that a Japanese bare noun can be interpreted either as singular or plural, as
illustrated in (22).  A similar claim has been made for Korean by Kang (1994).  Thus, we
may represent the denotation of the Japanese common noun gakusei as shown in (23):
(22)  gakusei-ga      kita ‘A(/the) student came.’  or
student-NOM came ‘Some(/the) students came.’
(23) gakusei ‘student’ :
{a|  |b|  |c,  (------ san-nin-no gakusei ‘three students’)
  a|  |b, a|  |c, b|  |c, (------ futa-ri-no gakusei ‘two students’)
  a, b, c} (------ hito-ri-no gakusei ‘one student’)
Now, let us consider the denotation of the classifier.  As we mentioned in the outset, each
classifier has its own meaning.   For example, the classifier nin is a unit for human
individuals.  Therefore, this must be a part of the lexical content of this classifier.  That
is, the classifier nin denotes a set of objects each of which has the property of being a
human being.
5  Now, if the classifier denotation also included both sums and atoms like
the common noun denotation, we would face a tremendous difficulty capturing the basic
truth conditions of Japanese NQ sentences.   Suppose that there were four human
individuals a, b, c and d in the domain of discourse and that the denotation of the
classifier nin included both sums and atoms. Then, the set denoted by the classifier nin
‘human individuals’ would include the following elements:
                                                   
5  To be precise, the property is that of being a whole human being, i.e. being a person, not merely the
property of being human.  Thus, the denotation of nin does not include, for example, individual human
fingers or human muscle tissue, etc.  For the clarification of this point I thank Arnim von Stechow (p.c).
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(24) {a|  |b|  |c|  |d,
  a|  |b|  |c, a|  |b|  |d, a|  |c|  |d, b|  |c|  |d,
  a|  |b, a|  |c, a|  |d, b|  |c, b|  |d, c|  |d,
  a, b, c, d}
Now, if the quantifier were ‘three’, the quantification computation would have to select
three elements from this domain.  However, no constraints are placed on which elements
are selected.  Consider, then, the hypothetical situations (25a) and (25b):
(25) a. {a|  |b|  |c|  |d,  b.  {a|  |b|  |c|  |d,
  a|  |b|  |c, a|  |b|  |d, a|  |c|  |d, b|  |c|  |d,                    a|  |b|  |c, a|  |b|  |d, a|  |c|  |d, b|  |c|  |d,
  a|  |b, a|  |c, a|  |d, b|  |c, b|  |d, c|  |d,                    a|  |b, a|  |c, a|  |d, b|  |c, b|  |d, c|  |d,
  a, b, c, d}                                                  a, b, c, d}
If the three underlined elements in (25a) were picked, then the number of elements would
indeed be three, yet the number of human individuals would only be two, namely a and c.
Worse, if the three underlined elements in (25b) happened to be picked, then the number
of elements would be three, but the number of human individuals would now be as many
as four, namely, a, b, c and d.   Clearly, there is a major problem here: We are not
capturing the basic meaning of the NQ.  The problem has a simple solution, though.  To
capture the basic truth conditions of the NQ, each element selected from the classifier
denotation must be exactly one human being.   This is guaranteed if the classifier
denotation lexically only contains atoms, as represented in (26):
(26) {a, b, c, d}
This is what the atomicity condition does.  Given the effect of the atomicity condition,
which I assume applies in the lexicon, we can guarantee that the elements selected by the
quantifier will always be a set of distinct individuals.  Note that our assumption here
simply reaffirms Kratzer’s (1989) and Chierchia’s (1998) general observation that the
domain of numeral quantification must be atomic.  Given the atomicity condition, then,
the lexical denotation of an object classifier and of an event classifier can be represented
as in (27).  The difference between these two types of classifier is that one denotes a set
of atomic objects while the other denotes a set of atomic events.
(27) a. Object classifier (type <e,t>)
nin (CLhuman individuals): lxe$ye[nin'(y) v x
CPy]
           ‘human’
satsu (CLvolume): lxe$ye[satsu'(y) v x
CPy]
           ‘volume’ (=bound paper)
        b. Event classifier (type <s,t>)
hatsu (CLshot): le1s$e2s[hatsu'(e2) v e1
CPe2]
             ‘blast/shot’
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Given such classifier denotations, the logical representation of the Japanese NQ sentence
in (28a), (29a), and (30a) is, under my proposal, as shown in (28b), (29b) and (30b),
respectively:
(28) DNQ sentence with object classifier
       a. san-nin-no  gakusei-ga     peepaa-o     kaita.     ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
3-CL-GEN student-NOM  paper-ACC wrote
       b. $y$K[KÕ(lu$v[nin'(v)Ÿu
CPv]«gakusei') Ÿ K≥3Ÿ|  |K=y] Ÿ peepaa-o kaita'(y)]
              ‘nin’                 ‘student’                                   ‘wrote a paper’
(29) FNQ sentence with object classifier
       a. gakusei-ga,   san-nin peepaa-o     kaita.           ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
student-NOM 3-CL    paper-ACC wrote
b.  $y[gakusei'(y) Ÿ $K[KÕ(lu$v[nin'(v)Ÿu
CPv]«peepaa-o kaita')ŸK≥3Ÿ| |K=y]]
     ‘student’                            ‘nin’                  ‘wrote a paper’
(30) FNQ sentence with event classifier
       a. pisutoru-ga,   san-patsu  utareta. ‘Three shots of a pistol were shot.’
pistol-NOM    3-CL          were shot
       b. le3$K[KÕ(le1$e2[hatsu'(e2)Ÿe1
CPe2]«le4$y[pisutoru'(y) Ÿ utareta’(y)(e4)])
     ‘hatsu’    ‘pistol’           ‘were shot’
ŸK≥3Ÿ|  |K=e3]
Given this analysis, the obligatory distributive reading of the FNQ sentence is a direct
consequence of the atomicity condition imposed by the classifier denotation after
application of the most basic syntactic operation of all, namely function composition (or
‘merge’ in the Minimalist framework).  As seen in (29b), the classifier denotation and the
predicate denotation intersect, and, since the elements in the classifier denotation are all
atomic, each element must be atomic and must have the property denoted by the
predicate.  A distributive reading results as a consequence of elementary principles of set
theory.  The same mechanism is applicable with the FNQ sentence that contains an event
classifier.   In (30b), quantification is over events instead of objects.   Here, the NP
pisutoru ‘pistol’ denotes a property of one of the participants of the event type denoted by
the predicate, and is not directly involved in the quantification proper.  This set of events
denoted by the predicate intersects with the set of events denoted by the classifier hatsu,
namely, a set of blasting-events.  Again, these blasting-events are all atomic.  Therefore,
the sentence asserts that there are three atomic blasting-events which are pistol-shooting-
events (rather than arrow-shooting-events or such).  As noted earlier, (30b) can be true
even when a single pistol is involved.   The semantic interpretation in (30b) readily
accommodates this fact since the FNQ is not directly associated with pisutoru.   Such
FNQ sentences actually have no host NP.
Now, it might seem that the analysis faces a problem since it would seem to
falsely predict that the DNQ sentence also cannot have a collective reading, one of the
problems for Nakanishi’s proposal.  That is, for sentence (28a), the atomicity constraint
has its usual effect in composition with the NP denotation, and so the sum K is a sum of
three individual students.  However, note that the sum K has exactly the same structure
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and content as the denotation of the English plural term three students:  As indicated in
(31a) below, a plural term is always ambiguous in that it can be construed either as an
individual sum or as a group atom, the latter derived from the former by an application of
a group operator, as discussed by Link (1984) and Landman (2000).  Analogously, the
sum generated in the computation of the Japanese DNQ may optionally be reanalyzed as
a group atom via application of the group operator as shown in (31b):
(31) a. three students:   a|  |b|  |c   or    ↑(a|  |b|  |c) (Link 1984, Landman 2000)
        b. san-nin-no gakusei :   a|  |b|  |c   or    ↑ (a|  |b|  |c)
3-CL-GEN student
‘three students’
c.  $y$K[KÕ(lu$v[nin'(v)Ÿu
CPv]«gakusei') ŸK≥3Ÿ↑(| |K)=y]
Ÿ peepaa-o-kaita'(y)]
  ‘nin’     ‘student’             |                 ‘wrote a paper’
 Group operator
Thus, the distributive/collective ambiguity of the Japanese DNQ sentence is captured by
a general mechanism that applies to all plural terms in all languages.   No additional
stipulation is necessary.   It is important to note that the same operation cannot be
performed on an FNQ sentence to yield a collective reading.  Consider the FNQ sentence
in (32a), analyzed as shown in (32b).  Suppose a group operator applied to the sum K, as
shown in (32c):
(32) a. gakusei-ga,   san-nin peepaa-o    kaita. ‘Three students wrote a paper.’
student-NOM  3-CL      paper-ACC wrote
       b. $y[gakusei'(y)Ÿ$K[KÕ(lu$v[nin'(v)Ÿu
CPv]«peepaa-o-kaita')ŸK≥3Ÿ| |K)=y]]
     ‘student’             ‘nin’                  ‘wrote a paper’
       c. $y[gakusei'(y)Ÿ$K[KÕ(lu$v[nin'(v)Ÿu
CPv]«peepaa-o-kaita')ŸK≥3Ÿ↑(| |K)=y]]
     ‘student’             ‘nin’                 ‘wrote a paper’
This would have no effect on the atomicity of the individuals in the intersection of the
classifier and the predicate denotations.   So, it could not eliminate the distributive
reading.   In (32c), the effect of the group operator is, if anything, only that the three
individual paper-writers may also be taken as a group, as a kind of independent after-
thought.  Furthermore, note that quite generally, the group operator may not optionally
apply in the verbal domain.  This is demonstrated by the fact that a lexically distributive
predicate such as walk cannot possibly be assigned a collective reading.  If it could, (33a)
would be as invalid as (33b):
(33) a. Three boys walked. --> One boy walked.
        b. Three boys carried it -/-> One boy carried it.
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6.  Agreement between CL and NP
Let us return now to our first question concerning the classifier-host NP agreement
phenomenon, illustrated again in (35) and (36).  We may now see what role syntax plays
in this phenomenon.   Just like selectional restrictions, the semantic agreement of the
classifier-host  NP  relation  is  based  on  the  basic  syntactic  operation  of  function
composition.   That is, syntactic composition is conditioned by a lexical semantic
requirement, i.e. selectional restrictions must be satisfied.
(35) a. san-nin-no gakusei-ga     kita.         ‘Three person-units of students came.’
3-CL-GEN student-NOM came
        b. #san-biki-no gakusei-ga     kita         ‘Three animal-units of student came.’
  3-CL-GEN student-NOM came
(36) a. gakusei-ga       san-nin   kita.         ‘Three person-units of students came.’
student-NOM   3-CL       came
        b. #gakusei-ga        san-biki  kita.          ‘Three animal-units of student came.’
  student-NOM    3-CL      came
The  Japanese  classifier-host  NP  agreement  observed  in  (35)  and  (36)  is  directly
analogous to that seen in the English minimal pairs in (37) and (38):
(37) a. A handful of students disobeyed the teacher.
        b. #A liter of students disobeyed the teacher.
(38) a. A branch suddenly hit the car.
        b. #A branch deliberately hit the car.
In (37) handful and liter are inside the subject DP and must compose with the NP
students to yield a combined meaning for the subject.  While handful is semantically
compatible with students, liter is not.  This directly determines the well-formedness of
(37a) and the ill-formedness of (37b).  Likewise, in (35), the composition of gakusei and
the DNQ must yield a coherent combined meaning.  This happens in (35a) but not in
(35b).  In (38), the adverbs suddenly and deliberately must compose coherently with the
predicate hit the car and then the adverb+predicate constituent must coherently compose
with the subject.  The composition of suddenly and hit the car yields a coherent combined
meaning, as does the composition of a branch and suddenly hit the car, so (38a) is well-
formed.  In contrast, in (38b), although deliberately composes coherently with hit the car,
the  composition  of a  branch and deliberately  hit  the  car  violates  the  selectional
restrictions of deliberately, causing the sentence to be ill-formed (except in fairly tales).
Likewise, in (36), the FNQ must first compose coherently with the predicate, and
subsequently, this complex predicate must compose coherently with the subject.  This
happens in (36a) but not in (36b).  In (36b), the composition of san-biki and kita is well-
formed; but  the  subsequent composition of  gakusei and san-biki  kita violates the
selectional restrictions of hiki.  The denotation of san-biki kita is a set of three objects
each of which has the property of being an animal (not a person) and of arriving.  This
Mana Kobuchi-Philip The Quantiﬁcational Function of the Japanese Numeral Classiﬁer
163Mana Kobuchi-Philip                                The Quantificational Function of the Japanese Numeral Classifier
14
cannot intersect with the subject denotation, which does not contain any animal.  Thus,
(36b) is ill-formed in ordinary contexts of use.  It is necessarily false if taken literally and
can only be used as a joke.
7.  Conclusion
Aside from the possibility of an application of the D-operator approach, there are two
basic types of quantificational analyses for the Japanese FNQ construction in the
literature.  In one, the domain of quantification is the NP.  In the other, the domain of
quantification is the event denoted by the predicate.  Both types of analyses, as well as
the  D-operator  approach,  are  descriptively  inadequate.   I  propose  an  alternative
quantificational account in which the classifier functions as the domain of quantification
for the numeral.   The atomicity constraint of the classifier denotation is a logically
necessary requirement.  Due to this constraint, the analysis straightforwardly accounts for
the obligatory distributive reading of the FNQ sentence, both for the sentence with an
object classifier and for the sentence with an event classifier.  The generation of a plural
term in DNQ quantification leads to the observed collective/distributive ambiguity of
DNQ sentences due to a general phenomenon concerning plural term interpretation in all
languages.  Thus, the analysis captures the truth conditions of Japanese DNQ and FNQ
sentences in a unified fashion.  Furthermore, the agreement between the classifier and the
NP in Japanese falls out naturally from the proposal as an instance of another very
general, universal, phenomenon, namely selectional restriction.
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Abstract 
The focus particle man ‘only’ in Korean shows different scopal behavior depending upon its 
syntactic environment. This non-uniform scope pattern cannot be accounted for if the particle is a 
scope-bearing element. This paper argues that the particle man is not a scope-bearing element, but 
an agreement morpheme that indicates the presence of a null head ONLY. Under this proposal, the 
particle man does not carry the exhaustive meaning of only, but the null head does. Therefore, it is 
the position of the ONLY head, not that of the particle, that determines the scope relation with 
respect to other quantificational elements. This paper also claims that there is a strong correlation 
between syntax and morphology (cf. Baker’s Mirror Principle). Thus, the relative order among the 
particle, case marker, and postposition reflects the hierarchy of corresponding functional heads. 
This helps detect the position of the ONLY head. The proposed analysis accounts for the scope 
patterns without making special stipulations about man-phrases.   
1  Introduction 
The focus particle man ‘only’ in Korean shows different scopal behavior depending upon the 
syntactic environment it appears in. Interestingly, the scope of a man-phrase varies with its 
morphological marking.
2 If a man-phrase is case-marked, its scope is fixed to its case position 
no matter where it appears in the sentence. By contrast, if it is marked by a postposition, its 
surface position affects scope relations.  
This non-uniform scope pattern cannot be accounted for if the particle is a scope-bearing 
element. Thus, I argue that, despite appearances, the particle man is not a scope-bearing 
element. Specifically, I argue that the particle man is actually an agreement morpheme that 
indicates the presence of a null head ONLY. This null head carries the exhaustive meaning of 
English only, and the particle has no meaning of its own. Therefore, it is the position of the 
ONLY head, not that of the particle, that determines the scope relation with respect to other 
quantificational elements. I also argue for a strong correlation between syntax and 
morphology, as claimed by Baker (1985) in the name of the Mirror Principle: the relative 
order among the particle, case marker, and postposition reflects the hierarchy of 
corresponding functional heads. Thus we can infer the position of the ONLY head from the 
order of nominal affixes. The proposed analysis accounts for the peculiar scope patterns 
without making special stipulations about man-phrases, unlike the commonly held view that 
takes the particle to be a quantificational element.    
This paper is organized as follows. After presenting the scope puzzle in section 2, I put 
forward the main proposal and analysis in section 3. Section 4 enumerates and confirms 
predictions of the null head analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.   
                                                 
1 My greatest thanks go to Danny Fox and Irene Heim for their valuable suggestions, insightful questions, and 
guidance. Many thanks also to Noam Chomasky, Kai von Fintel, Jon Gajewski, Sabine Iatridou, Alec Marantz, 
Shigeru Miyagawa, David Pesetsky, and Shoichi Takahashi for very helpful comments and questions. Thanks 
are also due to the audience and organizers of Sinn und Bedeutung VIII in Frankfurt, especially Shin-Sook Kim, 
for organizing a nice conference. All remaining errors are mine.  
2 Throughout the paper, the term ‘man-phrase’ refers to an XP that is accompanied by man.  
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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2  The scope puzzle 
This section presents the scopal behavior of man-phrases in scrambling contexts. The 
discussion will lead to the conclusion that we cannot account for the scope pattern of man-
phrases if the particle man is a scope-bearing element.  
Let us start with case-marked man-phrases. Case-marked man-phrases appear to obligatorily 
reconstruct when scrambled clause-internally. That is, clause-internal scrambling does not 
induce ambiguity. The relevant examples are illustrated below.  
 
(1) a. Motun-salam-i                John-man-ul   salanghanta.   
         every-person-NOM           John-only- ACC     love 
         ‘Everyone loves only John.’  
         (i) Everyone loves John and no one else.    (every > only) 
         (ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.   (*only > every) 
 
     b. John-man-ul1      [motun-salam-i                 t1      salanghanta]. 
         John-only-ACC       every-person-NOM       love 
         ‘Only John, everyone loves t.’  
         (i) Everyone loves John and no one else.     (every > only)  
         (ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.  (*only > every) 
 
The sequence of a universal quantifier and a man-phrase in (1a) only allows a surface scope 
reading whereby everyone takes scope over only John. So (1a) is true iff each person loves 
John and no one else. The other reading, where John is the only one whom everyone loves, is 
not available. In (1b), the man-phrase is scrambled across the subject quantifier everyone. 
Here the scope relation remains the same as in (1a). Wide scope for man is still not possible.
3 
Notice that the particle man precedes the case marker.  
Now we turn to man-phrases marked by a postposition. Postposition-marked man-phrases 
show different scopal behavior from case-marked ones. The scrambled PP-man phrase can 
take scope in the surface position, thus creating ambiguity, as shown in (2).  
 
(2) a. Motun-salam-i                John-hako-man   akswuhayssta.   
         every-person-NOM           John-with-only    shook_hands 
         ‘Everyone shook hands only with John.’  
         (i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else.  (every > only) 
         (ii) *John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands.  (*only > every) 
 
     b.  John-hako-man1     [motun-salam-i           t1   akswuhayssta].  
          John-with-only        every-person-NOM              shook_hands] 
          ‘Only with John, everyone shook hands t.’  
         (i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else.  (every > only) 
         (ii) John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands.   (only > every) 
                                                 
3 In order for the man-phrase to take scope over the subject QP, the man-phrase must appear in the sentence 
initial position without any case marker, as shown in (i). The sentence also has the narrow scope reading of the 
man-phrase, thus allowing ambiguity. In the interest of space, I leave the analysis of (i) for another occasion.  
 
(i)  John-mani     [motun-salam-i                ei           salanghanta]. 
                      John-only      every-person-Nom                  love 
                     ‘Only John, everyone loves e.’  
                     a. Everyone loves John and no one else.     (every > only)  
                     b. John is the only one whom everyone loves.      (only > every)  
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Without scrambling, the base order between the two elements determines the scope relation, 
as in (2a). If the PP is scrambled as in (2b), however, the man-phrase can take scope over the 
subject quantifier. Note also that the particle follows the postposition.  
This non-uniform behavior of man-phrases contrasts with the scopal behavior of quantifier 
phrases (QPs). It is well known that scrambled QPs optionally reconstruct and induce 
ambiguity in so-called scope-rigid languages (See Hoji 1985 for Japanese, Ahn 1990, Sohn 
1995 for Korean, among many others). The sentences in (3) exemplify the relevant facts for 
Korean.  
 
(3) a. Nwukwunka-ka              manhun-salam-ul           salanghanta.  
          someone-NOM          many-person-ACC         love 
          ‘Someone loves many people.’ 
          (i) There is someone who loves many people.     (some > many).   
          (ii) *There are many people who are loved by someone.  (*many > some).  
 
      b. Manhun-salam-ul1           [nwukwunka-ka            t1      salanghanta].  
          many-person-ACC             someone-NOM                 love 
         ‘Many people, someone loves t.’  
          (i) There is someone who loves many people.       (some > many).  
          (ii) There are many people who are loved by someone.   (many > some). 
 
When two quantifiers are in their base positions, as in (3a), the surface word order determines 
the scope relation between the two. When there is scrambling, however, the wide scope 
reading of the object QP becomes available, as in (3b). The scrambled QP can but need not 
undergo reconstruction, thus the sentence is ambiguous.
4 A schematic summary of the scope 
patterns is given in (4). The solid line indicates obligatory reconstruction, and the dotted line 
optional reconstruction.   
 
(4) a. [TP DP-man-Acci      [TP     QP     ti      verb]]              (unambiguous: 1b) 
 
 
     b. [TP PP-mani    [TP       QP        ti        verb]]        (ambiguous: 2b) 
 
              
     c. [TP    QPi      [TP      QP         ti        verb]]    (ambiguous: 3b) 
 
 
Suppose that the man-phrase is a QP of type <et, t>, that is, the set of properties that no one 
other than John has (J.-W. Choe 1998). Then, the non-ambiguity in (4a) is puzzling. 
Apparently, it undergoes obligatory reconstruction when scrambled, unlike QPs.  To solve 
this, one might stipulate that the man-phrase must reconstruct, e.g. that it is a special QP that 
can only undergo PF movement/scrambling (cf. Aoun and Benmamoun 1998, Sauerland and 
Elbourne 2002). However, this account lacks reasonable motivation, and faces empirical 
problems once we consider (4b). The stipulation does not hold for the case of PP-man, and 
we need another stipulation to distinguish the two cases. Any account that treats the man-
                                                 
4 When the man-phrase occurs in the subject position and a QP occupies an object position (e.g. Only Mary 
loves everyone), scrambling of the object QP induces an ambiguity. This is because what moves is a QP, not a 
man-phrase, and the scrambled QP can optionally reconstruct as shown in (3). For this reason, all the man-
phrases in this paper are accusative-marked.   
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phrase as a QP without further assumptions would fail to account for both the non-ambiguity 
of (4a) and the ambiguity of (4b).  
 
3  Proposal and analysis 
 
3.1  Proposal: man is an agreement morpheme 
This section proposes that the particle man is an agreement morpheme. As the Nominative 
case marker is an indication of the T(ense) head under standard assumptions, man is an 
indication of a null ONLY head. Under this proposal, the null ONLY head, rather than the 
particle, carries the quantificational/exhaustive meaning of English only. Therefore, the 
position of the null head, not the surface position of the particle, determines the scope relation 
with respect to other quantificational elements in the sentence.
5 
6  
I propose (5) as the lexical entry for the head ONLY, where ALT is the set of alternatives 
created by focus marking. It is the result of replacing the focused element by contextually 
plausible alternatives (see Rooth 1985).  
 
(5) 〚 ONLY〛= λP<e,t>.λxe.P(x) =1 & ∀ze∈ALT(x): P(z) = 1 → z = x   
 
The ONLY head takes two arguments (a predicate and an individual), and asserts that the 
individual argument is the only element that satisfies the predicate argument. Since the 
individual argument is focused, ALT(x) is a set of individuals. Basically, it is a covert only 
(cf. Horn 1969).  
I also claim that the ONLY head can occur in several distinct positions in the clause, as long 
as the semantic conditions imposed by (5) are satisfied. That is, there is no one fixed position 
for the null head. It can be above TP (high ONLY-P) or below TP (low ONLY-P). Now that 
the ONLY head can appear in various positions and it is phonologically null, a crucial task is 
to detect the position of this head. I argue that the position of ONLY can be detected, thanks 
to the strong correlation between morphology and syntax (cf. Baker’s (1985) Mirror 
Principle). Specifically, I argue that the relative order among the focus particle, case marker, 
and postposition reflects the hierarchy of the corresponding functional heads.
7 Take  for 
example John-man-i ‘John-only-Nom’. Since the particle man precedes the case marker, we 
conclude by the Mirror Principle that the ONLY head is lower than the Nominative case 
checking/assigning head, namely T (since Korean is a head-final language).    
Having said this, let us move to see how this works in interpreting sentences containing a 
man-phrase. We start with the simple sentence in (6).  
 
 (6) John-man-i       oassta.  
       John-only-NOM      came 
       ‘Only John came.’ 
 
In (6), the particle precedes the nominative marker, and the Mirror Principle tells us that 
ONLY-P is lower than TP. I claim that the subject, which is generated VP-internally, moves 
first to [Spec, ONLY-P], and then undergoes a second movement to [Spec, TP] to check the 
Nominative feature (Chomsky 1995, S. Cho 2000). The DP picks up the affixes through 
derivation, and the order of the affixes reflects the derivational steps. The derivation is 
                                                 
5 For the role of abstract heads in semantics literature, see Karttunen (1977) for question, and Laka (1990), 
Ladusaw (1992), von Stechow (1993), Beck & Kim (1997), Kelepir (2001), Penka (2002), and Ovalle & 
Guerzoni (2002) for negation.  
6 I will continue to gloss man as ‘only’ for the sake of convenience.  
7 This idea was suggested to me by Danny Fox.  
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illustrated in (7a) along with the semantic composition in (7b). As one can verify, the tree 
correctly derives the compositional meaning of the sentence.
8  
 
(7) a.                        TP ⑥  
              ru 
  John-man-i          ⑤ 
                       ru    
                      1               T′ 
                                           ru  
             ONLY-P ④   T[NOM]                                                 
ru      
                                   t1           ONLY′ ③  
        ru         
                                  ②          ONLY 
           ru       
       2                VP ① 
         ru     
                                            t2             came 
        
 
      b. 〚 ①〛= x came 
          〚 ②〛= λx.x came 
          〚 ③〛= λy.y came & ∀ze∈ALT(y): z came → z = y    
          〚 ④〛= u came and & ∀ze∈ALT(u): z came → z = u 
          〚 ⑤〛= λu.u came and & ∀ze∈ALT(u): z came → z = u 
          〚 ⑥〛= John came and ∀ze∈ALT(John): z came → z = John 
 
The focused phrase John undergoes focus movement to [Spec, ONLY-P], creating a lambda-
predicate.
9 This predicate is the first argument of ONLY, and the focused phrase in [Spec, 
ONLY-P] becomes the second argument of the ONLY head. This movement is obligatory 
although it sometimes applies string-vacuously, and thus has no effect on word order. One 
might wonder why we complicate the system by introducing the abstract ONLY head. When 
we look at simple cases like this, the motivation is not clear. Yet, this approach offers a non-
stipulative account for the scope puzzle, as will be shown in the next section.  
 
3.2  Deriving the compositional meaning 
Based on the proposal made in the above section, this section solves the scope puzzle noted 
in section 2. I first discuss case-marked man-phrases, and then turn to PP-man cases.  
The scope pattern of the case-marked man-phrase is repeated in (8). The point here is that 
clause-internal scrambling of the man-phrase does not affect scope interpretation. Sentence 
(8b) is not ambiguous.  
                                                 
8 Throughout this paper, I adopt Heim & Kratzer’s (1998) framework for semantic representation, e.g. numerical 
index as the variable binder. I also assume for convenience that case heads (T and Agro) are semantically 
vacuous.  
9 The lambda-abstractor in the first movement in (7) is in an unusual place, not directly under the moved 
element, as also pointed out by von Fintel (2001). There are other possible implementations that do not involve 
this choice (e.g. late merge of the ONLY head or movement to the sister node of the ONLY head), but the 
analysis does not hinge on the choice on this issue.  
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(8) a. Motun-salam-i        John-man-ul    salanghanta.   
         every-person-NOM        John-only-ACC     love 
         ‘Everyone loves only John.’  
         (i) Everyone loves John and no one else.    (every > only) 
         (ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.   (*only > every) 
 
    b. John-man-ul1     [motun-salam-i                  t1    salanghanta]. 
        John-only-ACC      every-person-NOM       love 
        ‘Only John, everyone loves t.’  
        (i) Everyone loves John and no one else.     (every > only)  
        (ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.   (*only > every)  
 
Let us start with (8a). From the order man-ul ‘man-acc’, we conclude by the Mirror Principle 
that ONLY-P is lower than AgroP where Accusative is assigned/checked. The AgroP is in 
turn below TP that contains the universal quantifier in its spec position. Therefore, the 
universal quantifier takes scope over the ONLY head. The structure of (8a) is given in (9a) 
along with the semantic value of the top node in (9b).  
 
(9) a.                    TP ① 
          ru 
             everyone        . 
        ru 
                              1         ru  
                                    AgroP     T[NOM] 
         ru       
                        John-man-ul         . 
         ru       
       2         ru         
                                          ONLY-P      Agro[ACC]     
                  ru          
                                          t2            ONLY′  
                ru  
                                                   .         ONLY 
                   ru     
                                          3             VP  
               ru   
            t1          ru       
                                                            t3             love   
 
 
      b. 〚 ①〛= For each person x, x loves John & ∀we∈ALT(John): x loves w → w = John   
 
The reading in (9b) is the meaning we want: each person has the property of loving John and 
no one else. Note that we must not allow reconstruction of the subject QP to its θ-position 
(t1), since it will produce the unattested reading (only > every). This is independently justified 
from the behavior of QPs in the scope-rigid languages. If the reconstruction were possible, 
sentences in the base order would be ambiguous, as in English (cf. (3a)).  
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Next, consider (8b) where John-man-ul ‘John-only-Acc’ is scrambled to the sentence initial 
position. Since man is a mere agreement morpheme, the man-phrase is a referential 
expression, not a QP. Given this, it is natural that scrambling of the man-phrase does not 
affect meaning, as is the case with referential expressions. The structure of (8b) is given in 
(10a), where the clausal structure remains the same as in (9a), except that the man-phrase is 
adjoined to TP via scrambling. The semantic value of the top node is given in (10b).   
 
(10) a.            TP ① 
         ru 
          John-man-ul              . 
 ru   
           1               TP    
                                  ru 
                                        everyone       . 
        ru 
                   2        ru  
                                                          AgroP      T [NOM] 
       ru        
                t1                . 
    ru 
               3        ru         
                                                                 ONLY-P   Agro[ACC]    
          ru         
                                                               t3            ONLY′  
                         ru  
                                 .      ONLY 
                                                    ru      
                                                               4               VP  
                          ru    
                                                       t2       ru     
                                                                                   t4             love 
  
   
         b. 〚 ①〛= For each person x, x loves John & ∀we∈ALT(John): x loves w → w = John 
  
The semantic values of (9b) and (10b) are the same: each person loves no one other than 
John. Even though John is interpreted in the scrambled position in (10a), the same reading 
results since the ONLY head is still below AgroP. This explains the apparent 
“reconstruction” effect, although there is no reconstruction of a QP in the real sense. What 
determines the scope relation is not the surface position of the particle, but the position of the 
ONLY head.   
One might wonder at this point why ONLY-P should be below AgroP and if there is any 
principled reason to rule out ONLY-P above AgroP. In principle, the present analysis does 
not rule out such a configuration. What it rules out, however, is the form where the particle is 
preceded by an overt case marker, for example *Mary-lul-man. We assume that the case 
marker is realized as a zero variant when it is followed by the particle man and some other 
particles such as to ‘also’, which disallows case marking in any position. Therefore, when 
case marking is covert, DP-man can be a spell-out of DP-Case-man or DP-man-Case. This 
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means, then, that if DP-man appears without case marking in the S-initial position, it does not 
guarantee the low ONLY-P and thus ambiguity is expected. This is indeed the case (cf. fn 3).  
Now we turn to the scope pattern of PP-man case. The man-phrase marked by a postposition 
does not have a fixed scope, unlike the case-marked one. Its scope seems to be affected by its 
surface structure. The data is repeated in (11).   
 
(11) a. Motun-salam-i              John-hako-man   akswuhayssta.   
            every-person-NOM        John-with-only    shook_hands 
           ‘Everyone shook hands only with John.’  
           (i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else.  (every > only) 
           (ii) *John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands. (*only > every) 
 
       b. John-hako-man1   [motun-salam-i          t1    akswuhayssta].  
            John-with-only    every-person-NOM            shook_hands] 
           ‘Only with John, everyone shook hands t.’  
           (i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else.  (every > only) 
           (ii) John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands.  (only > every) 
 
Why are postpositions different from case markers? The ordering among affixes provides an 
answer to this question. Postpositions precede the particle man; this shows that ONLY-P is 
higher than VP, where PP is generated. But it does not tell us whether ONLY-P is higher than 
TP or lower than TP, whose spec position is occupied by the subject QP. By contrast, case 
markers explicitly specify that ONLY-P is lower than AgroP or TP since they always follow 
the particle. 
With this contrast in mind, we derive the scope patterns in (11). First, in (11a), ONLY-P is 
positioned above VP (as inferred from the morpheme order hako-man ‘with-only’) but below 
TP. If the ONLY-P were located above TP, we expect the man-phrase to occur to the left of 
the subject QP since focused phrases move overtly to [Spec, ONLY-P]. The structure of (11a) 
is represented in (12).  
 
(12) [TP everyone λx [ONLY-P with_John  [ λy   [VP   x   y   shake_hands ]] ONLY] T] 
                         
                                                        Focus Movement      
 
Since the subject QP is above ONLY-P in (12), the scope relation follows from this syntactic 
configuration: for each person x, x shook hands with John, and for all alternatives z to John, 
if x shook hands with z, z is John.
10  
Let us next see the case of the ambiguous sentence in (11b). I argue that the two readings are 
due to different positions of ONLY-P, not to the reconstruction of the man-phrase as a QP. 
On the first reading, where everyone takes scope over the man-phrase, ONLY-P is still below 
TP. The man-phrase undergoes scrambling after focus movement. Thus, the clausal structure 
is the same as the one in (12) except that the PP is adjoined to TP. The same interpretation 
obtains, even though the man-phrase is interpreted in the scrambled position. 
 
(13) [TP with_John  λz  [TP everyone λx  [ONLY-P  z [ λy [VP   x    y  shake_hands ]] ONLY] T]] 
             
            Scrambling               Focus Mvt.    
                                                 
10 I assume that the postposition moves along with the focused element in the overt syntax, but reconstructs at 
LF for semantic interpretation. Under this assumption, there is no need to adjust the entry of ONLY for the PP 
case. Thanks to Irene Heim for suggesting this possibility.   
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On the second reading of (11b) (only > every), the ONLY head takes scope over the subject 
QP. That is, ONLY-P is positioned above TP. The S-initial appearance of the man-phrase is 
due to focus movement, not to scrambling. The structure is represented in (14).  
 
(14) [ONLY-P  with_John   [ λy   [TP   everyone  λx   [VP   x    y   shake_hands]  T]]  ONLY]                   
 
                                    Focus Movement 
 
Thus, the S-initial appearance of a PP-man could either be due to scrambling as in (13) or to 
focus movement as in (14), whereas that of a case-marked man-phrase could only be due to 
scrambling. The order of the postposition and the focus particle is compatible with both 
positions of ONLY-P (high ONLY-P above TP and low ONLY-P below TP), and the surface 
position does not distinguish focus movement from scrambling. This is why postpositions 
behave differently from case markers. Overt case marking rules out the high ONLY-P, and 
thus brings about the scope-fixing effect.  
This section showed how the current proposal accounts for the scope patterns of the man-
phrase. I showed that the apparent reconstruction of the man-phrase is not the reconstruction 
of a QP, and that the scope is determined by the position of the ONLY head. The difference 
between case markers and postpositions is correlated with the distribution of the particle with 
respect to case markers and postpositions. The current proposal derives this correlation 
without stipulations, unlike the QP approach under which the man-phrase is a QP that shows 
a non-uniform behavior.  
 
4  Further predictions on scope 
This section introduces further predictions of the null head analysis, and shows that each 
prediction is indeed borne out. The result provides further support to the proposed analysis.  
 
4.1 Multiple  Occurrences 
The first prediction is that multiple occurrences of the particle man would be able to indicate 
the presence of a single instance of the ONLY head. Suppose that the ONLY head can host 
more than one focused phrase in its spec position. Then, the number of particles in a sentence 
would not necessarily match the number of ONLY heads in the syntactic tree. Interpretation 
would depend on the number of ONLY heads, not on the number of particles.
11  
This prediction is borne out. When the particle occurs twice in a sentence, the sentence is 
ambiguous between one ONLY and two ONLY’s, as illustrated in (15).    
 
(15) John-man sakwa-man   mekesse.   
        John-only  apple-only    ate 
        ‘Only John ate only apples.’  
        (i) John is the only one who ate only apples. Others ate other fruits as wells as apples.  
        (ii) John is the only one who ate something, and John ate only apples (not other fruits).  
 
The first reading involves two ONLY heads. It says John is the only one who has the property 
of eating only apples. By contrast, the second reading involves just one ONLY head, and says 
that the pair <John, apples> is the only element that satisfies the eating relation.
12 If it were 
                                                 
11 Thanks to Kai von Fintel and Danny Fox for bringing this prediction to my attention.  
12 Here the ONLY head takes a relation (of type <e, et>) and two individuals as arguments. The new entry 
would be the following:  
(i)  〚 ONLY〛= λR<e,<e,t>>.λxe.λye.R(x)(y) =1 & ∀ze∈ALT(x)∀we∈ALT(y):  
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the particle man that carried the exclusive meaning, the second reading would not arise. This 
lends further support to the claim that man is a mere agreement morpheme.
13  
 
4.2  Scope splitting 
 
The second prediction is that if the scrambled man-phrase contains a scope-bearing element, 
the scope of the new scope-bearing element can be dissociated from the ONLY head. This is 
so because the new scope-bearing element, contained in the man-phrase, can be interpreted in 
the scrambled position, while the ONLY head still can be lower than TP. Suppose there is a 
subject QP intervening between the scrambled man-phrase and the low ONLY head. Then, 
the subject QP would be able to take scope between the new scope-bearing element and the 
ONLY head. The present analysis predicts this dissociation to be possible, and this section 
confirms this prediction.
14 
For this, we introduce a conjoined DP as a new scope element. Consider the following 
sentences, where a man-phrase contains a conjoined DP.  
 
(16) a. Nwukwunka-ka   John-kwa-Bill-man-ul   salanghanta. 
            someone-NOM    John-and-Bill-only-ACC   love 
            ‘Someone loves only John and Bill.’ 
           (i) There is someone who loves only John and Bill.        (some > only >and) 
           (ii) *There is someone who loves only John and someone who loves only Bill.   
                          (*and > some > only) 
 
        b. John-kwa-Bill-man-ul1         [nwukwunka-ka          t1         salanhanta]. 
            John-and-Bill-only-ACCc   someone-NOM         love 
           ‘Only John and Bill, someone loves t.’  
           (i) There is someone who loves only John and Bill.        (some > only > and) 
           (ii) There is someone who loves only John and someone who loves only Bill.   
                       (and > some > only) 
   
Sentence (16a) is not ambiguous. It only allows a surface scope reading. For this reading to 
be true, there should be someone who loves John and Bill and loves no one else. Sentence 
(16b), by contrast, has two readings. In one reading, one and the same person loves only John 
and Bill, as in (16a). In the other reading, there must be two different people involved such 
that one person loves only John, and the other person loves only Bill.   
The ambiguity of (16b) is interesting since scrambling of case-marked man-phrases has not 
induced ambiguity so far. This ambiguity, however, does not make a counterexample to our 
analysis. Compare the scope relations in the two readings. In (16a) and in the first reading of 
(16b), the subject QP takes scope over both the conjunction and the ONLY head. In the 
second reading of (16b), the conjunction takes scope over the subject QP, which in turn takes 
scope over the ONLY head. In both cases, the scope relation between the subject QP and the 
ONLY head remains the same. The former takes scope over the latter. What differentiates the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 R(z)(w) = 1 → z = x & w = y  
13 One can think of this in parallel to negation in negative concord languages, where multiple occurrences of 
negation can contribute a single instance of negation. For instance, in the following English and Italian 
sentences, the two negations do not cancel each other out. The interpretation involves only one negation.  
 
(i)  a. Maria  didn’t say nothing to nobody.              (Nonstandard English) 
               b. Mario non ha parlato di niente con nessuno.             (Italian) 
           ‘Mario hasn’t spoken with anyone about anything.’    (Ladusaw 1992:237)       
14 I thank Danny Fox and Sabine Iatridou for bringing this question and prediction to my attention.   
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two cases is where the conjoined DP is interpreted. If the conjoined DP is interpreted in the 
scrambled position, the scope of the conjunction is split from the ONLY head (and > some > 
only).  
Let me spell out how this reading is derived. In the interest of space, we focus on the 
scrambled sentence, but the interpretation of the non-scrambling case should be 
straightforward. Based on the morpheme order man-ul ‘only-acc’, we conclude that the 
ONLY head is positioned lower than Agro. Next, in order to interpret the conjunction, we 
introduce a D(istributivity) operator. Following Link (1983), Roberts (1987), and Beck 
(2000) among others, I assume the following lexical entry for the D-operator. 
 
(17) 〚 D〛= λf<e,t>. λXe.∀x∈X: f(x) = 1   
 
The D-operator takes two arguments, a predicate and a group individual, which is marked by 
a capital letter to be distinguished from an atomic individual. It asserts that the property f 
holds for all the atomic individuals that are parts of the group individual X. The structure of 
(16b) is illustrated in (18), where the scrambling of the conjoined DP John & Bill creates a 
new position for the D operator to apply.  
 
(18)                           TP ① 
         ru 
                 John & Bill         . 
                                      ru        
                                    (D)               . 
                                                 ru   
                        1              TP  
                                              ru 
                                                    someone         . 
                                                                    ru 
                               2         ru  
                                                                    AgroP     T [NOM] 
                   ru        
                              t1                . 
                 ru 
                            3         ru         
                                                                             ONLY-P    Agro[ACC]    
                                                                     ru         
                                                                               t3           ONLY′    
                                         ru  
                                                 .           ONLY 
        ru        
                                                                              4               VP     
                                          ru    
                                                                      t2         ru     
                                                                                                    t4             love 
                  
In the above structure, the readings diverge depending upon whether we apply the D-
operator. Without the D-operator, the first reading in (16b) obtains (some > only > and). For 
this reading to be true, there should be someone who loves only John and Bill. That person 
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does not love Tom, for example. The reading we are interested in (and > some > only) arises 
when the D-operator is present. In this reading the one who loves only John does not love Bill 
and the one who loves only Bill does not love John. The two values of the top node are given 
below. The one in (19a) is without the D-operator, and the one in (19b) is with the D-operator 
in the tree.  
 
(19) a.  〚 ①〛= There is someone x such that x loves John and Bill & ∀we∈ ALT(J&B):  
                       x loves w → w ∈ J & B
15  
       b.  〚 ①〛= ∀z∈J&B: there is someone who loves only z, i.e. there is someone  
    who loves only John and there is someone who loves only Bill.  
  
The existence of this reading confirms our second prediction. The scope of a scope-bearing 
element within the man-phrase can be split from the scope of the ONLY head.
16 At the same 
time, it provides another argument against the QP approach to the man-phrase as discussed in 
section 2. If the man-phrase were a special QP that must reconstruct, scope splitting between 
the conjunction and the ONLY head would not be allowed, and no difference is predicted 
between (16a) and (16b).  
  
5  Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper presented a theory of the scope-taking properties of the Korean focus particle man 
‘only’. I argued that the particle is an agreement morpheme rather than a scope-bearing 
element. The particle merely indicates the presence of a head ONLY, which carries the 
quantificational meaning. I claimed that this null head can appear at various points in the tree, 
                                                 
15 I assume that the set of alternatives to a group individual still includes atomic individuals (for reasons that I 
cannot discuss here in the interest of space). Under this assumption, we need to adjust the entry so that we do 
not wrongly rule out some elements from the set of alternatives:  
 
(i)  〚 ONLY〛= λP<e,t>.λxe.P(x) =1 & ∀ze∈ALT(x): P(z) = 1 → [P(x) ⇒ P(z)]  
          (cf.  von  Fintel  1997) 
 
The new entry says that if some alternative satisfies the predicate, the resulting proposition P(z) is entailed by 
the presupposed proposition P(x). With respect to our example, this means that if x loves w among the 
alternatives, w is a part of J&B. That is, w is John, Bill, or John & Bill. I thank Danny Fox and Irene Heim for 
pointing this out to me. 
16 There is one problem here, which the present account is not equipped to deal with at this point. If the man-
phrase contains a QP of type <et, t> rather than a conjoined DP, the sentence is still interpretable with our 
current entry for ONLY, but it leads to a wrong result: 
 
(i)  Mary-ka        motun-[kyoswu]F-man-ul mannassta.   
Mary-Nom        every-professor-Acc      met 
‘Mary met only every [professor]F.  
 
Judgments on this sentence vary among speakers (The same sentence in English seems controversial, too. See 
Bonomi & Casalegno (1993) and von Fintel (1997) for conflicting views). For most speakers, it means that 
Mary met no one other than professors. For some speakers, which are very few, it means that Mary met every 
professor, but she did not meet every student, for example. Thus, the second reading allows Mary to have met 
some students, as long as she did not meet all of them. The present account can derive the first reading, if motun 
kyoswu ‘every professor’ is assumed to denote the group individual that consists of all contextually relevant 
professors. In order to derive the second reading (if it is possible at all), however, we need to adjust the entry of 
the ONLY head. If motun kyoswu ‘every professor’ is interpreted as a QP of type <et, t>, the current semantics 
of ONLY wrongly predicts sentence (i) to mean that for all x, if x is a professor, Mary met only x. This is 
contradictory since it is not possible for Mary to meet only Professor A and meet only Professor B at the same 
time.  
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therefore its position (not that of the particle itself) determines the scope relation with respect 
to other quantificational elements. I also argued for a new correlation between the order of 
nominal affixes and the scope of focus particles, thus supporting Baker’s Mirror Principle in 
a new area outside the verbal domain. Specifically I argued that the relative order among the 
particle, case marker, and postposition reflects the hierarchy of functional heads, which 
played a crucial role in identifying the position of the ONLY head. The proposed analysis 
accounted for the puzzling scope facts without stipulations, and also derived the correlation 
between the particle’s distributional properties and its scopal behavior.  
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Abstract
Any analysis of middles has to account for the fact that across languages there is
variation in their syntax. English and Dutch employ an unergative verb, whereas in
French and Greek it is passives that can encode the middle interpretation. I propose
to treat ‘middle’ as the targeted interpretation, which diﬀerent languages express in
diﬀerent ways, depending on the means available to them with respect to encoding
genericity. I qualify middles as disposition ascriptions to the internal argument, and
argue that their core properties follow from this characterization.
1 Introduction
The syntactic properties of the so-called ‘(personal) middle construction’ in (1) and its
equivalent in other languages have received a fair amount of attention in the literature
(Roberts 1987, Tsimpli 1989, Fagan 1992, Stroik 1992, Hoekstra and Roberts 1993, Ack-
ema and Schoorlemmer 1994, 1995, 2002, Steinbach 2002). Its semantic properties have
been explored signigicantly less.
(1) This book reads easily.
The need to examine the semantics of middles becomes even more pressing, once we
acknowledge the cross-linguistic variation in the realization of the latter. In this paper, I
attempt a novel semantic characterization of the middle and propose to derive the cross-
linguistic variation in its realization from the diﬀerent ways in which languages encode
genericity in the verbal morphology. Section 2 contains some of the facts pertaining to the
cross-linguistic variation as well as the core properties that middles share across languages.
In section 3 I brieﬂy present my proposal of how to derive middles across the two types
of languages identiﬁed: English/Dutch and Greek/French. Section 4 is devoted to a
discussion of genericity, with the aim of ultimately bringing to the fore a characteristic of
middles from which their core semantic properties fall out, to wit dispositionality. Section
5 conludes.
2 The non-existence of the middle construction
(2) contains examples of middles in English, Dutch, Greek and French:
(2) a. This book reads easily.
b. Dit
this
boek
book
leest
read-3sg
gemakkelijk.
easily
‘This book reads easily.’
1
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c. Afto
this
to
the-nom
vivlio
book
δjavazete
read-nonact.imperf.3sg
efkola.
easily
d. Ce
this
livre
book
se
refl
lit
read-3sg
facilement.
easily
‘This book can be read easily.’
English and Dutch middles employ an intransitive verb, whereas Greek and French em-
ploy a (reﬂexive) passive. Even in the absence of passive morphology, there are certain
similarities that such sentences share with passives: the external argument, which would
normally occupy the subject position, is suppresed, and it is the internal argument which
is the subject of the sentence. These simliarities have led authors such as Hoekstra and
Roberts (1993), Roberts (1987), Stroik (1992) to argue that middles in English and Dutch
involve syntactic A-movement of the object to subject position, and the assignment of the
agent argument to a phonologically null syntactic element (either a pro within the VP,
as in Hoekstra and Roberts (1993), or a PRO adjoined to VP, as in Stroik (1992)). Such
analyses, which assimilate middle to passive formation even in languages such as English
and Dutch, rest on the assumption that there is a middle construction deﬁnable in syntac-
tic terms across languages. More crucially for the syntax-lexical semantics interface, such
analyses are imposed by adherence to Baker’s Uniformity of Theta-role Assignment Hy-
pothesis (UTAH). The UTAH dictates that internal arguments are always base-generated
in a unique syntactic position (sister of V); therefore, since the syntactic subject of the
middle corresponds to the internal argument, it can only appear in its surface position
via syntactic movement from its underlying position.
However, the empirical data speak against such a neat picture. The full array of argu-
ments concerning the cross-linguistic variation in the syntax of middles cannot be provided
here, but see Ackema and Schoorlemmer (1994, 1995) for an extensive discussion of the
English and Dutch case, and Lekakou (2002, 2003, forthcoming), Ackema and Schoorlem-
mer (2002) for the two types of middle more generally. Ackema and Schoorlemmer (1994,
1995) in particular have provided compelling evidence to the eﬀect that the subject of
the middle in English and Dutch is base-generated in its surface position, and not moved
there: contrary to the predictions of movement analyses, Dutch and English middles fail
the unaccusativity diagnostics, thus qualifying as unergative, and not unaccusative verbs.
Moreover, the implicit argument of middles does not show any signs of syntactic activity:
it cannot license agent-oriented adverbs, purpose clauses, or by-phrases (cf. (3) below).
The suppressed argument of passives, by contrast, is syntactically active (cf. (4)):
(3) This book reads easily *by anyone/*in order to impress the teacher/*carefully.
(4) The bank was robbed by unidentiﬁed criminals/ in order to save the poor/carefully.
Such considerations cast doubt on the validity of a movement analysis for English and
Dutch middles. On the other hand, there are good reasons to assume such a movement
analysis for French and Greek, where middles are syntactically indistinguishable from
(reﬂexive) passives and thus behave as unaccusatives (cf. among others Wehrli (1986),
Zribi-Hertz (2003), Tsimpli (1989), Lekakou (2003)). In these languages, the agent is
syntactically active, to the eﬀect that it can take the guise of a by-phrase:
(5) Afto
this
to
the
vivlio
book-nom
δjavazete
read-nonact.imperf.3sg
efkola
easily
akomi
even
ki
and
apo
by
peδja.
children
2
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‘This book can be read easily even by children.’ 1
(6) Ce
this
livre
book
se
refl
lit
read-3sg
facilement
easily
par
by
tout
all
le
the
monde.
world
‘This book can be read easily by anyone/everyone.’
Given this state of aﬀairs, any attempt to deﬁne syntactically ‘the middle construction’
in a cross-linguistically coherent way is doomed to fail; the ‘middle construction’ as a
syntactic animal does not exist.
A diﬀerent approach, within which the cross-lingustic variation can be accounted for, is to
treat the middle as a semantic notion. This was ﬁrst pursued by Condoravdi (1989), who
emphasized that there is no such thing as ‘middle verbs’ or a ‘middle forming operation’.
Especially since ‘middles’ are parasitic on independently existing structures—unergatives,
passives—, it makes more sense to think of the former as a particular interpretation that
the latter may receive. The real question then becomes, which factor determines the
choice of structure to be employed in a given language? This is the ultimate question that
I wish to answer, and I will provide my contribution in the following subsection.2
Our aim is then two-fold. We want to account for the cross-linguistic variation, and
in order to do that we need an explicit characterization of the middle interpretation
(henceforth MI). Condoravdi (1989) argues that middles are generic sentences. (7a) thus
receives the representation in (7b) (from Condoravdi (1989):
(7) a. This book reads easily.
b. Gen [e: book(x), read(e), Patient (e,x)] [easy(e)]
More in particular, it seems that there are three basic ingredients common to middles
across languages. (8) contains the essential properties of what I consider the core of the
middle semantics:3
(8) The core components of the middle interpretation:
a. The internal argument (the understood or notional object) is the subject of
the sentence.
b. The reading is non-eventive; middles do not make reference to an actual event
having taken place, they rather report a property of the grammatical subject.
The otherwise eventive verb becomes a derived stative and, more precisely,
receives a generic interpretation.
c. The agent is syntactically suppressed and receives an arbitrary interpretation.
In the following section, I will brieﬂy present my analysis of middles across languages,
which capitalizes on the (un)availability of imperfective aspect to encode genericity. In
1The by-phrase is accompanied by akomi ke, ‘even’, but not necessarily. I will return to this in the
following subsection.
2The reader is thus advised to interpret ‘middle’ as ‘the structure that conveys the middle interpreta-
tion’. I will be using such abbreviations throughout for ease of exposition.
3There are obviously more issues that I do not address here, such as the role of the adverb and the
restrictions on the aspectual classes of verbs eligible for middle formation. I have nothing to say at this
stage on the second issue. As for the ﬁrst one, one would be inclined to agree with Condoravdi (1989)
and McConnell-Ginet (1994) who argue that the adverb is required in order to provide the scope for the
generic operator. An indication that this cannot be the whole story is given at the end of the paper.
3
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the second part of this paper, I will argue that we can compress (8) into a single statement
from which the properties listed in (8) all follow:
(9) (MI) = the ascription of a dispositional property to the understood object.
3 The realization of the middle semantics across languages
3.1 Licensing the arbitrary agent
The understood agent, even in languages like English and Dutch where it doesn’t show
any syntactic activity, is nonetheless semantically present, and receives an arbitrary in-
terpretation. Several authors have tried to link this fact to the genericity that middles
exhibit (cf. Lyons (1995)). For instance, Ackema and Schoorlemmer (1994) propose the
following:
(10) A verb has an event role iﬀ it has a fully speciﬁed action tier.
Ackema and Schoorlemmer (1994) assume a Jackendoﬃan level of presyntactic represen-
tation, which comprises two tiers, the action tier and the thematic tier. For them, the
essence of middle formation is the assignment of an arbitrary interpretation to the agent,
which does not project in the syntax. This results in a not fully speciﬁed Action tier,
which in turn according to (10) has the eﬀect of the otherwise eventive verb ‘becoming’ a
stative one, and more precisely an individual level (i-level) predicate, in Kratzer (1995)’s
sense.
The Krazterian analysis of i-level predicates has not remained unchallenged (cf. Chierchia
(1995), J¨ ager (2001) among others) (nor has Ackema and Schoorlemmer’s claim that
middles are i-level predicates (Steinbach 2002)). Besides, one would like to know why
anything like (10) should hold. I propose to take the arbitrary interpretation of the agent
quite literally:
(11) The agent in middles is a covert free-choice any(one)—ANY*.4
Like its overt counterpart, ANY* needs to be licensed. In the case of middles it is licensed
by genericity—the generic operator Gen. The crosslinguistic variation concerning the
realization of middles is related to the form Gen takes in the languages in question. I
propose the following:
(12) Syntactically active ANY* needs to be licensed in the syntax.
ANY* can only be syntactic, i.e. projected in the syntax, if its licensor is present in
the syntax. This is what happens when the aspectual system of a given language real-
izes the opposition generic-nongeneric in the morphosyntax. As I will illustrate below,
4In this respect, my proposal is diﬀerent from Condoravdi (1989)’s, who argues that the Agent is
absent from all levels of representation, not just the syntactic, or the semantic (cf. 7b), but also from
the level of argument structure. Condoravdi’s claim is that the agent can be had as an entailment of the
lexical meaning of the verb, whenever the latter includes one. According to her, this move is required in
any event for the case of English. It also, however, makes it impossible to distinguish between middles
and generic unaccusatives. It is, for example, unclear on what grounds Condoravdi would be able to deny
generic unaccusatives like The sun rises from the East the status of a middle.
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Greek and French pattern together with respect to an important aspect of their aspectual
system: their imperfective verbal forms encode Gen. English and Dutch belong to a
class of languages in which Gen is morphosyntactically absent, that is, it is only present
semantically.
On the basis of this line of reasoning, I make the following typological prediction:
(13) A language will employ a passive structure to convey the middle interpretation iﬀ
Gen is encoded in imperfective morphology.
3.2 The nature of Gen qua imperfective aspect
What does it mean precisely for Gen to be morphologically encoded? I propose to
understand this in the following way:
(14) A language encodes Gen in imperfective morphology iﬀ in at least one tense it
has two distinct verb forms for generic and nongeneric uses, i.e. iﬀ genericity =⇒
imperfectivity.5
Let’s see how the languages in question fare with respect to 14. In Greek, all verbs are
obligatorily inﬂected for aspect. Episodic sentences contain perfectively marked verbs.
Generic/habitual sentences require imperfective aspect:
(15) a. O
the-nom
γianis
John
eγrafe
write-past.imperf.3sg
ena
one
γrama
letter
kathe
every
mera.
day
‘John used to write a letter every day.’
b. * O
the-nom
γianis
John
eγrapse
write-past.perf.3sg
ena
one
γrama
letter
kathe
every
mera.
day
‘John wrote a letter every day.’
The same situation obtains in French, where distinct verb forms are used for episodic and
generic/habitual sentences:
(16) a. Jean
Jean
´ ecrivit
write-past.perf.3sg
une
one
lettre
letter
hier/
yesterday/
*chaque
every
jour.
day
‘Jean wrote a letter yesterday/everyday.’
b. Jean
Jean
´ ecrivait
write-past.imperf.3sg
une
one
lettre
letter
chaque
every
jour.
day
‘John used to write one letter every day.’
c. Jean
John
a
has
´ ecrit
written
une
one
lettre
letter
hier/
yesterday/
*chaque
every
jour.
day
‘John has written a letter.’
5(14) requires a certain level of abstraction in the following sense. There is probably no tense/aspect
that is entirely incompatible with (at least) habituality. For instance, Linguistics students are working
harder and harder these days or John has always left for work at 8 am are perfectly ok, even though
they employ the Progressive and the Present Perfect respectively, and not, say, the Present or Simple
Past. This possibility, obviously related to the presence of Q-adverbs or temporal frame adverbials, does
not render either the progressive or the present perfect ’generic tenses’. Thanks to Gerhard Schaden and
Jenny Doetjes for discussion.
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Greek and French encode Gen in imperfective morphology, in the sense of (14). By (12),
Greek/French imperfective aspect licenses a syntactically active ANY*. Greek/French
type middles will employ a passive structure to convey the middle interpretation.
English does not distinguish morphologically between perfective and imperfective. Giorgi
and Pianesi (1997) have claimed that, in the absence of any inﬂectional morphology,
the English verbal forms area associated with the feature [+perfective]. The feature [-
perfective] is never instantiated in English, since there is no corresponding morpheme
(cf. also Comrie (1976), according to whom English realizes the distinctions progressive-
nonprogressive and perfect-nonperfect, but crucially not generic-nongeneric).
That English does not have Gen in the sense of (14) is illustrated below:
(17) a. John drove to school (yesterday).
b. John drove to school (as a teenager).
The same can be claimed for Dutch, on the basis of similar data:
(18) a. Jan
Jan
ﬁetste
cycled
gisteren
yesterday
naar
to
school.
school
‘Yesterday, John cycled to school.’
b. Als
as
tiener
teenager
ﬁetste
cycled
Jan
Jan
naar
to
school.
school
‘As a teenager, John cycled to school.’
By (12), English and Dutch middles cannot have a syntactically active ANY*, since its
licensor is morphologically covert Gen.
For reasons of space, I will not go into the derivations for the two types of middle. I refer
the interested reader to Lekakou (2003, forthcoming).
The semantics of Gen will be discussed in the following section. As for ANY*, it is
tempting to assume Kadmon and Landman (1993)’s analysis of any, whereby the latter is
an indeﬁnite which comes with two additional semantic/pragmatic characteristics, namely
widening and strengthening. The widening eﬀected by any (and by ANY*) is implicated
in the Greek example (5), which features an (optional even) by-phrase. The Greek ’even’,
akomi ke, eﬀects additional widening of the interpretation of the implicit agent.6
3.3 Interim Summary
So far, I have assumed a list of three core properties, (8), as an informal characterization
of the MI, and have proposed a way to link property (c) with property (b). In the rest of
the paper, I will motivate property (a), which is more of a syntactic, rather than semantic
description. I will argue that all three properties follow from the statement in (9). This
will become possible by granting middles the status of a particular type of generic sentence,
namely a disposition ascription.
6Thanks to Cleo Condoravdi for discussion on this point.
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4 ‘In virtue of’ generalizations
4.1 NP genericity
Although the genericity of middles is of the sentence type, and not the NP type (in the
sense of Krifka et al. (1995)), I will start by discussing the latter case, with the aim of
highlighting the import that ‘in virtue of’ generalizations have on genericity in general,
and of pointing to a feature of such generalizations that is of interest in connection to
middles: the fact that their conversational background incorporates properties of the
subject.
It is a well-established fact that sentences containing singular indeﬁnite (SI) and bare
plural (BP) generic NPs are very similar but at the same time diﬀerent. SIs diﬀer from
BPs in (at least) their felicity conditions and in expressing a somewhat stronger non-
accidental generalization (Cohen 2001, Greenberg to appear).
Greenberg (to appear) argues that there are two types of nonaccidental generalizations:
descriptive, and ‘in virtue of’ generalizations. SIs always denote the latter, i.e. they assert
that the generalization is non-accidentally true in virtue of some property that the subject
referent is taken (by the speaker) to have (and that the hearer has to accomodate). On
the other hand, descriptive generalizations merely assert the existence of a pattern. BPs
can denote both types of non-accidental generalization. The following is her illustration
of the diﬀerent readings.
(19) a. A boy doesn’t cry.
b. The generalization ‘Every boy doesn’t cry (in any relevant situation)’ is nonac-
cidentally true in virtue of some property, associated with the property of being
a boy (e.g. the property of being tough).
(20) a. Boys don’t cry.
b. The generalization ‘every boy deosn’t cry (in all relevant, e.g. tear inducing
situations)’ is not accidental: not limited to actual boys in actual (relevant)
situations, but is expected to hold for other, nonactual boys in other, nonac-
tual(relevant) situations, as well.
c. The generalization ‘Every boy doesn’t cry (in any relevant situation)’ is nonac-
cidentally true in virtue of some property, associated with the property of being
a boy (e.g. the property of being tough).
On the ‘in virtue of’ generalization, the accessibility relation restricting the generic quanti-
ﬁer involves a property that the speaker has in mind, in virtue of which the generalization
reported is true. For example, if the property in(19a) is ˆbe tough, then we only consider
worlds where boys are tough in order to evaluate the sentence.
How do we choose the ‘in virtue of’ property? And how do we avoid all SI sentences
coming out as true? Greenberg assumes that we only choose a property associated with the
subject referent and claims that this association relation is determined by our stereotypes,
norms, beliefs etc. about the actual world. In eﬀect, besides the accessibility relation
which tells us to look at worlds where the subject referent has the ‘in virtue of’ property,
there is another Kratzerian accessibility relation, which eﬀects the association between
the subject-referent property and the ‘in virtue of’ property. To be concrete, consider
(19a) and let the property ˆboy be represented as ˆP, the property ˆbe tough as ˆS,
and the property ˆ do not cry as ˆQ.
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Greenberg’s formal deﬁnition of ‘associated properties’ follows:
(21) ˆS is associated with ˆP in w iﬀ there is a Kratzerian accessibility function f from
worlds to sets of propositions (e.g. epistemic, deontic, stereotypical, legal, etc.)
s.t. ∀w”[w”Rfw]→[∀x [P(x,w”)] → [S(x,w”)]]
The truth conditions of SI sentences will then look like this:
(22) A SI sentence is true in w iﬀ:
∃ˆS ∀w’ [∀x [P(x,w’)] → [S(x,w’) & ˆS is associated in w with ˆP]] →
[∀x,s [P(x,w’) & C(s,x,w’)] → [Q(s,x,w’)]]
There is thus a double modality in SI sentences (and the ‘in virtue of’ readings more
generally) which is responsible for the more law-like ﬂavour that SIs have.
4.2 Sentence-level genericity: dispositionals
So far, the distinction between ‘in virtue of’ and descriptive generalizations has been
applied to NP genericity. The discussion in Greenberg (to appear) was inspired by the
analysis oﬀered by Brennan (1993) for modal auxiliaries. Brennan (1993) analyses certain
modals, in particular dynamic modals (i.e. ability can and dispositional will), not as
S(entence)-operators, but as VP-operators. On this view, a dynamic modal combines
with a VP, resulting in a modal property denoted of the subject; “VP-operator modals
relate properties and individuals” (Brennan 1993, 43). The intuition behind this idea is
that, “in uttering a root modal sentence, the speaker typically relies on information about
the syntactic subject” (Brennan 1993, 66).
Brennan’s innovation is the introduction of a diﬀerent accessibility relation that restricts
dynamic modals, which diﬀers form the one restricting epistemic modals (which are still S-
operators) on two counts: ﬁrst, although the latter constists of propositions (those that in
Kratzer (1991) are introduced by in view of), the former consists of properties (introduced
by in virtue of). Second, and most crucially, the accessibility relation of dynamic modals
consists of properties of the subject, and in that sense, it is keyed to the syntactic subject.
Dynamic (readings of) modals are thus subject oriented (cf. Barbiers (1995)). This is
supported by Brennan’s observation that overt in virtue of adverbials are obligatorily
subject-controlled only when combined with dynamic modals (Brennan 1993, 48-52):
(23) Joan can sing arias in virtue of her natural ability.
(24) In virtue of her patience, Joan will listen to anything.
(25) * In virtue of being a graduate student, Joan may be intelligent.
(26) * In virtue of winning a Guggenheim, Joan must be intelligent.
(27) ?? In virtue of the rock being lightweight, Mary can lift it.
(28) ?? Mary will agree to anything in virtue of the loose atmosphere in the oﬃce.
(29) They did not award him the prize in virtue of his reputation.
When combined with dynamic modals, in virtue of adverbials are property-denoting ex-
pressions that ﬁx the set of accessible worlds, and thus restrict the accessibility relation.
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A model for the semantics of such expressions is given in (30) (Brennan 1993, 65). Acces-
sibility keyed to an individiual (the subject) is deﬁned in (31) (Brennan 1993, 64). The
semantics of root must and dynamic will is given in (32) (Brennan 1993, 67):
(30) The meaning of (in virtue of) her physical properties will be that function f from
W×D into the power set of the power set of W×D, which assigns to any world-
individual pair, hw,di, in W×D, the set of all those (relevant) physical properties
that d has in w.
(31) Accessible for d: a world w’ is accessible from a world w for an individual d,
hw,di R w’, iﬀ hw’,di ∈ P
(where P is an arbitrary property-denoting expression restricting the modal)
(32) Property-level must and will (must2 and will2):
Must2 and will2 denote that function v of type schema hˆIV,IVi such that for
any index w, any assignment g, any conversational backgrounds hx, j, and any
expression P of type hs,he,tii,
[[v(ˆP)]]w,g,hx,j : D ⇒ 2.
For any d ∈ D [[v(ˆP)]]w,g,hx,j = 1 iﬀ
∀ w’ ∈ W if
(i) w’ is accessible from w for d given hx,
(ii) w’ is maximally close to the ideal established by j(w), then
(iii) hw’,di ∈ [[P]]g
The conversational background hx corresponds to the accessibility relation as deﬁned in
(31). j is the Kratzerian ordering source, which Brennan assumes is determined by a
stereotypical conversational background.
I propose to extend Brennan’s analysis of dispositional will to dispositional generics. For
canonical disposition ascriptions of the type illustrated in (33), Fara (2001) seems to share
Brennan (1993)’s intuition. His truth conditions for (33) are given in (34):
(33) Sugar is disposed to dissolve when put in water.
(34) ‘N is disposed to M when C’ is true iﬀ N has an intrinsic property in virtue of
which it Ms when C.
Fara argues that ‘to attribute to an object a disposition to do so-and-so is to say not just
that it does so-and-so, but that it has some intrinsic property in virtue of which it does
so-and-so’ (Fara 2001, 35-36). He too makes the assumption that disposition ascriptions
need not take the guise of sentences like (33). The classical examples of dispositional
predicates are adjectives like fragile and soluble, and -able adjectives more generally (cf.
Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990). At least some generic sentences, as we have already
seen above, are dispositional (cf. also sentences like This car goes 250 km/h which have
both a dispositional and a habitual reading). In fact, I am assuming that disposition
ascriptions, whichever form they take, are generic statements (cf. Dahl (1975), Krifka et
al. (1995). As I will argue in the following subsection, the class of dispositional generics
also includes middles.
The essense of disposition ascriptions is that they express ‘in virtue of’ generalizations.
Following Brennan (1993), I suggest that the implementation of this is that the accessi-
bility relation restricting such generalizations is keyed to the subject, and that therefore
all disposition ascriptions are subject-oriented:
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(35) Dispositional (readings of) generic sentences are subject-oriented.
That this is true of canonical disposition ascriptions is evident from the following example:
(36) ?? Bread is disposed to turn into gold when touched by Midas.
The myth has it that Midas had a special property, in virtue of which he could turn
anything into gold, merely by touching it. The problem with (36) is that it is dispositional
on its subject, whereas the relevant property resides with the referent of a non-subject
NP, namely Midas. Bread has no inherent property in virtue of which it turns into gold
when Midas touches it; it is Midas whose properties are responsible for the phenomenon.
I thus assume that Brennan’s accessibility relation restricts the modal operator in dispo-
sition ascriptions . When the operator is Gen, the latter is a VP-operator of the dynamic
will type, whose semantics was given in (32). Although a modal semantics of Gen, and
indeed one that assimilates the latter to a necessity (universal) operator, is more or less
standard, the view that we might need more than one variety of Gen is not. The claim
is supported by the diversity of the phenomena subsumed under the label ‘genericity’,
and in particular the diﬀerences between habituals and other generics. See Laca (1990),
Scheiner (2003), Van Geenhoven (2003) among others.
The proposal I am making generates the following prediction: according to (35), cases
(a) and (b) below can only express descriptive, and not ‘in virtue of’, generalizations: (a)
sentences with generic bare plurals in non-subject position (such as the cases of generic
objects that Laca (1990) discusses) and (b) generic sentences which attribute a property
to non-subject arguments (such as the well-known ambiguous examples that Krifka et al.
(1995) cite (p.24)).7
In the ﬁnal section, I will present a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of more
than one null generic operators.
4.3 Middles as dispositionals
Let us now return to middles. A ﬁrst indication that middles are dispositional predicates8
is the fact that the paraphrase that they most frequently receive is the -able adjective,
which, as mentioned already, is the dispositional predicate par excellence. If middles are
indeed dispositionals, and if (35) is correct, we have an explanation for why the understood
object surfaces in subject position in middles.
I start with some data. By treating middles on a par with dispositional modals, we
predict that in this case too, in virtue of adverbials can only be subject-controlled. This
prediction is borne out. The sentences below do not feature an in virtue of adverbial, but
a because clause, a fact which, I take it, strengthens the argument. Van Oosten (1977)
ﬁrst noted the contrast between (37) and (38), and Dowty (2000) oﬀers (39):
(37) The clothes wash with no trouble because...
a. ... they’re machine-washable.
7A fact worth noting in connection to this is that singular indeﬁnites, which only express ‘in virtue
of’ generalizations, can only have a generic interpretation in subject position. See Cohen (2001) for
discussion, and for a proposal of a mixed approach to genericity.
8This claim was made by Sally McConnell-Ginet in a handout of class lectures.
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b. * ... I have lots of time.
(38) It’s no trouble to wash the clothes because...
a. ... they’re machine-washable.
b. ... I have lots of time.
(39) This car drives well...
a. ... because the suspension is engineered well.
b. ?? ... because we’re driving on smooth pavement.
Van Oosten argues that the constrast is explained by (40):
(40) Responsibility condition
The subject of a middle (the logical object) must have properties such that it can
be understood to be responsible for the action expressed by the predicate.
According to her, (40) holds of all (nonstative) subjects, because responsibility is a general
trait of (agentive) subjects, which is why middles, but not sentences like (38), are subject
to this constraint.9
Something similar to (40) is discussed in McConnell-Ginet (1994), from where the follow-
ing examples originate:
(41) ? Cars park easily.
(42) Small cars park easily.
Sentence (42) is a deﬁnite improvement over (41). What is communicated is that small
cars, in virtue precisely of being small, are easy to park. McConnell-Ginet (1994) admits
this feature of the middle in the semantic representation, by designating the syntactic
subject as the causer. According to her, the middle in (42) means something like: ‘some
property of small cars is such that (the STATE of) their having that property is what
CAUSES parking them to be generally easy’ (McConnell-Ginet 1994:241). She provides
the following formulation of the property predicated of small cars in (42) (yi* stands for
a null reﬂexive that she assumes exists in English middles):
(43) λxλe.[easy(parking(yi*))(e) & x = Causer(e) & x= yi*]
There is no need to stipulate conditions like (40); nor to formally represent this feature
of the meaning of middles in the way it is done in (43). (In some systems, for instance
in Reinhart (2003), it would in fact be impossible to do so.) If middles are dispositionals,
then (40) is associated with the latter more generally. Treating middles as dispositionals
entails precisely that there is some property inherent to the subject which enables or
facilitates the action denoted by the verb. Unless we were to somehow generalize (43) to
all dispositionals, it seems to me that characterizing middles as disposition ascriptions is
to be preferred.
Building on what we’ve said so far, the property predicated of the syntactic subject in
(42) will look like this:
9By ‘subject’, van Oosten means ‘underived subject’, as she shows that subjects of passives are not
interpreted as responsible. That this cannot be entirely true is enforced by considering languages like
Greek, where middles are parasitic on passives.
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(44) [[Gen(ˆVP)(d)]]w,g,hx,j = 1 iﬀ
∀ w’ ∈ W if
(i) w’ is accessible from w for d given hx,
(ii) w’ is maximally close to the ideal established by j(w), then
(iii) hw’,di ∈ [[VP]]g
In the beginning of this subsection, I presented empirical evidence that middles are
subject-oriented, much in the way that dynamic readings of modals are (cf. (23)–(29)).
If that is correct, then we have evidence for (35). From this it follows that we have
discovered what constitutes a semantic reason for why the object occupies the subject
position in middles across languages: if it is to be ascribed a dispositional property, it
needs to appear in subject position. Moreover, (35) is to also be held responsible for the
demotion of the agent. The latter would normally be the most eligible candidate for the
subject position. Now that the semantics requires the understood object to appear in
that position, the agent has to be suppressed in one way or the other.
I speculate that the interpretation that the implicit agent receives is also related to the
dispositional semantics of middles. Note the oddity of (45):
(45) ?? Sugar is disposed to dissolve when put into water by John.
It makes little sense to ascribe a disposition to an entity that only manifests itself when
a speciﬁc agent is involved. Dispositions, I presume, hold across agents (whenever they
are involved). This is the desired result, but obviously more research is needed in order
to determine whether we do not really need to stipulate the precise interpretation of the
agent in middles, i.e. its free-choice reading.
I repeat below what we started with, namely the three core properties of the (MI), having
now restated property (i) so that it makes reference to the dispositionality element:
(46) The core components of the (MI):
a. The internal argument is ascribed a dispositional property.
b. An otherwise eventive verb becomes a derived stative and, more precisely,
receives a generic interpretation.
c. The agent receives an arbitrary, free choice interpretation.
Property (a), in conjunction with the subject-orientedness of disposition ascriptions ar-
gued for above, is responsible for the promotion of the understood object to subject
position (which takes place at a pre-syntactic level for English and Dutch, and in the
syntax for Greek and French). Property (b) follows from (a): a disposition ascription
is a generic statement. Property (c) also follows, in the sense of the syntactic suppres-
sion. As far as the interpretation is concerned, this could also be said to follow, given the
incompatibility of disposition ascriptions and speciﬁc agents.
Now the core of the middle semantics can be reduced to the statement in (9), repeated
below as (47):
(47) The middle ascribes a disposition to the internal argument.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have argued for an approach that treats the ‘middle construction’ as a
particular interpretation that independently available structures receive. The locus of the
cross-linguistic variation was taken to be the morphological means available to languages
with respect to encoding genericity. I proposed a treatment of the Gen employed in
dispositionals, of which middles were argued to be an instance, along the lines of Brennan
(1993)’s analysis of dynamic modals.
My focus has been the case of so-called personal middles, derived from transitive verbs,
whose subject corresponds to the understood object. Verbs lacking an internal argument
can in some languages (Dutch, German) give us impersonal middles, whose syntactic and
semantic properties remain an issue open for further research.
Another issue awaiting further investigation is the nature of disposition ascriptions. I have
argued that in the case of dispositional generics, Gen is a VP-operator. This potentially
leads to a proliferation of silent generic operators, which might be viewed as an unwelcome
consequence. In support of the view defended here, I would like to point to a thus far
unnoticed constrast between middles and generic passives. There are two contexts that
reveal the non-identity of their intepretation. In the absence of an adverbial, the passive is
habitual, but the middle is not. And conjoining the two does not result in contradiction:
(48) a. Linguistics articles just don’t read!
b. Linguistics articles just aren’t read!
(49) This book reads easily, but it isn’t easily read.
One explanation for the data above is that generic passives and middles employ diﬀer-
ent generic operators. In the spirit of the cross-linguistic account of middles defended
here, this would be related to the morphology of the periphrasis employed in English for
(generic) passives (recall that Greek passives/middles are synthetic). In addition to bring-
ing out the aspectual diﬀerence between generic passives and middles, the data above also
suggest that the role of easily has not been investigated thoroughly.
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196THE SEMANTICS OF NOUNS DERIVED FROM GRADABLE ADJECTIVES
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Abstract
What semantics should we attribute to nouns like wisdom and generosity, which are derived from
gradable adjectives? We show that, from a morphosyntactic standpoint, these nouns are mass
nouns. This leads us to consider and answer the following questions. How are these nouns
interpreted in their various uses? What formal representations may one associate with their
interpretations? How do these depend on the semantics of the adjective? And where lies the
semantic unity of nouns like wisdom and generosity with the more familiar concrete mass nouns,
like wine and furniture?
1  Introduction
The topic of this paper is what semantics should we attribute to nouns derived from gradable
adjectives? A gradable adjective, like wise, is one that describes a property that comes into
degrees, so that it accepts modifiers like very: July is very wise. (By contrast, an adjective like
perpendicular is not gradable: two lines may be perpendicular, but not *very perpendicular.)
From the adjective wise, English has derived the noun wisdom. Other examples of such pairs
include: generous Æ generosity, hostile Æ hostility, friendly Æ friendliness.
We begin by examining how these nouns can be used, that is, what their morphosyntactic
distribution is. This leads us to conclude that they are mass nouns. We then look at the
interpretations that these nouns can receive in these constructions.
After which we address the following questions: What formal representations may one
associate with these interpretations? How do these depend on the formal representation
associated with the adjective? And in what respects is the semantics of deadjectival mass
nouns similar to that of concrete mass nouns, like wine and furniture, on which research in
formal semantics has focused?
2
2  The uses of nouns derived from gradable adjectives
We find, first, that a noun derived from a gradable adjective can appear together with a
possessive phrase: Julie’s courage, the courage of Julie and Tom, or in a definite nominal
expression with a relative (non-possessive) phrase: the courage that Julie showed, the
courage that Fred attributed to Julie and Tom. We group theses uses together as the
possessive or relative phrase identifies the bearer(s) of the property described by the noun.
                                                   
1 I want to thank Paul Egré, Brendan Gillon, Friederike Moltmann, Philippe Schlenker, Benjamin Spector,
Arnim von Stechow and Lucia Tovena for comments on some of the ideas developed in this chapter.
2 For reviews of the literature, see Pelletier & Schubert (1989), Krifka (1991) and Nicolas (2002).
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2
Second, the noun can appear together with an indefinite, mass determiner like some, much, a
lot of or a little
3: July has much / a little courage, John found some / a lot of courage in those
men.
Third, the noun can appear in comparative constructions, its grammatical number being
singular: July has less / more wisdom than Tom, John saw more courage in his opponents
than in his teammates.
Fourth, the noun may be used bare, that is, without any determiner, in sentences that are not
comparative: Julie has encountered hostility, John found courage in those men, Friendliness
is nice. We see in particular that, in all the contexts in which the noun is combined with a
mass determiner, the noun can appear with no determiner.
Fifth, the noun is in general invariable in grammatical number: it seems hard, for instance, to
talk of wisdoms or friendlinesses; doing so requires a special context and induces a change in
meaning.
Finally, the noun may sometimes be used together with a count determiner, most notably in
expressions of the form [a(n) + adjective + noun]: a(n) exceptional / great / high wisdom.
4
This pattern of uses is the same as the one we find for concrete mass nouns, like wine or
furniture: nouns like wisdom and nouns like wine or furniture have the same morphosyntactic
distribution. This means, quite simply, that they are all mass nouns.
5
This immediately raises three questions: What formal representations may one associate with
the interpretations of nouns like wisdom? How do these depend on the formal representation
associated with the adjective? And where lies the semantic unity of nouns like wisdom with
the more familiar concrete mass nouns?
Before answering these questions
6, let us see w hat interpretations mass nouns like  wisdom
receive in their various uses.
                                                   
3 We call “mass” any determiner that is characteristic of mass nouns. On mass nouns, count nouns and their
characteristic determiners, see note 5 below.
4 We call “count” any determiner that is characteristic of count nouns; cf. the next note.
5 In many languages, including English, common nouns divide into two morphosyntactic subclasses, mass nouns
and count nouns (Gillon 1992). A defining characteristic of mass nouns, like milk, is that they are invariable,
while count nouns, like cat, can be used in the singular and in the plural. Depending on the language, this basic
morphosyntactic difference between the two types of noun is often supplemented by differences as to the
determiners they can combine with. Thus, in English, mass nouns can be used with determiners like much and a
lot of, but neither with one nor many. On the contrary, count nouns can be employed with numerals like one and
determiners like many, but not with much.
It is of course well-known that mass nouns can, in certain contexts, be used as count nouns (You should take a
hot milk with some honey), and vice versa (You will find a lot of rabbit around here). One then talks of
conversion. Conversion is a common grammatical possibility, whereby a member of a grammatical category is
used in the morphosyntactic environment characteristic of another grammatical category. For instance, proper
names  can  be  used  as  common  nouns:  The  professor  has  two  Picassos  in  his  class (cf. Gillon 1992,
Kleiber 1994, Nicolas Submitted). Uses of nouns like wisdom in the plural or with a count determiner are cases
of conversion, from mass to count.
6 The first two questions will be dealt with in section 4, while the third will be answered in the
conclusion (section 5).
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3  The interpretations of nouns derived from gradable adjectives
3.1  The interpretation of possessive and definite uses
Take sentences like:
Julie’s generosity attracted Tom.
They may be understood in two ways. First, as meaning something like:
(1) The particular generosity that Julie (and Julie alone) had attracted Tom.
Second, as meaning something like:
(2) (The fact) that Julie was generous attracted Tom.
Under the first interpretation, the noun phrase Julie’s generosity refers to an instance of a
property, an instance of generosity.
7 Julie’s generosity is unique to her, and differs from, say,
Tom’s. Under the second interpretation, the expression Julie’s generosity refers to a fact, that
Julie was generous, and it is this which is understood to attract Tom, rather than the particular
generosity that Julie had. A natural hypothesis is thus that expressions like Julie’s generosity
are ambiguous between two interpretations, an “instance-interpretation” as characterized
in (1) and a “fact-interpretation” as in (2).
A datum in favor of this hypothesis is of course the availability of the paraphrases in (1)
and (2): these paraphrases capture the intuition that sentences like Julie’s generosity attracted
Tom may be understood in two different ways. But the crucial datum comes from the
existence of predicates that license one interpretation but not the other.
We observe first that there are predicates, like admit and confess, that accept expressions like
Julie’s generosity as argument, license a fact-interpretation but do not give rise to an instance-
interpretation:
Tom admitted / confessed his sadness to Julie.
8
While these sentences can be understood as Tom admitted / confessed to Julie that he was
sad, they could not be taken to mean something that could be paraphrased as: Tom admitted /
confessed to Julie the particular sadness that he alone had. Admit and confess require that the
referent of his sadness be a fact.
9
                                                   
7 Instances of properties are also known to philosophers as moments, tropes or modes (see Mulligan et al. 1984
and Lowe 1998). Julie’s smile, Julie’s love for Tom, and the red of Julie’s shirt are other examples of instances
of properties. The ontology defended by Lowe (1998) offers a general, metaphysical framework congenial to the
views defended in this paper. In this framework, the relationship between individuals, kinds, property instances
and properties comes out as follows. July instantiates the kind HUMAN BEING. And July possesses the
property of generosity, in virtue of possessing a particular instance of generosity. But we could not say that she
possesses the kind HUMAN BEING, nor that she instantiates the property of generosity. So, in this ontology, an
individual  instantiates  a  kind,  while  she  possesses  properties;  instantiation  and  property  possession  are
categorically distinct relations.
8 Adapted from a similar example given in French by Van de Velde (1995: 141).
9 Notions like “factives” and “factive contexts” have been discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Kiparsky and
Kiparsky 1971, Delacruz 1973). So has Vendler’s idea that gerunds of the form her performing the song would
refer to facts (Asher 1993, Vendler 1968, Kistler 1999). However, we have found very few predicates that, with
expressions like Julie’s generosity, license a fact-interpretation and (clearly) refuse an instance-interpretation.
Consider for example “factive predicates” like surprise, bother and attract. These predicates are said to be
factive because, when they take a clausal subject, they presuppose that the embedded sentence be true. If the
sentence  That  Julie  was  generous  surprised  Tom is true, this entails that the sentence embedded in the
subject (Julie was generous) is also true. Nonetheless, in general, these predicates accept many things as the
David Nicolas The Semantics of Nouns Derived From Gradable Adjectives
1994
Second, we find that there are predicates, like describe and admire, that accept expressions
like Julie’s generosity as argument, license an instance-interpretation but do not give rise to a
fact-interpretation:
Tom described Julie’s wisdom.
Tom admired Julie’s wisdom.
In these sentences, the expression Julie’s  wisdom  may  not  be  understood  as  meaning
something like: that Julie was wise. These predicates license only the instance-interpretation,
where the expression may be paraphrased as: the wisdom that Julie alone had.
Finally, as observed at the beginning of this section, there are predicates, like attract and
surprise, that allow for the two interpretations:
Julie’s generosity attracted Tom.
Julie’s generosity surprised Tom.
We can thus conclude that expressions like Julie’s generosity are ambiguous between an
instance-interpretation and a fact-interpretation. Given their meaning, certain predicates allow
for only one of these two interpretations, while some accept both.
3.2  The interpretation of indefinite and comparative uses
Consider now uses of the noun together with an indefinite determiner characteristic of mass
nouns, like much or a lot of:
Julie has much wisdom.
Julie has a lot of wisdom.
The determiner quantifies over wisdom, and these sentences express something concerning
the degree of Julie’s wisdom.
Something similar is observed when the noun is used in a comparative construction:
Julie has more / less wisdom than Tom.
The degree of Julie’s wisdom is compared to the degree of Tom’s wisdom.
In all these uses, something is expressed concerning the degree of Julie’s wisdom. We will
refer to this as the “degree-interpretation”.
However, we do not want to suggest that wisdom would be ambiguous between three
interpretations, in terms of instances, facts and degrees. Rather, in definite and possessive
constructions, wisdom  is  ambiguous  between  an  instance-interpretation  and  a  fact-
interpretation, while in indefinite and comparative uses, something is expressed concerning
degrees of wisdom.
3.3  The interpretation of bare uses
Nouns  like  wisdom  can  also  occur  without  any  determiner,  outside  of  comparative
constructions:
Julie has encountered hostility.
                                                                                                                                                                   
referent of their subject, including ordinary people (Julie), property instances (the generosity that Julie alone had)
and facts (the fact that Julie was generous).
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Honesty is nice.
Lord Byron invented snobbism.
These sentences differ in their interpretations. The first makes an existential claim concerning
an instance of a property: Julie has encountered an instance of hostility from a certain
individual directed towards her. The second makes a general claim concerning instances of a
property: generally, instances of honesty are nice (cf. Moltmann, to appear). The third tells us
of the creation of a new property.
3.4  The interpretation of count uses
Consider now a sentence like:
Julie showed a great wisdom.
Its interpretation parallels that of a comparable sentence, where wisdom is replaced by a
concrete mass noun like wine:
Julie bought a great wine.
This sentence says that Julie bought an instance (or instances) of wine that is (are) of a
particular type, to which the predicate expressed by the adjective applies (this type of wine is
identified as great). Similarly, the sentence that concerns wisdom says that the instance of
wisdom showed by Julie is of a particular type, to which the predicate expressed by the
adjective applies (this type of wisdom is identified as great).
4  The semantics of the noun and its link with that of the adjective
The questions we now want to address are: What formal representations may one associate
with the interpretations of nouns derived from gradable adjectives?
10 And how do these
depend on the formal representation associated with the adjective?
4.1  Modeling possessive and definite uses
We will treat here only the instance-interpretation of sentences like Julie’s wisdom surprised
Tom, reserving the fact-interpretation for future work.
11 Under this interpretation, the subject
refers to an instance of wisdom, namely the particular wisdom that Julie alone had. A simple
model of such sentences is obtained as follows.
We take a noun like wisdom to denote a relation between an instance x of a property and a
bearer i of that property:
Wisdom:  lx li wisdom(x,i)
Now, the expression Julie’s wisdom has the same meaning as the expression the wisdom of
Julie. An element of definiteness is thus part of the meaning of Julie’s wisdom. We may take
                                                   
10 We will focus on the normal uses of nouns like  wisdom, that is, on the cases where they are used as mass
nouns. Sentences where they are used as count nouns are cases of conversion; cf. section 2 and Nicolas
(Submitted).
11 This interpretation is available with all derived nouns, when they are headed by a possessive construction:
Julie’s generosity surprised Tom / Julie’s love for Ted surprised Tom / Ted’s walk to Greece astonished Julie.
There must exist a general mechanism that, given a derived noun, constructs an interpretation in terms of fact:
that July was generous surprised Tom.
We may note that this mechanism is lexicalized in an overt construction: the fact that + S, where S is a sentence.
Semantically, it constructs a fact, given a proposition, like the proposition expressed by the sentence S.
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this element to be provided by an implicitly present, definite article the. It imposes semantic
conditions that we label ‘the’ in our model.
12 The expression Julie’s wisdom thus translates as
follows (with j the referent of Julie):
Julie’s wisdom: the x [wisdom(x,j)]
Finally, the truth conditions of the full sentence are (with t the referent of Tom):
Julie’s wisdom surprised Tom is true iff  the x [wisdom(x,j)] is such that surprised(x,t)
So now, what about indefinite and comparative uses?
4.2  Modeling indefinite and comparative uses
The solution becomes clear once we compare them with similar sentences with concrete mass
nouns like wine.
4.2.1  Measure functions for concrete mass nouns
Instead of looking directly at:
Julie has a lot of wisdom.
Julie has more wisdom than Tom.
we consider:
Julie has a lot of wine.
Julie has more wine than Tom.
The first question we should ask ourselves is, how the sentences with concrete mass nouns
like wine should be modeled? Higginbotham (1995) argues that to deal with such sentences,
and also with the quantification of mass nouns in general, we need the notion of a measure
function. In this case, the measure function will be a function m that associates to any instance
of wine x something that represents the quantity of wine that x contains.
Then we get:
Julie has a lot of wine is true iff Julie has some wine and the quantity of Julie’s wine is a lot
To be more precise, we can say, with Higginbotham, that the predicate “a-lot” is satisfied by a
quantity of wine if this quantity is greater than a certain standard quantity of wine c°:
Julie has a lot of wine is true
iff $y [wine(y) Ÿ has(j,y)]  Ÿ  the x [wine(x) Ÿ has(j,x)] is such that m(x) > c°
iff the x [wine(x) Ÿ has(j,x)] is such that m(x) > c° {where c° is a standard quantity of wine}
This measure function can also be used to deal with comparatives:
Julie has more wine than Tom is true
                                                   
12 We do not want to be tied to any account of the semantic conditions imposed by the definite article. Let us,
however, cite Sharvy (1980) as a good example of how these conditions may be made precise. He characterizes
them in terms of the notion of a supremum:
the x [N(x)] = ix [x=SUPy (y is such that N(y))] {where i is the iota operator}
That is, an expression of the form the N (like the cat, the cats, the wine, the wisdom of Julie) denotes the entity x
which is the supremum of all the entities y to which the predicate N that corresponds to the nominal expression
N applies in the circumstance. When the predicate can apply only to a single entity (as with cat or wisdom of
Julie), this turns out to be equivalent to the more familiar, Russellian condition: $!x Nx.
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iff the quantity of Julie’s wine is greater than the quantity of Tom’s wine
iff the x [wine(x) Ÿ has(j,x)] and the v [wine(v) Ÿ has(t,v)] are such that m(x) > m(v)
4.2.2  Measure functions for (mass) nouns derived from gradable adjectives
This account extends to nouns like wisdom, as long as we interpret differently the measure
function m. Obviously, in the case of wisdom, we cannot talk of a quantity of wisdom, at least
not in the same sense as we talk of a quantity of wine. But we certainly may talk of a degree
of wisdom. So we just have to take the measure function to associate to an instance of wisdom
a degree of wisdom. More precisely, when an instance x of wisdom manifests itself in an
individual j, the measure function m will associate to x the degree of wisdom of that person in
the circumstance. Here is then what we get:
Julie has a lot of wisdom may be paraphrased as: Julie has wisdom (an instance of wisdom
manifests itself in Julie) and Julie’s wisdom is a lot. That is:
Julie has a lot of wisdom is true
iff $y wisdom(y,j)  Ÿ  the x [wisdom(x,j)] is such that m(x) > c°
iff the x [wisdom(x,j)] is such that m(x) > c°
{where c° is a certain standard degree of wisdom}
Julie has more wisdom than Tom is true
iff the x [wisdom(x,j)] and the v [wisdom(v,t)] are such that m(x) > m(v)
4.3  Modeling bare uses
Dealing fully with bare uses would force us to take a stance on an issue that is not our direct
concern. This is the general issue of how to model sentences with bare mass nouns and bare
plurals. Some researchers take bare plurals and mass nouns to be indefinites (Gillon 1990).
Others  see  them  as  ambiguous  between  an  indefinite  reading  and  a  kind-
reading (Wilkinson 1991). Yet others take them to uniformly refer to kinds, and a certain
mechanism derives their existential interpretations (Carlson 1977). However, for the purpose
of this paper, we do not need to adjudicate between such positions. Indeed, whatever we end
up saying concerning bare mass nouns and plurals, we should be able to say it, in the same
way, in the specific case of mass nouns derived from adjectives. Thus, concerning the
sentences we gave as examples in 3.1.3, any position will give them truth-conditions that will
turn out to be essentially equivalent to:
Julie has encountered hostility is true
iff Julie has encountered an instance of hostility from an individual s directed towards him
iff $x $s hostility(x,s,j) Ÿ encountered(j,x)
Honesty is nice is true
iff generally, instances of honesty are nice
If we could avail ourselves of the notion of a “generic” operator, Gen, binding variables x
and i, then our sentence would be true iff Gen x,i [honesty(x,i) Æ nice(x)]
Lord Byron invented snobbism is true
iff invented(b,sn)  {where b stands for Byron and sn stands for the property SNOBBISM}
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In other words, in Lord Byron invented snobbism, the bare noun snobbism functions as the
proper name of a property.
4.4  The link with the semantics of gradable adjectives
To specify how the semantics of the noun is linked to that of the adjective, we need first to
say how we can model gradable adjectives.
4.4.1  A simple semantics for gradable adjectives
Following Kennedy (1999, 2001), we assume that gradable adjectives denote measure
functions, from individuals to degrees (see also Klein, 1991, on adjectives and degrees). We
adopt, for this paper, simple assumptions concerning gradable adjectives and degrees. What is
important to us is not those assumptions per se, but the relationship, in a model where
adjectives are associated with degrees, between the semantics of the adjective and that of the
derived noun.
We model Julie is wise as meaning: the degree at which Julie is wise is superior to a certain
standard d°. If j corresponds to Julie in the model, and wise is the measure function denoted
by the adjective, then we have the following truth-conditions:
Julie is wise is true iff wise(j) > d°
Similarly, for comparative constructions:
Julie is wiser than Tom is taken to be true
iff the degree at which Julie is wise is higher than the degree at which Tom is wise
iff wise(j) > wise(t)
4.4.2  How the semantics of the noun is linked to that of the adjective
We can now specify the links between the semantics of the adjective and the semantics of the
derived noun, through two axioms:
Axiom i)  An instance of wisdom manifests itself in an individual iff that individual is wise to
a certain degree:  $x wisdom(x,j)  iff  $d d = wise(j)
Axiom ii)  The measure function m associated with the noun wisdom is the measure function
denoted by the adjective wise:  wisdom(x,j) Æ m(x) = wise(j)
5  Conclusion
5.1  In brief
The model we propose is as follows.
A noun derived from a gradable adjective denotes a two-place relation, between an instance of
a property, and an individual in which this instance manifests itself.
Like more familiar concrete mass nouns, this noun has an associated measure function m. This
allows us to capture the interpretation of comparatives like more or less and quantifiers like
much or a lot of.
The relationship between the semantics of the gradable adjective and that of the derived noun
is captured by two axioms, like the ones we have for wisdom:
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Axiom i) $x wisdom(x,j) iff  $d  d = wise(j)
Axiom ii) wisdom(x,j) Æ m(x) = wise(j)
In particular, the second axiom says that the measure function associated with the noun
wisdom is the measure function denoted by the adjective wise.
This set of assumptions allows us to account in a simple way for the instance-interpretations
and degree-interpretations that these nouns are observed to have.
Let us pause, to address the following question: Why not simply say that mass nouns like
wisdom denote the measure function denoted by the adjective from which they derive (i.e.,
without attributing to wisdom an instance-argument)? Well, in English, wisdom is a mass
noun just like wine is. Now, we recognize that expressions like Julie’s wine refer. So it is only
natural to recognize that expressions like Julie’s wisdom also refer. In this way, we have a
uniform semantics for mass nouns, something that we would not have if we said that only
mass nouns like wine refer. By doing so, we explain in a straightforward fashion how
instance-interpretations  arise,  while  modeling,  with  the  associated  measure  function,
indefinite and comparative uses.
To say it differently, the model here advocated explains us where lies the semantic unity of
abstract and concrete mass nouns. Being common nouns, mass nouns have the capacity to
refer (and nouns like wisdom refer specifically to property instances). Being moreover mass
nouns,  they  not  only  refer,  but  have  an  associated  measure  function,  which  allows  a
comparison of the instances they denote, as required by comparatives and quantifiers.
5.2  Extending the account to other abstract nouns
To finish, another nice feature of this account is that it extends easily to other types of abstract
nouns, like beauty, chaos, perpendicularity and love. Let’s look at these types of noun in turn.
5.2.1.  Beauty
In English, a noun like beauty is not derived from any adjective. On the contrary, there is an
adjective, beautiful, derived from the noun. The direction of the derivation turns out to make
no difference. Indeed, a natural account for the noun beauty exactly parallels that for wisdom:
$x beauty(x,j) iff  $d d = beautiful(j)
beauty(x,j) Æ m(x) =  beautiful(j)
Julie’s  beauty attracts Tom is true iff the x [beauty(x,j)] is such that attracts(x,t)
Julie’s beauty is greater than Sue’s is true
iff the x [beauty(x,j)] and the v [beauty(v,s)] are such that m(x) > m(v)
5.2.2.  Chaos
Take now a mass noun like chaos. It is not derived and, when understood as in The chaos of
the bedroom worries Tom, its meaning cannot be adequately paraphrased using the derived
adjective chaotic. Still,  it is natural to give it a semantics similar to that of wisdom, except
that, when understood in this way, there  is no link with any adjective. We just take the mass
noun chaos as denoting a two-place relation, between instances of chaos and entities in which
they manifest themselves, and as having an associated measure function that sends an entity
to the degree of chaos that it exhibits.
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The chaos of the bedroom worries Tom is true iff the x [chaos(x,b)] is such that worries(x,t)
The chaos in the bedroom is greater than the chaos in the kitchen is true
iff the degree of chaos of the bedroom is greater than the degree of chaos of the kitchen
iff the x [chaos(x,k)] and the v [chaos(v,b)] are such that m(x) > m(v)
5.2.3.  Perpendicularity
What  about  a  noun  like  perpendicularity?  The  noun  is  derived  from  an  adjective,
perpendicular, but this adjective is not gradable. We cannot say that two lines l and m are
very perpendicular. As a result, the noun perpendicularity cannot be quantified: we cannot
talk of a lot of perpendicularity, or of more perpendicularity. So the noun will have no
associated measure function. But there will of course remain a link with the meaning of the
adjective, captured as follows:
$x perpendicularity(x,l,m)  iff  perpendicular(l,m)
Since the adjective perpendicular is not gradable, the adjective does not denote a measure
function, but simply a function to truth values.
5.2.4.  Love
Finally, take a mass noun like love. It is derived from a verb, to love. The verb has two
arguments, and so the noun may accept up to three arguments: we may talk of Julie’s love for
Tom. The noun love will have an associated measure function, which must be also available to
the verb to love, since we have equivalences like:
Julie has a lot of love for Tom is true iff the sentence Julie loves Tom a lot is true
A question that needs to be explored is in what way exactly will this measure function be
available to the verb.
In any case, we get truth-conditions like the following:
Julie’s love for Tom attracts Fred is true iff the x [love(x,j,t)] is such that attracts(x,f)
Julie has more love for Tom than for Fred is true
iff the x [love(x,j,t)] and the v [love(v,j,f)] are such that m(x) > m(v)
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Abstract
In this paper I will give a modal two-dimensional analysis of presupposition and modal
subordination. I will think of presupposition as a non-veridical propositional attitude.
This allows me to evaluate what is presupposed and what is asserted at diﬀerent
dimensions without getting into the binding problem. What is presupposed will be
represented by an accessibility relation between possible worlds. The major part of
the paper consists of a proposal to account for the dependence of the interpretation of
modal expressions, i.e. modal subordination, in terms of an accessibility relation as
well. Moreover, I show how such an analysis can be extended from the propositional
to the predicate logical level.
1 Introduction
Consider the following examples:
(1) a. A thief might break into the house. He might take the silver.
b. It is possible that John used to smoke and possible that he just stopped doing so.
c. It is possible that Mary will come and it is possible that Sue will come too.
∗The research for this paper has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy
of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), which is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to Cleo Condoravdi and
Stefan Kaufmann for inviting me to submit a paper to the special issue. I would like to thank an anonymous
referee, Frank Veltman, and Henk Zeevat for valuable comments and discussion.
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Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, GermanyThe sequence (1a) was discussed by Roberts (1989) as a problematic example for stan-
dard discourse representation theory and dynamic semantics (Kamp, Heim, Groenendijk
& Stokhof). The sequence (1b) was already given by Gazdar (1979) as a counterexample
to the satisfaction theory of presupposition defended in the seventies by, among others,
Karttunen and Stalnaker. The closely related (1c) is even a more serious problem for pro-
ponents of the satisfaction theory who claim that a trigger like too does not entail what
it presupposes, in this case that (it is possible that) Mary will come. The reason is that
according to such a two-dimensional analysis of presuppositions it is predicted that (1c)
can be true and appropriate without there being a possible world in which both Mary and
Sue are coming, i.e. the binding problem.
In this paper I will formulate a two-dimensional theory of presupposition satisfaction
in which the binding problem does not arise. I will do this by taking serious the proposal
of Stalnaker that presupposition should be thought of as a propositional attitude and rep-
resented by an accessibility relation between possible worlds. In the most substantial part
of the paper, I will show how such a modal analysis can account for the phenomenon
that the interpretation of one modal can depend on that of another: modal subordina-
tion. This modal analysis of modal subordination will be rather diﬀerent from the more
representational analyses proposed by, among others, Roberts (1989) and Geurts (1995).
This paper will be organized as follows. First, I will brieﬂy motivate and formalize
a two-dimensional analysis of presupposition satisfaction. In section 3, I will discuss the
phenomenon of modal subordination and propose a modal analysis in terms of a changing
accessibility relation. This analysis will be developed further in the remaining sections to
account for disjunctions, conditionals, belief and desire attributions, and the subjunctive
mood. Until then I limit myself to the propositional level. In the ﬁnal substantial section of
this paper I will brieﬂy indicate how the analysis can be extended such that also anaphoric
dependencies across modals can be taken care of. I will end with some conclusions.
2 Presupposition
2.1 The representation of presuppositions
The notion of presupposition plays a crucial role in dynamic semantics. A context is sup-
posed to represent what is presupposed. Stalnaker (1974, 1998, 2002) has always argued
that presupposition should be thought of as a propositional attitude and thus represented
in a similar way: by means of an accessibility relation. But what do agents presuppose?
The standard answer is: that what is common ground between the participants of the
2
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210conversation. According to discourse representation theory, what is common ground is
that what is explicitly represented in a discourse representation structure, a DRS. This
DRS, in turn, represents what has been explicitly agreed upon by the conversational par-
ticipants. This suggests that presupposition should by default be fully introspective: what
is presupposed is also presupposed to be presupposed, and what is not presupposed is also
presupposed not to be presupposed.1 I will represent what is presupposed by a primitive
accessibility relation R. Although the presuppositional accessibility relation should be fully
introspective, the relation should not be based on the assumption that what is presupposed
also has to be true: discourse can be based on an assumption that later turns out to be
false. So, presupposition should be represented by an accessibility relation that need not
be reﬂexive.
The non-veridicality of what is presupposed suggests that we should treat the valuation
of truth separately from context change – distinguish content from force. In this section I
will show how we can systematically account for presupposition satisfaction without giving
up the possibility of determining the content of a sentence separately from the way it
changes the context. For context change, I will rely mainly on work in dynamic epistemic
semantics, where updates are deﬁned in terms of eliminating arrows instead of eliminating
worlds.2
2.2 Formalization
When a speaker presupposes something, he presupposes it in a world or a possibility. A
possibility will be represented by a pointed model, hR,wi,3 where w is a distinguished world
representing the actual world and should be thought of as a valuation function from atomic
propositions to truth values and where R is the presuppositional accessibility relation that
is (by default) serial, transitive and Euclidean.4 I will take R(v) to be the worlds accessible
1See also Fernando (1995) for an analysis of context where full introspection is assumed. Stalnaker
(2002) suggests that what is presupposed by an agent is that what she believes is commonly believed by
the discourse participants. This has as a result, however, that the attitude of presupposition does not obey
negative introspection, because more things can be taken to be commonly believed than what is explicitly
agreed upon.
2Updating through the elimination of arrows instead of worlds has been used, among others, by Land-
man (1986a) and Veltman (1996). Its limitations for multi-agent settings are discussed in Gerbrandy
(1999).
3If we think of a world as representing everything that is the case, including some modal facts, a pointed
model should be thought of as such a world.
4A relation R is serial if ∀x : ∃y : xRy; transitive if ∀x,y,z : (xRy & yRz) → xRz; and Euclidean if
∀x,y,z : (xRy & xRz) → yRz.
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211from v: {u ∈ W : vRu}. As a result, it will be the case that what is presupposed is in-
trospective: ∀v,w : if v ∈ R(w), then R(v) = R(w), although it need not be veridical, i.e.,
it might be that w 6∈ R(w). To determine in possibility hR,wi whether P is presupposed,
we have to check what is presupposed in this possibility, R(w). The two-dimensional (or
four-valued) analysis of presupposition that was popular in the seventies treats the logic of
truth and that of presupposition at separate dimensions. This is appealing because some-
times a sentence can, intuitively, be true, although its presupposition is false. Standard
dynamic semantics treats conjunction in an asymmetric way: the second conjunct should
be interpreted with respect to the initial context updated with the ﬁrst conjunct. This is a
desirable feature of a framework to account for the asymmetric behavior of presuppositions
in conjunctive sentences. In this section I will combine the desirable features of both the
two-dimensional and the dynamic analysis of presuppositions. Thinking of presupposition
as a non-veridical propositional attitude, we can account for the dynamic aspects of pre-
supposition satisfaction without giving up the idea behind a two-dimensional analysis of
presupposition satisfaction. That is, although we will predict that conjunction behaves
asymmetrically with respect to presupposition satisfaction, ‘and’ will still be treated in a
symmetric way. The reason is that truth and presupposition satisfaction are deﬁned sep-
arately from the update function (although they will be deﬁned simultaneously). Making
use of Beaver’s (1995) presupposition operator, I will represent an atomic sentence A that
presupposes P as follows: ∂P ∧ A. For the time being, I will concentrate only on the
truth-conditional connectives. I will assume that a sentence has two values: (i) a sentence
is true or false, i.e. 1 or 0; (ii) a sentence has no presupposition failure or it has one, i.e. +
or -. The combined truth and presupposition satisfaction conditions of sentences are given
below (where ‘·’ is a placeholder):5
• [[A]]R,w = h1/0,+i, iﬀ w(A) = 1/0, if A is atomic (then always deﬁned)
• [[¬A]]R,w = h1/0,+i iﬀ [[A]]R,w = h0/1,+i, h·,−i otherwise
• [[A ∧ B]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ [[A]]R,w = h1,+i and [[B]]Upd(A,R),w = h1,+i
= h·,−i iﬀ [[A]]R,w = h·,−i or [[B]]Upd(A,R),w = h·,−i
= h0,+i otherwise
• [[∂A]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ ∀v ∈ R(w) : [[A]]R,v = h1,+i
= h·,−i otherwise
5Although I use a four-dimensional logic, I am not explicit about when a sentence is true or false,
although its presupposition is not satisﬁed. But this is needed if we want to allow Even John was there to
be true although it is not presupposed that John’s being there was unlikely (thanks to Kai von Fintel for
reminding this to me). However, there is no principle problem of distinguishing those cases as well.
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212Observe again that the presupposition value of a conjunction is determined in a symmetric
way. That is, if either A or B has a presupposition failure, the conjunction A ∧ B will
have a presupposition failure as well. However, to determine the presupposition value of a
conjunction of the form A∧B in possibility hR,wi, we look at the presupposition value of
B in possibility hUpd(A,R),wi – the update function is being relevant here. This is the
point at which we take over the insights of dynamic semantics. The update Upd(A,R) is
deﬁned as follows:
• Upd(A,R) = {hu,vi ∈ R| [[A]]R,v = h1,+i}.
Notice that this update function is eliminative, but instead of eliminating worlds in R(w)
it eliminate tuples, or arrows, in R. It eliminates all arrows in R that point to an non-
A-world. This has the eﬀect that after the update of R with A, not only all worlds v
accessible from w verify A, but also all worlds u accessible from v make A true. Thus,
after the update with A it is not only presupposed that A, but it is also presupposed to be
presupposed that A. Moreover, on the assumption that R is fully introspective, Upd(A,R)
will be fully introspective as well. Also after the update, everything that is not presupposed
is also presupposed to be not presupposed.
Our analysis is very similar to standard dynamic semantics. If we would say that
[[3A]]R,w = h1,·i iﬀ ∃v ∈ R(w) : [[A]]R,v = h1,·i and assume that possibility statements
don’t have any dynamic eﬀect,6 we predict just like Veltman (1996) an asymmetry between
3A ∧ ¬A and ¬A ∧ 3A; the former is okay, the latter is not. However, this contrast in
acceptability is explained in a somewhat diﬀerence way: Veltman’s explanation appeals to
acceptability of update, while we explain the contrast in terms of truth. We predict that
the former sequence can be true, but the latter cannot.
If we assume that sentence A presupposes P iﬀ ∀hR,wi : if [[A]]R,w = h·,+i, then ∀v ∈
R(w) : [[P]]R,v = h1,+i, the above implementation gives rise to the same presuppositional
predictions as the standard implementation of the satisfaction account. In particular, on
the assumption that John stopped smoking gives rise to the presupposition that John used
to smoke, this implementation predicts that sentences like John didn’t stop smoking and
John stopped smoking and Mary is sick will also gives rise to this presupposition, but John
used to smoke and he stopped doing so will never give rise to presupposition failure.
Although the predictions of the above implementation of the satisfaction approach
are similar to the predictions of the standard approach, there are still some important
diﬀerences. First, by treating presupposition as a propositional attitude, we can evaluate
in a distributive way whether a presupposition associated with a sentence is satisﬁed by
6Though we will give a somewhat diﬀerent analysis of possibility statements later.
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213what the speaker presupposes. This is possible, of course, because we have represented
in a single possibility all the information that is normally represented only in a whole
context/information state. Second, and related, we can now account for the dominant
view in the seventies that presupposition satisfaction and truth should be evaluated at
diﬀerent dimensions.
According to Karttunen & Peters (1979) and others a sentence like Even Bill likes
Mary presupposes something that it does not entail. Thus, the sentence can be true
without it actually being unlikely that Bill likes Mary, because what is presupposed need
not be true.7 Notice that we can now account for this intuition without assuming with
Karttunen & Peters (1979) that we should thus represent presuppositions separately from
assertions. On the other hand, we can also account for the intuition that a factive verb
both presupposes and entails that its complement is true.8 To analyze Sam realizes that
P we add the following construction to the language: if P is a sentence, Real(s,P) is a
sentence too. To interpret the formula, we add a primitive reﬂexive accessibility relation to
the model, Ks, modeling what Sam realizes.9 The formula is then interpreted as follows:
• [[Real(s,P)]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ ∀v ∈ Ks(w) : [[P]]R,v = h1,+i
= h0,+i iﬀ ∃v ∈ Ks(w) : [[P]]R,v = h0,+i, h·,−i otherwise
Notice that because Ks is reﬂexive, according to this analysis the formula entails, but
does not presuppose, that P. To account for the presupposition, we represent the sentence
Sam realizes that P by the following formula ∂P ∧Real(s,P), which both presupposes and
entails that P. If we now represent Sam does not realize that P by ¬(∂P ∧Real(s,P)), this
sentence presupposes that P, but can still be true in case P is false (in case w 6∈ R(w)).
3 Modal subordination
3.1 Possibility
According to standard dynamic semantics (Veltman 1996), the embedded sentence of ‘pos-
sibly A’ should be interpreted with respect to the same context as the whole sentence. This
7Soames (1989) observed already that this is problematic for the standard way of accounting for pre-
supposition satisfaction in dynamic semantics.
8Throughout the paper I will assume the same for an aspectual verb like stop.
9Our simple update function has limitations here: if we would attribute to Sam attitudes about what
the discourse participants presuppose, things go wrong. I will ignore such attributions in this paper. See,
among others, Gerbrandy (1999) for an analysis in which this problem is overcome.
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214gives rise to the prediction that ‘possibly A’ triggers the same presupposition as A itself.
However, if it has already been established that it is possible that John used to smoke, i.e.
after (2a) has been asserted, (2b) need not presuppose that John used to smoke.
(2) a. It is possible that John used to smoke,
b. and it is possible that he just stopped doing so.
The phenomenon that a modal expressions depends for its interpretation on another modal,
as illustrated by (1a) and (2a)-(2b), is known as ‘modal subordination’. Consider Roberts’s
(1a) from the introduction again:
(1a) A thief might break into the house. He might take the silver.
In both (1a) as in (2a)-(2b), we intuitively get the correct reading if we assume that
the modal in the ﬁrst clause takes scope over the whole sequence. Apart for reasons of
compositionality, however, Roberts (1989) showed already that such an analysis would be
on the wrong track. It would not be able to account for a slightly diﬀerent sequence like
(3a), where we have a necessity instead of a possibility operator in the second sentence.
(3) a. A thief might break into the house. He would take the silver.
b. If a thief broke into the house, he would take the silver.
Intuitively, the second sentence of (3a) means something like (3b). To account for this,
Roberts takes up Kratzer’s (1981) idea that the domain of a modal is context dependent,
and extends it by proposing that the actual selection goes via ‘accommodation’ of the
material that has been mentioned explicitly in an earlier modal statement. For (1a), (2a)-
(2b), and (3a), for instance, this means that the embedded clauses of their ﬁrst sentences
will be accommodated to function as the antecedents of the modals might, possible, and
would, respectively. In this way she predicts correctly for all of (1a), (2b) and (3a).
Although Roberts’s analysis reﬂects what intuitively goes on in the examples illustrated
above, the exact mechanism that she uses has been rightly criticized by Kibble (1994),
Geurts (1995), and others. Not only is her use of accommodation rather ad hoc and non-
compositional, it also seems to be a much too powerful device, even with the constraints
on accommodation that she proposes.10
10Roberts’s (1989) constraints are the following (i) modal subordination ‘requires non-factual mood’ (p.
701); (ii) ‘it must be plausible that the modally subordinate utterance has a hypothetical common ground
suggested by the immediately preceding context’ (p. 701); and (iii) modal subordination may not make
antecedents available to anaphoric expressions that have no explicit representation in the given DRS (p.
705). For a critical discussion of these constraints, see Kibble (1994) and Geurts (1995).
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215Kibble (1994) and Geurts (1995) propose that instead of selecting the domain of a
modal by means of (antecedent) accommodation, we should assume that the domain is
picked up anaphorically.11 Moreover, they suggest that modal statements also make such
domains anaphorically available for later modals: they introduce propositional discourse
variables to the discourse and these are mapped to the set of world-assignment pairs that
verify their embedded clauses by assignment functions.
Although these anaphoric analyses of modal subordination are more constrained and
appealing than Roberts’s, they are not unproblematic. For one thing, they are still too
unrestricted: modal statements just introduce and are allowed to pick up propositional
discourse markers. This makes it possible that a clause embedded under one kind of
modality can ﬁgure as the antecedent of a modal expression of a completely diﬀerent kind.
A second problem, due to Kibble (1994), is one that Geurts (1995) shares with Roberts
(1989). They both falsely predict that (4c) is an appropriate continuation of (4a)-(4b):12
(4) a. John might be at home reading a bookx
b. Actually, he’s still at the oﬃce.
c. *Itx’ll be War and Peace.
Although Kibble (1994) allows for interaction, his analysis is rather limited: a de re state-
ment represented as ∃x3A is not really treated as being about a particular individual, but
almost as if it were a de dicto statement, and he also cannot account for clauses in coun-
terfactual or subjunctive mood. Geurts’s (1995) analysis doesn’t have these limitations,
because each possibility of the ‘main’ context carries the information contained in the sub-
ordinated contexts. However, by making use of standard set theory, Geurts does not allow
for the situation that if hw,fi is a possibility that satisﬁes the main context (DRS) and
also assigns a set of possibilities to newly introduced propositional discourse marker p, that
there is a world v such that hv,fi ∈ f(p). A somewhat ad hoc analysis is given to assure
that this won’t happen. In particular, a somewhat arbitrary distinction is made between
embedded and unembedded information: although a propositional discourse marker can
11Geurts (1995) claims that a modal presupposes its domain and assumes an exclusively anaphoric
account of presupposition (satisfaction) for these cases. Given the important role that (non-global) ac-
commodation plays in Geurts’s (1995) analysis of presuppositions, this restriction is somewhat surprising.
12Kaufmann (1997) discusses a similar example involving a conditional:
(i) If John bought a book, he’ll be home reading it by now.
(ii) John works at a gas station.
(iii) *It’ll be a murder mystery.
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216be mapped to what is presupposed to be possible, it is not allowed there to be a proposi-
tional discourse marker that captures what is presupposed in the discourse as a whole. Not
only do I believe that this is undesirable for conceptual reasons, it also has an unfortunate
empirical consequence. It is predicted that modal statements cannot anaphorically pick
up what is presupposed in the entire discourse. Because a modal can, intuitively, use this
kind of information as its domain of quantiﬁcation, a somewhat artiﬁcial distinction has
to be made between anaphoric and non-anaphoric dependent modals.
One way to overcome this problem is to introduce a distinguished propositional dis-
course marker that with respect to each world assignment pair represents what is presup-
posed in that possibility. A straightforward implementation of this idea, however, requires
the use of non-wellfounded set theory.13 In this paper, instead, I will propose a more
traditional way to account for presuppositions and modal expressions: in terms of an ac-
cessibility relation.
In contrast to Robert’s analysis of modal subordination in terms of accommodation,
the above described anaphoric analyses keep the subordinated contexts made use of in
the interpretation of previous sentences ‘in memory’ by adding propositional discourse
markers to the discourse. Another way to store previously used subordinated contexts
was proposed by Kaufmann (1997). Instead of representing a context just by a set of
possibilities that verify everything established until now, he represents it by a stack of such
sets (see also Zeevat (1992)), where a set ‘below’ the top-level represents a subordinated
context. I have no principled objection to such an analysis. Still, I would like to see a
less ‘representational’ approach towards modal subordination where what is presupposed
can simply be represented by a single set of possibilities. But now the challenge is how to
account for the introduction of subordinated contexts without giving up that we represent
what is presupposed in terms of a single accessibility relation.
The basic idea is very simple: possibility statements introduce an ordering on the
worlds. However, because we assume that what is presupposed is a propositional attitude
and should be represented by an accessibility relation, we can implement this idea in an
appealing way. Following Veltman’s (1996) analysis of normally, I will assume that the
dynamic eﬀect of a possibility statement is that the worlds that make the embedded clause
true are the most preferred worlds by eliminating arrows from A-worlds to ¬A-worlds.
• Upd(3A,R) = {hu,vi ∈ R| if [[A]]R,u = h1,+i, then [[A]]R,v = h1,+i}
According to the update function, possibility statements disconnect A-worlds from ¬A-
worlds, although A-worlds can still be seen from ¬A-worlds and from actual world w.
13See, however, Fernando (1996) and Frank (1997) for less straightforward implementations of this idea
within standard set theory.
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217Suppose that before the update, R = {hw,vi,hw,ui,hv,vi,hv,ui,hu,ui,hu,vi} where v is
an A-world and w and u are ¬A-worlds. Then R is introspective: R(w) = R(v) = R(u) =
{v,u}. After the update with 3A, however, the new accessibility relation Upd(3A,R)
won’t be introspective anymore: the tuple hv,ui will be eliminated, which means that
Upd(3A,R)(w) 6= Upd(3A,R)(v) = {v} 6= Upd(3A,R)(u).14 Thus, if R was Euclidean
before the update with 3A, it won’t be Euclidean anymore afterwards.
Possibility statements will be interpreted as follows:
• [[3A]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ ∃v ∈ R(w) : [[A]]R,v = h1,+i
= h0,+i iﬀ ∃v ∈ R(w) : [[A]]R,v = h·,+i and
∀v ∈ R(w) : if [[A]]R,v = h·,+i, then [[A]]R,v = h0,+i,
= h·,−i otherwise
According to this rule it holds that if A presupposes P, 3A can be used appropriately
only if it is assumed to be possible that P is presupposed. Because out of context (or so
we assumed) it holds that ∀v ∈ R(w) : R(v) = R(w), under normal circumstances 3A
presupposes the same as A itself. However, it also can account for the sequence (2a)-(2b),
where the presupposition of the embedded clause of (2b) is not a presupposition of its
embedding sentence as a whole. The reason is that after the interpretation/update of (2a)
there is a world v consistent with what is presupposed in the actual world w in which John
used to smoke and in which it is presupposed that John used to smoke. Thus, because
from such a world v only worlds are accessible in which John used to smoke, the embedded
sentence of (2b) can be interpreted appropriately as well.
The concrete accessibility relation R discussed above illustrates what it means that
after the update of R with 3A, the A-worlds are the preferred ones: although in each
v ∈ R(w) it was the case that both 3A and 3¬A were true, this is only the case for 3A
for all v ∈ Upd(3A,R)(w).
In the introduction we noted that Karttunen & Peters’ (1979) two-dimensional analysis
gives rise to the binding problem: if it is assumed that Sue will come too presupposes, but
14This update rule is deﬁned on the assumption that either w 6∈ R(w) or w is not an A-world, because
otherwise we would falsely predict that after the use of the possibility statement only other A-worlds would
be accessible from w. In general we cannot make this assumption, of course. Fortunately, we can use a
technical trick to solve this problem. Assume that if w ∈ R(w) and w is an A-world, we don’t go to new
pointed model hR0,wi, but rather to the pointed model hR0,w∗i with a new world w∗. This new world
is exactly like w of the original pointed model, except that w∗ 6∈ R(w∗) although w ∈ R(w∗). Because
our technical problem has a simple solution, I will ignore this complication in the main text. (Thanks to
Frank Veltman and Henk Zeevat for discussion on this point).
10
Robert van Rooy A modal analysis of modal subordination
218does not entail, that somebody diﬀerent from Sue will come, it falsely predicts that (1c)
can be true although there is no possible world in which anyone besides Sue will come.
(1c) It is possible that Mary will come and it is possible the Sue will come too
Our analysis does not give rise to this false prediction. The reason for this is that,
although we have deﬁned update separately from truth, the deﬁnitions of truth and appro-
priateness are closely related: for a possibility statement to be true and appropriate, there
has to be an accessible world in which the embedded sentence is both true and appropri-
ate. Thus, the logics of truth and appropriateness (or presupposition satisfaction) are not
as independent of each other as proposed in Herzberger (1973) and Karttunen & Peters
(1979).
Notice that if we take 2A to be an abbreviation of ¬3¬A, we predict that A has to be
interpreted only in possibilities that satisfy the presupposition of A: 2A has value h1,+i in
hR,wi iﬀ ∃v ∈ R(w) : [[A]]R,v = h·,+i and ∀v ∈ R(w) : if [[A]]R,v = h·,+i,then [[A]]R,v =
h1,+i. But this means that 2(∂P ∧ A) can only be true in hR,wi iﬀ either P itself is
presupposed and A is true in all accessible worlds, or it is presupposed that P is possible
and A is true in all accessible P-worlds.
4 Extending the analysis
4.1 Modal Splitting
Now consider (5).
(5) Either John stopped smoking, or he just started doing so.
Landman (1985) proposed to account for such examples by assuming that the disjuncts
should be interpreted with respect to two mutually exclusive subordinated contexts, possibly
created by an earlier use of a disjunctive sentence that has split the context. Our analysis
of possibility statements suggests a straightforward analysis (where A is a set of formulas
and RA is {hu,vi ∈ R : [[A]]R,v = h·,+i}):
• [
W
A]]R,w = h·,−i iﬀ ∃Ai : [[3Ai]]R,w = h·,−i
= h1,+i iﬀ [[
W
A]]R,w 6= h·,−i and ∃Ai : [[Ai]]RAi,w = h1,+i
= h0,+i otherwise
• Upd(
W
A,R) =
T
j(3Aj,
S
i Upd(Ai,R))
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219Thus, I propose that A ∨ B requires both 3A and 3B to be appropriate. As for
the case of possibility statements, this means that normally all the presuppositions of the
disjuncts are also presuppositions of the whole disjunction. However, when the context is
split, this doesn’t have to be the case. This accounts for the problematic (5), if we assume
that the context was split (perhaps after accommodation of the disjunctive presupposition)
between, on the one hand, worlds where John smoked before, and, on the other, worlds
where he did not.
Questions give rise to modal subordination too:15
(6) Did John used to smoke? and did he stop smoking?
Although it is standardly assumed that a polar question gives rise to a partition, with
respect to modal subordination there seems to be a diﬀerence between the positive and
the negative answer: only the positive answer can be picked up to ﬁgure as the domain of
a later modal. To account for this, we can simply assume that the update of R with the
yes/no question A? is the same as the update of R with 3A. And this gives rise to the
following correct predictions: after question (7a), both (7b) and (7c) are appropriate and
do not give rise to presuppositional readings:
(7) a. Did anyone solve the problem?
b. It is possible that it was John who solved the problem.
c. Either it was John who solved the problem, or the problem was too diﬃcult.
4.2 Indicative conditionals
Conditionals show modal subordination behavior as well. Example (8a) shows that the
antecedent of a conditional might depend on an earlier epistemic modal; (8b) shows that
the interpretation of an epistemic modal may depend on a conditional sentence used earlier,
while (8c) shows that the interpretation of one conditional can depend on the interpretation
of another.
(8) a. I might have been wrong. If I realize that I was wrong, I will tell everybody.
b. If John feels bad, he will start smoking. His girlfriend might make him to stop.
15For a diﬀerent analysis of modal subordination with questions, see van Rooy (1998).
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220c. If Mary comes, we’ll have a quorum. If Susan comes too, we’ll have a majority.
I will follow Stalnaker (1976) in assuming that not only subjunctive, but also indica-
tive conditionals should be analyzed in terms of selection functions/similarity relations. I
will assume that the selected worlds are such that they satisfy the presupposition of the
antecedent. Out of context, the same will be presupposed in the selected worlds, or possi-
bilities, as in the actual possibility. However, the selected possibilities might also depend
on an earlier introduced subordinated context. To account for this, I make use of a sim-
ilarity relation between worlds, u <w v, meaning that u is at least as close to w as v is.
To make the selected antecedent-worlds explicitly depend on what is presupposed, I will
deﬁne a new relation <R,w between worlds that is dependent both on <w and on what is
presupposed in hR,wi (where v ≈w u iﬀ neither v <w u nor u <w v):
• v <R,w u iﬀ (i) v <w u, or
(ii) v ≈w u and R(u) ⊂ R(v) ⊆ R(w), or
(iii) v ≈w u and R(w) ⊆ R(v) ⊂ R(w)
Thus, v is closer to w than u with respect to R iﬀ either u is closer to v, or they are
equally close, but what is presupposed in v (with respect to R) is more similar to what is
presupposed in w than what is presupposed in u. The set of closest A-worlds to hR,wi is
the following set:
• fhR,wi(A) = {v ∈ W| [[A]]R,v = h1,+i & ¬∃u ∈ W : [[A]]R,u = h1,+i & u <hR,wi v}
A conditional sentence of the form if A then B is then counted as true in hR,wi iﬀ all
the with A updated closest A-worlds to hR,wi are B-worlds:
• [[A > B]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ fhR,wi(A) ⊆ {v ∈ W| [[B]]Upd(A,R),v = h1,+i}
Following Stalnaker’s (1976) suggestion that the antecedent of an indicative conditional
selects, if possible, worlds compatible with what is presupposed, I will assume that the use
of an indicative conditional demands there to be an accessible world in which its antecedent
is true and appropriate. That is, if A > B represents an indicative conditional, it can only
be appropriate in hR,wi iﬀ [[3A]]R,w = h1,+i. Notice that this enables us already to
account for sequence (8a).
To account for sequences (8b) and (8c), we have to make sure that conditional sentences
themselves make subordinated contexts accessible. In these subordinated contexts, both
antecedent and consequent should be true and presupposed. This suggests that we should
deﬁne the update rule for (indicative) conditionals as follows:
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221• Upd(A > B,R) = {hu,vi ∈ R : [[A > B]]R,v = h1,+i and
if [[A ∧ B]]R,u = h1,+i, then [[A ∧ B]]R,v = h1,+i}
According to this rule, all accessible worlds make the conditional true, and worlds in
which both the antecedent and consequent are true only ‘see’ other such worlds. But this
means that a later modal or conditional statement that presupposes what is entailed by
the antecedent and/or consequent can now also be interpreted appropriately. This enables
us to account for (8b) and (8c) as well.
4.3 Belief and Desire
According to Karttunen (1974), Stalnaker (1988), Heim (1992) and Zeevat (1992), a belief
attribution as (9a) presupposes (9b):16
(9) a. John believes that Mary stopped smoking.
b. John believes that Mary used to smoke.
How can we account for this in our two-dimensional approach? We have assumed that
what is presupposed can be represented by a primitive accessibility relation in the model.
Suppose that our model contains also the accessibility relation Bj which represents what
John believes. If R(w) represents what is presupposed in w, then Rj(w) =
S
{Bj(v) : v ∈
R(w)} represents what is presupposed in w about what John believes. Now we can adopt
the following combined truth- and appropriateness conditions:
• [[Bel(j,A)]]R,w = h1,+i iﬀ ∀v ∈ Bj(w) : [[A]]Rj,v = h1,+i
= h0,+i iﬀ ∃v ∈ Bj(w) : [[A]]Rj,v = h0,+i
= h·,−i otherwise
This immediately accounts for the non-presuppositional reading of the sequence (9b)-(9a).
In particular, we don’t have to introduce a new update function for belief attributions.
According to Heim (1992), also desire attributions should be interpreted with respect to
what is (presupposed to be) believed. The following discourse seems perfectly acceptable:
(10) a. John believes that Mary used to smoke,
b. but he hopes that she stopped doing so.
16For disagreement, see Geurts (1998).
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222But as noted by Asher (1987), Heim (1992), and later by Geurts (1998), desire attri-
butions can be conditional dependent on other desire attributions as well:
(11) a. John wants Mary to come,
b. and he wants Bill to know that Mary will come.
Intuitively, this suggests that desire attributions can introduce subordinated contexts
and can be interpreted with respect to such contexts as well. How can we account for this?
Just as before we took R to be a primitive accessibility relation that cannot be reduced
to what the participants of the conversation know or believe, I think that now we have to
assume the existence of a primitive accessibility relation Rj that represents what has been
explicitly established about what John believes. Thus, in the beginning of the conversation
Rj = W × W and Upd(Bel(j,A),Rj) = {hu,vi ∈ Rj : [[A]]Rj,v = h1,+i}.
I will assume for simplicity the following analysis of desire attributions Des(j,A) is
true in w iﬀ all the A-worlds in Bj(w) are preferred to the ¬A-worlds in Bj(w).17 Taking
also presupposition satisfaction into account, we deﬁne as follows (where X > Y iﬀ ∀x ∈
X : ∀y ∈ Y : x > y):
• [[Des(j,A)]]R,w = h·,−i iﬀ [[3A]]Rj,w = h·,−i
= h1,+i iﬀ [[3A]]Rj,w = h1,+i and
{v ∈ Bj(w) : [[A]]Rj,v = h1,+i} > {u ∈ Bj(w) : [[A]]Rj,u = h0,+i}
= h0,+i otherwise
• Upd(Des(j,A),R) = {hu,vi ∈ R| [[Des(j,A)]]R,v = h1,+i}
• Upd(Des(j,A),Rj) = {hu,vi ∈ Rj| if [[A]]R,u = h1,+i, then [[A]]R,v = h1,+i}
The truth condition basically says that the embedded sentence should be interpreted
with respect to all worlds in Bj(w) in which this sentence can be interpreted appropriately.
It also demands that if A presupposes P, the desire attribution is predicted to be appro-
priate if either P is presupposed to be believed by the agent, or P is presupposed to be
desired. The update rules are similar to what we have discussed above: the ﬁrst one just
demands that the desire attribution has to be true, while the second turns the A-worlds
in Rj(w) into the preferred ones.
17For a more serious discussion of the interpretation of desire attributions, see Van Rooy (1999).
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2234.4 Subjunctive mood and negative sentences
In section 3 we saw already that certain examples of modal subordination involving sub-
junctives are unproblematic for our account. Our analysis of possibility operators and their
duals in section 3.1 immediately gives the desired reading for a sequence as (3a):
(3a) A thief might break into the house. He would take the silver.
But now consider the following example:
(12) I don’t smoke. I (also) wouldn’t be able to stop.
This example is more problematic than (3a) because now there is no modal operator in
the ﬁrst sentence of the sequence that has a non-global eﬀect on the accessibility relation.
To account for this example one might propose, again, to accommodate the presupposition
locally within the scope of the subjunctive modal. I would like to suggest, however, that
also here that we don’t need to do so, once we represent what is presupposed by an
accessibility relation.
The ﬁrst idea that comes to mind to account for examples like (12) is to propose that
negative sentences have an eﬀect similar to that of modals. But it is not straightforward
to work out this suggestion, because the worlds that verify the negated clause are not
accessible anymore after the interpretation of the ﬁrst sentence.18 In this section I would
like to suggest tentatively some somewhat diﬀerent solutions for such examples.
A ﬁrst proposal would be to assume that the modal in the second sentence is interpreted
with respect to an accessibility relation that is determined by taking the complement of the
original accessibility relation with respect to which the whole of (12) is interpreted minus
the relation resulting from the interpretation of the ﬁrst sentence of the sequence. Let t
be the moment in time at which the second sentence should be interpreted. Then we can
deﬁne Rt∗ as {hu,vi ∈ Rt−1|u,v 6∈ Range(Rt)}. Thus, Rt∗ consists of the arrows between
worlds in the previous information state, Rt−1, that were eliminated by the last assertion.
In terms of this accessibility relation, we can analyze the subjunctive mood as follows:
• [[Would A]]Rt,w = h1,+i iﬀ ∃v ∈ Rt∗(w) : [[A]]Rt∗,v = h·,+i and
∀v ∈ Rt∗(w) : if [[A]]Rt∗,v = h·,+i, then [[A]]Rt∗,v = h1,+i
18Nevertheless, in the original version of this paper I gave such a non-straightforward analysis. A
comment of the reviewer made me see that this solution was more problematic than I realized before.
16
Robert van Rooy A modal analysis of modal subordination
224Notice that according to this interpretation rule of a subjunctive modal, the second
conjunct of a formula like ¬A ∧ Would (∂A ∧ B) is predicted to be true with respect to
accessibility relation R if all accessible A-worlds are also B-worlds. In particular, we can
now account for the sequence (12) without making use of local accommodation.
Still, I don’t think this proposal is unproblematic. The most problematic aspect, I
believe, is the fact that the suggested analysis can’t explain the contrast between positive
and negative sentences: why can subjunctive modals only ‘pick up’ negated sentences?
As discussed by Horn (1989), among others, there exists a crucial distinction between
the contexts in which positive and in which negative sentences can be used appropriately:
in contrast to their positive counterparts, negative sentences require a context in which the
truth of the positive sentence is expected, or at least very salient. One way of being salient
is to be the topic of conversation: a question to be addressed. Geurts (1995) suggested
tentatively that this might be the reason why sequences as (12) are appropriate. I think
that this is indeed a good suggestion. We have seen in section 4.1 what the dynamic
eﬀect is of a (positive polar) question: the worlds in which the positive sentence is true
become to be preferred to worlds where it is false. A subsequently used modal expression
can then be interpreted with respect to these most preferred worlds. This can’t be the
whole story, of course, because after the ﬁrst sentence of (12) these most preferred worlds
are eliminated. So, if t is the moment in time at which the second sentence should be
interpreted, the relevant accessibility relation should not be Rt, but rather Rt−1, i.e., the
context of interpretation for the ﬁrst sentence of (12). I think that this suggestion is
a natural one, especially given the fact that would is a past-tense modal. If this ﬁrst
sentence presupposes that the topic of conversation is whether I smoke, the most preferred
worlds in Rt−1(w) are all worlds where I smoke, and the second sentence of (12) can be
interpreted appropriately.
5 Indeﬁnites and pronouns
Although we have discussed Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) binding problem already with
respect to possibility statements, the most famous problematic example involves indeﬁnites:
their false prediction that the individual that satisﬁes the presupposition of a sentence like
Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of England need not be the one who
actually succeeded George V. In this section I will show that this problem will not arise
in our framework if we extend it to the predicate-logical case. However, the main goal of
this section is to indicate how we can account for modal subordination phenomena that
involve anaphoric dependencies across the sentential boundary.
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225To take indeﬁnites and pronouns into account, we have to make our accessibility relation
one between more ﬁne-grained possibilities. In contrast to standard dynamic semantics,
I assume that pronouns are (normally) used referentially, referring back to the speaker’s
reference of its antecedent indeﬁnite. Such a speaker’s reference of (an occurrence of) an
indeﬁnite depends on the referential intentions the speaker has. This kind of information
should be represented already in a possibility (actual and non-actual). But this means
that these possibilities have to contain more information than the world-assignment pairs
as standardly assumed in dynamic semantics. A clause with an occurrence of an indeﬁnite
is represented by ∃xrA, where r is a reference function. Let us assume that the set of
possibilities I is a set of functions from (i) n-ary predicates to their interpretations; (ii)
variables to individuals; and (iii) reference functions to individuals. If ∃xrA is interpreted
in possibility i, then i(r) is the speaker’s reference of the occurrence of the indeﬁnite
in i, and the dynamic eﬀect will be that from now on x will be assigned to i(r) in i,
i.e. i(x) = i(r). Let us deﬁne R[x/r] as {hi[x/i(r)],j[x/j(r)]i : hi,ji ∈ R}, and R[x/d] as
{hi[x/d],j[x/d]i : hi,ji ∈ R}. Now we deﬁne the update of hR,ai with ∃xrA as follows
(where a is the actual possibility):
Upd(∃xrA,hR,ai) = h{hi,ji ∈ R[
x/r] : [[A]]
R[x/j(r)],j = h1,+i},a[
x/a(r)]i
Thus, in the actual possibility, the speaker’s reference of the indeﬁnite is introduced
(although this need not be an individual that makes the sentence true). Also in each
possibility that is compatible with what is presupposed the speaker’s reference of the
indeﬁnite in that possibility is introduced, though they are supposed to verify the sentence.
The (rigid) truth and presupposition satisfaction conditions of the new clauses are given
below (where ~ x is an n-ary sequence)):
• [[P~ x]]R,i = h1/(0),+i iﬀ i(~ x) ∈ i(P) (or i(~ x) 6∈ i(P)) and i(~ x) is deﬁned
• [[∃xrA]]R,i = h1,+i iﬀ [[A]]R[x/i(r)],i[x/i(r)] = h1,+i
Notice that the above rules say that ∃xrP(x) is rigidly true in hR,ai if and only if the
speaker’s referent of the indeﬁnite in a has property P in this world/possibility. Existential
sentences, however, don’t seem to have such strong truth conditions. As argued for in van
Rooy (2001), although speaker’s reference is crucial for the analysis of pronouns, it doesn’t
seem to inﬂuence the truth or falsity of the clause in which the indeﬁnite occurs. To
account for this, I will follow the same procedure as I proposed in van Rooy (2001), and
deﬁne the semantic notion of truth as an abstraction of the more pragmatic notion of rigid
truth where speaker’s reference is crucial for the interpretation of indeﬁnites. Let us say
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226that j ≈ i iﬀ j is a possibility just like i, except that j might assign diﬀerent individuals
to reference functions than i does. Now I deﬁne the notion of truth (and presuppositional
appropriateness) of sentence A in possibility hR,ai in terms of this notion as follows:
• R,a |=+ A iﬀ ∃a0 ≈ a : [[A]]R,a0 = h1,+i
Now it follows that R,a |=+ ∃xrPx iﬀ ∃d ∈ D : [[Px]]R[x/d],a[x/d] = h1,+i. But this means
that the sentence is true in a just in case there is an individual that has property P in this
world, just as expected.
In van Rooy (2001), I argued that the notion of speaker’s referent is important for
at least two reasons. First, to account for the phenomenon of pronominal contradiction:
although speaker’s reference has no truth conditional eﬀect on the interpretation of indef-
inites, it does for the interpretation of pronouns. Second, to understand what a discourse
referent used in dynamic semantics really represents: a discourse referent represents what
is presupposed about the actual speaker’s referent. I will not discuss these arguments any
further here. However, in one sense the present implementation of the second intuition is
much more appealing than the one I have given in van Rooy (2001): it’s accounted for
now in terms of standard set theory making use of a standard way to model propositional
attitudes, i.e. an accessibility relation.
The binding problem of Karttunen & Peters’ (1979), involving indeﬁnites, was due to the
fact that they represented presupposition and assertion separately. Our analysis, instead,
only interprets them at diﬀerent dimensions. We represent their problematic sentence
abstractly as follows: ∃xr[∂Px ∧ Qx]. An easy calculation shows that this formula is
predicted to be true and appropriate in hR,ai, R,a |=+ ∃xr[∂Px ∧ Qx], just in case
∃d ∈ D : ∀i ∈ R(a) : [[Px]]R[x/d],i[x/d] = h1,+i & [[Qx]]R[x/d],a[x/d] = h1,+i. Thus, it is
required that the same individual has to satisfy both the presuppositional part and the
assertive part: the binding problem does not occur. This prediction is independent of our
assumption that indeﬁnites come with speaker’s referents.
How does our analysis of indeﬁnites and pronouns account for anaphoric dependencies
across modal statements? Consider the classical sequence of Roberts (1989):
(13) a. A wolf may come in. It would eat you ﬁrst.
b. 3∃xr[Wx ∧ Cx] ∧ 2Ex
Notice that [[3∃xr[Wx ∧ Cx] ∧ 2Ex]]R,a = h1,+i iﬀ [[3∃xr[Wx ∧ Cx]]]R,a = h1,+i and
[[2Ex]]R0,a0 = h1,+i, where hR0,a0i = Upd(3∃xr[Wx ∧ Cx],hR,ai). The ﬁrst conjunct is
true iﬀ ∃i ∈ R(a) : i(r) ∈ i(W)∩i(C). The update of hR,ai with the ﬁrst conjunct results
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227in {hj,ii ∈ R[x/r] : i(r) ∈ i(W) ∩ i(C)} ∪ {hj,ii ∈ R : ¬∃d ∈ D : d ∈ i(W) ∩ i(C)}.19 If
we then only look at possibilities i ∈ R0(a) where i(x) is deﬁned, the second conjunct is
predicted to be true iﬀ ∀i ∈ R(a) : ∀d ∈ D : if d ∈ i(W) ∩ i(C), then d ∈ i(E). Thus the
second conjunct says that in every possibility where there is a wolf who comes in, it eats
you ﬁrst. I believe that this is the correct reading for the second sentence of (13a).
In section 3.2 we followed Landman’s modal splitting analysis of disjunctive sentences.
Intuitively, such an analysis must be able to predict that (14a) really means (14b).
(14) a. Call this number. The phone will be answered by either a doctor or a secretary.
The doctor can tell you right away what’s a matter with you, or the nurse can
make an appointment for you.
b. Either a doctor will answer and he can tell you what is wrong, or a secretary will
answer and she can make an appointment.
Let us assume that Upd(A∨B,hR,ai) = Upd(A,hR,ai)tUpd(B,hR,ai), where hR,ait
hR0,a0i = hR ∪ R0,a ∪ a0i.20 If we now represent (14a) as something like (∃xrA ∨ ∃ysB) ∧
(Px ∨ Qy), this is indeed what we predict. The new possibility will be hUpd(A,R[x/r]) ∪
Upd(B,R[y/s]),a[x/a(r),y /a(s)]. Because of the deﬁnedness condition, we correctly predict
that the ﬁrst disjunct of the second disjunction will be regarded as a continuation of the
ﬁrst disjunct of the ﬁrst disjunction, and similarly for the second disjuncts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a modal two-dimensional analysis of presupposition and
modal subordination. For the analysis of presupposition I combined the strong points
of the standard dynamic analysis and the two-dimensional one: what is presupposed by a
sentence follows from the interpretation rules, and presupposition satisfaction is determined
(almost) independently from truth. For the analysis of modal subordination I proposed
that the embedded clauses of modal statements should be interpreted with respect to
possibilities that verify what is presupposed. Roberts (1989, 1996) discusses many more
phenomena under the heading of ‘modal subordination’ than I do in this paper. Some of
19Based on the assumption that [[∃xrA]]R,i = h0,+i only if ¬∃j ≈ i : [[A]]R[
x/j(r)],j[
x/j(r)] = h1,+i.
20Notice that because we think of worlds as a combined function from (i) propositional variables to truth
values; (ii) discourse referents to individuals; and (iii) variables to individuals, the union of two worlds is
well-deﬁned. Notice also that after the update of a world with new information, this can have an eﬀect
only on the individuals it assigns to variables.
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228her additional examples, e.g. bathroom sentences, I would deﬁnitely interpret in terms of
descriptive pronouns instead of as involving modal subordination (cf. van Rooy, 2001).
Other examples, however, in particular those where the interpretation of one quantiﬁed
phrase depends on that of another, are closer to the ones discussed in this paper. It
remains to be seen whether, and if so how, we should extend our analysis to cover these
examples as well.
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Abstract
The system of past tense marking in Afrikaans provides empirical evidence for the
need for scope underspeciﬁcation and multiple exponency of semantic operators within the
system of compositional semantics. Lexical Resource Semantics (LRS, Richter and Sailer
2003) has incorporated these two features, allowing for a straightforward account of the
data.
1 Introduction
Since Montague (1974) the Fregian concept of compositionality has been subject to a particular
technical incarnation (Partee 1984). In particular it is assumed that the meaning of a lexical
element can be stated as an expression of a formal language, and consequently the meaning
of a syntactically complex structure results from applying combinatorial operations (such as
functional application) to the meaning of the parts of this structure. These assumptions have
led to the development of theories of the syntax-semantics interface such as Transparent Log-
ical Form (Stechow 1993). On the other hand these strong assumptions require the syntactic
structure to contain many nodes which are not motivated by syntax proper. In particular, for
semantically ambiguous sentences a different syntactic representation is assumed for each read-
ing. This consequence was the reason to reject the “naive” concept of compositionality within
a number of theories such as Lexical Function Grammar or Head-Driven Phrase Structure
Grammar. Instead, Halvorsen (1995) has coined the notion of systematic semantics to capture
the idea that even though the interpretation of syntactic structures is not “compositional” in the
above-mentioned sense, syntax and semantics are still systematically related to each other.
In this paper we will present empirical evidence for phenomena which are hard to account
for within a traditional compositional system. We will argue that the system of past tense
marking in Afrikaans can best be described in terms of scope underspeciﬁcation and multiple
exponency of semantic operators. Scope underspeciﬁcation has become a widely discussed
issue in computational semantics (Reyle 1993, Pinkal 1996). Multiple exponency, on the other
hand, has not been in focus so far.1
In the following we will discuss the interpretation of Afrikaans sentences such as in (1) which
contains two morphological past markings: the verb wou, and the complex gekoop het.
(1) Jan
Jan
wou
wanted.IMP
die
the
boek
book
gekoop
bought.PART
het.
AUX
For comments and discussion I would like to thank Gerald Penn, Monika Rathert, Ede Zimmermann two
anonymous reviewers and the audience of SuB8. Thanks to Guthrun Love for her help with the English.
1Another phenomenon, semantic discontinuity, is one of the major motivations for the assumption of a phono-
logically empty negative head in German in Penka and von Stechow (2001).
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As discussed in the literature (de Villiers 1971, Ponelis 1979, Donaldson 1993, Kleij 1999),
sentences of the type illustrated in (1) are systematically ambiguous in Afrikaans In (2) we
will indicate the three possible temporal readings,2 ﬁrst by an English translation and then by
a logical term. In the latter, we use the operator “ˆ” to indicate intensional contexts, and the
operator “PAST” to indicate a semantic past tense. In Section 2 we will adopt a more elaborate
semantic representation of tense based on Stechow (2002).
(2) a. Jan wanted to have bought the book.
PAST(Jan wants ˆPAST(Jan buys the book))
b. Jan wants to have bought the book.
Jan wants ˆPAST(Jan buys the book)
c. Jan wanted to buy the book.
PAST(Jan wants ˆ(Jan buys the book))
In Section 2 we will introduce some basics of Afrikaans verbal morphology and discuss the
temporalvalueofthepasttenseformsinsimplesentences, andinSection3wewilldiscusssome
more complex examples. Then we will present the semantic system LRS (Lexical Resource
Semantics, Richter and Sailer 2001a, 2003) and apply it to simple sentences. In Section 5
we will illustrate the resulting analysis for sentence (1). We will close with a conclusion in
Section 6.
2 Basic Data
In this section we will present basic facts about the Afrikaans temporal system. First the inven-
tory of forms will be described (Section 2.1), then we will discuss the temporal interpretation
of clauses which contain at most one marker of anteriority in Section 2.2.
2.1 Afrikaans Verbal Morphology
In comparison to the verbal systems of related languages such as Dutch or English, Afrikaans
verbal morphology is relatively simple. We will outline this system using a simpliﬁcation of the
terminology from de Villiers (1971).
The copula wees (be) is the only verb which has a morphological inventory similar to that of
related languages.3 The form wees is an inﬁnitive. There is a ﬁnite presens (present tense)
form is and a ﬁnite imperfek (past tense) form was. In addition there is a past participle gewees.
The past participle can combine with either ﬁnite forms of the copula (i.e., is or was) or with
the auxiliary verb het to form a so called perfek (perfect tense). Note that while the combina-
tions gewees is and gewees was are necessarily ﬁnite, gewees het can also be used in inﬁnitival
contexts.4
(3) En
and
inﬂasie
inﬂation
... sou
would
sekerlik
surely
laer
lower
kon
could
gewees
been.PART
het,
AUX
as
if
...
‘and inﬂation could certainly have been lower if ...’
2In addition to the past tense use, wou and gekoop het can also be irrealis. Thus we may obtain the readings
Jan would love to have bought the book, and Jan would love to buy the book. We will ignore these irrealis readings
throughout this paper.
3The verb hˆ e (have) has almost as many forms as wees in formal registers. We will, however, ignore this verb
throughout the paper.
4Found at: http://www.accountancysa.org.za/archives/2002jan/columns/wik.htm
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In contrast to this morphological richness, the majority of verbs such as koop (buy) in (1) have
just two forms: a base form, e.g. koop, and a past participle, e.g. gekoop. The base form is
used as a ﬁnite verb to form the presens. The base form is also used as a bare inﬁnitive, for
example as a complement of the verb wil (want). The participle is used to form the perfek when
combined with the auxiliary het. Like the form gewees het, the perfek gekoop het can be both
ﬁnite or inﬁnite. For verbs like koop there is no imperfek form.
A small group of verbs, such as wil (want) or kan (can) have a base form which is used as
bare inﬁnitive and as presens form. Instead of a past participle, however, these verbs have a
morphologically simple imperfek (imperfect tense): wou (wanted.IMP), kon (could.IMP). The
imperfek forms also occur as bare inﬁnitives such as in (4).5
(4) Ek
I
het
AUX
niks
nothing
oorgehad
left over
om
for
te
to
kon
could.IMP
deel
share
nie
NEG
‘I didn’t have anything left over to be able to share.’
The auxiliary het can be used in ﬁnite and inﬁnitival contexts (see (1) for the latter). It lacks
a participial form, however. Thus a hypothetical “pluperfect tense” realized morphologically
as a “double perfect” such as in Southern German dialects or in Yiddish (see (5-a)) cannot be
formed in Afrikaans.
(5) a. Yiddish: ikh
I
hob
have
aykh
you.PL
gehat
had.PART
gevarnt
warned.PART
ir
you.PL
zolt
ought
nit
not
geyn.
go.INF
‘I had warned you (formal) not to go.’ (Katz 1987, p.,138)
b. Afrikaans: ek
I
het
AUX
u
you (formal)
gewaarsku
warned.PART
*het/
AUX/
*gehad
have.PART
2.2 The Interpretation of Tense in Simple Clauses
The way in which Afrikaans makes use of its morphological potential is intriguing. For the
purpose of this paper we will conﬁne ourselves to outlining a number of central phenomena.
The method of past tense marking differs according to the verb (wees, koop, wil). We will ﬁrst
consider the use of ﬁnite presens forms in Section 2.2.1. Then we will discuss properties of
ﬁnite uses of the perfek (Section 2.2.2) and of the ﬁnite imperfek (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Presens in Simple Clauses
The terminology introduced above suggests that perfek and imperfek would be the tenses used
to indicate anteriority. In Afrikaans, however, a presens can also be used for this purpose if
there is another indication of anteriority in the context. This is illustrated in (6) (quoted from
de Villiers 1971, p.47).
(6) a. Hy
he
het
AUX
dadelik
really
huis
house
toe
towards
gestap.
stepped.PART
‘He really stepped towards his house.’
5For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the forms wil and wou can be past participles since the combi-
nations het wil/wou koop are possible. In a syntactically more adequate system these forms might possibly count
as Ersatzinﬁnitiv since bare inﬁnitives are used in German and Dutch instead of a past participle in similar contexts
(see Robbers 1993).
Example (4) is taken from: http://home.global.co.za/gfjh7up/s_mug05.htm
3
Manfred Sailer Past Tense Marking in Afrikaans
2354 Manfred Sailer
b. Toe
Then
stap
goes
hy
he
dadelik
really
huis
house
toe.
towards
‘Then, he really stepped towards his house.’
c. Verlede
last
week
week
stap
steps
hy
he
huis
house
toe,
towards
en
and
daar
there
sien
sees
hy
he
sy
his
buurman
neighbor
...
...
‘Last week, he stepped towards his house and there he saw his neighbor ...’
Parallel data can be given for verbs with an imperfek form. Note that except for the case illus-
trated in (a), either the presens or the imperfek can be used.
(7) a. Hy
he
wou
wanted.IMP
huis
house
toe
towards
stap.
step
b. Toe
then
wou/
wanted.IMP/
wil
wants.PRES
hy
he
huis
house
toe
towards
stap.
step
c. Verlede
last
week
week
wou/
wanted.IMP/
wil
wants.PRES
hy
he
huis
house
toe
towards
stap
step
...
...
This indicates that the presens form does not make explicit reference to the speech time as part
of its meaning. Instead, it can require overlap with any contextually given time. We will use the
notation in (8-b) for the logical forms of a verb in presens.
(8) a. Jan
Jan
bel.
calls.PRES ‘Jan calls.’
b. 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
We will take s to be the contextually given speech time. In accordance with Stechow (2002)
we will write t(e) for the time of the event. This time overlaps (“”) with the speech time.
We will also specify the logical form of the verb wil (want) in (9-b). This speciﬁcation should
be regarded as an outline which contains the necessary ingredients for our analysis rather than
a fully ﬂedged semantic analysis.
(9) a. Jan
Jan
wil
want
bel.
call ‘Jan wants to call.’
b. 9s(ss^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j)))))
The verb wil denotes a state. States are assumed to be true or false of times. Therefore the
verb wil introduces a time, s, which appears as a temporal argument of the constant want0. In
the presens, Jan’s desire to call is true of a time s which overlaps with the speech time s. In
addition what Jan wants is a proposition. This proposition is an intensional object — indicated
by the “up” operator. Within the proposition a new “speech time” s is introduced. This new
s is said to correspond to the time of Jan’s wanting (s  s).6 The rest of the logical form is
identical to the logical form of the presens example in (8).
Note that the base form bel is interpreted in the same way whether it is used as a ﬁnite verb or
as an inﬁnitive under our analysis. In the latter case, however, s is not the matrix speech time
but shifted by the intensionality of the verb wil.
6As noted in Katz (2001), in such contexts the embedded event is usually interpreted as occurring after the
matrix time. A simple solution would be to incorporate this shifting into the restrictions on the embedded speech
time. To keep our logical forms simple, we will ignore this problem.
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2.2.2 Perfek as Past
Kleij (1999) argues that (in unembedded clauses) the Afrikaans perfek is interpreted as semantic
past tense, i.e., it corresponds to the Dutch imperfect. In order to remain concise we will present
just one of her arguments.
The sentence in (10-a) shows that the presens is not only compatible with past tense adverbials,
but can also be subject to a future interpretation if modiﬁed by mˆ ore (tomorrow). On the other
hand, as shown in (b), the perfek cannot be subject to a future interpretation of that kind — in
contrast to the German Perfekt for example. To express the idea of a “future perfect”, the future
tense auxiliary sal must be used (c.f. (c)).
(10) a. Mˆ ore
tomorrow
sien
see.PRES
ek
I
hom.
him ‘I’ll see him tomorrow.’
b. * Mˆ ore
tomorrow
het
AUX
ek
I
hom
him
gesien
seen.PART
(en
and
dan
then
sal
will
ek
I
alles
everything
vir
to
jou
you
vertel).
tell
c. Mˆ ore
tomorrow
sal
will
ek
I
hom
him
gesien
seen.PART
het
AUX
...
...
We may conclude that the Afrikaans perfek explicitly locates an event before the speech time.
In (11-b) we will present the logical form of a perfek sentence.
(11) a. Jan
Jan
het
AUX
gebel.
called.PART ‘Jan called.’
b. 9t(t < s^9e(t(e)t^call0(e, j)))
The perfek introduces a new time t which is explicitly located before s. This assumption
immediately explains the ungrammaticality of (10-b). The adverb mˆ ore requires the event to
follow s, whereas the temporal meaning speciﬁes anteriority to s.
In contrast to the semantic effect of the adverbial mˆ ore we assume that, analogously to the
logical form of wil in (9-b), the future auxiliary sal in (10-c) introduces a new s, which has
been shifted . The use of the (inﬁnite form of the) perfek is now unproblematic, because the
time introduced by the perfek precedes this new s. Note that we can assume the same temporal
interpretation for the ﬁnite and the inﬁnite uses of het.
2.2.3 Imperfek as Past
In simple clauses the distribution of the imperfek is identical to that of the perfek. To illustrate
this point, let us consider the parallel data with a future adverb in (12).
(12) a. Mˆ ore
tomorrow
is
is.PRES
Jan
Jan
tuis.
home ‘Jan will be home tomorrow.’
b. * Mˆ ore
tomorrow
was
was.IMP
Jan
Jan
tuis.
home
c. Mˆ ore
tomorrow
sal
will
Jan
Jan
tuis
home
gewees
been.PART
het.
AUX
‘Jan will have been home tomorrow.’
The parallel data lead us to assume the same temporal interpretation for both the perfek and
the imperfek. To illustrate this we will present the logical form for a simple imperfek sentence
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in (13-b). In this logical form s is the state of Jan’s being home. This state is said to be true at a
time s which overlaps with a time t which precedes s.
(13) a. Jan
Jan
was
was.IMP
tuis.
home ‘Jan was home.’
b. 9t(t < s^9s(st^be-home0(s, j)))
We argued in thissection that both the perfek and the imperfek have the same temporal meaning;
that of a past operator. This operator introduces a new time which precedes the given time s.
In contrast to this we analyzed the presens as being temporally unmarked. Thus there is no
new time introduced and no explicit reference made to s. In the following section we will
maintain this basic interpretation of the tenses, but we will argue that there is underspeciﬁcation
and multiple exponency in the use of the past operator.
3 The Interpretation of Tense in the Verbal Complex
Given the interpretation of simple tenses we can now reconsider the data in (1). We will
demonstrate that these data corroborate three empirical generalizations about tense marking
in Afrikaans:
G1 Every verb in perfek or imperfek introduces a past operator.
G2 The scopeofapasttenseisnotfullydeterminedbytheverbwhichintroducestheoperator.
G3 The number of perfek and imperfek verbs determines the upper-bound of the number of
past operators in a clause, but not the exact number.
G1 In Section 2 we argued for the existence of a past operator in the logical form of ﬁnite
perfek and imperfek forms. For sentence (1) we also observed a reading, (2-a), which expresses
two past operators. Thus we have positive evidence that each of the two verb forms, which are
potential candidates for introducing a past operator, actually does so.
G2 In (14) we will give a sentence with the imperfek form of wil, followed by an English
translation for each of the possible readings.
(14) Jan
Jan
wou
wanted.IMP
die
the
boek
book
lees.
read
a. Jan wanted to read the book.
b. Jan wants to have read the book.
We may conclude that in both readings there is a past operator. The ambiguity of sentence (14)
is, however, a well-established observation in the description of Afrikaans (de Villiers 1971,
Ponelis 1979, Donaldson 1993, Kleij 1999). This means that even though the verb wou can
be assumed to introduce a past operator, the scope of this operator with respect to the constant
want0 is not fully determined.
The underspeciﬁcation of the past operator also goes the other way. If there is an inﬁnite perfek
or imperfek, then there is also a past operator in the logical form. Note that in fact this past
operator can have scope over the higher presens verb. Therefore the sentences in (14) and (15)
have the same readings.
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(15) Jan
Jan
wil
wants.PRES
die
the
boek
book
gelees
read.PART
het.
AUX
a. Jan wants to have read the book.
b. Jan wanted to read the book.
Kleij (1999) gives the following example from her literary corpus. For clarity we will charac-
terize the intended reading with a simple logical form. Note that moet (must) is the only verb
which is not marked for anteriority in this sentence. Nonetheless it is in the scope of the past
operator.
(16) Ek
I
moet
must.PRES
los
freely
kon
can.IMP
rondgeloop
around.walked.PART
het.
AUX
‘I had to be able to run around freely.’
PAST(must0(ˆcan0(i,ˆrun-around-freely0(i))))
G3 Note also that there cannot be more past operators in the logical form of a clause than
there are perfek or imperfek verb forms. This means, that sentence (14) cannot express the idea
Jan wanted to have read the book. If we combine two verbs which are marked for anteriority
we can have at most two past operators in the logical form — and, according to G2, we must
have at least one. Here the example in (1) comes into play. The three generalizations predict
exactly the three readings given for (1) above. Also the interpretation of (16) can be accounted
for: There is an imperfek and a perfek verb. Nonetheless there is only one past operator in the
logical form. This operator has wider scope than the verbs which introduce it.
It should be noted that the generalizations stand in contradiction to standard assumptions on
compositionality: If a perfek contributes a past tense operator in (15), it is then unexpected
that this operator can have scope over the higher verb wil in any of the readings. Furthermore,
if there are two past operators contributed to the logical form of (1), then traditional semantic
systemswouldonlyallowus to derivea reading withtwopast operators, i.e. the readingin (2-a).
There would be no means in such a system to “eliminate” one of these operators.
In the next section we will present a different system for combinatorial semantics which can
cope with the empirical facts in a natural way.
4 Lexical Resource Semantics
Lexical Resource Semantics (LRS) was developed as a semantic system for Head-Driven Phrase
Structure Grammar (HPSG, Pollard and Sag 1994). An introduction to LRS is given in Richter
and Sailer (2003). LRS combines the techniques of underspeciﬁed semantics (Reyle 1993, Bos
1996, Pinkal 1996) with the properties of an HPSG grammar to yield a new system for phrasal
semantics. Richter and Sailer (2003) also compare the architecture of LRS with that of other
semantic systems. LRS has been applied to scope ambiguity (Bouma 2003) and to the analysis
of various cases of multiple exponency of semantic operators such as multiple wh-questions in
German (Richter and Sailer 2001a) and negative concord in Polish (Richter and Sailer 2001b).
In this paper we will use an HPSG-independent notation for LRS which is based on a notation
used in a joint enterprise for the implementation of LRS, conducted by Gerald Penn, Frank
Richter and the present author.
If we assume a given semantic representation language L, then expressions of LRS are taken
from a semantic meta language µ(L). Every expression of L is in µ(L). In addition, we assume
a set VAR of meta variables (written as A,B,...). For each V 2 VAR and for each n-tuple
7
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f1,...,fn of expressions of µ(L) which no not contain an occurrence of V, V[f1,...fn] is in
µ(L). Furthermore, all logical connectors of L can be used to combine expressions of µ(L), but
note that quantiﬁcation and lambda abstraction are only possible over variables from L, not over
meta variables. For convenience we will write~ f for n-tuples of µ(L) expressions, andV forV[ ].
Since µ(L) is a meta language, expressions of µ(L) denote expressions of L. This denotation is
deﬁned with respect to a meta variable assignment function ASS, which assigns an expression
of L to each element ofVAR . We will write [[f]]
ASS for this meta denotation. Expressions of the
formV[f1,...,fn]are interpretedas ASS(V)if for each fi, [[fi]]
ASS isa subexpressionof ASS(V).
Otherwise the denotation is undeﬁned. The denotation of syntactically complex expressions is
deﬁned recursively. For example, the denotation of f^y is the L expression [[f]]
ASS^[[y]]
ASS.
In the following we will indicate expressions of µ(L) as the logical forms of sentences. Usu-
ally these meta expressions can denote more than one expression of L, depending on the meta
variable assignment. Thus we may deﬁne a reading of an expression from µ(L) as in (17).
(17) For each f 2 µ(L), fl f 2 L, fl f is a reading of f, iff there is a meta variable assignment
function ASS such that
(i) fl f = [[f]]
ASS, and
(ii) for each y which is a subexpression of fl f,
if y is a variable or a constant, then y is a subexpression of f,
if y is of the form y1^y2, then there is a y0 such that
y0 is a subexpression of f and has the form y0
1^y0
2,
where [[y0
1]]
ASS = y1 and [[y0
2]]
ASS = y2,
analogously for the other complex expressions of L.
A reading of a µ(L) expression f is an interpretation of this expression (clause (i)). This con-
dition guarantees that all the L variables, constants and connectors that occur in f will also be
present in the reading fl f. In addition, the second clause imposes an exhaustivity condition on
this interpretation: every subexpression of fl f must appear in f, possibly in “disguised” form
by the presence of meta variables.
For example the µ(L) expression A[call0(e, j)] can denote any L expression which contains
call0(e, j) as a subexpression. However, it has only one reading, in which ASS assigns call0(e, j)
to the meta variable A. The expression 9e(call0(e, j)) is an interpretation of A[call0(e, j)], since
ASS(A) contains the subexpression call0(e, j). Nonetheless, it is not a reading of A[call0(e, j)]
because the original µ(L) expression does not have a subexpression of the form 9e(...).
In LRS the semantic contribution of linguistic signs will be written as expressions of µ(L).
The logical forms of an utterance are the readings of the meta expression associated with the
utterance. The combinatorial system speciﬁes principles of how to combine µ(L) expressions
of daughters to form the semantic contribution of a mother node in a syntactic tree.
In order to specify the combinatorial principles of LRS we will deﬁne an lrs as a triple of µ(L)
expressions hf,f ,f#i. In accordance with the terminology of Richter and Sailer (2003) we
will call f the parts structure of the lrs, f  the internal content and f# the external content.
In an lrs, f  is a subexpression of f, and there is a meta variable assignment ASS, such that
(i) [[f ]]
ASS is a subexpression of [[f#]]
ASS, and (ii) [[f#]]
ASS is a subexpression of [[f]]
ASS. For
utterances we even require that the external content (f#) be a reading of the parts structure.
We will write the semantic contribution of a word as an lrs. For example with the Afrikaans
verb bel (call) we will assume the lrs in (18-a). For convenience we will use an abbreviated
notation in which we preﬁx the external content with a # sign and underline the internal content.
8
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This notation is illustrated in (18-b).
(18) a.


A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)])],call0(e, j),A

b. #A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)])]
An L expression is a reading of an lrs hf,f ,f#i iff it is a reading of f as deﬁned in (17).
Note that the lrs in (18-a) has exactly one reading, given in (19) together with the meta variable
assignment which is responsible for this reading.
(19) a. 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
b. T = s
A = 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
B = call0(e, j)
We can show that (19) is indeed a reading of the parts structure of the lrs in (18-a). For the sake
of convenience we will write f for this parts structure. The logical form in (19) satisﬁes the ﬁrst
conditionof the deﬁnition of a reading, since [[f]]
ASS =ASS(A). ASS(A)is deﬁned, because both
[[s]]
ASS and [[9e(t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)])]]
ASS are subexpressions of ASS(A). For the second
condition we must check the subexpressions of the logical form in (19-a). Let us consider the
case of y = 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j)). There is a y0, y0 = 9e(t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)]) which is a
subexpression of f. y contains the two immediate subexpressions y1 = e and y2 = t(e)s^
call0(e, j). For y0 the immediate subexpressionsare y0
1 =e and y0
2 =t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)]. As
can be seen from the meta variable assignment in (19-b), [[f0
1]]
ASS = f1 and [[f0
2]]
ASS = f2. The
other subexpressionsof (19-a) can be checked analoguously. Thus the meta variable assignment
indicated in (19-b) leads to a reading as deﬁned in (17).
At this point it is not obvious why we use the meta variable T in the lrs of bel. We will see
later that this corresponds to our intuition that the base forms do not directly express temporal
location with respect to the speech time.
We will also need the notion of a constraint lrs. This is a pair hl,ki, where l is an lrs and k
is a ﬁnite set of constraints of one of the forms: (i) f / V, where f 2 µ(L), and V 2VAR both
occurring in l, or (ii) f = y, where f,y both occur in l. Every constraint lrs can be rewritten
as a normal lrs applying the following algorithm: To eliminate a constraint of the form f / V,
replace each V[~ y] in l with V[~ y,f]. For constraints of the form f = y we will take a meta
variableW which does not occur in l and replace each occurrence of f and y withW[f,y].
We will use the notion of constraint lrs in the Semantics Principle (SP). The SP speciﬁes how
the semantic contributions of daughters are combined depending on the syntactic structure. In
this paper we will only refer to parts of the full SP for LRS.
(20) The Semantics Principle (SP):
Lethf,f ,f#ibethelrsof thehead daughter,hy,y ,y#ithelrsofthenonheaddaugh-
ter, and V a meta variable which does not occur in either lrs,
then the lrs of the mother results from eliminating the constraints from D

V[f,y],f ,f#

,k
E
,
where k contains exactly the following constraints:
1. f# is of the form b[~ f], and y# / b is in k,
2. if the non-head is a raised complement of the head, then f  = y ,
...
9
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NP
Jan
# j
V
gebel
#A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[call0(e, j)])]
V
het
#C[9t(t < s^D[t,E])]
COMP HEAD
VP
E = call0(e, j),A / C
COMP HEAD
S
Figure 1: The structure of (dat) Jan gebel het
To illustratethe SP we willconsider the sentence (dat) Jangebel het ((that) Jan called), which is
similar to (11-a). Figure 1 shows the syntactic structure.7 At the leaves we indicate the semantic
contribution of the words.8 Note that we assume that the past participle gebel and the base form
bel have identical meaning contributions.
Given the lexical speciﬁcations in Figure 1 we will state the constraint lrs which results from
applying the SP at the VP level in (21-a). In (b) the constraints are eliminated. The elimination
of “call0(e, j) = E” leads to the introduction of a new meta variable, G.
(21) a.
D
F[#C[9t(t < s^D[t,E])],A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[c0(e, j)])]],

A /C,c0(e, j) = E
	E
b. F[#C[9t(t < s^D[t,G[E,call0(e.j)]]),A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[G[E,call0(e, j)]])]],
A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[G[E,call0(e, j)]])]]
At the S node nothing interesting happens semantically because the subject is translated as a
semantic constant j. Thus we can continue working with the lrs in (21-b). Even though this lrs
looks rather complicated, there is only one meta assignment, given in (22-a), which provides a
reading, the logical form in (b).
(22) a. T = t
A =C = F = 9t(t < s^9e(...))
B = E = G = call0(e, j)
D = 9e(t(e)t^call0(e, j))
b. 9t(t < s^9e(t(e)t^call0(e, j)))
It can be seen that for the perfek sentence the metavariable T is not interpreted as s but
as t instead, i.e. the event time is located after the speech time. The alternative assignment
(ASS(T) = s) would not result in a reading because under such an assignment ASS(D) could
not contain an occurrence of t, thus ASS(D) would be undeﬁned.
A similar analysis applies to the sentence in (23-a). In (b) we indicate the lrs of the verb wil.
As noted in connection with (9-a) the semantic contribution of the base form bel is the same in
ﬁnite and inﬁnite uses.
7We will use verb ﬁnal clauses to avoid issues of V2. We will not discuss details of the Afrikaans verbal
complex either (see e.g. Robbers 1993 for an overview), but simply assume a selectional behavior analogous to the
standard HPSG analysis of German (Hinrichs and Nakazawa 1994, Kiss 1995, Kathol 2000, Meurers 2000), i.e.,
that the complements of the auxiliary het and the verb wil are a verbal word and the complements of this verb.
8Note that the constant j already appears in the correct argument position of call0 in the semantic contribution
of gebel. We have adopted the general assumption of HPSG and other lexical grammar formalisms, that the lexical
entry of a verb has access to information about the referential indices of its complements (see Halvorsen 1995).
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(23) a. (dat)
that
Jan
Jan
wil
want.PRES
bel
call
b. wil: #F[EXs(sT0^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^G[s,H])))]
In this paper we are only concerned with verbal complexes. Thus at the phrasal level the SP
identiﬁes the internal contents of the head and the nonhead, and places their respective lrs rep-
resentations within a larger one. Therefore we can ignore the additional meta variables added
by the SP, since they will eventually be identical to meta variables which are already present.
Taking this into consideration, the meta variable assignment in (24-a) will result in the only
possible reading of the sentence, the logical form in (b).
(24) a. T = s T0 = s
A = G = 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
B = H = call0(e, j))
F = 9s(ss^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9e(...))))
b. 9s(ss^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j)))))
In this section we gave a brief outline of LRS. For clarity we presented a framework neutral ver-
sion of the theory. In the following section we will address the more complex data of Section 3.
We will show that the data follow directly from lexical speciﬁcations and from the notion of an
LRS reading as deﬁned in (17).
5 Analysis
We will now address the data discussed in Section 3. We will present the lexical LRS speciﬁca-
tion for the imperfek form wou and show how the different readings can be derived.
In (25) the LRS speciﬁcation of the verb wou (want.IMP) is given. It can be seen that this lrs
contains both a past operator (9t(t < s^...)) and an intensional operator (ˆ9s(...)). However,
the relative scope of these two operators is not speciﬁed. The only information given is that the
internal content (K) must be in the scope of both operators. Due to the semantics principle the
internal content of the verb wou will be identical to that of its inﬁnite complement.
(25) wou: #I[9t(t < s^J[t,K]),9s(sT0^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^L[s,K])))]
In (26) we will give a simple sentence which contains the verb wou. The syntactic structure
is identical to that of sentence (23-a). In (a) and (b) are given the two possible readings of
this sentence which correspond to the readings indicated in (14). The respective meta variables
assignments follow in (27).
(26) (dat)
that
Jan
Jan
wou
want.IMP
bel
call
a. 9t(t < s^9s(st^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))))))
b. 9s(ss^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9t(t < s^9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))))))
(27) a. T = s T0 = t
A = L = 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
B = K = call0(e, j)
I = 9t(t < s^9s(...))
J = 9s(st^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(...)))
b. T = s T0 = s
11
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V
wou
#I[9t(t < s^J[t,K]),
9s(sT0^want0(s, j,
ˆ9s(s  s^L[s,K])))]
V
gebel
#A[s,9e(t(e)T ^B[c0(e, j)])]
V
het
#C[9t(t < s^D[t,E])]
COMP HEAD
V
E = call0(e, j),A / C
HEAD COMP
VP
K = call0(e, j),C / I
Figure 2: The structure of the verbal complex wou gebel het
A = I = 9s(ss^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9t(...))))
B = K = call0(e, j)
J = 9e(t(e)t^call0(e.j))
L = 9t(t < s^9e(...)
These meta variable assignments show that we can express generalization G1 directly in LRS,
because we do not need to specify the relative scope of the temporal and the intensionaloperator
in the lexicon.
With the speciﬁcation of wou we can return to the analysis of the data in (1). In (28) a simpliﬁed
version of the sentence will be given together with the three available readings. Figure 2 shows
the syntactic structure of the verbal complex together with the lexical LRS speciﬁcation at the
leaves and the constraints added by the semantics principle. The semantic speciﬁcations given
for het in Figure 1 and for wou in (25) both contain a temporal operator. Thus we express the
generalization G2 by lexical speciﬁcation.
(28) (dat)
that
Jan
Jan
wou
want.IMP
gebel
call.PART
het
AUX
a. 9t(t < s^9s(st^w0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9t(t < s^9e(t(e)t^c0(e, j)))))))
b. 9s(ss^w0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9t(t < s^9e(t(e)t ^c0(e, j))))))
c. 9t(t < s^9s(st^w0(s, j,ˆ9s(s  s^9e(t(e)t^c0(e, j))))))
In (29) we indicate the meta variable assignments which determine the respective readings.
(29) a. T = t T0 = t
A =C = L = 9t(t < s^9e(...))
B = E = K = call0(e, j)
D = 9e(t(e)t^call0(e, j))
I = 9t(t < s^9s(...))
J = 9s(st^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(...)))
b. T = t T0 = s
A =C = L = 9t(t < s^9e(...))
B = E = K = call0(e, j)
D = J = 9e(t(e)t ^call0(e, j))
I = 9s(ss^want0s, j,ˆ9s(...))
c. T = s T0 = t
A = L = 9e(t(e)s^call0(e, j))
B = E = K = call0(e, j)
12
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C = I = 9t(t < s^9s(st ^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(...)))
D = J = 9s(st ^want0(s, j,ˆ9s(...)))
The meta variable assignments in (29) deﬁne readings according to the deﬁnition in (17). The
important property of an LRS reading is that even if a semantic operator appears in the lrs of
more than one word, it may be that there is only one occurrence of this operator in a given
reading. To illustrate this we will consider the past operator in reading (28-b). In the reading,
there is a subexpression y = 9t(t < s^9e(t(e)t ^c0(e, j))). In the lrs of the sentence, there
are two subexpressionswhich stand in the required relation to y: clause (ii) in the deﬁnition of a
readingissatisﬁedbybothy0 =9t(t <s^J[t,K])andy0 =9t(t <s^D[t,E]). Inthedeﬁnition
of a reading in (17) we do not impose a uniqueness requirement on y0. This immediately allows
for multiple exponency.
It should be noted in addition that it is not possible to derive a reading for (28) which contains
three past operators. An LRS reading must consist exclusively of the L-subexpressions of a
given lrs. Since there are only two past operators in the lrs of the clause, we cannot construct a
reading with three such operators. This shows that the notion of an LRS reading is deﬁned in an
adequate way to allow for multiple exponency of semantic operators. This correctly accounts
for our generalization G3.
Before we can close this section we should reﬂect on the question of whether we are excluding
other non-available readings. In particular logical forms such as outlined in (30), i.e. readings
where both past operators have either wide or narrow scope with respect to the intensional
operator, would be conceivable.
(30) a. PAST(PAST(want0(j,ˆcall0(j))))
b. want0(j,ˆPAST(PAST(call0(j))))
A “pluperfect” reading of this kind is not available in Afrikaans and correctly excluded by our
semantic representations, because the past operator always uses the variable s to locate time
introduced by the temporal operator.
Inthissectionwe demonstratedthatthe readingsofmore complexexamplesfollowimmediately
from the general LRS system and the way in which we specify the lexical contributionof certain
verbs.
6 Conclusion
The system of past tense marking in Afrikaans provides empirical evidence for the need for
scope underspeciﬁcation and multiple exponency of semantic operators within the system of
compositional semantics. Since LRS has incorporated these two features, it allows for an ade-
quate account of the data.
The Afrikaans data follow directly from the way LRS is constructed together with the lexical
speciﬁcations for the particular verbs. Interestingly the data considered in this paper did not
require further assumptions about the syntax-semantics interface. While we only discussed
simple clauses, the present study provides a basis for a more comprehensive account of the
Afrikaans temporal system which would include an account of temporal adverbials, and several
sequence-of-tense patterns (see de Villiers 1971).
LRS was originally developed as a semantic formalism for HPSG. In the original formulation
the notion of an LRS reading followed directly from the HPSG formalization. In contrast to this
we had to introduce it explicitly for a framework-independent deﬁnition. Nonetheless, we think
13
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that deﬁning this notion explicitly is helpful for a better understanding of LRS, and will make
the predictions of an LRS theory more transparent.
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Abstract
This paper is divided into two parts. In part one I apply a formal method for the es-
tablishment of cause-relations between events to cases involving manner modiﬁcation. In
the second part I argue that the status of a manner adverb with regard to its role in a cause-
consequence sequent does not play a role for its formal representation at the sentential
level. Instead, it inﬂuences a sentence’s information structure. In turn, this can inﬂuence
the syntactic position of a manner adverb.
1 Introduction
The manner in which things are done can have a inﬂuence on subsequent events. This fact has
proofed to be fruitful in the investigation of questions such as event individuation, but it has also
been used in investigations into the different readings of sentences containing manner modiﬁca-
tion as well as the formalization of such sentences. In this paper, I will mainly address this latter
issue, especially with respect to the question whether or not causal relations between events can
be used in order to gain insight into the correct formal representation of manner adverbs. Ques-
tions concerning the metaphysics of events and event individuation will be excluded as much as
possible.
In the course of the paper, I will show that causal relations can not be used to gain insight into
the formal representation of manner adverbs, though they inﬂuence information structure and
in turn an adverb’s syntactic position.
I will start with a short introduction into the formalization methods used to establish causal
relation between events. Secondly, I will turn to the linguistic reﬂexes of the role a manner
adverb plays with respect to causation.
Before starting with the main body of the paper, I would like to clarify what I take to be manner
adverbs. Manner adverbs basically fall into two classes, namely Pure Manner Adverbs (PMA)
and Agent-Oriented Manner Adverbs (AOMA), cf. (1).
(1) Er hat laut/schnell/wunderbar gesungen. [Pure Manner Adverbs]
He sang loudly/quickly/wonderfully.
(2) Er hat sich intelligent/geschickt verteidigt. [Agent-Oriented Manner Adverbs]
He defended himself intelligently/cleverly.
They can be identiﬁed with the help of the paraphrase text given in (3), taken from Bartsch
(1976).
(3) Sentences with manner adverbs can be paraphrased by How X verbs, that is ADJ
cf. [s] in Bartsch (1972, p. 150), Bartsch (1976, p. 153)
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2 Martin Sch¨ afer
2 When does manner matter? Some possible worlds
To illustrate the manner-cause interaction, take for example the situation depicted by the sen-
tences in (4).
(4) Weil der Wecker laut klingelte, ist das Baby aufgewacht.
Because the alarm rang loudly, the baby woke up.
Without further information about the exact circumstances in which this sentence is uttered, it
is not clear whether the baby woke up simply because of the ringing of the alarm as such, or
whether it was the loudness of the alarm’s ringing which was responsible for the waking up of
the baby. E.g., the baby usually sleeps on when the alarm rings, but someone has turned its
volume up and that woke her up today.
For the purpose of a more formal exposition, I will differentiate between three events, e1, e2,
and e1b, as in (5).
(5) e1 = the ringing of the alarm
e1b = the loud ringing of the alarm
e2 = the waking-up of the baby
The consequence of the occurence of either e1 or e1b with respect to e2 can differ in different
worlds, cf. 1 which gives the constellations for three different possible worlds A, B, and C.
Occurence of Consequences in the possible worlds
A B C
e1b e2 does not occur e2 e2
e1 e2 e2 e2 does not occur
Figure 1: Patterns for cause-consequence relations between two events in three different possi-
ble worlds
Before I begin to discuss these three possible worlds in some more detail, it is useful to think
about the relationship between e1 and e1b in (5). In particular, the question is when an explicit
modiﬁcation such as loudly is used and when it is not used. Starting from the latter, there can
be two reasons for the absence of explicit manner modiﬁcation. If the action refered to with
the help of the verbal predicate is carried out in a default manner there is no need to mention
the manner explicitly. If the action is not carried out in a default manner or if in fact no default
manner exists (think of kill, for example), the exact manner might simply not be important
enough to mention, either because it has no inﬂuence on the course of events or what inﬂuence
it has is not important from the point of view of the speaker. Thus, one has to bear in mind that
the absense of explicit manner modiﬁcation does not mean that the event in question was not
carried out in some manner, quite on the contrary, in principle the manner in which something
was carried out can always be speciﬁed, but the factors mentioned above prevent this in practise.
In world A, the chain of events connected to the three events can be expressed with the help of
the two conditional sentences in (6).
(6) If the alarm rings, the baby wakes up.
If the alarm rings loudly, the baby does not wake up.
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What strikes one as strange in the case of the two conditionals is related to our default assump-
tions about alarm ringings. Firstly, the ringing of an alarm is, usually, loud. Consequently the
explicit mention of the ringing being loud seems to be almost superﬂuous as far as causal re-
lationships are concerned. Furthermore, the louder it is, the better are its effects as far as the
waking up of sleeping persons is concerned. That is, the world described with the help of the
two conditional sentences seems highly implausible. However, it is not the constellation as such
that is implausible, compare the sentence (7) where quietly has been used instead of loudly.
(7) Because the alarm rang quietly, the baby did not wake up.
This does make sense, as it is a common experience that people do not wake up if their alarm is
too quiet. In addition, quietness is not a default attribute of alarm ringings.
Thecausalrelationshipexpressedin(7)hasbeencalledpseudo-causalityinEckardt(1998), who
differentiates between REAL-CAUSAL STATEMENTS and PSEUDO-CAUSAL STATEMENTS.1
Events referred to in Pseudo-causal sentences do not pass the classical criteria for causal depen-
dence introduced by Lewis (1986). Lewis introduced (8) as a deﬁnition of causation between
two events c and e. Or, in other words, if (8) holds, than c causes e.
(8) O(c) 2→ O(e)
and ¬ O(c)2→ ¬ O(e)
cf. Lewis (1986, pp. 164ff)
O(e) is a proposition which holds in a world w when e occurs in that world w.
The symbol 2→ is deﬁned as given in (9).
(9) 2→=df. A 2→C is true (at a world w) iff
(1) there are no possible A-worlds (A 2→C is vacuous), or
(2) some A-world where C holds is closer (to w) than is any A-world where C does not
hold.
cf. Lewis (1986, pp. 164ff)
We can easily apply the deﬁnition in (8) to the constellation referred to by (7), cf. (10).
(10) Baby’s not waking up depends causally on the alarm ringing quietly iff
O(bnw)2→ O(arq) and
¬O(arq)2→ ¬O(bnw)
In prose: The event c “the alarm ringing quietly” causes the event e “Baby’s not waking up” in
a world w if and only if (A) some world w’ where e and c hold is closer to w than any world w”
where e but not c holds and (B) a world w’ where e and c do not hold is closer to w than any
world w” where e does not hold but c holds.
These criteria are clearly not met by (7), since the event e “the baby not waking up” is very
likely to be true in a world where the alarm does not ring at all.
World B can be described with the help of the following conditionals, cf. (11).
(11) If the alarm rings, the baby wakes up.
1The discussion in Eckardt (1998) uses mostly sentences containing temporal adverbials, such as delayed and
late, whereas the examples used here exclusively contain manner adverbs. I believe, however, that they are con-
structed parallel enough to justify this discussion.
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If the alarm rings loudly, the baby wakes up.
The notable property of this world is that the presence or absence of the explicit manner modi-
ﬁcation clearly has no impact on the causal chain of events. In addition, the events e1 and e1b
can refer to the same event in this world, though this must not necessarily be the case. In the
case were both events are identical, the explicit modiﬁcation given for e1b corresponds either
to some default modiﬁcation or is deemed irrelevant for the context at hand. Such a case would
correspond to Davidson’s claim in Davidson (1996) which holds that events are the same if they
have the same causes and effects (relative to what we know from just the two sentences alone).
Below I give another example which makes clear that a sentence containing a modiﬁcation with
null-effect on the causal relation can nevertheless be judged as informative, cf. (12).
(12) Weil Peter w¨ ahrend der Auff¨ uhrung leise/heimlich den Saal verlassen hatte, war er
beim Empfang nicht mehr da.
Because Peter quietly/secretly left the room during the concert, he was absent at the
reception.
Clearly, it is Peter’s leaving the room which stands in a causal relation to his absence at the
reception, and the manner modiﬁcation gives just some additional information, inconsequential
for the causal relation.
World C is the most interesting for the discussion of manner in interaction with causation, as
here manner plays a decisive role. Again, the world can be described with the help of the two
conditionals in (13).
(13) If the alarm rings, the baby does not wake up.
If the alarm rings loudly, the baby wakes up.
With the help of the formal framework for the establishment of causal relations between events
by Eckardt (1998)2 (adopting Dowty (1979, p. 108, ex. 128-130) to events case), reproduced
here as (14), the event eb the loud ringing of the alarm can be established as the causing event
for the waking up of the baby.
(14) i. e depends causally on c iff O(e), O(c) and ¬O(c)2→ ¬O(e)
ii. c is a causal factor for e iff there is a series of events, c,c1,...,cn,e (for n ≥ 0) such
that each member of the series depends causally on the previous member.
iii. c CAUSE e is true iff
-c is a causal factor for e and
- for all other c’ such that c’ is a causal factor for e: for all worlds w where ¬(O(c)∧
O(c’)) is true and ¬O(c’) in w, there is some world w’ which is equally or more similar
[to the actual world w0] among the ¬(O(c)∧O(c’))-worlds than w and ¬O(c) is true in
w’. As a formula:
∀w(w |= ¬(O(c)∧O(c’)) ∧ w |= ¬O(c’) →
∃w0(w0 |= ¬(O(c)∧O(c’)) ∧ w0 |= ¬O(c)) ∧ d(w0,w0) ≤ d(w0,w)))
where d measures the distance (≈ similarity) of worlds to the actual world w0
= D.II in Eckardt (1998, p. 62)
O(e) stands here for ‘e occurs’, and the notion of distances between worlds is meant to talk
about the similarity of worlds: the closer the distance from a world w to the actual world w0,
2The same argumentation can be found in Eckardt (2000).
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the greater the similarity of these two worlds.
The main achievement of this deﬁnition is the selection of the cause from a set of causal factors.
A simple example will make this clearer. We have three events, e1, e2, and e3, cf. (15), which
are situated in time as in (16).
(15) e1 = a baby is born, little Ann
e2 = an alarm is ringing in little Ann’s bedroom
e3 = little Ann wakes up
(16) e1 < e2 < e3
According to the deﬁnition given in (14), e3 causally depends on e1 and e2, and e1 and e2 are
both causal factors for e3.
However, it is e2 (=alarm) and not e1 (=birth) which CAUSEs e3, cf. the true (17) and the false
(18).
(17) ∀w(w |= ¬(O(alarm)∧O(birth)) ∧w |= ¬O(birth) →
∃w0(w0 |= ¬(O(alarm)∧O(birth)) ∧ w0 |= ¬O(alarm)) ∧ d(w0,w0) ≤ d(w0,w)))
(18) ∀w(w |= ¬(O(alarm)∧O(birth)) ∧w |= ¬O(alarm) →
∃w0(w0 |= ¬(O(alarm)∧O(birth)) ∧ w0 |= ¬O(birth)) ∧ d(w0,w0) ≤ d(w0,w)))
In prose: A world where little Ann is born and the alarm does not ring in her bedroom is more
similar to the actual world than the world where although little Ann has not been born at all the
alarm is ringing in her bedroom.
Looking at world C with the help of the formal deﬁnition of causation just introduced, we arrive
at the following result (where: (arl)= the alarm rings loudly and (ar)=the alarm rings):
(19) ∀w(w |= ¬(O(arl)∧O(ar)) ∧w |= ¬O(ar) →
∃w0(w0 |= ¬(O(arl)∧O(ar)) ∧ w0 |= ¬O(arl)) ∧ d(w0,w0) ≤ d(w0,w)))
(20) ∀w(w |= ¬(O(arl)∧O(ar)) ∧w |= ¬O(arl) →
∃w0(w0 |= ¬(O(arl)∧O(ar)) ∧ w0 |= ¬O(ar)) ∧ d(w0,w0) ≤ d(w0,w)))
That is, (21-a) is true but (21-b) is false.
(21) a. arl CAUSE baby wakes up
b. ar CAUSE baby wakes up
Interestingly, Eckardt, in the discussion of an example containing temporal modiﬁcation, cf.
(22), argues that the results achieved through the application of the formal deﬁnition (14)[D.II]
are not reliable. Eckardt tries to show this for the scenario given in (22), discussing whether
here the event csl “cooking spaghetti late” or the event cs “cooking spaghetti” cause the event
ncp “neighbour calling the police”.
(22) Pat came home late last night, due to a trafﬁc jam. She started cooking spaghetti at
11pm which caused the neighbour to call the police.
= 3 in Eckardt (1998, p. 63)
According to D.II, csl is the cause for the ncp, while cs is not the cause. While Eckardt agrees
that “This in and of itself does not violate against our intuition.”Eckardt (1998, p. 63), she argues
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that it leads to problems when counterfactuals come into play, cf. (23).
(23) If Pat’s cooking had occured earlier, it would not have caused the neighbour to call the
police.
= 12 in Eckardt (1998, p. 63)
According to Eckardt, the subordinate clause in (23) cannot refer to (csl), because “wherever
(csl) occurs, it occurs late.” (Although, strictly speaking, the subordinate clause should then
be absolute, e.g. If Pat’s cooking had occured early). Reference to (cs) is, in contrast, easily
possible, the second sentence taking up the event with the anaphoric pronoun it.
Thesameargumentationcanbecarriedovertothemanner-modiﬁedexamplesentence, compare
(24).
(24) If the alarm had rang more quietly, it would not have caused the baby to wake up.
Applying Eckardt’s line of argumentation, the subordinate clause in (24) cannot refer to (arl),
as it speciﬁes that the alarm had rang more quietly. Consequently, it in the main clause does
not refer to (arl) but, most likely, to (ar). Following Eckardt’s line of thought, the fact that (24)
counterfactually states that it would not have stood in a certain causal relation presupposes that
it actually does stand in that causal relation in the actual world. “The sentence [her comment
on (23)] counterfactually states that ‘it’ would not have stood in a certain causal relation. This
presupposes that ‘it’ actually does stand in that causal relation in the actual world.”(Eckardt
1998, p. 63f.). This argument, in my view, is not convincing. Consider eg. (25).
(25) If the alarm had not rang, it would not have caused the baby to wake up.
Here, it in the matrix sentence cannot refer to the ringing of the alarm, as this is explicitly
negated in the subordinate sentence. However, letting it refer to (ar) seems to me the most
natural interpretation. Similar problems for Eckardt crop up if we look at counterfactuals with
multiple modiﬁcation, cf. (26).
(26) If the alarm had not rang loudly in her room, it would not have caused the baby to wake
up.
Applying Eckardt’s argumentation, it should be taken as refering to (arl) but not to (arlr), prov-
ing that it is (arl) which stands in the CAUSE relation to the waking up of the baby.
3 Causality and the formal representation of manner adverbs
Intheprevioussection, Iarguedthatactivitieswhicharecarriedoutindifferentmannersarebest
regarded as different events, as the different manner can play a role for the causal conseqences
of the actions refered to. In this section, I investigate whether the status of a manner adverb with
regard to causality plays a role in its formal description. In particular, I will discuss and refute
the proposal from Peterson that this is indeed the case.
Peterson (1997) discusses data with patterns similar to those discussed above; he argues that
event nominalization containing adverbs such as (27) are ambigue and “may simply refer to the
non-complex event that is a particular ringing or it may (evidently on the preferred use) refer to
another event- the complex event of the alarm’s ringing being loud”Peterson (1997, p. 187, his
markup). In the latter case, the subject of (27) is co-referential with that of (28).
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(27) The alarm’s ringing loudly awakened Susan.
=7 in Peterson (1997, p. 187)
(28) The loudness of the alarm’s ringing awakened Susan.
=6 in Peterson (1997, p. 187)
Peterson ﬁnds further support for the ambiguity of (27) by looking at sentences like (29), where
the construction is similar, but arguably no reading corresponding to the one in (28) is available,
cf. (30).
(29) The alarm’s ringing early awakened Susan.
=8 in Peterson (1997, p. 187)
(30) *The earliness of the alarm’s ringing awakened Susan.
While here again a non-manner adverb, early, is used, this effect corresponds to the ﬁnding for
(13), consider also the nominalized variants in (31) vs. (32).
(31) The alarm’s ringing quietly awakened Susan.
(32) The quietness of the alarm’s ringing awakened Susan.
The difference between the two readings corresponds to readings differences discussed by Pe-
terson later on, where he uses the labels RESTRICTIVE versus NON-RESTRICTIVE readings, in
anology to the terminology of relative clauses. I will take over his terminology.
Peterson’s representation of the restrictive reading of (27) is given in (33).
(33) The alarm’s ringing loudly [complex event reading]
∃e2[LOUDLY(
i e1[RING(Alarm,e1)],e2)]
The formula in (33) makes use of two events, e1 and e2. e1 is a simple event, where the alarm
exempliﬁes the property of RINGING, and e2 is a complex event, build up from e1 exemplifying
the property LOUD.
Peterson (1997, p. 187) does not offer a solution for the non-restrictive cases, besides saying
that the subordinate sentence in those cases does not refer to a complex event.
I believe that Peterson’s argumentation for the association of restrictive readings with complex
events leads into the wrong direction. Although I agree with Peterson that there is a interpre-
tational difference between the two cases, I think that this is a phenomenon which should be
treated exclusively at the superclausal level. That is, the modiﬁed event is the same event, re-
gardless of wether the modiﬁcation is restrictive or not. This is especially so in view of the fact
that even for (29) on can construe a situation in which it is the earliness of the ringing of the
alarm which causes the surprise.
3.1 Causality and syntactic position
Wickboldt (2000) gives data that shows that the presence of manner modiﬁcation inﬂuences the
interpretation of since-clauses, cf. (34).
(34) a. Since John entered the room, he’s been looking for a seat. [=temporal]
b. #Since John entered the room quietly, he’s been looking for a seat.
c. Since John entered the room quietly, no one noticed him. [=causal]
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= 1-3 in Wickboldt (2000). # marks the sentence as pragmatically anomalous “in the
sense that it would not be used in ordinary situations or would be dispreferred.”p. 359
While she does not give formal details, her explanation for the observed pattern rans as follows:
The effect of the manner adverb is to make subevents of the event refered to by the verbal
predicate accessible for further commentary. In a certain sense, the telicity of the event is
suspended, cf. also the data in (35).
(35) a. #John died. For hours he struggled for breath.
b. John died slowly. For hours he struggled for breath.
b=23b in Wickboldt (2000)
This suspension of telicity has consequences for the interpretation of since: since needs a tem-
poral anchor for its temporal interpretation, but there is no such anchor if a manner adverb
suspends the telicity.
Shaer (2003) builds on Wickboldt’s data, but adds a very important piece of evidence to the
data, cf. (36), especially (36-a).
(36) a. Since John quietly entered the room, he’s been looking for a seat. [=temporal]
b. #Since John entered the room quietly, he’s been looking for a seat.
c. Since John entered the room quietly, no one noticed him. [=causal]
= 48 in Shaer (2003)
What this data shows is that it is not the presence of a manner adverb in the subordinate sentence
as such which inﬂuences the interpretation of since, but also its position.
We ﬁnd the same pattern in German, cf. (37) and (38).
(37) a. Weil Peter w¨ ahrend der Auff¨ uhrung leise den Saal verlassen hatte, war er beim
Empfang nicht mehr da.
Because Peter quietly left the room during the performance, he was absent at the
reception.
b. ??Weil Peter w¨ ahrend der Auff¨ uhrung den Saal leise verlassen hatte, war er beim
Empfang nicht mehr da.
??Because Peter left the room during the performance quietly, he was absent at
the reception.
(38) a. ??WeilPeterw¨ ahrendderAuff¨ uhrungleisedenSaalverlassenhatte, hatihnniemand
geh¨ ort.
??Because Peter quietly left the room during the performance, nobody noticed
him.
b. WeilPeterw¨ ahrendderAuff¨ uhrungdenSaalleiseverlassenhatte, hatihnniemand
geh¨ ort.
Because Peter left the room during the performance quietly, nobody noticed him.
If the difference is not made clear through the syntactic position of the modiﬁer, prosody can be
used, cf. (39), where in (39-a) manner is important for the cause-relation, in (39-b) not.
(39) a. Weil der Wecker LAUT geklingelt hat, ist das Baby aufgewacht.
b. Weil der Wecker laut geKLINGELT hat, ist das Baby aufgewacht.
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If the manner adverb in question is unable to appear in different syntactic positions, prosody
is the only way to indicate its status with regard to causation. This seems to hold for some
agent-oriented adverbs, cf. e.g. (40) and (41), where, again, in (40) intelligent is decisive for
the cause-relation, in (41) it is not.
(40) Weil er das Problem intelliGENT gel¨ ost hat, bekam er einen Sonderpreis.
Because he solved the problem intelligently, he was awarded a special award.
(41) Weil er das Problem intelligent geL¨ OST hat, konnte ein Zusammenstoß verhindert wer-
den.
Because he solved the problem intelligently, an accident could be avoided.
4 Conclusion
This paper had two aims. In the ﬁrst part, I showed how the deﬁnition from Eckardt (1998) can
be applied to cases involving manner modiﬁcation. As it turned out, the manner in which an
event is carried out can be decisive for its consequences. Whenever this is the case and the man-
ner adverb does not describe a default manner, one is likely to ﬁnd explicit manner modiﬁcation
in a sentence. In the second part of the paper I argued that the status of a manner adverb with
respect to causation has no consequences for the formal representation of the manner adverb
at the clausal level, but does have inﬂuence on the information structure of the sentence and in
turn on the syntactic position of the adverb.
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Abstract
The German copular verb bleiben („to remain“) is supposed to denote the
continuation of a state. In this paper, I will argue that bleiben has next to that
reading another reading, too, where it denotes a change of state and which seems
to be equivalent to werden (“to become”). The aim of this paper is to present an
event structure for bleiben which integrates both readings as well as to examine
the event structures of werden and bleiben and to discuss whether the change-of-
state meaning denoted by bleiben is equivalent to that of werden. I will show that
this is not the case and that bleiben always denotes a state. An exception to this
last point forms bleiben when it appears in the context of non-finite posture verbs.
These bleiben-constructions, which are limited to a small number of posture
verbs, denote events, too.
1  The event structure of German copular verbs
The meaning of the three German copular verbs sein ("to be"), werden ("to become") and
bleiben ("to remain") seems to represent a well-balanced system: sein denotes a state, werden
denotes a change of state and bleiben the continuation of some state:
(1)  a. Peter ist gesund [Peter is healthy]
b. Peter wird gesund [Peter becomes healthy]
c. Peter bleibt gesund [Peter remains healthy]
(2)  Bei dem Flugzeugunglück blieben die Passagiere unverletzt
[Despite the crash of the plane the passengers remained healthy]
A classical, somehow more precise analysis of the meaning of bleiben is that bleiben asserts a
state P and presupposes another instance of P at an interval preceding the interval of the
assertion immediately. So (1)c) asserts that Peter is healthy and presupposes that he has been
healthy before.
The following diagram represents these intuitions about the internal structure of sein, werden
and bleiben
1.
                                                   
1 Note that the representation of  werden in the diagram is a simplification because obviously the change of state
is not necessarily atomic as the diagram indicates but can also cover some time. I will not take this into
consideration nor will I talk about other problems concerning the event structure of sein and werden. I consider
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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P
(3)  a. sein: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
ÿ P P
b. werden: ////////////////////////////•~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
P P
c. bleiben:  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
 [cf. Lenz 1996]
However, on a closer look it seems that bleiben has – in contrast to the above overview  - at
least two different readings. Next to the "regular" cases like in (1)c) and (2) there are a lot of
data where the alleged presupposition of an identical first state doesn't hold. In these cases,
bleiben denotes a change of state rather than the continuation of a state and it seems to be
equivalent to werden. This shows, first of all, that an internal structure of bleiben like the one
suggested above is too restrictive. Second, if the meaning of bleiben is at least partly identical
to that of werden, how can the existence of such an equivalence be motivated within the
system of the copular verbs? Accordingly, the aim of this paper is not only to present a
solution to the problem of the two readings of bleiben but also to consider this solution within
the whole system of the copular verbs and to show how they form a well-balanced system in a
different way than indicated above.
2  Data
Next to the "regular" occurences where bleiben denotes the continuation of a state, there are
data where the alleged presupposition doesn't seem to hold, i.e. where there isn’t any identical
state P at the first interval. This reading is called the BECOME-reading, as in these cases
bleiben seems to be equivalent to werden ("to become"), whereas the "regular" reading can be
called the REMAIN-reading (cf. Steinitz 1999a). Basically, two groups of BECOME-data can
be distinguished: first, constructions where bleiben appears in the context of non-finite
posture verbs, and second, all other bleiben-constructions in the BECOME-reading.
In a null context, constructions where bleiben appears in the context of non-finite posture
verbs are ambiguous ((4)). In an appropriate context they can be desambiguated ((5), (6)).
(4)  a. Peter bleibt stehen [Peter remains/becomes standing]
b. Der Ball bleibt liegen [The ball keeps/becomes lying]
REMAIN-reading
(5)  a. Alle setzten sich hin, nur Peter blieb stehen
[Everybody sat down but Peter remained standing]
b. Die Kinder vergaßen den Ball und so blieb er im Garten liegen
[The children left the ball and therefore it remained lying in the garden]
                                                                                                                                                                   
sein as denoting a state and werden as denoting a change of state, either as accomplishment,  achievement or
even as a process (cf. Steinitz 1999b, Musan 1999).
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BECOME-reading
(6)  a. Plötzlich blieb Peter stehen              [Suddenly Peter stopped]
b. Der Ball rollte aus und blieb kurz vor dem Tor liegen
[The ball went slowlier and stopped short of the goal]
In (7) there are examples of bleiben-constructions other than with non-finite posture verbs
where the alleged presupposition doesn't hold either. Therefore, these constructions represent
some sort of a BECOME-reading, too.
(7)  a. (Talking to somebody who is extremely nervous at the moment:)
Nun bleib mal ganz ruhig! [Please get calm!]
b.  Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann bleibt es still
[He beats the door for a while, then it becomes silent]
[Zwerenz 1973, in: Rosenthal 1984]
c.  Wo ist das Buch geblieben? [Where did the book go?]
d.  Im Dorf mit den niedrigen, weissgetünchten Häusern war eine Gewehrsalve zu hören.
Dann blieb es still       [In the village with the small whitewashed houses a volley
        was heard. Then it became quiet]
Apart  from  these  data  there  are  independent  general  arguments  from  the  historical
development of bleiben which support the claim that confining bleiben to the REMAIN-
reading is too restrictive. The first argument concerns the fact that bleiben chooses sein as
auxiliary. Following a general rule, sein is chosen as auxiliary by non-transitive eventive
verbs whereas haben ("to have") is chosen by verbs denoting a state or a process. According
to the "traditional" view which says that bleiben denotes the continuation of a state, one
would therefore expect bleiben to choose haben as auxiliary, but in fact sein is chosen. This is
a hint that bleiben at least originally had a change-of-state meaning rather than that of a
durative state. The second argument deals with the oldest predecessor of bleiben, Gothic
*leiben, *bileiben which means something like remain behind, stay behind. This refers to a
change of state rather than to a continuing state, too: if somebody or something remains
behind this presupposes that there are other entities which in contrast do not take part in the
state asserted but which realize a state contrary to that state. For example, if somebody
remains behind at a certain place there must be somebody who left. To make the sentence
Peter remained behind true, the presupposition of others leaving the place is inevitable, but
not the one of Peter having stayed at that place before. So remain behind makes reference to
the counterstate rather than denoting the continuation of the state asserted.
Given these data, it is too restrictive to assume that bleiben denotes the continuation of a state
because this includes the presupposition of an identical first state. Besides, there is another
conceptual problem about such a structure: if there are two instances of state P following each
other immediately, how can we tell at which point the first interval ends and the second
starts? What does "continuing" really mean? Continuing over and above which point of time?
– With respect to these problems, the remainder of the paper deals with the following
questions:
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(1) Does bleiben in the BECOME-reading really behave like werden? And if this is the case,
how  can  the  existence  of  two  copular  verbs  be  motivated  having  partly  identical
functions?
(2) How must an underlying event structure look like that covers both readings of bleiben
(provided we want to exclude the possibility of two homonym occurences of bleiben)?
3  Bleiben as state denotation
I assume that there are two main groups of bleiben-constructions: First there are "regular"
bleiben-constructions: state denotations which are obtained compositionally. The state
asserted is characterized either as a continuing state (see (1)c), (2)) or as a resultant state (see
(7)). In contrast, bleiben in the context of non-finite posture verbs is an event denotation (see
(6)). Its meaning can't be obtained compositionally. Due to these basic differences I will
restrict  the  term  “BECOME-reading”  to  the  latter  group;  state  denoting  “become”-
constructions like in (7) are instead referred to as ‘resultant state reading’.
State denoting, compositional bleiben consists of three components: the assertion of some
state P at an interval I and the presupposition of the existence of an interval I' which precedes
I  immediately.  The  assumption  of  a  first  presupposed  interval  whose  value  is  left
underspecified allows to achieve the continuing state reading as well as the resultant state
reading from the same lexical entry. In section 3.3 we will discuss which kind of eventuality
is allowed at that interval and we will see how the two readings are realized in the actual use.
The third component of state denoting bleiben is the reference to a counterstate ÿ P in a
closest possible world at the time of the interval of assertion. The following diagram indicates
how assertion, presupposition and reference to a counterstate are related to each other:
(non-specified) P
ÿ P
    I'  I
In the following sections we will discuss the notion of 'reference to a counterstate' as well as
the internal structure as given above. Among other things, we will examine whether it is
necessary to assume that the internal structure consists of two intervals if the first interval is
underspecified anyway.
3.1  Reference to a counterstate
Bleiben typically appears in a context (or creates such a context) where the counterstate is
more likely to exist than the state asserted; it appears in a context where one would typically
expect the counterstate to take place instead of what actually happens. In this sense, bleiben
denotes the absence of the counterstate, and therefore, a sentence like Peter blieb krank
("Peter remained ill") could be paraphrased as "Peter didn't become healthy".
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A similar idea about the expectation of a counterstate is found in Landman's (1992) article
about the progressive and the imperfective paradox. Landman assumes that the progressive
makes reference to one or, if necessary, more possible worlds where everything happens as
one would expect if things go their normal way. One example he gives is (8):
(8)  Mary was crossing the street when the truck hit her
The problem Landman raises is whether it is true to say that Mary is crossing the street
because due to the truck she doesn't manage to reach the other side, so there is no actual
crossing. Landman argues for the truth of uttering Mary was crossing the street in a context
like (8) because he assumes that in the case of interruptions (for example the truck hitting
Mary), as soon as the interruption takes place the progressive makes reference to the closest
possible world where everything is like in the real world up to and except for the interruption.
What happens in the possible world is the normal, reasonable continuation of what started in
the real world. With respect to (8), this means that given Mary is equipped with average skills
of street crossing one can assume that in the closest possible world she will manage to finish
the crossing of the street and therefore it is true to say Mary was crossing the street in a
context like (8).
For bleiben, the idea of the reference to a counterstate can be formulated in a similar way.
Still, there are differences concerning the interruption: in the case of the progressive, what
happens in the possible world is the normal, reasonable continuation of what took place
before the interruption. So the interruption itself is not part of the stage of event in the real
world which is to be continued in the possible world. In the case of bleiben in contrast, this
interruption forms a part of the stage of event which is to be continued in the possible world.
The evaluation of what is the normal, reasonable continuation takes place on the basis of the
interrupted original event. Apart from this, the existence of some kind of interruption forms
an obligatory part of the meaning of bleiben, but this is not true for the progressive.
(9)  Progressive:
bleiben:
real
world
real
world
possible
world
possible
world
interruption
interruption
evaluated stage of event
evaluated stage of event
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The reference to the counterstate has one important additional function: it helps to identify the
two intervals I and I'. If there is some state P which is followed immediately by another state
P, and we want to assume that these are somehow two different intervals, they have to be
distinguished. This is what the reference to the counterstate does: the second interval is the
one for which not only P is asserted, but, at the same time, for which the counterstate is
expected to be (or become) true, in contrast to the first interval, where there aren't any
expectations about a counterstate.
3.2  Event Structure: One-, two-, or three-piece structure?
Obviously the resultant state reading can't be explained on the supposition that bleiben
presupposes P at I', the interval preceding the interval of the assertion. However, this problem
could be solved (and the presupposition of P at I' kept) if we assume that the resultant state
reading adds an interval to the REMAIN-(continuing state)-reading. The resultant state
reading could then be paraphrased as "to become and remain P".
ÿ P P P
ÿ P
Such an analysis would correspond to the intuition that the REMAIN-reading is the regular
reading and that the resultant state reading is irregular and derived from the REMAIN-reading
and dependent on a special context. According to such a "become and remain"-analysis (10)
has the following structure: a first (additional) interval where there is noise, a second interval
of silence and a third interval where it is quiet, too, with the additional expectation of noise.
(10)  Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann bleibt es still
[He beats the door for a while, then it becomes silent]
It is doubtful whether (10) is interpreted in this way, namely as a continuing state which is
marked as the result of a change of state. The problem gets clearer through adding temporal
modification:
resultant state reading
continuing state reading
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(11)  Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann bleibt es für 5 Minuten still
[He beats the door for a while, then it becomes silent for 5 minutes]
The temporal modifier applies to the interval of assertion which in a tripartite structure is the
last one. According to the “become and remain”-analysis, there would be a first (additional)
interval where there is noise, a second (presupposed) interval of silence and then a third
(asserted) interval where it is quiet, too, and which is temporally modified. With other words,
after a change of state there would first be an interval of non-specified length which is
followed up by an interval of 5-minute-duration, and this for sure doesn't meet our intuition
about  the  meaning  of (11). Instead, the most natural interpretation of (11) is that the
temporally modified interval takes place right after the change of state.
So a "become & remain"-analysis doesn’t lead to the correct interpretation. Instead, we must
assume that the resultant state reading consists of two intervals, too, but that the first interval
has – in contrast to the REMAIN-reading – a value which is contrary to that of the second
interval. But if this is true, what exactly does bleiben presuppose? On that condition one can't
say any more than that bleiben presupposes the mere existence of some interval. It is unclear
whether this kind of information is sufficient; we will discuss this problem in the remainder of
this section and in the next one.
One way to get rid of the presupposition problem just mentioned is to assume that bleiben
isn’t a presupposition trigger at all. On this supposition the event structure of bleiben consists
of just one interval. The only difference from sein (be) then would be that next to the assertion
of some state P there is the reference to the counterstate ÿ P. So is bleiben  really  a
presupposition trigger? Such an one-piece-analysis seems possible in cases like:
(12)  a. Maria blieb von Peters Reue unbeeindruckt und ließ sich trotzdem scheiden
[Maria remained unimpressed by Peter’s remorses and got divorced nevertheless]
b.  Peter blieb drei Tage lang in Spanien           [Peter remained in Spain for three days]
The (a)-sentence could be paraphrased as "Maria didn't get impressed by Peters remorses and
got divorced (though it was to expect that she would get impressed)" and the (b)-sentence as
"Peter was in Spain for three days (and did not leave)". Here, a relation to an interval before
the time of the assertion doesn't seem necessary. However, for the following sentences a one-
piece-analysis is much more difficult:
(13)  a. Bei dem Flugzeugunglück blieben die Passagiere unverletzt
[The passengers remained unhurt despite of the plane crash]
b.  Der Bankräuber fuchtelte mit der Pistole herum. Die Kassiererin blieb ruhig
[The bank robber waved the pistol. The cashier remained calm]
Here, the paraphrases would be "The passengers were unhurt despite of the plane crash" and
"The bank robber waved with his pistol. The cashier was calm though". This doesn't seem to
be sufficient. The context specifies some point of time (namely, the crash respectively the
waving of the bank robber) from which on one would expect the counterstate to become true.
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But in fact the state continues despite of these interrupting events. In order to interpret this
continuation the relation to the interval before is indispensable.
On a closer look it appears that the one-piece-analysis in (12) is only possible because these
sentences show special features. Durative temporal modifiers like drei Tage lang in (12)b)
specify the duration of the interval about which something is said and indicate the left and the
right boundary of that interval. What happens before or after is irrelevant. So the denotation
of (12)b) is restricted to the second interval I due to the temporal modifier, but not because of
the internal event structure of bleiben. In (12)a), the one-piece-analysis is possible for a
different reason. (12)a) asserts that Maria is unimpressed by Peter’s remorses. The beginning
of I is marked by Peter’s remorses, they form the “interruption”. But strictly speaking, there is
no state at all which continues despite an interruption because before Peter’s remorses took
place, Maria could neither be impressed nor unimpressed by them. So at I' there isn’t a state
identical nor contrary to the one asserted at I, and we would rather say that here I' isn’t
interpreted at all. So a one-piece-analysis seems possible but not necessary: if we assume a
two-piece-structure  for  bleiben, cases like this show that the first interval may also be
underspecified in the actual use and therefore they provide evidence for the flexibility of this
analysis.
More evidence for the claim of the existence of a first underspecified interval comes from
Late Middel Dutch. These data (legal sources 1250-1600) differ from the data of today in two
respects: first, there are much more data with a resultant state reading, and second, there are
lots of data which are ambiguous between both stative readings. In these cases the value of
the first interval can’t be determined, so it remains underspecified in its actual use. Thus, next
to explicit continuing or resultant state readings, Late Middel Dutch bliven can denote a state
despite the fact that the counterstate is more likely to come into existence – and it is left open
whether this state did exist before or not.
(14)  Niettemin ein jeglich mach in plaetse van ein schutsel ofte bevrijinge op sijnen cost wel ein
scheidtzmuer doen maken, ende setten dieselve op gemein erve, sonder metsgateren ofte mit
medtsgateren over beyde sijden, ende bie soeverre hie die muer stelt op gemeine erffe, soe blijft
de muer altijt gemein, ende moet daernae op gemeine costen onderhalden werden
[Nichtsdestotrotz darf jeder (...) eine Mauer auf Baugrund der Allgemeinheit bauen, (...),
und wenn er die Mauer auf allgemeinen Grund setzt, so wird/bleibt/ist die Mauer
Allgemeingut, und muß von da an durch die Allgemeinheit in Stand gehalten werden]
[http://www.kulak.ac.be/rechten/Monballyu/Rechtlagelanden/Geldersrecht/gelder1-2.html]
3.3  The condition of a reasonable relation
Assuming that bleiben doesn't presuppose an identical state P but just the existence of some
first interval I' whose value is underspecified makes it possible to achieve both the continuing
state reading and the resultant state reading. What can be said about this first interval?
Obviously states being identical as well as contrary to the state asserted occur at that interval.
Given there is sufficient contextual information, (15) can have two readings: either one has
been calm before and remains calm afterwards, or one is nervous before and becomes calm
afterwards.
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(15)  Nun bleib mal ganz ruhig! [Please remain/get calm!]
The question is whether we also find states or even other eventualites which do not have a
relation of identity or contradiction to the state asserted, and, if this is the case, how such
constructions are interpreted. In both (16) and (17) the eventualities at I' are neither identical
nor contrary to the state asserted at I; still the sentences in (16) are fine whereas the examples
in  (17) are  hardly  acceptable.  This  shows that  we  need  additional  restrictions on  the
eventualities at I'.
(16)  a. Peter ging in die Oper. Danach blieb er schick
[Peter went to the opera. Afterwards, he remained chic]
b.  Peter spielte Flöte, danach blieb er sitzen
[Peter played the flute, afterwards he remained sitting]
c. Peter spielte Flöte, danach blieb er nicht sitzen
                      [Peter played the flute, afterwards he didn't remain seated]
b.  Peter war jahrelang Radiomoderator, danach blieb er Frühaufsteher
     [Peter was a presentor at the radio for years, afterwards he remained an early raiser]
(17)  a. Peter ging in die Oper. ??Danach blieb er gut genährt
[Peter went to the opera. ??Afterwards he remained well nourished]
c.  Peter spielte Flöte, ??danach blieb er stecken
[Peter played the flute, afterwards ?? he remained sticking]
d.  Peter war jahrelang Radiomoderator, ??danach blieb er Metzger
        [Peter was a presentor at the radio for years, afterwards ?? he remained a butcher]
In the sentences in (17), the eventuality at I' doesn't relate in any way to the state asserted at I,
they don't have anything in common. This is different in (16): we can easily imagine Peter
going to the opera and being chic at the same time, as well as his playing the flute and being
seated simultaneously or being an early raising radio presentator. What we do here is to
interpret the eventuality of the first interval such that we can accommodate for that same
interval a state identical to the state asserted at I. In short: we try to interpret the state asserted
as a continuing state. (16)b) & (c) are fine because it seems unproblematic to interpret the
playing of the flute as being consistent with someone's sitting whereas in (17)b) it seems less
easy to interpret the playing of the flute as being consistent with someone's sticking.
The eventualities at I' are restricted to states which are either identical or contrary to the state
asserted at the second interval. Eventualities other than these must be able to be interpreted
such that they are consistent with the state we want to accommodate, namely with a state
identical to the state at I. These restrictions can be summarized by saying that the eventuality
of the first interval must relate to the state of the second interval in a reasonable way.
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Condition of a reasonable relation:
The eventuality of the presupposed interval must relate to the state asserted in the second interval in a
reasonable way.
This means that the default-interpretation of bleiben is the REMAIN-reading. In case there is
no information about I' like in (1)c), (2), the bleiben-state is interpreted as a continuing state,
and a state being identical to the state asserted is accommodated for the first interval. The
construction also has a continuing state interpretation in case of explicit information about an
identical first state. If there is explicit information about another eventuality (event or process)
at I' like in (16) and (17), only the REMAIN-reading is available. This is on condition that it is
possible to interpret that eventuality such that it is consistent with the state we want
accommodate (namely, a state identical to the state asserted at I). The resultant state reading is
only available if there is explicit information about a state contrary to the state asserted.
Bleiben presupposes the existence of an interval which precedes the interval of the assertion
immediately. It doesn't say what kind of eventuality takes place at that interval. But there is a
condition that this eventuality must stand in a reasonable relation to the state asserted and its
counterstate, namely: the counterstate is the reasonable continuation of that eventuality as one
would expect in the given circumstances. The state asserted on the other hand is contrary to
that state and it is that continuation one would not expect under the given circumstances – yet,
it is a possible continuation.
4  Bleiben as event denotation
All bleiben-constructions mentioned in the previous section are state denotations, also those
in the resultant state reading. In these cases, the change of state is only derived secondarily.
So the event structure of bleiben denoting a resultant state with an implicit change of state is
quite different from that of werden and from the BECOME-reading in the context of non-
finite posture verbs. These differences will be examined more detailed in this section. My
claim is that these latter constructions are event denotations and that they represent an
irregular, non-compositional construction. The number of verbs which can take part in this
construction is limited to a small extent. Temporal modification serves as diagnostics to
support this claim and points out the differences between them and the constructions so far
mentioned. In this paper, I will restrict myself to the discussion of these properties. I will
refrain from examining how this construction comes about and what its relation to “regular”
bleiben-constructions is (but see Steinitz 1999a, Rosenthal 1984, Krämer 2002).
The data in (4), (5) and (6) show that constructions where bleiben appears in the context of
non-finite posture verbs are ambiguous in that they can have a REMAIN-reading as well as a
BECOME-reading and that they can be desambiguated in an appropriate context. They show
properties different from regular state denoting constructions, however this only concerns the
BECOME-reading. In the REMAIN-reading they are just an instance of regular state denoting
constructions. The two main differences are the following: (a) bleiben + non-finite posture
verb-constructions (BECOME-reading) denote events, not states, and (b) bleiben + non-finite
posture verb-constructions (BECOME-reading) don't make reference to a counterstate.
The first difference mentioned, namely that these constructions denote events rather than
states, is intuitively clear: in a sentence like
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(18)  Plötzlich blieb Peter stehen       [Suddenly, Peter stopped]
the state of Peter's standing isn’t interpreted as being of some duration but rather as being the
result of an event of stopping. This stopping-event is over as soon as the resultant state is
reached. Therefore for this construction we can assume an event structure which is equivalent
to that of werden, for example a structure like Dowty (1979) assumes for BECOME:
   "BECOME"
           ÿ P        P
[Dowty 1979:140; slightly modified]
Considering again sentence (18), the second property is also intuitively clear: the most natural
interpretation is that (18) denotes the event of stopping but this interpretation doesn’t include
any expectations about Peter not stopping. This lack of reference to a counterstate follows
naturally from the assumption that these constructions do not denote states but rather events:
there is no state which can have a counterstate.
Temporal modification can serve as diagnostics to verify these intuitions. If there is an event,
namely a change of state, one would expect event modification to be admissible. On the other
hand, if we assume that regular bleiben-constructions in the resultant state reading denote
states, event modification shoudn’t be possible in these cases, and this is exactly what we
find:
no event modification with regular bleiben (resultant state reading)
(19)  a. Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann bleibt es *langsam still
[He beats the door for a while, then it slowly becomes silent]
b. Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann wird es langsam still
                   [He beats the door for a while, then it slowly becomes silent]
(20)  a. Jetzt bleib mal *allmählich ganz ruhig! [Please get calm gradually!]
b. Jetzt werd mal allmählich ganz ruhig!  [Please get calm gradually!]
The (a)-sentences show that event modification is not possible in the case of regular bleiben-
constructions in the resultant state reading. In the (b)-sentences bleiben is replaced by werden,
and here, event modification is admissible. So the ungrammaticality of the (a)-sentences can't
be due to some conceptual restriction but must result from the event structure: there is no
change-event which can be modified. This is different with bleiben in the context of non-
finite posture verbs (bleiben-NPV-constructions); here, event modification is possible:
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event modification with bleiben-NPV-constructions
(21)  a. Der Ball rollte lange übers Feld, bevor er langsam im Tor liegen blieb
[The ball rolled over the field before it slowly stopped at the goal]
b.  Der Trecker fuhr durch den Schlamm und blieb dann langsam stecken
[The tractor drove through the mud and then slowly got stuck]
This different behaviour regarding event modification indicates different underlying event
structures. State modification on the other hand is allowed by regular state denoting bleiben-
constructions:
state modification with regular bleiben (resultant state reading)
(22)  Er trommelt eine Weile von innen gegen die Tür, dann bleibt es fünf Minuten lang still
[He beats the door for a while, then it becomes silent for five minutes]
Interestingly, we find that state modification is also possible with bleiben-NPV-constructions
((23)). This can be explained by the fact that bleiben in these constructions has not only an
event-denoting function, but can be an instance of regular, state denoting bleiben, too.
state modification with bleiben-NPV-constructions
(23)  a. Der Trecker fuhr durch den Schlamm und blieb dann 3 Stunden lang stecken
[The tractor drove through the mud and then remained stuck for 3 hours]
b.  Der Ball rollte lange übers Feld, bevor er für 5 Minuten im Tor liegen blieb
[The ball rolled over the field before it remained lying at the goal for 5 minutes]
If we assume that bleiben-NPV-constructions can either be regular bleiben-constructions (thus
state denoting) or non-compositional event-denoting constructions, it follows naturally, that
state modification as well as event modification is possible, but not both at the same time, as
we can see in (24):
(24)  a. Der Trecker fuhr durch den Schlamm und blieb dann *langsam 3 Stunden lang stecken
[The tractor drove through the mud and then *slowly remained stuck for 3 hours]
b.  Der Ball rollte lange übers Feld, bevor er *langsam für 5 Minuten im Tor liegen blieb
[The ball rolled over the field before it *slowly remained lying at the goal for 5 minutes]
Evidence for the claim that bleiben + NPV-constructions are structurally ambiguous also
comes from Dutch: Dutch blijven can take most verbs as a non-finite complement. These
constructions are always interpreted in the REMAIN-reading and denote the continuation of
the activities denoted by the non-finite verb ((25)). Dutch blijven also has an eventive
BECOME-reading, however, this reading is restricted to exactly the same posture verbs as in
German ((26)):
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(25)  blijven eten, slapen, werken, wachten, boodschappen doen, ....
[to remain eating, sleeping, working, waiting, shopping, ...]
(26)  stehen / sitzen / liegen / hängen / kleben / haften / stecken / schweben bleiben
blijven staan / zitten / liggen / hangen / haken / kleven / plakken / steken / zweven
[to remain/become standing / sitting / lying / hanging / sticking / adhering / floating]
This accounts for the assumption that there is one particular construction with bleiben in the
context of a limited number of non-finite posture verbs with an eventive BECOME-reading.
Still, bleiben in the context of non-finite posture verbs, and, for Dutch, with (more or less) all
verbs, can take part in the regular, state-denoting construction, either as continuing or as
resultant state. This means that these constructions can have three different readings in total:
(27)  Ia. (stative bleiben, REMAIN-reading):
Die Kinder vergaßen den Ball und so blieb er im Garten liegen
[The children left the ball and therefore it remained lying in the garden]
Ib. (stative bleiben, resultant state reading)
Der Ball rollte lange übers Feld, bevor er für 5 Minuten im Tor liegen blieb
[The ball rolled over the field before it remained lying at the goal for 5 minutes]
II. (eventive bleiben – BECOME-reading)
Der Ball rollte lange übers Feld, bevor er langsam im Tor liegen blieb
[The ball rolled over the field before it slowly stopped at the goal]
5  Conclusion
One of the questions raised at the beginning was how to motivate the existence of an event
denoting BECOME-reading of bleiben because such a reading would be equivalent to the
meaning of werden. We have seen that – except for the construction bleiben + non-finite
posture verb – there is no eventive BECOME-reading of bleiben and therefore no reading
where the event structures of bleiben and werden are equivalent. This difference can clearly
be shown by the different behaviour regarding event and state modification. Compositional
bleiben-constructions denote states and, at the same time, make reference to a counterstate
rather than denoting the continuation of some state. Accordingly, the main difference between
the meaning of sein and bleiben isn't that between a state on the one hand and some longer (or
continuing) state on the other but that between a state and another which exists despite of the
fact that its counterstate is much more likely to come into existence. Furthermore, bleiben also
presupposes  the  existence  of  an  interval  which  precedes  the  interval  of  the  assertion
immediately. At that first interval a state can take place which is either identical or contrary to
the state asserted at the second interval, but also other kinds of eventualities given they satisfy
the condition of a reasonable continuation.
Taking the arguments from the historical development of bleiben into account, too, this leads
to the conclusion that the assertion of a state and reference to a counterstate are the most
prominent components of bleiben which define its meaning in contrast to that of sein and
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werden whereas the presupposition of the existence of the first interval can be considered as
being less important.
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Abstract
This  paper  investigates  the  semantics  of causative constructions in Korean, German and
English with regard to their force dynamic profiles à la Talmy (1988), i.e. distributions over
animacy configurations of causer and causee. We investigate how the distributions of types of
caused predicates are correlated with the (in)animacy criterion of the causer and the causee. We
will be concerned with analytic, syntactic causatives in Korean, German and English in which
there are separate predicates expressing the notions of causation and the predicate of the effect.
This study reveals that contrary to English, the most directly causing event in Korean is part of the
inducive causation (human on human). We also discuss German causative constructions which
show relatively tighter argument selectional restrictions compared to English.
1  Introduction
1
This paper investigates the semantics of causative constructions in Korean, German and
English with regard to their force dynamic profiles à la Talmy (1988), i.e. distributions over
animacy configurations of causer and causee. We investigate here how the distributions of
types of caused predicates are correlated with the (in)animacy criterion of the causer and the
causee.  Comrie  (1981)  draws  three  different  types  of  causative  typology:  lexical,
morphological and analytic (syntactic) causatives. However, we will be concerned only with
analytic, syntactic causatives in Korean, German and English in which there are separate
predicates expressing the notions of causation and the predicate of the effect (cf. 1).
(1) I made John go.  I brought it about that John went.
(2)  Na-nun   John-ul     ka-key       hay-ss-ta     (key ha causative)
      I-TOP           ACC  go-AD      do-PST-DC
      (AD:adverbializer suffix; DC: declarative sentence-type suffix)
      ‘I made John go.’
This causative type is the most productive of all the causative constructions in Korean in that
it can combine with any kinds of verbs or adjectives except for the copular adjectives (cf.
Sohn 1999).
2 In this paper, we compare the semantic aspects of the English  ‘make causative’
with those of the Korean key ha construction and some corresponding German analytic
causative constructions.
It is Leonard Talmy who elaborated on “force dynamics” as a semantic category - how
entities interact with respect to force. Force dynamics can be understood as a “generalization
over the traditional linguistic notion of “causative” (Talmy 1988: 49). Talmy (1976) identifies
the following four causation types:
                                                   
1 The Yale romanization system is used in transcribing Korean language examples in this paper.
2 For the analysis of   key ha causative construction in this paper, I exclude examples with  key ha such as the
following , since such key has a purely adverbial function:
John-un      yonku-lul      chungsilha-key ha-ess-ta
John-top    research-acc  faithful-adv       do-pst-decl.  ‘John conducted research faithfully.’
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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Physical causation: physical object acting on physical object;
Volitional causation: volitional entity acting on physical object;
Affective causation: physical object “acting on” entity with mental states;
Inducive causation: volitional entity acting on entity with mental states.
With these four semantic categories Kemmer (2000) analyses the English make causative
constructions.
2. The analysis of causer and causee in English make causative construction (Kemmer
2000)
Based on force dynamics of Talmy (1976, 1988), Kemmer came up with the following
distributions from an English database with respect to make + NP + V causative construction.
Table 1. Distribution of Causer and Causee over animacy category in make + NP + V
 ANIMATE INANIMATE Total
CAUSERS 87 (43.3%) 114 (56.7%) 201 (100%)
CAUSEES 147 (73.1%) 54 (26.9%) 201 (100%)
Table 2. Detailed semantics of make causatives in various causer-causee configurations
Causer Animate 87 43%
      Causee Animate 60 29.9%
      Causee Inanimate 27 13.4%
Causer Inanimate 114 56.7%
      Causee Animate 87 43.3%
      Causee Inanimate
Total
27 13.4%
100% 201 100%
The figures on the tables 1 and 2 show that in the English make + NP + V causative
constructions the inanimate causer constructions (56.7%) are far more productive than the
animate causer constructions (43.3%). At the same time we note that the animate causee types
occur far more frequently than the inanimate causee types. The predicate types in caused
events in English are given as follows (English examples from 3 through 6 are taken from
Kemmer 2000).
(3)  animate causer on animate causee
a. How do you make a witch itch?
b. They make you feel they’re trying
(4) inanimate causer on animate causee: physical and mental predicates in caused events
a. The humiliation made me shudder
b.  The inconvenience made her chuckle
c. It made me feel an awful lot less isolated
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(5)  animate causer on inanimate causee: predicates of motion, mechanical function, and
appearance
a. we promote each number, make it go higher, right then
b. those states which are committed to making European cooperation work:
The initiator of the event sets causee into motion or operation.
c.  I’ll probably make the headline look smaller:
External initiator creates a perception in the mind of experiencer relating to the causee.
(subjectivized cause)
(6)  inanimate causer on inanimate causee
Physiological response, but causee is a body part:
a. I see boys calling the girls fat and it makes my hair stand on end
b. a wide choice of restaurants make your mouth water
Motion (including by chemical reaction) and mechanical function
c. the the um, what do you call it that made it rise. Yeast…
d. the effort and planning which had gone into making the whole program run
As the semantic distributions of the force dynamics of the English make causative examples
above show, the category of inanimate causer on animate causee seems to be the most
frequently attested one among the four different configurations (cf. examples in [4] ). Why is
this so? What kind of explanations can we provide to account for these seemingly unbalanced
semantic distributions in English make causative constructions?
Given  the  (in)animacy  distribution  of  the  causer  and  causee  in  the  English  causative
constructions with make (56.7% inanimate causers over 43.3% animate causers), Kemmer
(2000) argues that there are many inanimate causers attested because “the primary function of
make is to describe causation events in which things in the world, external to human causes,
act on and affect other things, either human or not” (e.g., Inanimate on Animate: The
humiliation made me shudder; Inanimate on Inanimate: A wide choice of restaurants makes
your mouth water). According to this version, the most directly causing event is part of the
non-human world. On the other hand, she makes a further claim that there are as many
animate causers (cf. 44.3%) as there are because i) humans are intrinsically more topical than
inanimates, and ii) the use of make is construed to indicate compulsion of other animates (
e.g. He said they made him pay back five pounds).
Despite the insightful observation of Kemmer, a careful study of Korean and German data
leads to some contradictory findings in her argument. In section 3, we discuss Korean data
primarily with respect to the (in)animacy configurations of causative constructions.
3. The analysis of causer and causee in Korean key ha causative construction
This analysis of Korean key ha causative construction is based on token frequency attested in
four different Korean novels by four different contemporary writers (cf. www.sejong.or.kr for
Korean corpora).
3
Typically, key ha causative is used for indirect or distant causation, compared with the direct
or immediate causation of suffixal and lexical causatives.
4  This suggests that there is a degree
                                                   
3 The four Korean novels are  Inkan mwuncey(Human problem by K. E. Kang),  Pompom (Spring, Spring by Y.
C. Kim), Yenghonuy miso (Smile of Spirit by H. Shim) and B Sakwan-kwa love letter (B cadet and love letter by
C. K. Hyun).
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of causation along a continuum with respect to the different causative constructions. Thus,
Comrie (1989: 173) states that “the construction closer to the analytic end is more appropriate
for the distant (indirect) causative, while the one closer to the lexical end is more appropriate
for the direct causative.” Although this seems to hold also true for Korean causative
constructions in general, the detailed semantic nature of the Korean analytic causatives is far
from clear. Let us consider the semantic distributions of the key ha causatives in Korean.
Table  3. Distribution of Causer and Causee over animacy category in Korean key  ha causative
construction
ANIMATE INANIMATE TOTAL
CAUSERS 70 (68.6%) 32 (31.4%) 102 (100%)
CAUSEES 57 (55.9%) 45 (44.1%) 102 (100%)
Table 4 Distribution of Korean syntactic causative key ha in various causer-causee configurations
Causer Animate 70 68.6%
      Causee Animate 50 49%
      Causee Inanimate 20 19.6%
Causer Inanimate 32 31.4%
      Causee Animate  7  6.9%
      Causee Inanimate
Total
25 24.5%
100% 102 100%
Table 5. Distribution of Causer and Causee over animacy in Korean key ha construction
                                                                                                                                                                   
4 Song (2002:123) demonstrates that the syntactic  key ha causative in Korean can potentially be interpreted in
such a way that no causation on the part of the subject NP takes place. This discussion goes beyond the scope of
the current paper.
animacy distribution in key ha  causative construction
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As the tables 3-5 on Korean corpus data show, the constructions with the causer animate
(68.6%) predominate over those with the causer inanimate (31.4%). This result is shown to be
the direct opposite of the English analyses on make causative construction. Furthermore, the
most preferred construction type among the four different force dynamic configurations
adduced from the given Korean database turns out to be the semantic category of causer
animate over causee animate. In fact, this category of causer animate over causee animate is
analysed  as  a  significantly  lower  profile  in  the  English  corpus  as  compared  to  the
corresponding Korean one. In the following, we present the detailed predicate types in caused
events in Korean key ha causative constructions.
3.1. The following predicates are attested for causer animate on causee animate (inducive
causation: volitional entity acting on entity with mental states, cf. Talmy 1988, Croft 1991):
cap-a-kata  (arrest), mekta (eat), cata (sleep), issta (exist for human), cwuta (give), ota (come),
kyelceng-hata (decide), mos-hata (cannot do), omkita (move to another place), phalta (sell),
nakata (go out), pwuluta (call someone) cwukta (die), mannata (meet), nulta (age) tephta
(cover), mwungchita (gather together), masita (drink or inhale) etc.
Compared to English inducive causation, the kinds of Korean verbs identified in this category
include not only intransitive motion verbs but also typical transitive action verbs. The
following sentences (7) and (8) are the representative examples for this category.
(7)  chemci-nun  kwanka-ey kosocang-ul  tulye  i kunche
     old man-top  a district office-goal a written accusation-acc   file  nearby
     nongmin-dul-ul motwu capaka-key hay-ss-ta
     farmer-pl.-acc   all         arrest-causative-pst-decl.
     Lit. ‘An old man, by filing an accusation to a district office, made [police officers]
  arrest all farmers in the vicinity.’ (animate causee is contextually identifiable: police
officers)
(8)  senpi-nun                   alay-cip       kase   ca       key  ha ye la
     private scholar-top/acc. lower cabin go      sleep-causative-imperative
    ‘Make the private scholar go to the lower cabin and sleep (there).’
3.2. The category of animate causer on inanimate causee (volitional causation: volitional
entity acting on physical object): This category signifies motion and change of state. The
initiator in causative event possesses and exercises his mental capacity acting on a physical
object. Thus, this semantic category inherently blocks the participation of the causee in the
effected event :
cakta (be small), kanulta (be thin), aphuta (ache, be sick), tule-ota (enter), ppita (sprain), poita
(look like), kwulekata (roll over), phikonhata (be tired), caymi-issta (be interesting):
The predicate types in the caused events of this category involve mostly intransitive and
stative verbs.
(9)  Chelsoo-uy           maum-ul     aphu-key               ha-tu-ni
       Chulsoo-genitive  heart-acc.    ache-causative      do-pret-conjunctive
     ‘You made Chelsoo’s heart ache and …’
(10)  senpi-nun                         say-mwul-i           tule-o-key hay-ss-go
        private scholar-top/subj.  fresh-water-nom.  enter-come-causative-pret-conjun.
    ‘The private scholar made the fresh water enter and then …’
3.3. The category of inanimate causer on animate causee (affective causation): This category
is not productive at all in Korean (6.9%). In one of the four novels investigated, no instance of
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this type is found. The kinds of caused predicates are non-actional. Cognitive verbs of mental
response and processing are attested as in the English instances (cf. examples in [4]). Recall
that in table (2) above the English data collected by Kemmer show the highest percentage of
occurrence (43.3%) in this semantic configuration. Unlike the category of animate causer on
inanimate causee in 3.2., this semantic configuration allows the participation of the causee in
the event of causation. The predicates of the effect for this category are given as follows:
silcungnata (get distasteful), salta (live), sayngkaknata (occur to one’s mind), ca-a-nayta
(evoke [one’s feeling]), nolata (be surprised), moluta (do not know).
(11) phyoceng-i       Shinchel-lo hayekum    tewuk   silcungna    -key ha-yess-ta
countenance-nom Shinchul-agentive         more    get distasteful-causative-pret-decl.
‘The countenance made Shinchel get distasteful all the more.’
(12) ku-uy       cwulyang-i                      na-lul     nola-key ha-ess-ta
he-gen.     drinking capacity-nom    I-acc      be surprised-causative-pret-decl.
‘The alcohol amount he drinks surprised me.’
3.4. The category of inanimate causer on inanimate causee (physical causation: physical
object acting on physical object): As in English, physiological responses are attested  in
Korean. However, this category alone is productive in Korean compared to the category of
inanimate on animate type causation. 12 tokens out of 25 cases involve ‘affected causee as a
body part’. This causation type involves the effected predicates representing the mechanical
and metaphorical functions. The effected events are independent of the will or intention of the
experiencer or human patients involved.   This category  also includes appearance and
interaction of two non-volitional entities. In (13) and (15) we find that the external stimuli
evoke a certain feeling or perception unto experiencer relating to the state of the affairs. The
effected predicates are:
palkahta (be red), (ohan-i) nata ([cold] come to exist), ttuupta (be hot), tangkita (appeal to
one’s appetite), ttwita ([one’s heart] beat), pekchata (be beyond one’s power or capacity), ca-
a-nayta (evoke [one’s thought]), koyohata (be quiet).
(13) kwangsen-un     ku-uy     sonkalak-ul   palkah-key ha-yess-ta
beam-top/subj.  he-gen.   finger-acc     red –cauative-pret-decl.
‘The beam made his finger look red.’
(14) etten  kyelsim-i              ku-uy    censin-ul              ttukep-ke hay-ss-ta.
a certain decision-nom  he-gen.  whole body-acc.  hot-causative-pret-decl.
‘A certain decision made his whole body be hot.’
(15)  ku  soli-nun             koyohan  sup-ul    te  koyoha-key ha-yess-ta
        the  sound-top/subj   quiet   forest-acc   more quiet-causative-pret-decl.
      ‘The sound made the quiet forest be more quiet.’ [appearance]   
4. The semantic nature of syntactic causative construction: a cross-linguistic view
Judging from the discussions so far, it is clear that the analyses of causer and causee in
English make causative construction in section 2 provided by Kemmer do not suffice to
account for the cross-linguistic differences attested in section 3. The present author finds
some logical inconsistencies in her argument, because a cross-linguistic lexical semantics of
the causative constructions with make does not corroborate its syntactic compatibility with
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inanimate causers which act upon humans as we have seen in Korean data. We have clearly
noticed that in Korean data, the cases of schematic make are far more restricted.
5
Croft (1991: 169) also observes that among the four causation types by Talmy, the most
marked type is the inversion of volitional causation, namely, affective causation (inanimate on
animate) and that the behavior of the marked causation types is “based on” or “derived from”
that of the unmarked types. According to this view and our analyses on Korean data, then,
contrary to Kemmer, the compulsion make (animate on animate) is shown to be not an
extension of schematic make.
The problems of Kemmer’s version on causatives crop up further, when we consider the
following observation. Kemmer attempts to provide an answer as to why there are so many
animate causees (cf. Kemmer 2000: 5):
(16) animates can have two types of responses to direct external causation, physical or mental,
whereas inanimates can have only one; so there are more types of events that will occur with
animates (raising their frequency)
The problem with this interpretation is that whereas we can confirm this generalization in the
analyses of English make force dynamic profiles in section 2, this is not the case in the
Korean data in section 3. Recall that in table 2 for English data, in the case of causer
inanimate, causee animate (43.3%) has much higher frequency than causee inanimate
(13.4%). For the same category, however, Korean shows the opposite proportion (6.9% for
causer inanimate on causee animate vs. 24.5% for causer inanimate on causee inanimate). If
Kemmer’s universal interpretation (16) is right, we would expect the higher frequency rate for
the category of causer inanimate on causee animate in Korean. We also need to note that
English shows the highest frequency rate for this category among the four different force
dynamic profiles.
How  do  we  explain  these  semantic  distribution  differences  in  the  analytic  causative
constructions?
What interests us in an attempt to establish a more convincing and coherent account for these
linguistic differences is not the research tradition that seeks to explain away the instances as
mere deviations from the central proto-typicality. Rather, in order to provide a better balanced
and inviting account for the constructions at issue, we want to establish a coherent relevance
among typologically different types of languages that allow or disallow those deviations in a
regular fashion.
We argue that the schematic senses of make in English are analogical modeling of more
inclusive transitive constructions [actor-action-goal model] where inanimate subjects can
control the state of affairs, whereas Korean causer in the causing events is subject to an
animacy constraint broadly applicable to the transitivity phenomena. In English, it is also the
case that, with respect to the subject category, the semantic scope to fill in the subject slot is
highly liberal. Thus, we find the following unagent-like entities as grammatical subjects in
English.
(17)   a. The room seats 500.
  b. *De kamer zetelt 500. (Dutch)
c. De kamer heeft 500 zitplaatsen. (Dutch: The room has 500 seats)
d. The fifth day saw our departure.
                                                   
5 Kemmer (2000: 4) defines the general sense of make (Schematic make) as follows:
To affect an entity so as to cause it to be an initiator participant in a caused event: the initiator carries our some
action/undergoes some reaction, independently of any will it might have. The most directly causing event is part
of the non-human world.
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e.*De vijfde dag zag ons vertrek.
In English, the subjecthood has a grammatical status that does not tolerate complete reduction
to semantic and pragmatic notions, in the sense that it is grammaticalized to the extent where
an expletive grammatical subject is required (cf. Van Oosten 1986, Seong 2001). In this case,
the English expletive subjects (e.g., it or there) contract no semantic relationship with
predicates. We can extend this line of reasoning to the analyses and interpretation of the
analytic causative constructions at issue.
In Talmy’s terms, energy transfer does not take place in the examples in (17), because these
subjects actually do nothing to execute the unfolding of the events denoted by the predicates.
The fact that these unagent-like noun phrases can appear as syntactic subjects in English does
not pose serious problems in cognitive grammar since they are considered mere deviations
from the central semantic specification of prototypical transitivity (Taylor 1995: 214).
Compared to typical transitive constructions like John killed a snake, the semantic relation
between subject and each event involved in (17a, 17d) is less intense. In the transitive
constructions the relation between the subject that initiates the event and the process it
triggers and the relation between this process and the affected entity (object) can have
different degrees of intensity. The present author assumes that these relations also hold for the
analytic causative constructions that we are investigating.
The following causative constructions also help clarifying our explanation.
(18) a. The terrorist threats close US embassy in Bosnia. (CNN)
b. *De terroristische bedreigingen zorgen voor sluiting van de Amerikaanse    
     ambassade  in Bosnië (Dutch).
       c. *Die terroristischen Bedrohungen schließen die US Botschaft in Bosnien. (German)
       d. Wegen der Terrorbedrohungen wurde die US Botschaft in Bosnien geschlossen.
    ‘Because of the terrorist threats the US embassy in Bosnia was closed’
In the event of closing an embassy we usually expect an agent (Ger. Handlungsträger) to
appear as a grammatical subject. In this sentence, however, ‘threats’ as an indirect source or
cause can function as subject in the English sentence. The corresponding German and Dutch
constructions are ungrammatical. The same kind of grammatical relation holds true for the
verb ‘buy’.
(19) a. That job bought him a house in Berkeley.
       b. *Die baan kocht een huis voor hem in Berkeley.
       c. Door die baan kon hij een huis in Berkeley kopen.
       d. *Die Arbeit hat ihm ein Haus in Berkeley gekauft.
       e. Wegen der Arbeit konnte er in Berkeley ein Haus kaufen.
   ‘Because of the work he could buy a house in Berkeley.’
Money and job in these cases are seen as performing an instrumental function in the act of
buying a meal and a house respectively. Even though this function is not directly relevant to
the  act  of  purchasing,  money  and  job  can  indeed  appear  as  subjects  in  the  English
constructions. This rule can be applied to a more complex German causative sentence type
which shows relatively tighter argument selectional restrictions compared to English:
(20) (Doherty, 1993)
a. The drug encourages the heart to beat more regularly.
b. ?Das Medikament ermutigt das Herz regelmäßiger zu schlagen
In English we find many transitive constructions in which the grammatical differentiations
available in overtly case-marking systems such as German and Korean are simply neutralized
(G. Peter braucht eine Frau ‘Peter needs a wife’ vs Peter fehlt eine Frau ‘Peter is lacking a
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wife’). With respect to these differences in grammatical relations, we can conclude that there
is cross-linguistic regularity as regards the semantic intensity between the subject and the verb
on the one hand, and between the verb and the object on the other, when it comes to the
transitive causative constructions. In this respect, it is also clear that traditional primitive
notions of grammatical relations, such as subject and object, do not suffice to adequately
describe the grammars of German and Korean as opposed to English. Thus, Korean and
German transitive causative constructions show a relatively transparent semantic encoding
system of subject and object selection, while in English these constructions are opaque. This
comparative perspective provides a better explanation as to why there are cross-linguistic
differences of causative constructions with respect to the force dynamic profiles.
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Abstract 
 
This paper defends a “classical” quantificational view on the semantics of comparatives. 
Building on a proposal in Heim (2000), I examine the role of syntax in scope interactions between 
the comparative operator and other scope bearing elements. I reevaluate Heim’s interface 
constraint, known as Kennedy’s generalization and propose to reduce it to a more general 
constraint about intervention effects of quantifiers, independently motivated in Beck (1996a). My 
proposal also sheds light on long known puzzles in the than-clause of comparatives.   
 
1  DegP: a degree quantifier or not? 
 
1.1 Background  assumptions 
Research on the semantics of comparatives is impressively extensive. Among the various 
proposals, two major approaches are currently competing: one which treats the comparative 
construction as a quantificational structure (cf. Seuren (1973), Cresswell (1976), Hoeksema 
(1983), Hellan (1984), Stechow (1984), Heim (1985), Heim (1998), Heim (2000), Rullmann 
(1995), Lerner and Pinkal (1995), Beck (1997), Hackl (2000), Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 
(2002), etc.), and another which treats them as non-quantificational (cf. McConnell-Ginet 
(1973), Bartsch and Vennemann (1972), Klein (1980), Klein (1982), Kennedy (1999), etc.).  
The former approach views the degree word –er/less as an operator that binds a degree 
variable introduced by a scalar predicate: adjective, adverb, or a verb. The ability of the 
degree operator to bind a variable in its scope, leads one to expect that the operator, being in 
that sense a quantificational element, can interact with other scope bearing elements. 
However, evidence for such interactions, as argued by Kennedy (1999), are hard to find. Our 
main goal here is to offer one such piece of evidence and thus argue for the quantificational 
theory of comparatives. But before we are able to do that, let us lay out the essentials of that 
theory. 
We specify the basic assumptions of the quantificational theory of comparatives 
following mostly Heim (2000). Adjectives are assumed to relate individuals and 
degrees/extents/intervals (depending on different ontological views) on a scale. Therefore, the 
lexical entries for adjectives like old  look like (1): 
 
(1)  [[old]] := [λx ∈ Dd .[λy ∈ De .old(d)(y)]]         where e is a type for individuals, and d 
is a type for degrees 
 
The comparative operator quantifies over parts of a scale. It takes two arguments: two 
sets of degrees. The first one, the restriction on the operator, is the set of those degrees which 
satisfy the than-clause.  Consider (2), for example: 
 
(2)  a. Scott is taller than Keith is. 
  b. Scott is taller than Keith. 
 
                                                 
1 For generous help and comments on different versions of this paper I am grateful to Željko Bošković, Sigrid 
Beck, Hans Kamp, Manfred Krifka, Roger Schwarzschild, Yael Sharvit, Arnim von Stechow, Arthur Stepanov 
and Ede Zimmermann. 
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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The set of degrees that satisfy the than-clause are those to which Keith is tall: ld: 
tall(d)(Keith). This set is not a singleton on the assumption that adjectives are monotone 
functions in the sense of (3): 
 
(3) A function R of type <d,et> is monotone iff 
 "x,d,d1[ d > d1 & R(d)(x) ® R(d1)(x)]    (after Gawron (1995)) 
 
There are, however, than-clauses like the one in (4) whose reference is a degree, rather 
than a set of degrees.  
 
(4) Scott is taller than 190cm. 
 
For these cases, it is assumed that there is a comparative operator of the appropriate 
type: it is a function whose first argument is a degree.  
The second argument of the comparative operator is a set of degrees provided by the 
main clause. In (2), this would be the set of degrees to which Scott is tall: ld: tall(d)(Scott). 
The denotation of the comparative –er applied to its to arguments gives True just in case the 
“biggest” degree that satisfies the main clause is greater than the “biggest” degree satisfying 
the than-clause. With less, the relation is reversed. (5) and (6) list the respective lexical 
entries: 
 
(5)  a. [[er1]]:= lP: PÎD<d,t> .[lR: RÎD<d,t> .[max(ld.P(d))< max(ld.R(d))]] 
      b. [[er2]]:= ld1:d1ÎDd.[lR: RÎD<d,t> .[d1 < max(ld.R(d))]]  
 
(6)  a. [[less1]]:= lP:PÎD<d,t> .[lR: RÎD<d,t>.[max(ld.P(d))>max(ld.R(d))]]  
      b. [[less2]]:= ld1 .[lR: RÎD<d,t>.[d1 > max(ld.R(d))]] 
 where max: = lP Î D<d,t> . [[the]] (ld. [P(d) & "d1[P(d1) ® d1 £ d]]) 
 
The theory is dependent on a particular syntactic assumption: that the comparative 
operator and the than-clause form a constituent at LF (see Bresnan (1973), Lechner (1999)).
2 
This constituent is what Heim (2000) assumes to be the DegP in comparatives. 
  AP 
￿
￿
￿
 
 DegP  A 
￿
￿
￿
 
      Deg         than-clause  
       er 
 
 The comparative construction comes in two varieties, clausal, as in (2a) and phrasal as 
in (2b). We do not take a stand here on a long going debate whether these two types of 
comparatives are transformationally related. For reasons of simplicity, however, we will 
pretend until Section 4 that they are. We believe that this assumption, though highly 
questionable, does not affect the issue about the quantificational status of the comparative 
morpheme with which we are concerned here.  
Let us illustrate the quantificational theory with an example. Consider again (2a), 
repeated as (7a). (7b) gives the D-structure of the sentence which feeds its LF:
3 
 
(7) a. Scott is taller than Keith is. 
                                                 
2 This assumption, though widely followed has been questioned and criticized (see, for example, Lerner and 
Pinkal (1995), Kennedy (1999)).    
3 The assumption is that the than-clause is reconstructed at LF.  
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 b.  [IP Scott is [AP [DegP -er than Keith is σ[A’ tall]]]] 
 
DegP contains the than-clause and with it an ellipsis site but ellipsis resolution is impossible 
in the base position of DegP since the antecedent in the AP includes the ellipsis site. To 
overcome the difficulty, following a standard solution to the problem of antecedent contained 
deletion (ACD), DegP is adjoined to IP by Quantifier Raising (QR), leaving behind a trace of 
type d.
4 The movement creates a binder for the trace which is attached on the sister of the 
moved element (Heim and Kratzer (1998)). Now the antecedent of the elided AP is free of 
infinite regress and can be copied into the ellipsis site. The trace that is left from the 
movement of DegP is semantically a variable. It is bound in the main clause but in the than-
clause the copied degree variable needs a binder, too. The quantificational theory uses a 
proposal from Chomsky (1977) that there is a wh-operator in the CP-domain of the than-
clause. That operator is assumed to bind the degree variable in the than-clause. With these 
assumptions, we arrive at (8a), as the LF of (7a), which feeds the semantic component. (8b) 
gives the corresponding semantic derivation:
5 
 
(8)   a. [IP2[DegP -er [CPthan wh1 Keith is d1 -tall]][IP12[IP Scott is [AP d2-tall]]]] 
  
  b.  [[AP]] = λy:y∈D.tall(d2)(y)  
       [[IP1]] = λd2:d2∈Dd.tall(d2)(Scott) 
       [[CP]] = λd1:d1∈Dd.tall(d1)(Keith) 
       [[Deg]] =λP: P∈D<d,t> .[λR: R∈D<d,t> .[max(λd.P(d))< max(λd.R(d))]] 
       [[DegP]] = λR:R∈D<d,t>.[max(λd.tall(d)(Keith)) < max(λd.R(d))] 
       [[IP2]] = 1 iff max(λd.tall(d)(Keith) < max(λd.tall(d)(Scott)) 
 
[[Scott is taller than Keith is ]]
 =1 iff The “biggest” degree to which Keith is tall is 
smaller than the “biggest” degree to which Scott is tall. 
 
The derived interpretation closely reflects the intuitions one has about the meaning of 
(7a).    
As Heim observes, under this view, the comparative operator looks very similar to 
quantificational elements in DPs. The latter have a restriction which is a function from 
individuals to truth values and a nuclear scope of the same type. The comparative operator, on 
the other hand, is restricted by a function from degrees to truth values and takes as a second 
argument a function of the same type. Individuals and degrees are similar basic types. There’s 
a natural analogy then between the <et,t>-type generalized quantifiers and DegP, which is 
highlighted by the quantificational theory of comparison: <αt,t> is a type of a quantifier 
(where α = d or e).  
 
 
1.2  Kennedy’s observation and the non-reductionist view of Heim (2000)  
If –er/less has quantificational force, it should interact with other scope bearing elements, as 
Kennedy (1999) notes. Detecting ambiguities involving a DegP, however, is quite difficult as 
Heim (2000) shows. Heim (2000) shows that in many cases, the available degree theories, in 
fact, do not predict truth conditional differences between the comparison operator and a 
quantified DP, and therefore the lack of ambiguity cannot be taken as an argument against 
                                                 
4 The proposals for ellipsis resolution in ACD constructions are executed mainly by LF-copying (May (1985), 
etc.). However, as Lasnik (1993), Lasnik (1999) show, ACD in many cases can also be resolved through PF-
deletion. 
5 The preposition than is assumed to be semantically vacuous. 
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them. We have analogous situations with sentences like (9), which certainly involve more 
than one quantifier: 
 
(9)  Every professor interviewed every applicant. 
 
(9) is associated with two possible LFs, but they lead to the same truth conditions. The lack of 
ambiguity is correctly predicted. (10) is a parallel (in the relevant sense) case involving a 
comparative: 
 
(10)  Every student is taller than Mary is. 
 
If the comparative degree word is a quantificational element, we expect it to take scope either 
under or over the universally quantified DP. The corresponding LFs are those in (11a) and 
(11b), respectively. However, they lead to (logically) equivalent truth conditions.  
 
(11)  a.   [[every student] [1 [[-er than wh3 Mary is d3-tall] [2 [t1  is d2-tall]]]]] 
  a’.  [[Every student is taller than Mary is]] = 1 iff  
  ∀x[student(x) Æmax(λd.tall(d)(Mary)) <max(λd.tall(d)(x))] 
 
  b.  [[-er than wh3 Mary is d3-tall] [2 [[every student] [1 [t1  is d2-tall]]]]] 
  b’.  [[Every student is taller than Mary is]] = 1 iff  
  m a x ( λd.tall(d)(Mary) < max(λd∀x[student(x) Ætall(d)(x)])  
 
The set of truth conditions in (11a’) amounts to requiring that each student is such that she is 
taller than Mary. The conditions in (11b’) require that the shortest of the students be taller 
than Mary. But the situations in which the conditions from (11a’) will be fulfilled are those 
situations in which the conditions from (11b’) will be fulfilled. (10) is judged to be 
unambiguous, and the degree theories predict that.  
  A second problem with detecting the scopal properties of comparison operators, which 
Heim (2000) discusses is that in many cases the truth conditions derived from the compared 
LFs are not equivalent, but there is an independent reason for one of the LFs to be ill-formed. 
Again, the empirical facts that we do not detect any ambiguity in such sentences coincide with 
the prediction of the quantificational theory.  
It is then more instructive to look at those examples, for which the quantificational 
theory predicts an ambiguity. One of them, discussed by Heim, is (12):   
 
(12)  Every student is less tall than Mary is. 
 
The sentence is unambiguous. Given the assumptions made so far, we expect to find two 
readings in (12). We have two well-formed LFs from which we derive two unequivalent sets 
of truth conditions, as in (13).  
 
(13)  a.  [[every student] [1 [[less than wh3 Mary is d3-tall] [2 [t1  is d2-tall]]]]] 
  a’.  [[Every student is taller than Mary is]] = 1 iff  
  ∀x[student(x) Æmax(λd.tall(d)(Mary)) > max(λd.tall(d)(x))] 
  
 
  b.  [[less than wh3 Mary is d3-tall] [2 [[every student] [1 [t1  is d2-tall]]]]] 
  b’.  [[Every student is taller than Mary is]] = 1 iff  
  m a x ( λd.tall(d)(Mary) > max(λd∀x[student(x) Ætall(d)(x)])  
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(13a’) represents the attested reading of (12), according to which the sentence is true only if it 
is true of each student that she is shorter than Mary. (13b’), however, allows its truth 
conditions to be met only if the shortest student is shorter than Mary. But these are inadequate 
truth conditions: such a reading does not exist.  
    It looks like some explanation is needed to account for the overgenerated reading of 
(12) in order to save the quantificational theory. Careful examination of different types of data 
lead Heim to formulate a syntactic condition on the well-formedness of LFs involving a 
DegP. This condition rules out (13b) and makes the quantificational theory consistent with the 
facts. Heim (2000) refers to this condition as the Kennedy generalization:  
 
(14)  If the scope of a quantificational DP contains the trace of a DegP, it also contains 
  DegP itself.    
 
It follows from the above discussion that if DegPs have significant scopal properties, we 
should not expect them to be revealed in just any linguistic context in which we find another 
scope bearing element. On the assumption that scope interaction involves movement, 
restrictions on DegP movement could prevent us from getting (otherwise expected) well-
formed LFs. We need, then, to expand the domain of inquiry and look for configurations that 
circumvent Kennedy’s generalization. This is what we offer in the next section. 
 
 
2  A puzzle: ambiguity in comparative conditionals 
 
The generalization in (14) accounts for the missing reading of the German sentence (15). 
 
(15)     (Frank kommt in unsere Laden einmal pro Woche.) Viele Rentner kommen öfter. 
  (Frank comes in our shop once a week)             many retirees come more-often  
  ‘(Frank comes to our shop once a week.) Many retirees show up more often than that.’ 
 
(15) contains the comparative quantifier öfter and a quantificational DP viele Rentner. It is 
judged to be unambiguous. It can only have the interpretation in (16a) which results from 
having DegP take narrower scope than the DP. The interpretation in (17a), which reflects the 
reverse scopal order is unavailable. 
 
(16)  a. Many retirees x are such that x shows up more often than once a week.  
       b.[[many retirees] [1 [[-er than once a week] [2 [t1  show up d2-often]]]]]  
      QP     DegP           tDegP 
  c. for many retirees x, max(λd.x comes d-often) > once a week 
  
(17)  a. #The frequency of having many retirees is greater than once a week. 
  b. [[er than once a week] [2 [[many retirees] [1 [t1  show up d2-often]]]]] 
         DegP      QP         tDegP 
 c.  max(λd.d-often, many retirees come) > once-a-week 
 
(17a) is created by an illegitimate, from the point of view of Kennedy’s generalization, 
configuration DegP  quantificational DP tDegP. What this generalization does not explain, 
however, is why there are two readings in (18), informally represented in (19): 
 
(18)  Je  mehr  Sonderangebote wir haben,   umso öfter        kommen viele Rentner 
       the more special-offers      we  have   the     more-often come      many retirees 
  ‘The more special offers we have, the more often many retirees show up.’ 
Penka Stateva Beck Effects in the Comparative
287Penka Stateva 
 
6 
 
(19) a. "t1,t2 [where t1 and t2 are relevant periods of time, if we have more special offers at t2 
than we do at t1, then many retirees show up more often at t2 than they show up at t1] 
      b. "t1,t2 [where t1 and t2 are relevant periods of time, if we have more special offers at t2 
than we do at t1, then we have more often many retirees showing up at t2 than we have 
many retirees at t1]  
 
(19b) results from a LF, which is similar to the illegitimate (17b) in that it utilizes the 
configuration DegP quantificational DP tDegP, as we will show promptly. If indeed we are 
right in claiming that, two important questions will arise. First, is Kennedy’s generalization 
flexible enough to make a difference between (17b) and (19b)? And second, what is the 
property that distinguishes the two LFs? That property must be blamed for the different 
acceptability status of the readings that correspond to the respective LFs.   
Before we ask these questions, let us first show how (19a) and (19b), the two readings 
of the comparative conditional (CC) sentence in (18) are derived. We follow Beck (1997)’s 
proposal for analyzing comparative conditionals.  
We start with the essentials of her proposal. CCs are genuine conditional sentences. 
One of the clauses is viewed as an antecedent, the other – as a consequent. Like in other 
conditional sentences, Beck proposes that there is an implicit adverb of universal 
quantification. It binds a pair of world/time variables. Let us look at one of her examples:  
 
(20) Je    besser Otto  vorbereitet ist,  desto  besser  wird sein  Referat   werden. 
 The better  Otto  prepared  is    the      better   will his  talk     become 
 ‘The better Otto is prepared, the better his talk will be.’ 
    
The intuitive truth conditions of (20), given in (21), involve a universal quantification over a 
pair of worlds in which Otto has a different degree of preparedness: 
 
(21) "w1,w2 [w1ÎAcc & w2ÎAcc & if Otto is better prepared in w1  than he is prepared in 
w2 then Otto’s talk is better in w1 than it is in w2] 
 
(22) is the proposed syntactic structure underlying (20): 
 
(22)                   CP 
       
￿
￿
          CP                CP
￿
￿
￿
￿
  DegP1          C’          DegP2       C’
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
           je                 Deg’ Otto t1 vorbereitet ist  desto         Deg’  wird sein  Referat  
       
￿
￿ t2 werden 
        besser            besser 
 
The DegP in the antecedent and the consequent is fronted to the respective [Spec, CP]. The 
consequent is the main clause. The antecedent is adjoined to it. 
Beck notices that in both the antecedent and the consequent there is a part of the 
clause that is used twice in the interpretation. Again informally, such are the incomplete 
clauses  Otto is prepared d-well and Otto’s talk is d-good. But then it follows that everything 
except for je/umso/desto  and –er  is used twice. Beck draws two conclusions: (i) either 
je/desto or -er must be blamed for using the interpretation of each of these clauses twice. Her 
proposal is that je/desto are defined to do that. This is a case of what Heim (2000) calls 
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semantic ellipsis: an instruction in the semantics of a lexical item that requires an argument to 
which that item applies to be used more than once in a semantic derivation. (ii), the adverb 
from each DegP which appears fronted along with the comparative morpheme in its surface 
position must be reconstructed to its base position at LF in order to create the appropriate 
incomplete clause which is recycled in the interpretation procedure. Je/umso/desto is 
suggested to occupy the syntactic position of the missing than-clause in the construction and 
is defined as in (10): 
 
(10) [[je/umso]](<w1,w2>)([[er]])(D<s,<d,t>>) = 1 iff  [[er]](D(w2))(D(w1)) 
 
-Er and je/umso/desto form a constituent at LF, DegP, whose denotation combines with the 
denotation of the antecedent/consequent clause, D, (i.e. a set of degrees) after DegP is fronted. 
These assumptions allow for CCs to be interpreted compositionally. (20) has the interpretation 
in (23) which correctly represents the intuitive meaning given in (21). 
 
(23)  ∀w1,w2,[w1∈Acc & w2∈Acc & [max(λd.[well(d)(λx.prepared(x) in w2)](Otto)) < 
max(λd.[well(d)(λx.prepared(x) in w1)](Otto))] ⇒[max(λd.[good(d)(Otto’s_talk)  in 
w2]) <  max(λd.[good(d)(Otto’s_talk) in w1])]]    
   
Let us now go back to (18) and see how the two intuitively present readings of the sentence 
can be compositionally derived. Beck’s semantics of CCs, coupled with the quantificational 
theory of comparatives offers the desired account of the ambiguity in CCs. By assumption, 
the comparative operator is a scope bearing element, so given that there is another scope 
bearing element in the consequent clause, we can represent that clause by two LFs: one in 
which the DP viele Rentner has the comparative operator in its scope, and another, with the 
reverse scopal ordering. (24) represents the first option.  
( 2 4 )       C P 4 
   
  C P        C P 3 
                                                                                                     
  ∀   CP1               λ<t1,t2>  
                                                                                         DP11 
   λ<t1,t2>     CP                 
                                                                    many        t1              λ11           CP2 
         DegP10   λt4                retirees                 
                                       λ10                                                                      λt3                
                                              C’                     DegP12        λ12      C’ 
            er            
       the     <t1,t2>               we have t10-many                               C            IP    
                                        special offers at t4                            er 
                  the        <t1,t2>          IP            AdvP               
            
                                           t11 come at t3  t12-often 
  
(25) gives the semantic interpretation derived by this LF. Note that the gradable adverb with 
which the comparative operator is associated is reconstructed to its base position at LF:
6 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 t1,…n are variables over periods of time. t1,…n are traces of moved elements. 
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(25)          antecedent clause CP1 
 
[[DegP10]]  = λD.[max(λd.D(d)(t1)) < max(λd.D(d)(t2))] 
[[CP1]]        = λt1.λt2.[max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t1) < 
        max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t2)]    
 
   consequent clause CP3 
[[DegP12]]  = λD.[max(λd.D(d)(t1)) < max(λd.D(d)(t2))] 
[[CP2]]        =  max(λd.d-often, x comes at t1) < max(λd.d-often, x comes at t2) 
[[CP3]]        =  λt1.λt2.for many retirees(t1) x, max(λd.d-often, x comes at t1) < 
  m a x ( λd.d-often, x comes at t2)  
 
 CP4   
[[CP4]] =1 iff   ∀(t1,t2) [max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t1) < 
        max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t2)] ⇒    
   for  many  retirees(t1) x, max(λd.d-often, x comes at t1) < 
   m a x ( λd.d-often, x comes at t2)  
 
The truth conditions that we derived by scoping the quantified DP in the consequent clause 
above its respective DegP predict (18) to be true when for all pairs of time periods t1 and t2, if 
the number of special offers at t2 exceeds the number of special offers at t1 then for many 
retirees x the number of visits of x (to our shopping center) at t2 exceeds the number of visits 
of x at t1. These truth conditions correspond to one of the intuitive readings we associated (18) 
with, (19a). It remains to be seen whether the truth conditions derived from the LF 
representing the reverse scopal configuration involving DegP and the DP will adequately 
represent the second reading of the sentence, (19b). (26) gives the relevant LF.   
(26)                    CP3 
   
  C P        C P 2 
                                                                                                     
  ∀   CP1               λ<t1,t2>           CP 
                                                                                         
   λ<t1,t2>     CP                        λt3    
                                                                           DegP12      λ12         C’            
         DegP10   λt4                                 
                                       λ10                                                                   
                                              C’     the   <t1,t2>    er    C              IP      
            er                               
       the     <t1,t2>                 we have t10-many                                 
                                         special offers at t4                             IP                   AdvP  
                         
                DP               I’  t12-often                     
                
        
                  many  t3    retirees      come at t3 
Here are the truth conditions derived by this LF: 
 
(27)  antecedent clause CP1 
 
[[DegP10]]  = λD.[max(λd.D(d)(t1)) < max(λd.D(d)(t2))] 
Penka Stateva Beck Effects in the Comparative
290Beck effects in the comparative 
 
 
9
[[CP1]]        = λt1.λt2.[max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t1) < 
        max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t2)]    
 
   consequent clause CP3 
[[DegP12]]  = λD.[max(λd.D(d)(t1)) < max(λd.D(d)(t2))] 
[[CP2]]        =  λt1.λt2.max(λd.d-often, many retirees(t1) come at t1) < 
   max(λd.d-often, many retirees(t2) come at t2)  
 CP3   
[[CP3]] =1 iff   ∀(t1,t2) [max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t1) < 
        max(λd.we have d-many special offers at t2)] ⇒    
   m a x ( λd.d-often, many retirees(t1) come at t1) < 
   max(λd.d-often, many retirees(t2) come at t2)  
    
According to these truth conditions, derived from (26), the sentence should be true when for 
all pairs of time periods t1 and t2, if the number of special offers at t2 exceeds the number of 
special offers at t1, then more frequently at t2 than at t1  the shop gets many retirees as 
customers. These are adequate truth conditions for (18) because they represent the intuitive 
second reading of the sentence. 
  These new data shed light on the debate about the adequacy of the quantificational 
theory of comparatives. The observed ambiguity in CCs is easily explained on the assumption 
that the quantified DP in (18) interacts scopally with DegP, while any non-quantificational 
theory would stumble here.
7 We conclude then that ambiguity in CCs present an argument for 
the “classical” quantificational theory. 
  We are now also ready to face the two questions we posed earlier. The first one is 
whether Kennedy’s generalization is descriptively adequate. Obviously, it is not fine grained 
as needed to make a difference between (17b) and (19b) and rules the latter out on a par with 
the former. This calls for a revision. The property that distinguishes (17b) and (19b) is the 
timing of DegP movement. The observation that we can make on the basis of CCs is that 
whenever DegP movement is overt, DegP and it trace can be separated by a quantified 
expression; if DegP movement is covert, quantified expressions that intervene make the LF 
ill-formed. We thus propose to modify Kennedy’s generalization. We suggest the formulation 
in (28): 
 
(28)  If the scope of a quantificational expression contains the LF trace of a DegP, it also 
contains DegP itself.        
 
That formulation raises a question about the status of the constraint related to Kennedy’s 
generalization. Is it an independent principle of grammar? As an interface condition, (28) is 
                                                 
7 One might be concerned whether we correctly identified the source of ambiguity in (18). Could it be that the 
sentence is ambiguous not because the quantified DP in the consequent clause interacts with -er but because it 
interacts with the adverb which is part of öfter. We have two arguments against such a view. First, if this were 
true, then the wide scope reading of viele Rentner should be derived by raising it above the adverb but lower than 
the comparative head. The resulting interpretation for (18) would be as in (i): 
(i)   ∀t1,t2 [where t1 and t2 are relevant periods of time, if we have more special offers at t2 than we have t1, then 
the lowest degree d such that many retirees visit us d-frequently is greater at t2 than it is at t1.  
This reading is unavailable. So, on the one hand, one of the available readings of (18) cannot be derived at all, 
and on the other, a non-existing reading is predicted if we assume that the adverb in öfter, rather than the 
comparative operator is responsible for the ambiguity. 
  Second, (17), recall, is not ambiguous. The "missing" wide scope DegP reading is to be attributed to 
Kennedy's generalization. That account is unavailable under the alternative hypothesis considered here.  
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strongly reminiscent of Beck (1996b)’s Minimal Quantified Structure Constraint (MQSC), 
given in (29): 
 
(29)  If an LF trace β is dominated by a Quantifier-Induced Barrier (= the first node that 
dominates a quantifier, its restriction, and its nuclear scope) α, then the binder of β must 
also be dominated by α. 
 
MQSC is formulated as a more general interface principle about intervention effects induced 
by a quantified expression, while (28) covers a smaller empirical domain which falls under it. 
We propose then, that Kennedy’s generalization be reduced to MQSC. In the next section, we 
briefly review the independent evidence for MQSC.   
  
 
3  Independent evidence for the constraint on LF-movement 
 
Beck (1996b) discusses four cases from German, related to wh-movement, that motivate 
MQSC. All of them point to the conclusion that LF movement is more constrained than overt 
movement. A quantified expression intervening between a moved element and its trace leads 
to ungrammaticality or loss of ambiguity. But this is true only if traces result from LF 
movement. Let’s look at some data. Beck considers the following constructions: scope-
marking questions, exemplified in (30a), multiple wh-questions, exemplified in (30b), the wh-
alles construction in (30c) and a construction in which the restriction of a wh-phrase is left 
behind after overt wh-movement, as in (30d): 
 
(30) a.  Was glaubt    Luise  wen Karl gesehen  hat? 
    What  believes  Luise  whom  Karl  seen              has     
    ‘Who does Luise believe that Karl saw?’ 
 
 b.  Wen  hat  Luise  wo gesehen? 
  Who  has  Luise  where  seen 
    ‘Where did Luise see whom?’ 
 
 c.  Wen  hat  Luise  alles gesehen? 
  Whom    has    Luise    all    seen 
    ‘Who-all did Luise see?’ 
 
 d.  Wen  hat  Luise  von  den  Musikern getroffen 
  whom  has  Luise  of  the    musicians  met 
    ‘Which of the musicians did Luise meet?’ 
 
The scope-marking question in (30a), as Beck argues, is interpreted like a regular long-
distance question in German. That requires that the wh-phrase  wen, from the embedded 
clause, is covertly raised to take scope over the whole question. Beck also argues on semantic 
grounds that each of the underlined expressions in the rest of the examples must raise at LF: 
the wh-phrase in-situ in (30b) must be interpreted in [Spec,CP]; alles in (30b) universally 
quantifies over a question denotation, so it must take scope over the whole question at LF; and 
finally the restriction of the D-linked wh-phrase must be interpreted along with the wh-
element, so the restriction must also raise to [Spec,CP].    
  Raising the underlined phrases is possible in each of the examples in (30), since they 
are acceptable. However, if the proper name, which, being in the subject position c-commands 
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the moved element, is replaced by a quantified expression, the status of the sentences 
changes: they become unacceptable: 
 
(31)  a.  ??Was glaubt      niemand  wen Karl gesehen  hat? 
    What  believes    nobody  whom  Karl  seen    has     
    ‘Who does nobody believe that Karl saw?’ 
 
 b.  ??Wen  hat  niemand  wo gesehen? 
  Who  has  nobody  where  seen 
    ‘Where did nobody see whom?’ 
 
 c.  ??Wen  hat  niemand  alles gesehen? 
  Whom    has    nobody    all    seen 
    ‘Who-all did nobody see?’ 
 
 d.  ??Wen  hat  keine  Studentin  von  den  Musikern getroffen 
    whom  has  no  student     of  the   musicians  met 
    ‘Which of the musicians did no student meet?’ 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the contrast between (30) and (31) is that the quantified 
expressions in (31) intervene between each moved element and its trace. That causes the 
ungrammaticality in the latter case. However, that conclusion is too strong. As (32) shows, the 
quantified expressions don’t cause a problem if they separate an overtly moved expression 
and its trace: 
 
(32)  a.  Wen  glaubt      niemand  daß  Karl  gesehen  hat ? 
    What  believes    nobody  that  Karl  seen    has     
    ‘Who does nobody believe that Karl saw?’ 
 
 b.  Wo  hat  niemand  Karl  gesehen? 
  Where  has  nobody  Karl  seen 
    ‘Where did nobody see Karl?’ 
 
 c.  Wen  alles  hat  niemand  gesehen? 
  Whom    all  has    nobody    seen 
    ‘Who-all did nobody see?’ 
 
  d.  Wen  von   den   Musikern   hat  keine  Studentin getroffen 
    whom  of  the  musicians  has  no  student     met 
    ‘Which of the musicians did no student meet?’ 
 
The contrast between (31) and (32) requires a characterization of intervention effects that 
makes reference to the type of movement involved in creating the offending configuration in 
(33): 
 
(33) *Q1...Q2...t1  
 
Therefore, MQSC, which Beck proposes, applies only to LF movement.  
  From a different empirical point, we reached the same conclusion, namely, that LF 
movement of DegP is more restricted than overt movement. We have also observed that 
Beck’s filter is general enough to cover also the cases related to comparatives.  
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  Finally, it is important to mention that Bošković (1998) and Bošković (2000) reach 
independently Beck’s conclusion that LF movement is more restricted than overt movement. 
Here is one of Bošković’s arguments. French is a language that has overt wh-movement but 
allows a wh-phrase to remain in situ in certain well defined contexts. This is illustrated in 
(34): 
 
(34) a.  Tu  as  vu  qui? 
  you  have  seen  whom 
    ‘Who did you see?’ 
  b. Qui  as-tu  vu 
 
Bošković brings evidence that the wh-phrase in-situ in (34a) must undergo movement to C at 
LF. In long-distance questions, however, wh-phrases can’t remain in situ. Consider (35) in 
this respect: 
 
(35)  a.  *Jean et  Pierre croient  que  Marie a  vu  qui 
  Jean  and  Pierre  believe  that Marie  has seen  whom 
    ‘Whom do Jean and Pierre believethat Marie saw?’ 
  b.  Qui  Jean  et  Pierre croient-ils  que  Marie a  vu 
 
Like in (34a), the wh-phrase in the long-distance question (35a) must undergo LF-movement 
to the matrix C. But the contrast between (34a) and (35a) shows that long distance wh-
movement is clause-bounded at LF. Crucially, this is not so with overt movement, as we can 
see from (35b). Therefore, Bošković concludes, LF-movement must be more restricted than 
overt movement. Bošković offers an account in terms of feature movement. Under Chomsky 
(1995) Move F hypothesis, LF movement applies to feature bundles, not to whole lexical 
items. Feature movement is an instance of head movement. Consequently, crossed heads are 
interveners in the sense of Relativised Minimality. In (35a) the embedded complementizer, an 
A' head, blocks the LF movement of the wh-features to the matrix C, also an A' head. Since 
overt movement applies to whole categories, no intervention effect is observed in (35b). 
  We take the fact that Beck (1996b) and Bošković (1998) converge on their view about 
the relative restrictedness of LF-movement to indicate that the conclusion is on the right track. 
But, although they make a very similar claim, the empirical basis for each of the accounts is 
somewhat different and it isn’t immediately obvious that either account can be extended to the 
whole set of data. Beck’s account refers to inherently quantified elements as interveners. 
Also, very importantly, the cases that Beck considers involve phrasal movement. Bošković 
identifies a different set of interveners. Perhaps it is desirable, on conceptual grounds, that the 
two sets of data find a common explanation. In the lack of an obvious general proposal, 
however, we side with Beck’s account because our data are, in the relevant respect, very 
similar to the data for which MQSC was originally proposed.  
 
     
4  Schwarzschild and Wilkinson’s problem and MQSC 
 
In  Section 1 we discussed data like (36) which do not allow one to observe any scope 
interaction between the quantified DP and the comparative operator: 
 
(36)  (Scott is 180cm tall.) Every girl is less tall than that. 
 
Along with Heim (2000), we argued that the lack of ambiguity in (36) does not suggest that er 
has no scopal properties. We gave an argument from CCs defending the quantificational 
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theory of comparatives. Following Heim (2000), we appealed to an interface constraint that 
disallowed LFs derived by scoping the comparative DegP across a quantified DP in order to 
account for “missing” readings in sentences with comparatives. We further argued, on the 
basis of cases involving overt movement of DegP, that Heim's constraint should be reduced to 
the more general Beck filter on LF-movement. There is a set of data involving the 
comparative construction, which, in the relevant respect, poses a similar question to the 
quantificational theory of comparatives. We offer here some speculations about that. These 
data involve quantifiers in the than-clause. The problem has been known for many years, but 
recently examined in great detail in Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002). A few examples are 
given in (37): 
 
(37)  a.  Scott is taller than every girl. 
  b.   Scott is taller than every girl is. 
  c.  Scott is taller than most of the others. 
  d.  Scott is taller than most of the others are. 
  e.  Scott is taller than exactly three girls. 
  f.   Scott is taller than exactly three girls are. 
 
Similarly to (36), all of the sentences in (37) are unambiguous. And, again, the quantified DP 
cannot stay in the scope of the comparative operator. To see that, let us look more carefully at 
(37b), for example. If every girl is interpreted in-situ, we derive counterintuitive truth 
conditions, as (38b) shows. The LF in (38a) results from resolving ellipsis in the than-clause 
through LF copying:   
 
(38) a.  [[DegP er than wh2 every girl is t2-tall] [1[IP Scott is t1-tall]]] 
 b.  max(λd.tall(d)(every girl)) < max(λd.tall(d)(Scott)) 
 
According to (38b), (37b) is true only if Scott is taller than the shortest girl. To derive the 
intuitive truth conditions, which make the sentence true only if Scott is taller than each of the 
girls, i.e. he is taller than the tallest girl, one has to allow the universal quantifier in (37b) to 
QR above the than-clause outside of the scope of the comparative operator. And further, one 
has to stipulate that QR in this context is obligatory since the reading derived when QR does 
not apply is unattested, as we saw from (38). So, let us make sure that QR leads to the 
desirable truth conditions: 
 
(39)  a.  [[every girl] [3[DegP er than wh2 t3 is t2-tall]] [1[IP Scott is t1-tall]]]  
 b.  ∀x[girl(x) → max(λd.tall(d)(x)) < max(λd.tall(d)(Scott)) 
 
These are indeed the desired results. But does MQSC, which we argued to be accountable for 
"missing" readings like those in (36) also extend to quantifiers in the than-clause? Since 
quantifiers behave similarly in the two types of contexts, we expect that their inability to 
appear in the scope of the comparative operator to have the same explanation. If we are on the 
right track, then the answer is Yes, MQSC rules out the LF in (38a), and this creates the effect 
of illusionary obligatoriness of QR. Let us elaborate.  
      We picked the clausal comparative in (37b), as an exemplary case because it is 
somewhat easier to see the relevance of MQSC in clausal comparatives. Recall, that the 
standard quantificational theory assumes that ellipsis in the than-clause is resolved similarly 
to ACD in sentences like John dated every girl Bill did. -er and its restriction, the than-clause 
with which it forms a constituent, is QR-ed in the covert component, which makes it possible 
to reconstruct the elided predicate. That predicate contains the trace of the moved DegP. QR 
itself doesn't violate MQSC, unlike in the wide scope DegP "reading" of (36). DegP in (38a) 
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does not raise across an intervener. What makes (38a) illegitimate is reconstructing the trace 
of DegP in the than-clause and thus creating the configuration DegP intervener tDegP. If we 
are correct in assuming that a violated MQSC accounts for the missing readings in (37), we 
have an argument that the condition applies representationally. If it applied derivationally, the 
LF in (38a) could be saved by having MQSC apply before LF-copying.  
  Some explanation is now in order for the phrasal comparatives in (37a), (37c), and 
(37e). Recall from Section 1 that there is no agreement on the question whether these involve 
ellipsis in the than-clause. If they do, then the "missing" wide scope DegP reading must be 
attributed to MQSC without further discussion: the reconstructed predicate be d-tall contains 
an offending trace which is separated from its binder by an intervener.  
  The (semantic) alternative to an ellipsis-based analysis of phrasal comparatives is the 
direct analysis, suggested by Heim (1985). We will briefly review a close relative of that 
proposal and after that we will consider its implications for the "missing" readings in the 
phrasal comparatives in (37).
8  
  Any comparative construction, be it causal or phrasal, needs two predicates: one to be 
ascribed of the subject, and another, of the DP-complement of the preposition than in the case 
of phrasal comparatives, or the subject of the than-clause in the case of clasal comparatives. 
The surface representation of comparatives, however, contains only one such predicate. The 
standard solution for clausal comparatives, as we discussed many times by now, is to assume 
that the predicate in the than-clause is syntactically reconstructed. The alternative, that Heim 
suggests and exploits in her 1985 paper on comparatives is semantic ellipsis. Recall that 
semantic ellipsis refers to a phenomenon triggered by an operator that requires using the 
denotation of an expression twice in the interpretation. The direct analysis gives such 
semantics to the comparative operator: one of its arguments is a relation between a degree and 
an individual: it applies once to the individual denoted by the subject and once more to the 
individual denoted ny the DP in the than-clause. For this to be possible, however, DegP must 
always raise at a minimal distance above the main verb in order to derive the appropriate 
relation which can be an argument of -er. -er is specified in the lexicon as in (40): 
 
(40)   [[er]]:= λy:y∈D.[λR:R∈D<d,et>.[λx:x∈D.max(λd.R(d)(x)) > max(λd.R(d)(y))]] 
 
As we see from (40), -er applies first to the denotation of the than-phrase. Since than is 
semantically vacuous, the denotation of the PP is the denotation of the DP, an individual. The 
second argument of -er is a relation. Finally, -er takes an individual as an argument to yield 
                                                 
8 In a nutshell, Heim proposes that phrasal comparatives contain a comparative operator with the following 
semantics: -er has two arguments: an ordered pair of individuals, and a scalar predicate - a relation between a 
degree and individual. It is defined as in (i): 
(i) [[-er]]<x,y>(R<d,et>) = 1 iff max(λd.R(d)(x)) >  max(λd.R(d)(y))  
For example, the LF of (iia), is derived without reconstruction in the than-clause. Rather, the DP Amy adjoins to 
the subject of the main clause, and -er adjoins to that constituent, as in (iib): 
(ii)  a.   Scott is taller than Amy. 
 b.  [IP [er [DPScott Amy]] [1[2[ t2 is t1-tall]]]]] 
(iib) leads to the interpretation in (iii): 
(iii) max(λd.tall(d)(Scott)) >  max(λd.tall(d)(Amy))  
According to (i), (iiia) is true only if the degree to which Scott is tall is greater than the degree to which Amy is 
taller. The conditions correspond to speakers' intuitions. However, as Lerner and Pinkal (1995) point out the 
syntactic status of these two adjunction operations, especially the adjunction of the DP that starts in the than-
phrase to the subject, is unclear. In addition, we also believe that the semantic interpretation in not, strictly 
speaking compositional. If it were, [[-er]] would not apply to the pair of individuals denoted by each DP but 
rather to the denotation of the constituent that dominates the two DPs. But it isn't obvious to us that the 
denotation of that constituent in an ordered pair of individuals. To avoid these problems, we consider a variant of 
the original proposal. It is in the spirit of the direct analysis, and is a straightforward extension of Heim (1999)’s 
proposal about the interpretation of superlatives.    
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true just in case the maximal degree of the set of degrees related to the individual from the 
main clause is bigger than the maximal degree of the set of degrees related to the individual 
from the than-phrase. A sample derivation involving phrasal comparatives is given in (41):  
 
(41)  a.  Scott is taller than Amy. 
 b.  [IP Scott [DegP er than Amy] [1[2[ t2 is t1-tall]]]] 
 c.  [[er]]([[Amy]])(λd.λx.tall(d)(x))([[Scott]]) =1 iff 
  m a x ( λd.tall(d)(Scott)) > max(λd.tall(d)(Amy)) 
 
Now, we are ready to go back to (37a): Scott is taller than every girl. Under Heim's proposal, 
(42) is the LF of (37a): 
 
(42)   [IP Scott [DegP er than every girl] [1[2[ t2 is t1-tall]]]] 
 
In phrasal comparatives, in contrast to clausal comparatives, -er must apply directly to the 
denotation of the DP in the than-phrase. However, in (37a) that DP is not of the appropriate 
type. -Er's first argument is an individual but every girl denotes an expression of type <et,t>. 
To resolve the type mismatch, every girl must be QR-ed. And no matter how short than 
movement is, it will be above the scope of the comparative operator. But this, in turn, explains 
why in phrasal comparatives like (37a), (37c), and (37e), the only attested reading is the one 
where DegP scopes below the quantified DP. 
  To summarize the discussion so far, we addressed the question about missing readings 
in the comparative construction, involving quantified expressions in the than-clause. We 
extended the MQSC-based explanation to at least clausal comparatives. Crucially, we argued 
that the disallowed configuration in which a quantified expression intervenes between DegP 
and its trace is created as a result of the reconstruction process in the than-clause. We argued 
that even if phrasal comparatives do not involve ellipsis, there is an alternative explanation 
that accounts for the wide scope of a universal quantifier there.  
  We need to acknowledge, however, that Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) present 
an argument against QR-ing a quantified expression out of a than-clause. And this might be a 
potential problem for us since we argued that such DPs cannot be interpreted in the scope of 
DegP, rather they must move out of the c-command domain of DegP in LF. We leave our 
answer to this challenge for future research. But first, let us present Schwarzschild and 
Wiskinson's argument. It involves sentences with a quantifier in the than-clause buried in the 
scope of another scope bearing element. (43) is such an example: 
 
(43)  Bill did better than John predicted most of his students would do.  
 
Consider (43) in the context where John predicts that most of his students will get a score 
between 80 and 90 on the exam. If John gets 96 points, (43) can truthfully be uttered in this 
context. But how is the sentence interpreted? The problem with the quantifier most of his 
students in the than-clause resurfaces as it did in (37). If it is interpreted in situ, we get too 
weak truth conditions for (43). The sentence is predicted to be true if John makes a prediction 
that the bigger portion of his students will score within a particular range and Bill scores more 
than the lower limit that John sets but not more than the higher limit. For example, if Bill gets 
81 points, (43) will still be true in the context where John predicts that most of his students 
will get between 80 and 90 points. This type of problem was explained as a violation of 
MQSC in clausal comparatives in (37) and resolved by QR-ing the quantifier out of the than-
clause. But, for (43) that solution doesn't work. Suppose we QR that quantifier and give it 
wider scope than DegP. Then (43) will have the truth conditions in (44): 
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(44)  Most of John's students are x such that: Bill did better than John predicted x would do.  
 
The problem with (44) is that the first argument of the comparative operator, λd.John 
predicted x to do d-well, is the empty set since John made no predictions about the scores of 
particular students. The max operator cannot apply to an empty set of degrees because the 
maximum of that set is undefined. And consequently, contrary to speakers' intuitions (43) is 
not predicted to be true in the context we considered. As a solution, Schwarzschild and 
Wilkinson (2002) develop a new theory of scalar predicates where the degree argument of 
gradable adjectives/adverbs is in fact an interval, rather than a point on the scale.  
  This is not to say that the MQSC account of "missing" readings, for which we argued, 
must be wrong. Rather, the solution relying on QR out of the than-clause, is problematic in 
light of (43). Either, there is an alternative strategy altogether that is used in deriving the 
interpretation of (43) and the interpretation of the sentences in (37), or such a strategy is 
available along with QR out of the than-clause but for an independent reason, it is the only 
option when the quantifier is embedded under another scope bearing element in the than-
clause.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the ambiguity observed in comparative conditionals supports the view that the 
comparative construction contains a degree quantifier. Scope interactions in the comparative 
construction are constrained by a general constraint on LF movement.  
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Abstract
In this paper a subclass of specific indefinites called cataphoric indefinites is investigated.
These indefinites carry an accent on the determiner, are partitives, and occur in topic position.
They induce a particular set of alternatives, which represents an implicit, cataphoric, identifying
property,  and  are  closely  similar  to  attributive  (non-pronominal)  definite  descriptions.  For
cataphoric  indefinites,  the  speaker-hearer  asymmetry  turns  out  to  be  a  mere  side  effect  of
information structure.
1  Introduction
Specific indefinites are commonly characterized as (i) exhibiting exceptional scope behavior,
(ii) being existentially presupposed and, (iii) involving a speaker-hearer asymmetry. Specific
indefinites exhibit exceptional scope behavior taking wide or intermediate scope with respect
to modal operators or additional quantifiers. The referent of a specific indefinite appears to be
existentially  presupposed,  which  places  specific  indefinites  near  to  referentially  used
definites. The attempt to explain the specific/non-specific distinction by correlating it with the
referential/attributive distinction failed, however, because of the existence of intermediate
readings. Moreover, while referentially and attributively used definites are symmetric, the
speaker and the hearer being able to identify the referent, specific indefinites convey a
speaker-hearer asymmetry: The speaker seems to have a particular individual in mind without
communicating the individual's identity to the hearer. Specific indefinites have been a topic of
continuing interest for the last two decades, cf., e.g., Fodor and Sag (1982), Enc (1991),
Farkas (1994), (2002), Abusch (1994), Kratzer (1998), Portner and Yabushita (2001),
Schwarzschild (2002), Heusinger (2002). For an overview see section four and five in
Heusinger (2002).
The analysis presented in this paper takes the speaker-hearer asymmetry as the starting point:
What does it mean for the interpretation of a noun phrase if the speaker has a particular
individual in mind, but the hearer is unable to identify the referent? Using a specific
indefinite, the speaker informs the hearer that he will not be able to identify the referent the
speaker is talking about, which is counterintuitive from a Gricean point of view: Why should
it be relevant for the hearer to learn that the speaker withholds information? Why does the
speaker not simply use an existential instead of a specific indefinite, if he doesn't want to
reveal the referent's identity? If specificity is taken to be a semantic instead of a purely
pragmatic phenomenon these questions have to be answered.
It is well-known that the interpretation of noun phrases is influenced by focus, cf., e.g., Bosch
(1988), van Deemter (1994), Jäger (1998) and Umbach (2001). For specific indefinites it has
been claimed that they tend to carry an accent on the determiner (e.g. Enc 1991). However,
the position of the accent is clearly insufficient to distinguish non-specific from specific
indefinites. Consider the German examples in (1)(a) and (b):
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2     Carla Umbach 
(1)  (a)  (Paulsen, who is the local plumber, has been asked to provide internships for a group 
of local students:) 
Paulsen: /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN, (aber zwei sind mir zuviel.)    
(I would take one student, but two are too many for me.) 
(b) (Grün, the owner of the drugstore, has been asked, too. At first, he is reluctant. But 
then he says:) 
Grün:  /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN (nämlich den kleinen Otto Pitzke. Die 
anderen taugen nichts.) 
(I would take one (of the) student(s), namely Otto Pitzke. The others are 
good for nothing.) 
The indefinite NP EINEN Schüler in (1)(a) requires a non-specific reading whereas in (b) it is 
clearly specific. Nevertheless in both (a) and (b) the indefinite NP carries an accent on the 
indefinite determiner, which is in German used as an article and also as a numeral, similar to 
English one. Note, however, that in (a) EINEN Schüler contrasts with zwei [Schüler] (two 
students), whereas in (1)(b) it contrasts with die anderen [Schüler] (the other students). This 
difference will be essential to the analysis presented in this paper. It will be shown that 
indefinites of the latter type constitute a subclass of specifics for which the speaker-hearer 
asymmetry turns out to be a mere side-effect of information structure. This subclass will be 
called "cataphoric indefinites". 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we will briefly review the account of 
focus in definite NPs proposed in Umbach (2001) and (2003), providing a suitable 
background for the representation of cataphoric indefinites and for the comparison of 
cataphoric indefinites and definites. In section three, Eckardt's (2002) notion of referential 
and denotational contrastive topics will be presented which account for the difference 
between (1)(a) and (b). In section four it will be shown how cataphoric indefinites relate to 
specificity (and why they are cataphoric in the first place). Finally, the scope behavior of 
cataphoric indefinites will be considered. Although the examples in this paper will mostly be 
in German, the basic results will also apply to English taking differences with respect to the 
distribution of the indefinite articles and word order into account. 
 
2 Focus in definite noun phrases 
In Umbach (2002), (2003) it is shown that intonation is essential for the interpretation of 
definite noun phrases. Consider the example in (2): Depending on whether there is an accent 
or not the interpretation of the definite NP the shed is radically different. The NP in (a), 
which carries an accent, clearly refers to some shed belonging to John's cottage. The NP in 
(b) is completely deaccented and without further context we will interpret it as referring to 
the cottage itself, the speaker making a disapproving comment. Obviously, in the accented 
version in (a) the NP introduces an additional discourse referent related to John's cottage 
whereas in the deaccented version in (b) it constitutes an identity anaphor.  
(2)   (John has an old cottage.)    
(a)  Last summer he reconstructed the SHED. 
(b)  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed. 
Farkas (2002) suggested viewing definiteness as uniqueness where familiarity is regarded as 
a special case of uniqueness (for uniqueness accounts of definite NPs see also Hawkins 1991 
and Löbner 1985). According to Farkas a definite may achieve uniqueness either because its 
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descriptive content singles out a unique referent or because the referent of the definite can be 
identified with a previously given referent, which divides the range of definite expressions 
into two classes: While proper names and pronouns achieve uniqueness via identification 
with a given referent, full definite descriptions have to provide a singleton by means of their 
descriptive content (supplemented by a restriction of the relevant domain). This 
classification, however, is disproved by the example in (2), which demonstrates that even a 
full definite description may achieve uniqueness either way. For this reason in Umbach 
(2002) it is proposed to distinguish between two uses of full definite descriptions depending 
on whether there is an accent on (part of) the descriptive content:  
(i)  A (use of a) definite description is "given" iff it is completely deaccented. Given 
definites constitute identity anaphors. Uniqueness is accounted for by the salience 
hierarchy of accessible discourse referents, i.e. there has to be a most salient discourse 
referent to be identified with the definite's referent. The descriptive content of the 
definite merely has to be compatible with the antecedent and may be accommodated. 
Thus given definites are comparable to pronouns, and can be substituted by a pronoun 
without affecting the meaning of the sentence. Consider, for example, (2)(b): John has 
an old cottage. Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED it. 
(ii)  A (use of a) definite description is "non-given" iff at least part of the descriptive content 
is focussed. Non-given definites introduce novel discourse referents.
1 The uniqueness 
requirement has to be satisfied by the descriptive content. This is straightforward in the 
case of semantically unique descriptions (the pope, the smallest prime number,...), but 
may also be achieved by the help of a bridging antecedent. In the latter case the referent 
will be singled out by the descriptive content together with the bridging relation. In 
(2)(a), for example, we have to interpret the shed as "the unique object related to John's 
cottage which is a shed" making use of the previously introduced cottage as a bridging 
antecedent. In introducing novel discourse referents non-given definites are similar to 
indefinite NPs. Nevertheless they cannot be substituted by the latter because indefinites 
in general lack the uniqueness requirement. It will, however, be shown in section five 
that non-given definites may be substituted by cataphoric indefinites without affecting 
truth conditions. 
It is important to note that this approach, although admitting two uses of definite NPs, does 
not admit two readings of the definite article the. Instead, the definite article uniformly 
indicates uniqueness. The two uses are due to focusing/deaccenting of the descriptive content 
of the definite NP and result from the interaction of the meaning of the definite article and the 
semantics of focus. To support this idea, in Umbach (2003) an analysis of focus in complex 
definite NPs is presented which is based on DRT (Kamp, Reyle 1993) and the 
presuppositions-as-anaphors theory of van der Sandt (1992). The interpretation of focus 
follows the general ideas in Rooth (1992) without, however, employing a separate level of 
alternative meaning. Instead, the alternative set is represented as an anaphor (see the 
representation in (5)(b) below). This account makes crucial use of the notion of the focus 
phrase as suggested by, e.g., Krifka (ms.), thus accounting for the fact that the alternatives 
                                                 
1 Discourse referents are regarded as novel iff they are no identity anaphors, i.e. they are regarded as novel even 
if they relate to a bridging antecedent. There are examples challenging the correspondence of deaccented/given 
and focussed/novel DRs, especially if the NP has occurred in a preceding conjunction (John has a boy and a 
girl. The BOY is called Kim). Note, however, that the use of a (deaccented) pronoun (he) would not be 
appropriate in this example. For a comprehensive discussion of apparent counterexamples cf. Umbach (2001).  
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induced by a focus need not correspond to the focussed item. In the case of definite NPs the 
focus phrase is the "highest" NP including the focus. The focus phrase must not be confused 
with the focus domain: While the focus domain indicates the range within which alternatives 
vary, the focus phrase indicates the range within which backgrounded information has to be 
taken into account to yield the appropriate alternatives.
2 
This analysis also accounts for the fact that the set of alternatives induced by a focussed 
definite NP is restricted by the bridging antecedent (if there is a bridging antecedent involved 
in the interpretation). Consider the example in (3). Ben is supposed to be a reporter who 
wants to conduct an interview with the members of a certain research team. The proposition 
in (3) will be false, if Ben interviewed any member of the research team other than the Dutch 
one. But it will not be false if he additionally interviewed someone who is not on the team. 
Hence the set of alternatives relevant for quantification by only is limited by the members of 
the research team. This is intuitively intelligible taking into account that the definite NP the 
DUTCH researcher has to relate to the previously mentioned research team as a bridging 
antecedent in order to achieve uniqueness, that is, it has to be interpreted as "the unique 
member of the research team who is Dutch". Evidently, if a (partly) focussed definite NP 
involves a bridging antecedent (and most of them do because semantically unique 
descriptions are rare), then the bridging antecedent plays a double role, supporting uniqueness 
and also restricting the relevant alternatives. 
(3)   (The research team arrived at the base camp late at night.) 
Ben only talked to the DUTCH researcher. 
Consider finally the continuation of (3) given in (4). The NP the OTHERS refers to the set of 
non-Dutch members of the research team, which is the set of the proper alternatives induced 
by the focus in the DUTCH researcher.
3  
This is accounted for by assuming that the meaning of other consists in the property of being 
distinct from a co-referent. The NP the OTHERS and its co-referent have to relate to the same 
bridging antecedent, thereby partitioning the common set of alternatives into two 
complementary sets ("the one" and "the others").
4 
(4)  (The research team arrived at the base camp late at night. Ben only talked to the DUTCH 
researcher.)  
 The  OTHERS were preparing for the next day.  
The DRT-based representation requires, in short, a (set valued) discourse referent A 
representing the set of alternatives along with the following presuppositions: (i) A is 
constrained by the local background (i.e. the non-focussed part of the focus phrase); (ii) the 
                                                 
2In (i) the focus domain (or focus) is given by Denmark whereas the focus phrase comprises the superordinate 
NP the girl from Denmark. In (ii) focus domain and focus phrase coincide.  
(i)  Ben only invited [the girl from [DENMARK]Focus Domain ]Focus Phrase  (... not the girl from Bulgaria) 
(ii)   Ben only invited [[the girl from DENMARK]Focus Domain ]Focus Phrase  (...not the man with the fancy hat) 
3The set of "proper" alternatives is defined as the set of alternatives minus the focussed element. 
4Throughout this paper we will assume that the co-referent is a single individual and the others comes as a 
plural, thereby simplifying the presentation. Moreover, we will ignore backgrounded descriptive material, e.g. 
the OTHER geologists. For a comprehensive discussion cf. Umbach (2003). 
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focus phrase referent is an element of A; (iii) A includes at least one contrasting element, 
which is distinct from the focus phrase referent. These conditions match with Rooth's (1992) 
requirements, the discourse referent A corresponding to Rooth's variable C. Since we will 
employ a similar representation in the case of cataphoric specific indefinites in section five, 
we will briefly discuss the representation of the NP das BLAUE Bild in (5):  
–  Carrying a focus, the NP constitutes a non-given definite introducing a novel discourse 
referent x. The focussed part of the description corresponds to the asserted condition, 
blue(x). 
–  The presuppositions are partly due to focus and partly due to definiteness. Focus requires a 
discourse referent A representing the set of alternatives which is constrained by the 
background part of the description, picture*(A) (star indicating distributivity). The set of 
alternatives includes the NP referent, x∈A, and also the contrasting elements, ω⊂A, x∉ω. 
(For convenience, the contrasting element is assumed to be set-valued, cf. previous 
footnote concerning "the others". It has to be maximal w.r.t. A\{x}).  
–  Definiteness, on the other hand, requires a bridging antecedent B and a relation R(x, B). 
Due to uniqueness x has to be the only blue picture which is R-related to the bridging 
antecedent, i.e.∀z.R(z,B)&picture(z)&blue(z)→ z=x. The bridging antecedent moreover 
restricts the set of alternatives, y∈A iff R(y,B). 
–  On updating, B will be bound to the previously introduced exhibition, and A will be bound 
to the set of elements R-related to B. When updating the succeeding sentence, the referent 
of die ANDEREN (the others) will be bound to the set of contrasting elements ω (for details 
cf. Umbach 2003). 
 
(5)  (a)  (...Marek's exhibition is worth seeing.) 
Das /BLAUE Bild hat mir \BESONDERS gefallen. (Aber die anderen sind auch gut.) 
(I especially liked the blue picture. But the others are interesting, too.) 
 
  (b) Das /BLAUE Bild... 
x 
A, B, ω  blue(x) 
picture*(A)   ω⊂A 
x∈A    x∉ω 
"∀y.R(y,B) ↔y∈A" "∀Z. Z⊂A\{x} → Z⊂ω" 
 
R(x,B) 
"∀z.R(z,B) & picture(z) & blue(z) → z=x" 
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3.  Referential vs. denotational readings of contrastive topics 
Example (1) in the introduction made clear that the position of the accent is insufficient to 
distinguish between the non-specific and the specific reading of an indefinite NP. Although 
the accent is located on the determiner in (a) and (b), the indefinite EINEN Schüler (ONE 
student) has a non-specific reading in (a) and a specific reading in (b). At first sight this seems 
to be reason enough to cancel the intonation hypothesis. However, it has been pointed out by 
Eckardt (2002) that quantifiers in topic position with an accent on the determiner exhibit a 
systematic ambiguity. It will turn out in the next section that this ambiguity perfectly matches 
the distinction between the non-specific and the specific reading in (1)(a) and (b). 
In Eckardt (2002) it is argued that quantifiers in topic position which carry an accent on the 
determiner are systematically ambiguous between a referential and a denotational reading. 
Consider Eckardt's examples in (6) and (7). In the referential reading, in (6), the NPs are 
partitives referring to subgroups of the previously given plural referent, i.e. the seven dwarfs. 
The subgroups may have the same cardinality, but they must be disjoint, that is, no dwarf both 
peels potatoes and roasts sausages. Assuming that (6)(a)-(c) constitute the answer to a 
question, the appropriate question will be What did the dwarfs do?, and the answer has to be 
exhaustive, mentioning each of the disjoint subgroups. Thus, we learn from (a)-(c) that the 
overall number of dwarfs is seven. Finally, the complement of the NP referent is defined, that 
is, the expression the others can be felicitously used in a continuing sentence (THREE dwarfs 
were peeling potatoes. The others were roasting sausages). 
(6)  (The [seven] dwarfs were busy cooking dinner.) 
(a) /THREE dwarfs were \PEELING POTATOES. 
    (b) /TWO dwarfs were \FETCHING BEER, and 
    (c) /TWO dwarfs were \ROASTING SAUSAGES. 
In the denotational reading, as shown in (7), the NPs denote quantifiers of different 
cardinality. They may, but need not be partitives relating to subgroups of a given group of 
objects. The quantifiers must be of different cardinality, but the denotations may overlap. The 
appropriate question to be answered by (7)(a)-(c) will be How many spots were visible on 
what day?, where the answer need not be exhaustive and the cardinalities cannot be added up. 
From (a)-(c) we cannot infer the overall number of red spots. Finally, in the denotational 
reading the complement of the NP referent is not defined, that is, the expression the others 
will not be felicitous in a continuation (At different days of my measles I had increasing 
numbers of red spots: FOUR spots appeared on Monday. #The others were visible on 
Tuesday.) 
(7)  At different days of my measles, I had increasing numbers of red spots: 
    (a) /FOUR spots appeared on \MONDAY, 
    (b) /FIVE spots were visible in \TUESDAY, and 
    (c) /EIGHT spots shone on my face on \WEDNESDAY. 
It follows from the above characterization that the referential and the denotational reading 
essentially differ with respect to the alternatives triggered by the focus. In the denotational 
reading the alternatives consist of quantifiers of different cardinality, {four spots, five spots, 
six spots,....}, where the denotations may overlap. As compared to this, in the referential 
reading the set of alternatives has to comprise disjoint subsets of a given referent, where the 
subsets are exhaustive, for example {three of the dwarfs, another two of the dwarfs, the rest of 
the dwarfs} or {three of the dwarfs, the other dwarfs}. The latter type of alternative sets will 
be most important in the analysis of cataphoric indefinites in the next section. 
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In addition to the characteristics given in Eckardt (2002) it can be observed that the referential 
and the denotational reading of a topicalized quantifier differ with respect to the scope of the 
negation: Referential topics induce narrow scope, cf. (8)(a), which has to be read as 
"most...not". Denotational topics, on the other hand, induce wide scope, cf. (8)(b) which is 
"not...most". 
(8)  (a)  (The seven dwarfs were playing in the garden.) 
/MOST dwarfs were \NOT wearing a cap (but two of them did.)       
(b) (When I had my measles, the doctor promised that most spots were gone within a 
week.) 
/MOST spots were \NOT gone by Friday (but at least half of them...) 
These observations provide evidence that the referential/denotational difference is not just 
vagueness in the sense that there are different contexts and the referential reading corresponds 
to one type of context set while the denotational reading corresponds to another. Instead, it 
seems to be a genuine ambiguity. Actually, similar distinctions have been suggested by other 
authors, for example, Gyuris (to appear), who points out a referential/quantificational 
distinction with respect to Hungarian contrastive topics, and Endriss and Ebert (to appear), 
who discuss the conditions under which a quantifier qualifies as a topic (thereby licensing a 
specific interpretation). Still, the referential/denotational distinction is far from being settled 
issue. It is, for example, unclear whether it relates to the other features of quantifiers 
(monotonicity, weak/strong etc.). Moreover, it might be doubted whether denotational topics 
are genuine topics in the sense of aboutness topics. The question attributed to (7) appears to 
be a multiple focus question suggesting that the NP might be part of the comment instead of 
being a topic. Also, the fact that negation takes wide scope is evidence against a genuine 
topic. We have to leave these questions open in the present paper. 
 
4 Cataphoric indefinites 
Let us reconsider the example in (1) in the introduction, repeated in (9). In (9)(a) and (b) the 
indefinite NP EINEN Schüler carries an accent on ein, which is in German used as an indefinite 
article and also as a numeral, similar to English one.  (9)(a) and (b) perfectly match the 
distinction between the denotational and the referential reading discussed in the previous 
section. In the non-specific reading in (a) the alternatives triggered by EINEN Schüler have to 
be quantifiers of different cardinality {one student, two students, three students,...}. This is 
evident from the continuation of the sentence. In contrast, in the specific reading in (b) the 
alternatives triggered by EINEN Schüler are subgroups of the student group which are disjoint 
and exhaustive, {one of the students, the other students}. 
(9)  (a)  (Paulsen, who is the local plumber, has been asked to provide internships for a group 
of local students:) 
Paulsen: /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN, (aber zwei sind mir zuviel.)    
(I would take one student, but two are too many for me.) 
(b) (Grün, the owner of the drugstore, has been asked, too. At first, he is reluctant. But 
then he says:) 
Grün:  /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN (nämlich den kleinen Otto Pitzke. Die 
anderen taugen nichts.) 
(I would take one (of the) student(s), namely Otto Pitzke. The others are 
good for nothing.) 
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The example in (9) demonstrates that indefinites with an accent on the determiner, if they 
constitute referential topics, qualify as specifics. On the other hand, indefinite NPs which 
constitute denotational topics are clearly non-specific. The essential difference between the 
denotational/non-specific reading of the indefinite in (a) and the referential/specific reading in 
(b) lies in the nature of the alternatives evoked by the focus on the determiner. In the 
referential/specific reading in (b) the alternatives consist in two disjoint subgroups which 
exhaust the group antecedent: {one of the students, the other students}. Notice that two 
disjoint and exhaustive subgroups of a supergroup result in a two-cell partition, and a two-cell 
partition is equivalent to a property. Thus the set of alternatives in (b) represents a property. In 
addition, one of the cells has to be a singleton, which is indicated by the stressed determiner 
EIN (ONE).
5 Accordingly, in the specific reading the set of alternatives represents a property 
which is unique with respect to the antecedent group. By using EINEN Schüler (one student) in 
contrast to die anderen Schüler (the other students) the speaker conveys a particular partition 
of the antecedent student group into a singleton cell and the rest and, by virtue of this 
partition, she conveys a unique property without explicitly mentioning it.  
It has been suggested by, e.g., Zimmermann (2003), Schlenker (2003) that specificity comes 
with an implicit identifying property. This idea is confirmed by the analysis given here. But in 
contrast to the above accounts, in the present analysis the identifying property need not be 
introduced as an additional assumption. Instead, the identifying property turns out to be a side 
effect of focus, that is, of the particular formation of the alternative set triggered by a 
referential/specific indefinite. Deducing the identifying property from the alternatives also 
clarifies the problem of trivial properties: If you simply assume that a specific indefinite 
implies the existence of an identifying property, then any unique property will do. In contrast, 
in the present analysis it is not the mere existence of a property which is expressed by the 
speaker. Recall that EINEN Schüler in the referential reading is not a quantifier but an anaphor. 
Thus when using EINEN Schüler in contrast to die anderen Schüler the speaker doesn't merely 
communicate the existence of a partition but instead communicates this particular partition. 
The property corresponding to this partition might be spelled out as "being distinct from the 
others", which is tantamount to an anaphoric expression which lacks information for 
resolution, that is, a cataphoric expression. This is the reason why these indefinites are called 
"cataphoric indefinites" in this paper. It will be shown below that referential/specific 
indefinites actually function as cataphors in a discourse. 
On this analysis, the core feature of specific indefinites, namely the intuition that the speaker 
has a particular individual in mind without communicating the individual's identity to the 
hearer, turns out to result from cataphoricity, which is a well-known phenomenon. Note, 
however, that on the above analysis the speaker has a particular property in mind, but not 
(necessarily) a particular individual. Thus examples like EINEN Läufer in (10), which are 
clearly specific although the speaker cannot have a particular individual in mind, don't pose a 
problem.
6  
                                                 
5It is commonly agreed that stress on EIN (ONE) implies the interpretation "exactly one". But what has been 
ignored is the fact that, even if stressed, the determiner EIN (ONE) need not contrast with different numbers but 
may also contrast with die anderen (the others). It is commonly said that ein is homonymous being either a 
determiner or a numeral. However, stressed EIN when contrasting with die anderen also implies a "numeral" 
interpretation, since it induces a singleton property. Hence there is no clear-cut distinction between the 
determiner and the numeral ein. A clear determiner reading for stressed EIN is given if it contrasts with the 
definite determiner DER: Er ist nicht EIN Verdächtiger, sondern DER Verdächtige. This reading corresponds to 
English stressed A which contrasts with THE (He is not A suspect, he is THE suspect.) 
6Many thanks to Cornelia Endriss for this example. 
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(10)   (Berlin Marathon. Before the start of the race the mayor of Berlin informs the head 
organizer:) 
/EINEN Läufer möchte ich nach dem Rennen \PERSÖNLICH beglückwünschen, 
nämlich den Sieger, (... den anderen lasse ich meine besten Grüße ausrichten.) 
(I would like to congratulate one of the runners, namely the winner, and offer my 
best wishes to the others.) 
The major question concerning the speaker-hearer asymmetry of specific indefinites relates to 
the Gricean maxime of informativity: Why does the speaker not simply use an existential 
instead of a specific indefinite, if he doesn't want to reveal the referent's identity? Why should 
it be relevant for the hearer to learn that the speaker withholds information? On a closer look, 
however, it turns out that the speaker actually doesn't withhold information. Consider the 
example in (11)(a) and (b) which are slight modifications of (9)(b): 
(11) (Grün is asked by the teacher of the graduating class to provide internships for a group of 
local students:) 
(a) Grün:  /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN (... wie heißt der denn noch? ...na, der 
Enkel von meinem früheren Nachbarn.) 
(I would take one (of the) student(s), ... wait a moment, what's his name? 
... well, the grandson of my former neighbor.) 
(b) Grün:  /EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN. 
(I would take one (of the) student(s)) 
Teacher:  Wen denn? (Who then?) 
Grün:  Na, den Otto Pitzke,.... (Well, Otto Pitzke.) 
In (11) (a) Grün cannot remember the referent's name and therefore he falls back upon a 
definite description. In (11)(b) Grün stops immediately after the first sentence. In this 
situation the teacher is prompted to ask for the identity of the referent, and Grün in turn has to 
answer this question (or else has to give a good reason for not answering the question) 
Obviously, the speaker-hearer asymmetry is only temporary. The speaker might have 
forgotten the referent's name, or be in search of a suitable description, or she might simply 
want to make her utterance more dramatic, but in the end she has to place the hearer in a 
position to determine the referent. Similarly, when using a cataphoric pronoun the speaker 
withholds the referent's identity, but only for a short moment. In the case of cataphoric 
pronouns the referent is missing, in the case of cataphoric indefinites the identifying property 
is missing. In either case, the missing information constitutes an open question-under-
discussion, and the speaker is obliged to answer this question to ensure successful 
communication. 
 
5 Cataphoric indefinites vs. non-given definites 
It is generally agreed that specific indefinites exhibit a close relationship to definite NPs. 
Taking the given/non-given distinction for definites into account (cf. section two), cataphoric 
indefinites are in fact strikingly similar to non-given definites. Compare (12)(a) (= (5)(a)) and 
(12)(b). The examples differ only with respect to the point in time when the identifying 
property is provided. While in the case of the definite in (a) the identifying property is 
presented by a prenominal modifier, it is presented by a postponed apposition in the case of 
the cataphoric indefinite. 
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(12) (Marek's exhibition is worth seeing ...) 
(a) Das  /BLAUE Bild hat mir \BESONDERS gefallen, (aber die anderen sind auch gut.) 
(I especially liked the blue picture, but the others are interesting, too.)  
(b) /EIN Bild hat mir \BESONDERS gefallen, nämlich das \BLAUE, (aber die anderen sind 
auch gut.) 
(I especially liked one picture, namely the blue one, but the others are interesting, 
too.) 
Apart from the position of the modifier, i.e. the point in time the identifying property is 
named, the non-given definite in (a) and the cataphoric indefinite in (b) are structurally 
equivalent: First, both NPs introduce a novel discourse referent. Secondly, both NPs relate to 
a bridging antecedent to achieve uniqueness, which is the previously introduced exhibition. 
Note that in either case the relation to the antecedent is not simply group membership, but 
approximately "shown in". Thirdly, the alternatives triggered by the non-given definite and 
those triggered by the cataphoric indefinite are provided by the bridging antecedent, i.e. the 
respective sets of alternatives consist of the elements shown in the exhibition that are pictures 
(due to the backgrounded part of the descriptive content). The only difference between the 
non-given definite and the cataphoric indefinite concerns the property responsible for 
uniqueness. In the case of a non-given definite this property is given by the focussed part of 
the descriptive content and in the case of the cataphoric indefinite it is a cataphor represented 
by the partition of the alternatives into "the one" and "the others". Let the cataphoric property 
be denoted by C. Then the non-given definite yields the interpretation "the unique painting 
shown in Marek's exhibition which is blue" and the set of alternatives is given by {the blue 
picture shown in the exhibition, the non-blue pictures shown in the exhibition}. Compared to 
this, the cataphoric indefinite yields the interpretation "the unique painting shown in Marek's 
exhibition which is C", and the set of alternatives is given by {the C picture shown in the 
exhibition, the non-C pictures shown in the exhibition}.  
Following the representation suggested in section two, the cataphoric indefinite in (12)(b) will 
be represented as shown in (13):  
–  Being an indefinite the NP introduces a novel discourse referent x.  
–  Due to partitivity there has to be a bridging antecedent B and a relation R(x, B). 
–  Focus requires a presupposed discourse referent A representing the set of alternatives.
7 A 
is constrained by the background description, picture*(A) and includes the NP referent, 
x∈A, and also the contrasting elements, ω⊂A, x∉ω. Moreover, A is restricted by the 
bridging antecedent, y∈A iff R(y,B).  
–  Due to the focus on ein (on the referential interpretation) the alternatives are partitioned 
into a singleton cell and the rest, i.e. the NP referent is the only element which is R-
related to B and a picture and is not included in the contrasting elements, ∀z.R(z,B)& 
picture(z)&z∉ω → z=x. Note, that this entails the existence of a property C such that 
∀z.R(z,B) & picture(z) & C(z) → z=x, where C(z) iff z∉ω.  
–  On updating, B will be bound to the previously introduced exhibition. When updating 
the succeeding sentence, the referent of die ANDEREN (the others) will be bound to the set 
of contrasting elements ω.  
                                                 
7As in the case of definite NPs the relevant alternatives are assumed to relate to the focus phrase. 
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The representation of the cataphoric indefinite in (13) corresponds exactly to the 
representation of the non-given definite in (5)(b), apart from the fact that in the case of the 
non-given definite there is an asserted condition, blue(x), whereas in the case of the 
cataphoric indefinite, there is a presupposed condition C(x) which has to be bound by a 
succeeding property.
8  
(13) EIN Bild  (... die anderen) 
 
  x 
 
  A, B,  ω, C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
picture*(A)   ω⊂A 
x∈A    x∉ω 
"∀y.R(y,B) ↔y∈A" "∀Z. Z⊂A\{x} → Z⊂ω" 
R(x,B) 
"∀z.R(z,B) & picture(z) & z∉ω → z=x" 
" C(x) ↔ x∈A & x∉ω" 
 
 
It has been discussed in Umbach (2001) whether the distinction between the given and the 
non-given use of definites corresponds to the distinction between the referential and the 
attributive use of definite descriptions introduced by Donellan (1966). First of all, there is no 
one-to-one correspondence, since there are attributive uses which are identity anaphors, e.g. 
"Someone murdered Smith. We're all very distressed because Smith was such a nice guy. It 
must be that Smith's murderer is insane -- that's the only way to explain it."
9 The definite 
Smith's murderer is attributive in this example, even though the discourse referent has been 
introduced before and thus the definite counts as given (and is in fact deaccented). On the 
other hand, Wilson (1991) suggested distinguishing between pronominal and attributive 
definite descriptions where Donellan's referential uses constitute a special case of the former. 
The definite Smith's murderer in the above example would be a pronominal one and we might 
amend the above claim by saying that the given/non-given distinction corresponds to the 
pronominal/attribute distinction according to Wilson.  
In any case, cataphoric indefinites are not identity anaphors. The discourse referent is novel 
and is determined by a property, even if this property is a cataphor. It is important to recall 
that due to the cataphoric indefinite analysis the speaker-hearer asymmetry does not pertain to 
an individual but to a property. Thus it might be the case that the speaker has a particular 
property in mind and is nevertheless unable to determine the referent. One example of this 
kind is (10), where the indefinite is uttered before the identifying property (i.e. winner) can be 
evaluated. Note that in (10) it would be perfect to add "(namely the winner) whoever that is". 
Similarly, Donellan's famous Martini example can easily be rephrased by a cataphoric 
                                                 
8For convenience, C is included in the list of discourse referents. But keep in mind that it is a property instead of 
a (group-) individual. 
9Many thanks to Barbara Abott for pointing out this example to me. 
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indefinite, cf. (14). But surprisingly it is the attributive version which facilitates a cataphoric 
indefinite. Contrary to the common assumption that specifics are similar to referentially used 
definites, cataphoric indefinites pair up with attributive (non-pronominal) definite 
descriptions. 
(14)   (After it was revealed to him that someone present at the meeting had a flask in his 
jacket pocket, the head of the teetotalers announced at the meeting:) 
/EIN Mann muss sofort den \RAUM verlassen, ... nämlich der mit dem Flachmann in 
der Jacke, ... wer immer das ist. 
(One man must leave the room immediately,... namely the one who has a flask in his 
jacket,... whoever that is.) 
 
6 Cataphoric indefinites and scope 
It has been shown in the preceding sections that for cataphoric indefinites the core feature of 
specificity, i.e. the speaker-hearer asymmetry concerning the identification of the referent, is a 
result of the interpretation of focus. Of course, cataphoric indefinites cover only a small range 
of the variety of specific indefinites listed in the literature. Classical examples such as the 
specific reading of a logician in Mary talked to a logician are not included, and neither are 
indefinite NPs of the form a certain N. Where scope with respect to other operators is 
concerned wide scope readings of indefinites are, of course, not restricted to cataphoric ones, 
cf., e.g., (15)(a) which has a de re reading. Still, if we focus on indefinites carrying a rising 
accent on the determiner, i.e. those qualifying for either a referential or a denotational topic, 
then there is evidence that wide scope readings require cataphoric indefinites. For example, 
the indefinite in (15)(b) has wide scope and is a cataphoric one, inducing the set of 
alternatives {one of the Greek girls, the other Greek girls}.
10 
(15) (a)  During his holidays in Greek, Paul has fallen in love: 
Anne:  Stell dir vor: Paul will eine \GRIECHIN heiraten. (Er hat sie im Urlaub 
kennengelernt.)          
(Have you heard the news: Paul wants to marry a Greek woman. He met 
her while on vacation.) 
(b)  During his holidays in Greek, Paul met a Greek girl group and is full of enthusiasm. 
Anne:  Stell dir vor: Paul will /EINE Griechin tatsächlich \HEIRATEN. Ich glaube, 
es ist die Schlagzeugerin.) 
(Believe it or not: Paul wants to marry one of the Greek girls. I think it's 
the drummer.) 
In (16) the interaction with another quantifier is demonstrated. In each of the examples the 
focus in the indefinite is on the determiner, EINEN Vortrag (one talk). In (a) the indefinite has 
wide scope and is at the same time cataphoric, one of the talks being contrasted with the other 
talks. In (b) the indefinite has narrow scope and is not cataphoric, the alternatives being {one 
                                                 
10Note that in (15)(b) the cataphoric indefinite has to precede the sentence adverb, which is a prerequisite for a 
topic to occur in the German middlefield (cf. Frey, to appear). Shifting the adverb seems to induce the reading 
where EINE Griechin contrasts with two Greeks, three Greeks etc. which is hard to interpret because it contradicts 
world knowledge: Paul will offenbar /EINE Griechin \HEIRATEN. 
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talk, at least three talks}.
11 In (c) the indefinite has narrow scope. Still, the alternatives consist 
of {one of talks, the other talks} indicating that the indefinite is a cataphoric one. Examples of 
this type were presented in Farkas (2002) and in Heusinger (2002) to point out that specific 
indefinites need not have wide scope (Farkas refers to these cases as co-variation, Heusinger 
call them subject-specific). 
(16) (After the workshop...) 
(a) Alle Teilnehmer fanden /EINEN Vortrag offenbar /BESONDERS interessant. (Die 
/ANDEREN waren eher /SCHLECHT besucht.)              
(Every participant found one talk especially interesting. The other talks were less 
popular.)                          
(b) Jeder Teilnehmer fand offenbar /EINEN Vortrag \BESONDERS interessant (...aber 
mindestens DREI durchaus lohnenswert.)     
(Every participant found one talk especially interesting and at least three talks worth 
hearing.) 
(c) Jeder Teilnehmer fand /EINEN Vortrag offenbar \BESONDERS wichtig, (... nämlich 
seinen eigenen, und die anderen mäßig interessant.)     
(Every participant found one talk especially important,... namely his own one,... and 
the others slightly interesting.) 
Let us finally have a brief look at the examples in (17). In (a) the intermediate scope reading 
is the most natural one. EINE Aufführung (one production) must be contrasted with the other 
productions due to world knowledge (since the theater festival has to present more than one 
production). Thus the indefinite is a cataphoric one. In (b) the indefinite is slightly varied, 
thereby licensing a denotational topic interpretation where one Marthaler production is 
compared to two and the indefinite has narrow scope with respect to drei Argumente. 
(17)  (The jury of the Berlin theater festival provided the reviewers with the following 
instructions:)  
(a) Jeder Kritiker soll drei Argumente bringen, die zeigen dass /EINE Aufführung ins 
\PROGRAMM genommen werden muss, (während die anderen verzichtbar sind.) 
(Each reviewer has to come up with three arguments that show that one production 
must be put on the program whereas the others are dispensable.) 
(b) Jeder Kritiker soll drei Argumente bringen, die zeigen dass /EINE  Marthaler-
Aufführung ins \PROGRAMM genommen werden sollte, (aber zwei zuviel wären.) 
(Each reviewer has to come up with three arguments that show that one Marthaler 
production should be put on the program, but two would be too many.) 
Although these examples are not sufficient for definite conclusions, they provide evidence 
that exceptional scope behavior is allowed for cataphoric indefinites but not for denotational 
topic indefinites. Cataphoric indefinites in German are not restricted to the sentence initial 
position, but may also occur in the topic position of the German middle field (cf. Frey, to 
appear). Denotational topic indefinites are excluded from this position, which is evidence that 
they do not constitute genuine topics, in spite of the rising accent. Cataphoric indefinites may 
have wide scope with respect to preceding operators, as in (15)(b) and (16)(a), which is not 
                                                 
11Note again that the sentence adverb has to precede the indefinite in this reading. 
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possible for denotational topic indefinites. But cataphoric indefinites may also have narrow 
scope inducing a co-variation reading, cf. (16)(c). Finally, cataphoric indefinites can take 
intermediate scope whereas denotational topic indefinites cannot.  
 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper it has been argued that cataphoric indefinites constitute a subclass of specific 
indefinites which is distinguished by a particular type of alternative set. Cataphoric indefinites 
(i) carry a focus on the determiner, (ii) are partitives, (iii) are topics, and (iv) induce a defined 
complement. Thus they trigger a set of alternatives of the form {one of the N, the other N}. 
For cataphoric indefinites, the speaker-hearer asymmetry with respect to the identity of the 
referent has been shown to result from the particular form of the alternative set: Inducing a 
partition into a singleton subgroup and the rest, the alternative set is equivalent to a unique 
property which is a cataphor to be specified in the subsequent discourse. On this analysis the 
core feature of specificity, i.e. the intuition that the speaker has a particular referent in mind 
without communicating its identity to the hearer, turns out to be a mere side effect of the 
interpretation of focus in topic constituents. 
This analysis confirms the claim of Portner and Yabushita (2001) that specifics have to be 
partitive and topical. If we accept the evidence from German in the previous section, then 
denotational topics are no genuine topics and thus the combination of partitivity and topicality 
yields a sufficient characterization. Yet, the discussion in this paper has been limited to 
indefinites with an accent on the determiner and the results do not straightforwardly carry 
over to different accent positions. For example, shifting the accent from EIN Bild to ein BILD 
the alternatives no longer consists of one picture as compared to the other ones. For a specific 
reading of ein BILD, specificity effects have to be explained in some other way.  
The present analysis also confirms the idea of an implicit identifying property pertaining to 
specific indefinites, as suggested by Schlenker (2003) and Zimmermann (2003). In contrast to 
their account, the present analysis need not pose the identifying property as an additional 
feature because it is a consequence of the particular alternative set. Moreover, the cataphoric 
indefinite analysis appears reminiscent of Schwarzschild's (2002) singleton indefinite 
analysis. However, on a closer look the accounts differ fundamentally. Schwarzschild argues 
that specific indefinites result from an implicit domain restriction. Different from other 
quantifiers, in the case of specifics the domain is restricted to a singleton. Implicit domain 
restrictions are given by the context and are familiar to the speaker and the hearer. Since this 
contradicts the observed speaker-hearer asymmetry, Schwarzschild has to pose an ad hoc 
privacy principle for specific indefinites. According to the cataphoric indefinites analysis the 
domain restriction is given by the backgrounded descriptive content and may be 
supplemented with implicit restrictions. For example, EIN Bild in (12)(b) has as its domain 
"pictures shown in Marek's exhibition". In contrast to Schwarzschild's account (and in 
accordance with the usual assumptions in focus semantics), the domain restriction is supposed 
to apply to all of the alternatives, whereas the singleton restriction is due to the cataphoric 
property induced by the particular alternative set. 
Finally, cataphoric indefinites confirm the common idea that specific indefinites are close to 
definites. Taking the difference between given and non-given definites into account, a 
cataphoric indefinite is like a non-given definite apart from the fact that for non-given 
definites the identifying property is given by the focussed part of the descriptive content, 
while for cataphoric indefinites it is given by the particular alternative set and has to be 
specified afterwards. The similarity between cataphoric indefinites and non-given definites 
has a surprising consequence: If we accept that the difference between given and non-given 
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definites correlates with the difference between referentially (or pronominally) used and 
attributively used definites, then cataphoric indefinites are on the side of the attributive ones. 
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Abstract
Szabolcsi (1997a) proposes that some left-peripheral syntactic positions encode not
compositional semantic information, but different procedures for the assessment of truth
conditions. These procedures are said to be reﬂected in the range of quantiﬁed noun phrases
that may appear in certain positions in the pre-verbal ﬁeld in Hungarian. While one of Sz-
abolcsi’s proposed procedures correctly predicts a monotonicity-based constraint on the
quantiﬁers appearing in certain positions, her other procedure is too vaguely deﬁned to pro-
duce useful predictions. I argue that the appropriate procedure in this latter case is the same
as the one that produces ‘narrow focus’ interpretations and that the related position that Sz-
abolcsi proposes for quantiﬁcational processes is nothing other than the well-known ‘focus
position’ of Hungarian. Apparent interpretive differences between the relevant quantiﬁca-
tional phrases and other uses of syntactic focus follow naturally from an inferential prag-
matic approach to this position. This has important theoretical implications: an inferential
analysis of syntactic focus requires (1) a ‘dynamic’, parsing-based view of the relation-
ship between syntax and semantics and (2) a re-alignment of the burden of explanation
between linguistically encoded semantics and inferential pragmatics. An analysis of this
nature proves to explain the quantiﬁer distribution facts and a number of other syntactic
phenomena in an extremely parsimonious fashion.
1 Background
The structure of the Hungarian sentence, as viewed by Szabolcsi (1997a), can be summarised as
in the template in (1) (where an asterisk is the Kleene star, signifying the possibility of iteration).
This article concentrates on the pre-verbal ﬁeld, in particular on contrasts between TopP and QP,
on the one hand, and PredOp and Focus, on the other1. In (2)–(5), an example of the use of each
putative syntactic position is given.
(1) (Top[ic]P*) (Q[uantiﬁer]P*) (PredOp) (Focus) V (XP*)
(2) TopP: [Kati]
Kati
megijedt.
VM-feared
‘Kati was frightened.’
(3) QP: [Minden
every
gyerek]
child
megijedt.
VM-feared
‘Every child was frightened.’
∗The ideas presented in this article ﬁrst appeared in Wedgwood (2003), where more detailed argumentation
may be found. The further development of this work is supported by an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship.
1Szabolcsi (1997a) in fact refers to TopP and QP as ‘RefP’ and ‘DistP’, respectively. I employ the better known
and more transparent terminology of ´ E. Kiss (1987) for essentially the same positions. For the distinction between
TopP and QP, which is beyond the scope of this article, see the above-cited works and ´ E. Kiss (2002).
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany2 Daniel Wedgwood
(4) PredOp: [Kev´ es
few
gyerek]
child
ijedt
feared
meg.
VM
‘Few children were frightened.’
(5) Focus: [Kati]
Kati
ijedt
feared
meg.
VM
‘It’s KATI that was frightened.’
It is immediately obvious that the four positions split into two groups, according to the position
of any ‘verbal modiﬁer’ (VM), such as the aspectual particle meg, shown in boldface in (2)–
(5)2. VMs appear left-adjacent to the tensed verb except in the presence of a PredOp quantiﬁer
or a syntactically focused expression, when the VM appears post-verbally. This is line with the
fact that foci and PredOp quantiﬁers are themselves strictly left-adjacent to the tensed verb3.
Alongside strict adjacency and some prosodic cues, the position of any VM therefore provides
a diagnostic for the use of PredOp or Focus. Below, in section 2, I argue that this structural
indicator has a unique signiﬁcance: PredOp and Focus are the same position.
Szabolcsi (1997a), discussing only quantiﬁcational issues, argues that the effect of moving a
quantiﬁed noun phrase (QNP) to TopP/QP is to cause it to undergo a certain kind of semantic
assessment procedure; moving a QNP to PredOp causes it to be interpreted by a different pro-
cedure (the procedures themselves are outlined below). Hence, Szabolcsi’s proposal contrasts
with the more common approach to semantics, which assumes that the lexical and syntactic ele-
ments of natural languages declaratively encode pieces of compositional semantic information.
I believe that Szabolcsi’s use of procedural encoding represents a very valuable insight, but one
which she applies at an inappropriate level: the quantiﬁcational phenomena that she discusses
are actually mere manifestations of much more fundamental procedures.
Szabolcsi’s primary aim is to explain the existence of a number of restrictions on the kinds
of QNP that can appear grammatically in the different syntactic positions in (2)–(5). Encoded
semantic procedures potentially provide an explanation, because some QNPs are incompatible
with semantic assessment by certain procedures. Szabolcsi is able to deﬁne some such incom-
patibilities by reference to standard Generalised Quantiﬁer (GQ) theory. However, the set of
QNPs appearing grammatically in the PredOp position appears to defy categorisation in terms
of GQ theory and Szabolcsi resorts to classifying these as ‘counting quantiﬁers’, a classiﬁcation
that lacks any clear deﬁnition. Below, I argue that restrictions on appearance in PredOp can
be deﬁned in terms of GQ theory, as long as the structural properties of QNPs are also taken
into account, and that this reﬂects a basic procedure which applies to all expressions that are
left-adjacent to tense in Hungarian, including foci.
The nature of the Hungarian pre-verbal ﬁeld is of interest far beyond the study of this one
language. BeghelliandStowell(1997)assumerichLFstructureforlanguageslikeEnglish(with
associated covert QNP movement) partly on the basis of Szabolcsi’s analysis of Hungarian.
Meanwhile, the widespread analysis of the ‘focus position’ as a dedicated FocusP projection
has led to highly inﬂuential theories of ‘the ﬁne structure of the left periphery’ (e.g. Rizzi 1997,
citing Hungarian as the primary evidence for such projections in universal grammar). Therefore,
if the pre-verbal positions of Hungarian prove to require a quite different kind of analysis,
signiﬁcant elements of current approaches to the syntax-semantics interface must be called into
question—indeed, my proposals point to a need for fundamental changes of perspective.
2In addition to a class of directional/aspectual particles, VMs include resultative secondary predicates, deter-
minerless object nominals and certain adverbial phrases.
3More accurately, there are only two entities that can intervene between such expressions and the tensed verb:
the negative particle nem and a clitic-like particle, is. These exceptions are explained in Wedgwood (2003).
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2 Restrictions on QNP distribution and Szabolcsi’s procedures
2.1 QNPs in TopP/QP
Szabolcsi (1997a) observes that only QNPs with monotone increasing (upward entailing) quan-
tiﬁers are found in TopP and QP; QNPs with monotone decreasing (downward entailing) or
non-monotonic quantiﬁers are ungrammatical in these positions. Some illustrative examples
are given in (6) and (7).
(6) T¨ obb,
more
mint
than
hat
six
di´ akunk
student-1PL
f´ elre´ ertette
aside(VM)-understood
a
the
k´ erd´ est.
question-ACC
‘More than six of our students misunderstood the question.’
(7) *Kevesebb,
fewer
mint
than
/ *Pontosan
precisely
hat
six
di´ akunk
student-1PL
f´ elre´ ertette
aside(VM)-understood
a
the
k´ erd´ est.
question-ACC
Intended: ‘Fewer than six / Precisely six of our students misunderstood the question.’
Some QNPs can occur in either QP or PredOp. These have a distinct interpretation in each
position. The difference seems to be based on whether or not the QNP is used to refer to a
closed set of entities. This is demonstrated by Szabolcsi’s ‘others’ test, as in (8) (I give speaker
B’s contributions only in English, as the meaning alone is at issue here).
(8) a. A: T¨ obb,
more
mint
than
hat
six
di´ akunk
student-1PL
f´ elre´ ertette
aside(VM)-understood
a
the
k´ erd´ est.
question-ACC
‘[QP More than six of our students ] misunderstood the question.’
B: ...“Maybe you’ll ﬁnd others too.”
b. A: T¨ obb,
more
mint
than
hat
six
di´ akunk
student-1PL
´ ertette
understood
f´ elre
aside(VM)
a
the
k´ erd´ est.
question-ACC
‘[PREDOP More than six of our students ] misunderstood the question.’
B: # ...“Maybe you’ll ﬁnd others too.”
Szabolcsi concludes from this evidence that the QNP contributes its semantics to the sentence in
different ways, according to its syntactic position. A QNP in TopP or QP appears to introduce
a set referent, with the rest of the sentence predicating something of this set. A PredOp QNP,
on the other hand, seems merely to specify the cardinality of some set denoted by the rest of the
sentence. It follows that if the quantiﬁer, like more than six, has no upper bound, then no closed
set is invoked in PredOp and reference to ‘others’ will be infelicitous, as in (8-b). The different
positions thus encode two procedures, described in Szabolcsi’s own words as follows:
(9) TopP/QP: “start out with a set determined by the quantiﬁer and check its members for
some property” (1997a, 125)
PredOp: “[perform] a counting operation on the property denoted by the rest of the
sentence” (1997a, 122)
In more technical terms, the TopP/QP procedure involves predicating over a witness of the QNP.
That is, in contrast to standard representations of GQs, the value of the quantifying determiner
is not assessed with respect to the composite semantic contribution of the rest of the sentence.
Rather, the QNP as a whole contributes a set as a logical subject of predication. In terms of the
tripartite structure of quantiﬁcation, this means that the quantiﬁer combines with its restrictor to
produce a witness set and the nuclear scope then predicates over this set.
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As Szabolcsi notes, this explains the monotonicity-based constraint on appearance in TopP or
QP, for the following reasons. With upward entailing quantiﬁers, predicating over a witness
set produces the correct truth conditions, irrespective of the cardinality of the intersection of
the restrictor and nuclear scope. With other quantiﬁers, however, the truth conditions of the
sentence depend upon the cardinality of this intersection.
For example, the upward entailing QNP at least two students may have as a witness the set
{kenny0, henry0}, assuming that both Kenny and Henry are students. To assess the truth of
the proposition ‘At least two students smoke’ with respect to this set one may simply check
the set of smokers for Kenny and Henry. In contrast, the truth of the proposition ‘Exactly
two students smoke’ cannot be established in this way, even though the set {kenny0, henry0}
fulﬁls the criteria for a witness of the non-monotonic QNP exactly two students. In this case
it also matters whether or not there exist other student smokers—that is, the cardinality of the
intersection of the restrictor and the nuclear scope must be established—so the sentence cannot
be assessed simply by predicating over a closed set.
Though Szabolcsi (1997a) concentrates on the formal properties of witness sets, there is a clear
intuitive connection between predicating over a witness set presented as the denotation of a
QNP and the notion of that QNP being the ‘topic’ of the sentence. This mode of semantic
assessment amounts to investigating the properties of some identiﬁable set without regard to
the rest of the model. The various characteristics of topics—‘aboutness’, ‘discourse-linked’
status, speciﬁcity—are all to some extent implied by some part of this description. As my
primary aim is to explain the nature of PredOp/Focus, rather than TopP/QP, I shall not pursue
this subject, beyond noting that the connection between the witness set mode of interpretation
and the notion of topichood seems fairly direct4. It may well therefore be unnecessary to posit
the encoding of any more detailed semantic information in TopP and QP in order to derive the
essential properties of topics (especially given the likely addition of further information in use
by inferential pragmatic means).
2.2 QNPs in PredOp/Focus
There is no monotonicity-based constraint on QNPs in PredOp (which I show below to be iden-
tical to Focus). Among the expressions that appear unproblematically in this position are QNPs
with monotone increasing quantiﬁers, as seen already in (8-b), and with monotone decreasing
and non-monotonic quantiﬁers, as shown in (10).
(10) Kati
Kati
kevesebb,
fewer
mint
than
¨ ot
ﬁve
/ pontosan
exactly
sz´ az
hundred
szavakat
words-ACC
´ ırt
wrote
le.
down(VM)
‘Kati wrote down fewer than ﬁve / exactly a hundred words.’
QNPsthatcannotappearinPredOp/Focusincludethosewithuniversalquantiﬁersanda legt¨ obb N
‘most N’. Such QNPs provide initial evidence in favour of treating PredOp and Focus as a single
position: they are unable to appear in the immediately pre-verbal, VM-inverting position even
under an explicitly contrastive focus reading, as shown in (11)—so the same constraints seem
to apply to Focus and the putative PredOp.
(11) Minden
every
gyerek
child
megijedt
VM-feared
/ #ijedt
feared
meg.
VM
For: ‘EVERY child got frightened (e.g. not just the girls).’
4See Ebert and Endriss (this volume) for a technical development of the use of witness sets to capture the notion
of topichood.
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Universal quantiﬁers and ‘most’ belong to a well-known class within GQ theory: proportional
(i.e. non-intersective) quantiﬁers. However, Szabolcsi (1997a) points out a number of examples
which show that proportional QNPs are not barred from PredOp/Focus. For example, kev´ es N
‘few N’ may be found in this position. Szabolcsi also notes examples like (12).
(12) A
the
ﬁ´ uknak
boys-DAT
t¨ obb,
more
mint
than
50
50
sz´ azal´ eka
percent-3PL
´ ertette
understood
f´ elre
aside(VM)
a
the
k´ erd´ est.
question-ACC
‘More than 50% of the boys misunderstood the question.’
The QNP here is not only proportional but also, by most deﬁnitions, denotationally equivalent
to a QNP that cannot appear in PredOp/Focus: a legt¨ obb N ‘most (of the) N’. This kind of
example prompts Szabolcsi to conclude that we must look beyond denotational semantics in
order to deﬁne the class of QNPs that may appear in PredOp (and thereby reveal the encoded
procedure that, by hypothesis, underlies this class).
Szabolcsi in fact claims that only ‘counting quantiﬁers’ are permitted in PredOp. It is not
clear how this category might be deﬁned. It is difﬁcult to see how any deﬁnition of ‘counting’
could distinguish between kev´ es N ‘few N’, which occurs grammatically in PredOp/Focus and
a legt¨ obb N ‘most (of the) N’, which cannot. In any case, given the evidence presented below
for the uniﬁcation of Szabolcsi’s PredOp and Focus, the nature of the position cannot be deﬁned
in purely quantiﬁcational terms.
3 PredOp and Focus uniﬁed as a procedure
In order to understand the class of QNPs that appear in Szabolcsi’s putative PredOp position, it
is instructive to take Szabolcsi’s descriptions of her proposed procedures, (9), remove unhelpful
references to ‘counting’ and re-phrase them so that they are expressed in a truly parallel fashion.
This yields something like (13).
(13) TopP/QP: “start out with a set determined by the quantiﬁer and check its members for
some property”
PredOp: “start out with the rest of the sentence and evaluate the quantiﬁer in terms of
this”
Connections to the information-structural readings of the respective positions now begin to look
quite direct. Just as there is an intuitive link between the procedure of predicating over a wit-
ness set and a simple ‘topic-comment’ reading, so the idea of ‘starting out with the rest of the
sentence’ is suggestive of taking a ‘focus frame’ from the context.
This reduces Szabolcsi’s PredOp position to a special use of Focus: narrow focus on a quantiﬁer.
Ofcourse, twoputativesyntacticpositionscannotbereducedtooneonthebasisofsuchintuitive
reasoning alone. As Wedgwood (2002, 2003) shows, there is also clear syntactic evidence for
identifying PredOp with Focus. In brief, there are certain phenomena in Hungarian that are
generally recognised to be licensed only in a sentence that contains a pre-verbal focus; these
include the post-verbal appearance of monotone decreasing QNPs, as in (14) and the use of a
deﬁnite internal argument NP with so-called ‘Deﬁniteness Effect’ verbs like hoz ‘bring’, as in
(15)5. As (14-c) and (15-c) show, such phenomena are licensed straightforwardly by ‘PredOp’
QNPs (i.e. with the kind of relatively unmarked readings that Szabolcsi associates with PredOp;
not requiring any special cleft-like reading).
5It is beyond the scope of this article to explain these phenomena; see Bende-Farkas 2002 for valuable discus-
sion.
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(14) a. *J´ anosnak
J´ anos-DAT
visszaadott
back(VM)-gave
legfeljebb
at.most
h´ arom
three
k¨ onyvet.
book-ACC
For: ‘To J´ anos were given back at most three books.’
b. J´ anosnak
J´ anos-DAT
MARI
Mari
adott
gave
vissza
back(VM)
legfeljebb
at.most
h´ arom
three
k¨ onyvet.
book-ACC
‘It’s Mari who gave at most three books back to J´ anos.’
c. J´ anosnak
J´ anos-DAT
kevesebb,
fewer
mint
than
hat
six
l´ any
girls
adott
gave
vissza
back(VM)
legfeljebb
at.most
h´ arom
three
k¨ onyvet.
book-ACC
‘To J´ anos, fewer than six girls gave back at most three books.’
(15) a. #J´ anos
J´ anos
hozta
brought
a
the
sz´ ekeket.
chairs-ACC
For: ‘J´ anos brought the chairs.’
b. J ´ ANOS
J´ anos
hozta
brought
a
the
sz´ ekeket.
chairs-ACC
‘It’s J´ anos who brought the chairs.’
c. Kevesebb,
Fewer
mint
than
hat
three
l´ any
girl
hozta
brought
a
the
sz´ ekeket.
chairs-ACC
‘Fewer than three girls brought the chairs.’
PredOp being a special use of Focus, the second half of (13) should be generalised by replacing
the phrase “the quantiﬁer” with the “the pre-verbal expression” or “the focused expression”.
This ‘procedure’ is, as it stands, no more than a post hoc description of the effect a certain
syntactic conﬁguration produces (the reasons why the pre-verbal position relates to this form
of interpretation are outlined below), but is sufﬁcient to indicate the basis of an approach to
Hungarian focus that differs signiﬁcantly from current mainstream analyses.
Given the assumption of a procedure that always yields a broad ‘focus frame’ and a narrow fo-
cus, many of the properties associated with syntactic focus in Hungarian are explained without
further stipulation. The commonly ‘identiﬁcational’ nature of pre-verbal foci (Kenesei 1986,
´ E. Kiss 1998) follows for purely pragmatic reasons from their narrowness: a richly speciﬁed
‘focus frame’ sets up the expectation of a particular kind of expression playing a particular role
in the eventuality in question, so that the item in focus appears simply to identify who or what
fulﬁls this role. Relatedly, the well-known ‘exhaustivity’ (sometimes termed ‘exclusivity’ or
‘contrast’) of Hungarian pre-verbal foci follows by purely pragmatic reasoning: when one indi-
vidual (or group, value, etc.) is asserted as fulﬁlling a particular role within a known eventuality,
other hitherto contextually possible alternatives to the asserted item are implicitly excluded, by
the kind of pragmatic reasoning known in the Gricean tradition as ‘quantity implicature’6.
There is therefore no reason to assume that exhaustivity as such is part of the encoded semantics
of the Hungarian pre-verbal focus position. The commonly accepted analysis of this position,
as put forward by the likes of Szabolcsi (1981, 1994) and ´ E. Kiss (1998), is that it corresponds
to a semantic ‘exhaustivity operator’. However, the availability of an inferential pragmatic
explanation of exhaustive/identiﬁcational readings suggests that this kind of detail need not be
actually encoded in the grammar.
Indeed, theargumentspresentabove, totheeffectthatSzabolcsi’sPredOpandFocusaredemon-
strably the same position, provide evidence in favour of the pragmatic approach. As noted
above, there is generally perceived to be a certain difference in the readings of pre-verbal
6The fact that the exhaustivity of pre-verbal foci may affect truth-conditions, as identiﬁed by Szabolcsi (1981),
does not preclude an inferential pragmatic account of this nature. As well-founded pragmatic approaches like
Relevance Theory emphasise (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 2002), there is no principled reason to restrict
inferential pragmatic processes to operating only over the output of truth-conditional semantics.
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QNPs, compared to individual-denoting pre-verbal foci: the latter are typically associated with
a strongly exhaustive cleft-like reading, while pre-verbal QNPs usually are not. This difference
in interpretation appears to be one of the main motivations for Szabolcsi’s distinction between
PredOp and Focus—and indeed this distinction must be made, if an encoded exhaustivity oper-
ator is taken to provide the semantics of Focus. Szabolcsi (1994) argues that the correct form of
any such operator must have the form in (16), to allow for appropriate entailments.
(16) lzlP[z = ix[P(x) & ∀y[P(y) → y ⊆ x]]]
As Szabolcsi (1997a, 149) notes, this deﬁnition of exhaustivity only works with set (singular or
plural individual) denoting expressions. As tests like (8) show, immediately pre-verbal QNPs
are not set-denoters, but part of a truly quantiﬁcational structure. It follows that if (16) is the
semantic contribution made by the Focus position, such QNPs must be in a different position
where they undergo a different kind of interpretation. However, this conclusion contradicts the
syntactic evidence, as shown above. Encoding the semantics of exhaustivity into the Focus
position therefore forces the adoption of an empirically unsustainable analysis.
In contrast, the pragmatic approach to exhaustive identiﬁcational focus predicts that narrow fo-
cus on a quantiﬁer will tend to have a different impact to narrow focus on an individual-denoting
expression. In Wedgwood (2002, 2003), I discuss at length how the nature of contextual alter-
natives to individual-denoters contrasts with the alternatives to asserted quantiﬁcational values
(which are generally context-independent and, in the case of numerals, often open-ended) and
how this tends to create different perceptions of exhaustivity. In essence, it is pragmatically
predictable that the inferred exclusion of well-deﬁned and contextually evoked alternatives will
produce a stronger sense of an intentionally contrastive reading than will the exclusion of the
other members of an inﬁnite and ‘ever-present’ scale of values like the natural numbers7. More-
over, in many cases the narrowly focused item is not the whole QNP, but some sub-part of it, for
reasons expounded below. In these cases, the majority of the QNP is not asserted material at all,
but rather background material that is ‘pied-piped’ into the pre-verbal position8. The QNP as a
whole is therefore often not expected to bear any kind of contrastive reading, under a pragmatic
account of the origins of such readings.
Even besides the issue of QNPs, there are good reasons to reject the idea that Focus encodes an
exhaustivity operator. First, narrow foci without markedly exhaustive readings (i.e. those natu-
rallytranslatedwithEnglishsentencesofunmarkedwordorder, ratherthanit-clefts)mayappear
in the immediately pre-verbal position—for example, the unmarked answer to a Wh-question
like (17) appears there. Because all ‘given’ material is generally elided in such contexts, the
answer to (17) would normally be simply J´ anost, but native speakers conﬁrm that the only pos-
sible full sentence answer would involve the use of the ‘Focus’ position, as shown (the example
is taken from Horvath 2000). The idea that the Focus construction is only used in strongly
exhaustive/contrastive contexts thus springs from its independently determined ‘invisibility’ in
unmarked contexts.
(17) Kit
who-ACC
h´ ıvtak
invited-3PL
meg?
VM
‘Who did they invite?’
J´ anost
J´ anos-ACC
h´ ıvt´ ak
invited-3PL
meg.
VM
‘They invited J´ anos.’
7It is of course possible for a restricted, context-speciﬁc sets of numeral values to be salient—and in this case
a strong sense of exhaustivity/contrast is felt (e.g. FIVE students [not four]). Note that this depends only on the
nature of the (psychological) context; no special grammatical encoding is required to ‘add’ the exhaustive reading.
8Despite the name, this ‘pied-piping’ need not entail a syntactic theory involving movement. See Kemp-
son, Meyer-Viol and Gabbay (2001, 113) for technical ways of encapsulating pied-piping effects within Dynamic
Syntax—a framework with which my analysis shares fundamental assumptions.
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Furthermore, as in English, special indicators are required to convey the idea that a narrow focus
is non-exhaustive: Horvath comments that explicit phrases such as t¨ obbek k¨ oz¨ ott ‘among others’
are necessary to create a non-exhaustive answer to a question like (17); rising intonation also
appears to be obligatory. This conﬁrms that exhaustivity is the pragmatically unmarked reading
of narrow foci, making a grammatically encoded operator superﬂuous.
Further evidence that the Focus position cannot encode an exhaustivity operator comes from
applying a test due to Horn (1981). Horn shows that the English it-cleft construction cannot
directlyencodeexhaustivity, sinceanexhaustivereadingofthecleftedconstituentfailstoappear
in a sentence like (18-a), even though the addition of exhaustive semantics (akin to ‘only a
pizza’) is precisely what is required to make the meaning of the sentence coherent. As (18-b),
the translation of Horn’s example, shows, the same is true of the Hungarian Focus construction,
demonstrating that the exhaustive meaning is not provided by the grammar and must instead be
inferred from the way in which the item in Focus is asserted.
(18) a. ?? I know Mary ate a pizza but I’ve just discovered that it was a pizza that she ate.
b. ?? Azt
that
tudtam,
knew.1SG
hogy
that
Mari
Mari
megevett
VM-ate.3SG
egy
a
pizz´ at,
pizza-ACC
de
but
most
now
vettem
take
´ eszre,
mind-to(VM)
hogy
that
egy
a
pizz´ at
pizza-ACC
evett
ate
meg.
VM
Let us summarise the argument so far. The true counterpart of Szabolcsi (1997a) successful
procedural analysis of TopP and QP is not the ‘counting’ operation that she proposes, but rather
something reminiscent of a procedural approach to ‘focus frame + narrow focus’ sentences.
The idea that such a procedure somehow underlies the interpretation of the ‘PredOp’ QNPs
is consistent with strong syntactic and interpretive evidence that the putative PredOp position
is identical to the position known as Focus. A procedural approach to this position seems
appropriate, given the existence of signiﬁcant problems for the commonly-held idea that this
position contributes an exhaustive focus operator. In the remainder of this paper, I present a
proposal regarding the precise nature of the procedure associated with this position and show
how this explains both its information-structural reading and the nature of the QNPs that can
appear there.
4 The ‘Focus’ position as a predicative position
My proposals regarding the information-structural and quantiﬁcational signiﬁcance of the posi-
tion left-adjacent to the tensed verb in Hungarian rely on a radical new analysis of this position.
Rather than positing a specialised Focus projection, I concentrate on the linear relationship of
left-adjacency to the tensed verb. Considering the range of items that can enter into this rela-
tionship and the range of resulting interpretations, its signiﬁcance is clearly more general and
underspeciﬁed than any available deﬁnition of ‘the semantics of focus’. I propose that the linear
adjacency relationship acts as a signal to the hearer to pursue a particular interpretive proce-
dure involving the expression to the left of the tensed verb. Depending on the nature of this
expression, the procedure is predicted to trigger different inferential processes, which lead to
the appropriate information-structural readings. Constraints on the distribution of QNPs also
follow from the nature of this procedure.
If Focus is to be subsumed in a more general phenomenon, a new name is required for the
relevant syntactic position. Furthermore, the involvement of the tensed verb in particular will be
8
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shown to be crucial, so descriptions such as ‘the pre-verbal position’ will not sufﬁce. Instead, I
shall use the abbreviation ‘PT’ (for ‘pre-tense’) to refer to the relevant position (which continues
to contrast with TopP and QP).
4.1 Pre-tense, not pre-verbal
Concentration in the literature on present and past time sentences (such as (2)–(5)), in which the
main verb is inﬂected for tense, has led to the common perception that the position of syntac-
tically focused expressions in Hungarian is related to the position of the main verb. Examples
containing tensed auxiliary verbs and inﬁnitival main verbs tell a different story. In these ex-
amples, the main verb is independent of the expression of tense, revealing the true nature of the
PT position. Consider (19): here tense is carried by the auxiliary fog, which, rather like English
will, acts in such sentences simply to convey temporal information.
(19) a. Mari
Mari
l´ atni
see-INF
fogja
will-PRES.3SG
J´ anost.
J´ anos-ACC
‘Mari will see J´ anos.’
b. Mari
Mari
J´ anost
J´ anos-ACC
fogja
will-PRES.3SG
l´ atni.
see-INF
‘It’s J´ anos that Mari will see.’
The sentence in (19-a) has what is known as a ‘neutral’ reading; that is, it appears to contain no
syntactically focused expression and hence is essentially read as ‘topic + broad focus’. Every
neutral sentence has the same basic linear structure: the main verb immediately precedes the
expression of tense, whether as [verb stem + tense afﬁx] or as inﬁnitival verb followed by tensed
auxiliary. Sentences containing auxiliaries diverge from those with tensed main verbs in clear
examples of syntactic focus, like (19-b). Here the main verb appears to the right of the tensed
element, effectively ‘vacating’ the immediately pre-tense position, which is occupied by the
focused item. What these examples show is that in a neutral sentence the verb itself is in PT: the
same position occupied by a focused expression when there is one. Tensed main verbs confuse
the picture, inevitably appearing to the left of tense, for morphological reasons. In this position,
they can be interpreted as being left-adjacent to tense, but can alternatively be viewed as being
the tensed element themselves. In terms of semantic signiﬁcance, the contribution of a main
verb stem may be itself subjected to the procedure encoded by PT, or, as the tensed element,
it may simply indicate that another expression is to be interpreted in terms of PT. The former
situation results in neutral sentences; the latter in the identiﬁcation of a syntactic focus.
The observation that PT, the position of foci, is occupied by the main verb in neutral sentences
precludes any direct encoding of the semantics of focus (appropriately, given that the problems
with encoded exhaustivity noted above leave us with nothing but a vague notion of ‘narrow
focus’) and supports the idea of underspeciﬁed procedural encoding. Further evidence for this
approach comes from the behaviour of verbs when there is both a tensed auxiliary and a VM.
As shown in (20-a), in this case the inﬁnitival main verb does not appear before tense even in
a neutral sentence; instead, the VM does—though still postposing in the presence of a focused
expression, as in (20-b).
(20) a. Mari
Mari
meg
VM
fogja
will-PRES.3SG
h´ ıvni
call-INF
J´ anost.
J´ anos-ACC
‘Mari will invite J´ anos.’
9
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b. Mari
Mari
J´ anost
J´ anos-ACC
fogja
will-PRES.3SG
megh´ ıvni.
VM-call-INF
‘It’s J´ anos that Mari will invite.’
The conclusion from sentences with tensed auxiliaries is that VMs, main verbs or other expres-
sions may appear in PT, with different interpretive consequences: a neutral reading in the case
of VMs and verbs and a narrow focus interpretation with other expressions. These differences
follow from the ways in which each is able to fulﬁl the procedure that is encoded in PT9.
4.2 PT and predication
The analysis pursued here suggests that PT encodes a fundamental semantic procedure that is
highly underspeciﬁed with regard to the eventual interpretive effects it may produce. Observed
interpretations arise via chains of inferential reasoning, on the basis of the kind of expression
that is actually encountered in the PT position. It follows that the path from syntactic structure to
observed interpretations must take account of what occurs during the processing of utterances;
attempting to ‘interface’ a static representation of syntactic structure with semantics could at
best result in a highly underspeciﬁed semantic representation. Indeed, I argue below that a
crucial part of the chain of inference from PT to its eventual semantic interpretation involves
the time-linear processing of utterances: the explanation of the observed information-structural
readingsdependsonthefactthatmaterial‘totherightof’PTisprocessedafterthePTprocedure
has been completed. My analysis is therefore inherently ‘dynamic’, in the sense of Kempson
et al.’s (2001) Dynamic Syntax. This allows for forms of explanation that are not possible under
more conventional approaches, with the particular advantage of allowing for a reasoned shifting
of the burden of explanation from encoded semantics to inferential pragmatic processes.
The nature of the underlying interpretation of PT is suggested by the fact that it is the unmarked
position of main verbs (a situation mirrored in the verb-initial focus position found in many
otherwise strictly V-initial or Aux-initial languages; see Paul 2001). This indicates that the idea
of predication may in some way be important in the interpretation of PT. This is consistent with
the use of PT as a ‘focus position’—there is a long tradition of relating background and focus to
the notions of ‘logical subject’ and ‘logical predicate’, respectively (see von Heusinger 2002 for
a historical overview). Note also how this connects to the basic procedures suggested in (13).
The ﬁrst procedure is evidently concerned with predication; if, as seems likely, the second is in
some sense the inverse of the ﬁrst, it too is essentially predicative.
A further indication of the underlying interpretation of PT is to be found in the following gen-
eralisation (which has been hitherto overlooked in the literature on the ‘focus position’). What-
ever expression appears in PT is usually the beginning of the ‘new’ (or ‘comment’) part of the
utterance. This is accounted for if the PT position somehow encapsulates the idea of focus-
as-logical-predicate. However, while any material following a verb or VM is typically further
‘new’ material, anything that follows a non-verbal expression in PT is necessarily background,
leaving the expression in PT as the whole of the ‘new’ material by itself. To be all of the new
material in the sentence is to be a narrow focus; therefore, explaining the different information-
structuralreadingsofHungariansentencescanbereducedtoexplaininghowdifferentoccupants
of PT determine the focus/background status of subsequent material.
The different effects of verbal and non-verbal expressions can be accounted for if the following
is assumed to be the procedure encoded in PT: the expression left-adjacent to tense contributes a
9For reasons of space, I do not address here why it is VMs, not verbs, that appear in PT in a neutral sentence
with a tensed auxiliary; see Wedgwood (2003, Chapter 7).
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predicate, the application of which must create a full, if skeletal, propositional form (apart from
the temporal anchor contributed by tense), at the point at which PT is parsed.
The appropriate effects on subsequent material follow from this because of a key semantic dif-
ference between verbs and non-verbal expressions: the degree to which each contributes the
structure of a proposition. Verbs provide rich information such as argument structure, which
allows the verb alone to give the bare bones of an eventuality. In combination with tense (pro-
viding a temporal anchor point), a verb can therefore create the skeletal structure of a proposi-
tion. This is reﬂected in the fact that in a fully ‘pro-drop’ language a tensed verb alone can be
a full sentence, corresponding to a full proposition. For example, the Hungarian verb L´ atta can
convey the entire meaning ‘S/he saw him/her’.
The fact that a verb contributes skeletal semantic structure also means that this structure can
be ‘ﬁlled out’ by subsequent assertions, adding information without changing the propositional
form that has been created. This creates the impression of a ‘broad focus’ reading (i.e. as part
of a so-called neutral sentence). Thus, in a sentence like (19-a), the main verb in PT fulﬁls
the procedure outlined above, a full propositional form (minus temporal anchor) being created
at the appropriate point thanks to the richly structured semantics of the verb. The subsequent
accusative NP J´ anost is asserted material, elaborating on a part of the propositional form already
created by the verb. The verb is therefore just the beginning of the newly asserted material in the
sentence, but simultaneously also constitutes the whole of the ‘logical predicate’ of the sentence
on its own10.
The case of VMs is somewhat more complicated (see Wedgwood 2003, Chapter 7), but essen-
tially similar to main verbs, in that VMs too bring abstract structure to a proposition (many VMs
affect aspectual structure, for example, and in general VMs contribute to complex predicates, in
ways that can be analysed as effectively ‘selecting for’ a main verb). Again, this structure can
be ‘ﬁlled out’ by subsequent assertions within the same sentence, creating the effect of ‘broad
focus’, but without changing the fundamental structure of the proposition.
A non-verbal expression, such as an argument NP, has no such internal structure. How could
such an expression fulﬁl the proposed procedure associated with PT and create a propositional
form before the rest of the utterance is parsed? On its own, it clearly cannot. All of the necessary
elements of a proposition must therefore be available ‘in advance’, outwith the sentence itself.
In practice, this means that the whole of the relevant proposition apart from the contribution
of the PT expression must be ‘given’ in the context. This brings us back to the procedures
outlined in (13): everything other than the expression in PT must be taken to be something akin
to a ‘complex topic’, in the sense that all of this material must be treated as the logical subject
over which the PT item can predicate11. Thus, the proposed procedure obligatorily yields a
’focus frame + narrow focus’ interpretation just when the occupant of PT is non-verbal12.
Anumberofotherimportantfactsaboutthe‘focusposition’arealsopredictedbythisaccountof
PT, without any ad hoc syntactic machinery or semantic operators. Notably, the apparent post-
posing of VMs in the presence of a focused expression is explained: if a VM intervenes between
some expression and the tense-carrying element, that expression simply will not be interpreted
as the proposition-creating predicate, since it will not be recognised as being in PT—and there-
10For a compatible view of how adjuncts relate to verbal semantics in a dynamic approach, see Marten 2002.
11One way to achieve this technically is to turn to neo-Davidsonian event-based semantics (Parsons 1990),
within which expressions like NPs correspond to predicates over eventuality variables, giving a close parallel to
the semantic contribution of verbs. An approach of this kind is taken in Wedgwood (2003), where a means of
formally representing the dynamic aspects of the contribution of PT is developed.
12Note that, correctly, there is nothing in this analysis that prevents a verbal element from receiving a narrow
focus interpretation, just in case there is a suitable ‘focus frame’ available in the context. The point is that this is
not necessarily the reading with verbal elements—indeed, it is clearly the more marked possibility.
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fore it will not be interpreted as a narrow focus. At the same time, the unmarked appearance of
VMs before auxiliary verbs does not rely on any ad hoc operation of ‘VM climbing’, such as
is required in many purely syntactic accounts. As shown in Wedgwood (2003, to appear), the
PT analysis also explains without further the stipulation the nature of two apparently aspectual
constructions that interact with focusing and, with minimal further assumptions, the positions
and associated interpretations of the Hungarian negative particle.
5 PT and QNP distribution
The key to explaining the class of QNPs that appears in PT is the fact that this structural position
necessarily relates to a single act of predication. In order to fulﬁl this function, the occupant
of PT must contribute a predicate that is independent of the rest of the proposition. This must
be so because the rest of the proposition is background material when the occupant of PT is a
non-verbal expression, the PT predicate itself being the only asserted material in the sentence.
There is a well-known class of quantiﬁers within GQ theory that, in effect, contribute no pred-
icate that is independent of the rest of the proposition in which they appear: the proportional
(non-intersective) quantiﬁers. This is clear from basic representations of GQ semantics, viewed
in terms of tripartite quantiﬁcational structure. As can be seen in (21-a), the contribution of
an intersective quantiﬁer like four is a predicate—it assigns to the intersection of its restrictor
and nuclear scope sets the property of having the cardinality ‘4’. This intersection is therefore
unproblematically available as a ‘focus frame’ for a quantiﬁer in narrow focus. In contrast, a
proportional quantiﬁer imposes the condition that the intersection of its restrictor and nuclear
scope is a certain proportion of the restrictor, as shown in (21-b). The contribution of every may
be alternatively expressed as a relation between the restrictor and the nuclear scope, as in (21-c).
Either way, there is no predicate over the intersection of restrictor and nuclear scope that can be
identiﬁed as the property of the quantiﬁer alone, so the quantiﬁer cannot fulﬁl the predicative
procedure encoded in PT.
(21) a. |{x : R(x)}∩{y : N(y)}| = 4
b. |{x : R(x)}∩{y : N(y)}| = 1
2|{x : R(x)}|
c. {x : R(x)} ⊆ {y : N(y)}
Universal quantiﬁers and ‘most’ are unable to appear as the asserted item in PT (as shown in
(11)), so appear to corroborate the idea that the need for an independent predicate is involved
in deﬁning the class of PT QNPs, as predicted by the analysis outlined in section 4.2. However,
as noted in section 2.2, it is not the case that proportional quantiﬁers never appear in PT, so
PT cannot be simply restricted to QNPs with intersective quantiﬁers. Recall that ‘few (of the)
N’ and ‘more than 50% of the N’ may appear in PT, despite their proportional quantiﬁers (see
section 2.2). Another of Szabolcsi’s examples is (22).
(22) A
the
ﬁ´ uk
boys
k¨ oz¨ ul
among
t¨ obb/kevesebb,
more/fewer
mint
than
hat
six
emelte
lifted
fel
up(VM)
az
the
asztalt.
table-ACC
‘More/fewer than six among the boys lifted up the table.’
Given Szabolcsi’s assumptions, whereby what appears in her PredOp position must be deﬁned
in terms of quantiﬁer semantics, such examples mean that one must abandon the idea that the
proportional/intersective distinction may be relevant to characterising this position. But given
the PT analysis outlined above, these QNPs merit further analysis. Under the latter approach,
the signiﬁcant factor is not intersectivity as such, but a necessary consequence of intersectivity:
12
Daniel Wedgwood Using Focus ... Hungarian Quantiﬁcation
328Focus and quantiﬁcation in Hungarian 13
the ability to provide a predicate that is independent of the rest of the proposition. As outlined
below, this property is in fact consistent with certain proportional quantiﬁers, including those
listed above, though not through the semantic contribution of the quantiﬁer as a whole. The
ability to recognise and account for this depends upon a uniﬁed procedural account of PredOp
and Focus.
Inasyntacticallycomplexquantifyingdeterminerlikethosein(12)and(22), certainlexicalsub-
parts of the quantiﬁer are potential contrastive foci. That is, one of these sub-parts may provide
the predicate demanded by PT. In this case, the appearance of the whole QNP in PT represents
a kind of pied-piping—something that is independently attested in Hungarian focusing (see
(24) below). Furthermore, it is intuitively clear that focus on certain sub-parts of QNPs like
(12) is pragmatically highly likely. The proportion ‘50% of N’ may easily form part of the
background in addressing whether more than, fewer than, or exactly this proportion of some
set is involved in some eventuality. Alternatively, the value ‘50’ may be asserted contrastively
against the background assumption that, say, ‘more than 30% of’ some set is involved in some
eventuality. The case of (22) is similar, but with more marked phrase-internal information
structure. Native speaker informants report that the ‘fronted’ PP (‘among the boys’) has a
‘topical feel’ and requires corresponding intonation, and that contrastive focus must fall after
this (on t¨ obb/kevesebb, on the numeral hat or on the head noun). Thus, the quantiﬁer as a whole
cannot be taken to be the item in focus, making it unsurprising that the proportionality of the
quantiﬁer has no bearing on the syntactic distribution of the QNP.
The possibility of contrastive focus on a lexical sub-constituent explains the appearance of pro-
portional QNPs with syntactically complex quantiﬁers in PT. The emerging descriptive general-
isation is that single-lexeme proportional quantiﬁers cannot be focused and therefore appear to
be banned from the PT position. The case of kev´ es ‘few’ appears to be a counter-example even
to this, however, and as such might seem to be a problem for the whole PT analysis.
In fact, this apparent problem only arises through confusion over the precise application of the
term ‘proportional’; kev´ es does not exhibit the kind of proportionality that is relevant to PT.
The meaning ‘few’ clearly expresses a proportion in some sense, but, unlike with ‘every’ or
‘most’, this need not be taken to be a proportion of the quantiﬁer’s restrictor set. Rather, the
meaning here relates to a proportion of some contextually determined ‘standard’ or ‘expected’
amount. The number of students to fail an exam in a given year may be considered ‘few’ even
when it is the majority of the class—for example, if most years at least three-quarters fail but
this year only 60% do so. The point is still clearer with the monotone increasing counterpart of
‘few’, ‘many’ (Hungarian sok). Five students out of a group of 30 taken ill in a single day might
be considered many, but in other contexts this could be considered a very small number. This
analysis is well enshrined in semantic practice; consider the following rough semantics for few
taken from Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) textbook:
(23) |{x : P(x)}∩{y : R(y)}| is small
Giventhatkev´ esandsok arethusproportionaltosomecontextualvalueandnottotheirrestrictor
sets as such, the intersection of the restrictor and the nuclear scope can straightforwardly act as
the background against which the fully independent meaning of the quantiﬁer is asserted as
a narrow focus, as the representation in (23) implies. The generalisation therefore holds that
single-lexeme quantiﬁers that are semantically proportional to their restrictor sets are unable
to appear as the focused element in PT. This is precisely what is predicted by the analysis of
section 4.2, based on PT as a special predicative position.
ThehypothesisthataQNP’sabilitytoappearinPTisdeterminedbywhetheritmakesasemanti-
cally independent predicate available creates another prediction that distinguishes this approach
13
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from one based in quantiﬁer semantics alone. If the current approach is correct, then even a
QNP with the structure minden N ‘every N’ should be able to appear in PT if the head noun
is taken to be contrastively focused and the rest of the QNP pied-piped, since in this case the
noun itself may supply the required semantically independent predicate (presupposing a logical
subject that contains the value of the quantiﬁer and abstracts over the contribution of the noun).
This prediction is fulﬁlled, examples like (24) being grammatical (in contrast to (11)).
(24) Minden
every
FI ´ U
boy
ijedt
feared
meg
VM
(nem
not
minden
every
L ´ ANY).
girl
‘It’s every BOY that got frightened (not every GIRL).’
6 Conclusions
The denotational semantics of quantiﬁers helps to account for the hitherto mysterious class
of quantiﬁers that may appear in the Hungarian ‘focus position’ (or Szabolcsi’s PredOp) just
insofar as GQ theory explains why some quantifying determiners can’t contribute any predicate
that makes no reference to the rest of the tripartite quantiﬁcation structure. Understanding why
the availability of such a predicate is crucial depends on recognising that the interpretation of
QNPs in Szabolcsi’s PredOp position and the apparently strictly exhaustive foci in her Focus
position are manifestations of a single underlying procedure. To do so, and to identify the nature
of this procedure, depends in turn on identifying what may be inferred in performance, on the
basis of general pragmatic principles, and on the possibility of signiﬁcant underspeciﬁcation at
the level of what is actually encoded in the grammar.
This analysis of Hungarian therefore carries an important lesson regarding the assumptions
we bring to the analysis of linguistic data. It illustrates two major reasons why we cannot
apply a strong assumption of compositionality, whereby observed semantic effects are reﬂected
homomorphically in syntactic structure, to the study of natural languages. The ﬁrst reason is
that the structural details of natural languages may encode procedures rather than declarative
compositional semantic material. Where this is the case, there may be apparent associations
betweendenotationalsemanticgeneralisationsandsyntacticforms, buttheseareepiphenomenal
(as in the connection between proportional quantiﬁers in PT). The second reason is that what is
systematically encoded in the grammar of a language may be signiﬁcantly underspeciﬁed. What
we understand to be the semantics of a sentence is the output not only of interpreting lexico-
syntactic forms but also of inferential processes, carried out in context according to general
pragmatic principles (Carston 2002). For these reasons, elements of semantic representations
cannot simply be attributed to those elements of linguistic structure that appear to produce them.
To do so is to risk missing key generalisations, while complicating the grammar with machinery
that only duplicates the work of independently necessary extra-grammatical processes.
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Abstract 
In this paper I investigate the relation between Negative Concord (NC) and the syntactic status 
of negative markers. I will show that (basing myself on three different empirical domains) 
Jespersen’s original bidirectional generalization between these two phenomena should be replaced 
by a unidirectional one: whenever a language has a negative marker that is a syntactic head, the 
language exhibits NC; languages that only exhibit Double Negation lack a negative head. I will 
analyze NC as a form of syntactic agreement. This means that only NC languages have a 
functional projection NegP. Moreover, this means that n-words in Negative Concord languages 
cannot be regarded as semantically negative and that not in every language the negative marker 
itself is the phonological realization of a negative operator. I will conclude my paper by showing 
that this analysis predicts the correct readings of multiple negative expressions, including those 
that formed problems for previous analyses of NC. 
1  Introduction 
Negative Concord (NC) has been a problem for compositionality for a long time. In this paper 
I will show that the solution for NC can be found in the syntactic status of negative markers 
that participate in NC relations. The analysis of the status of negative markers provides a 
framework in which NC naturally falls out as a form of syntactic agreement. I will also argue 
that n-words in NC languages are semantically non-negative, and the combinations of these 
two assumptions predicts the correct readings of multiple negative expressions, including 
those that formed problems for previous analyses of NC. 
In section 2 I will discuss four different instances of Negative Concord, and I will argue that 
one particular instance (Emphatic Negation) does not count as ‘true Negative Concord.’ 
In section 3, I will discuss the correspondence between Negative Concord and the syntactic 
status of the negative marker in three different empirical domains: Dutch diachronic variation, 
Dutch dialectological variation and cross-linguistic variation. I will argue that Jespersen’s 
(1917) original bidirectional generalization should be replaced by a unidirectional one. 
In 4.1 I will present a syntactic analysis for negative markers and argue that only negative 
heads require the presence of a functional projection NegP, whereas negative adverbs are 
base-generated in a lower position in the clause and do not necessarily require the presence of 
a NegP. The result of this analysis is that it is possible to connect NC to he presence of a 
NegP. In 4.2 I will argue that n-words are semantically non-negative, but that they are 
semantically marked for negation and that this also may hold for negative markers in several 
NC languages. In 4.3 I will show that NC can be analyzed as agreement between a negative 
operator and negative elements that are only marked for negation in the syntax. 
2  Negative Concord 
In this section I will introduce one of the two topics in this study of negation: Negative 
Concord. Negative Concord (NC) is the name for the phenomenon that multiple negative 
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
Arbeitspapier Nr. 177, FB Sprachwissenschaft, Universit¨ at Konstanz, Germany   Hedde  Zeijlstra  2 
elements in the syntax only yield one negation in the semantics
1. Although many different 
subclasses of Negative Concord have been defined in the literature (cf. Den Besten 1989, Van 
der Wouden 1994, Giannakidou 2000 a .o.) I will restrict myself to four different instances of 
NC. 
(1)  a.  Strict Negative Concord: N-words are not allowed to occur by themselves, but 
have to be accompanied by a single negative marker. 
  b.  Non-strict Negative Concord: N-words are not allowed to occur by themselves,  
    but should be accompanied by a single negative marker, except when the n-word 
     is a preverbal position. Then it never co-occurs with a negative marker. 
c.  Paratactic Negation: a verb or preposition with a negative connotation in a main 
clause selects an n-word in its complement (clause), that does not contribute any 
negation of its own.  
d.  Emphatic Negation: One negative element enforces another negative element. 
Whereby the following definitions hold: 
(2)  a.  Negative markers: elements that denote that a sentence (or constituent) is under 
the scope of negation. Examples are French ne and pas, Italian non, Czech ne- and 
Dutch niet. 
 b.  N-words: elements that are only under well-defined conditions equivalent to a 
negative quantifier. Examples are French rien or personne, Italian nessuno or 
Czech nikoho (after Laka 1990). 
 c.  Negative elements: the set of negative markers, n-words and negative quantifiers 
Examples of these four instances in (1) are in (3)-(6). 
(3)  a. Milan  nikomu nevolá.       Czech 
    Milan n-body neg-call     
    ‘Milan doesn’t call anybody’ 
 b.  Dnes  nevolá nikdo. 
    Today neg-calls n-body       
    ‘Today nobody is calling’ 
 c.  Dnes  nikdo nevolá. 
    Today n-body neg-calls 
  ‘Today nobody is calling’ 
(4)  a. Gianni  *(non) ha telefonato a nessuno     I t a l i a n  
    Gianni neg has called to n-body 
    ‘Gianni didn’t call anybody’  
 b.  *(Non) ha telefonato nessuno 
    Neg has called n-body 
   ‘Nobody  called’ 
 c.  Nessuno (*non) ha telefonato 
    N-body neg has called 
   ‘Nobody  called’ 
(5)  a. J’ai  peur qu’il ne  v i e n t        F r e n c h  
    I am afraid that he neg comes 
    ‘I am afraid that he comes’ 
 b.  Il  est  autre que je ne croyais  
    He is different than I neg believed.SUBJ 
    ‘He is different than I thought’ 
                                                 
1 Cf Van der Wouden (1994) and Giannakidou (1997, 2000) for their definitions that are only slightly different. 
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 c.  Il  vient  sans personne 
    He comes without n-body 
    ‘He comes without anybody’ 
(6)      a.  Hij heeft nergens geen zin in          Dutch 
    He has n-where no lust in 
    ‘He doesn’t feel like anything at all’ 
  b.  Hij gaat nooit niet naar school 
    He goes n-ever neg to school 
    ‘He never ever goes to school’ 
  c.  Ik vind dat niks niet leuk 
    I find that n-thing neg nice 
    ‘I don’t like it at all’ 
In (3) we see that the negative marker ne is prefixed to the finite verb in all examples. In (4) 
the negative marker (which is not a prefix but a separate word), is only allowed in negative 
sentences, if it is not preceded by an n-word in subject position. Given that the negative 
marker can co-occur with a negative subject in a lower position, it is not due to the fact that 
the nessuno is a subject, but due to the position of nessuno in the clause in (4) that the 
occurrence of the negative marker is forbidden. 
Whereas (3) and (4) are examples that denote the traditional notion of Negative Concord, the 
phenomenon in (5) is different, because the concord relation is not clause-internal, and the 
first element in the concord relation, is not a negative element. It is known from the literature 
(Van der Wouden 1994) that Paratactic Negation only takes place in three different kinds of 
environments: after verbs with a negative connotation (such as fear, doubt, forbid), after 
prepositional operators with a negative connotation (such as unless, before, without) and 
comparative environments. These are contexts that also allow for licensing Negative Polarity 
Items (NPI’s). Paratactic Negation is a subcategory of Negative Concord since it is only 
possible in languages that exhibit Strict or Non-strict NC
2. 
Emphatic Negation is a special subclass of NC. It shows similarities with other classes of NC, 
due to the fact that the cancellation of two negatives does not take place, but it is far more 
restricted in its distribution than the other kinds. First, the reading is idiomatic in the sense 
that the semantic negation is strengthened, whereas standard NC yields an unstrengthened 
negation. Secondly, Emphatic Negation is subject to very strict locality conditions: Emphatic 
Negation can only occur if the two negative elements are (almost) adjacent.  
(7)  a. Hij  gaat  nooit niet  naar  school      Dutch 
    He goes n-ever neg to school 
    ‘He never ever goes to school’ 
  b.  NOOIT gaat hij NIET naar school 
    N-ever goes he neg to school 
    ‘He always goes to school’ 
(8)  Niemand vertelde mij (*gisteren) niks
3     Dutch 
    N-body told me (yesterday) n-thing 
    ‘Nobody told me anything at all (yesterday)’  
                                                 
2 For a more fine-grained classification of environments in which Paratact Negation may occur, cf. Van der 
Wouden 1994 
3 The sentence with gisteren (‘yesterday’) included is not ungrammatical, but cannot yield the emphatic negative 
reading anymore. This sentence gets a Double Negation reading. 
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Moreover emphatic negations are forbidden when the negative marker precedes an n-word, or 
when the negative marker gets additional stress. Those constructions only yield a Double 
Negation reading. 
(9)  a. Hij  gaat  nooit NIET  naar  school      Dutch 
    He goes n-ever neg to school 
    ‘He does never NOT go to school’ 
 b.  Hij  gaat  niet nooit naar school 
    He goes neg n-ever to school 
    ‘He sometimes (=not never) goes to school’ 
Finally, Emphatic Negation is different from the other subclasses of Negative Concord, 
because it only occurs in languages that do not exhibit any other Negative Concord (like 
Dutch or German varieties). Languages that standardly use negative concord lack Emphatic 
Negation. 
From the fact that Emphatic Negation does not occur in any standard Negative Concord 
language it follows that an explanation for Emphatic Negation is different from an account 
that explains any of the other NC instances
4. In the rest of this paper I will provide an analysis 
that accounts for Strict and Non-strict Negative Concords and for Paratactic Negation. I argue 
that Emphatic Negation should be treated as idiomatic expressions that are lexically stored. 
3  The syntactic status of Negative Markers 
I will argue that the key to a solution for the puzzle of NC lays in another phenomenon: the 
syntactic status of the negative marker (i.e. the marker that expresses sentential negation). 
Languages vary with respect to syntactic status of negative markers. Some languages express 
sentential negation by means of a negative affix on the finite verb; other languages express 
negation by means of a negative particle in that is the head of its own functional projection 
and other languages use a negative adverb in order to express sentential negation. 
In this section I investigate the relation between the syntactic status of the negative marker (in 
informal terms) in three different empirical domains: Dutch diachronic variation, Dutch 
dialect variation, and typological variation. I will show that the Dutch diachronic development 
of negation reflects the general development of negation as first described by Jespersen 1917. 
For every different phase in this development, I will investigate whether this variety of Dutch 
exhibits NC or not. On the basis of the diachronic development of negation and its 
correspondence to NC Jespersen (1917) drew a generalization that has been adopted by 
Haegeman & Zanuttini (1996) and Rowlett (1998). After that I will investigate whether this 
generalization holds for different Dutch dialects (based on an investigation of 267 Dutch 
dialects) and for a set of 30 mostly Indo-European languages. I will show that Jespersen’s 
original bidirectional generalization between NC and the status of the negative marker does 
not hold and should be replaced by a unidirectional relation. This unidirectional 
generalization will form the input for my syntactic and semantic analysis. 
3.1  Dutch diachronic variation 
Jespersen (1917) describes the development of negation as follows: 
The history of negative expressions in various languages makes us witness the following curious 
fluctuation; the original negative adverb is first weakened, then found insufficient and therefore 
strengthened, generally through some additional word, and in its turn may be felt as the negative 
                                                 
4 Emphatic Negation is also widely spread under English varieties. However, their distribution is freer and its 
occurrence is more frequent. I will take English as a language that substandardly allows for Negative Concord. 
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proper and may then in course of time be subject to the same development as the original word. 
[Jespersen 1917] 
This development has been known as ‘the Jespersen Cycle’ and can be formalized as in (10). 
In (10) the diachronic development of the negation is described as a process that takes place 
in several phases. Dutch negation underwent the Jespersen starting from Phase I or II (given 
the small amount absence of fragments of Old Dutch this is hard to say) until Phase V, which 
is the way that Standard Dutch expresses sentential negation. 
(10)  The Jespersen Cycle 
PHASE I  Negation is only expressed by an obligatory negative marker attached 
to Vfin. 
PHASE II  Negation is expressed by an obligatory negative marker attached to Vfin 
and an optional negative adverb. 
PHASE III  Negation is obligatory expressed by both a negative adverb and a 
negative marker attached to Vfin. 
PHASE IV  Negation is obligatory expressed by a negative adverb and an optional 
extra negative marker attached to Vfin. 
PHASE V  Negation is only expressed by an obligatory negative adverb. 
PHASE  VI  The negative adverb becomes also available as a negative marker 
attached to Vfin. Negation is expressed by either one of them. 
PHASE VII=I  Negation is only expressed by an obligatory negative marker attached 
to Vfin. 
Only few fragments are left over from Old Dutch. The only fragment form the 9
th century that 
is still present is a translation of Latin psalm texts. This fragment, the Wachtendock Psalm 
texts, has met much scepsis throughout the years, as the translation is very literal and thus it 
could not provide any proper insight in the Grammar of Old Dutch (Hoeksema 1997). 
However, close observation of the texts shows that the translator added negative markers that 
were absent in the original Latin texts (11). Moreover, through this adding of negative 
markers, the translation in Old Dutch shows NC, whereas Vulgate Latin is not a negative 
Concord language (12). Thus, this is in fact proper evidence that Old Dutch is a Negative 
Concord language. 
(11)  Ne reslag thu sia
5   Old  Dutch 
 Neg  kill  you  them           
 ‘You  don’t  kill  them’        
(12)  nequando obliviscantur populi mei    Vulgate Latin 
 that  nohuuanne ne  fargetin  folk  mîn      Old  Dutch 
  that n-ever neg forget.FUT my people 
  ‘that they will never forget my people’ 
Middle Dutch has been well investigated and proven to be a Phase III language. Most 
negative expressions in Middle Dutch have both a preverbal negative marker and a negative 
adverb (13). Moreover Middle Dutch exhibits NC (14).  
(13)  a. Maer  dat  en mach niet sijn
6      Middle  Dutch   
    But that neg may not be 
‘But that may not be (the case)’ 
 
 
                                                 
5 Wachtendock Psalms 58.12 
6 Cf. Burridge 1993. 
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b. dat  sie  niet en  p r e d i c t e n             
  that they not neg-preach 
‘that they didn't preach’ 
(14)  a.  Nyemant en moet upten kerchoeve hout zaghen    Middle Dutch 
      No-one neg must on-the churchyard wood saw  
    ‘No one should saw wood on the churchyard’ 
b.  Niemen en had mi niet  gesien     
    No-one neg had me neg seen 
    ‘Nobody has seen me’ 
During the 17
th Century, the Dutch preverbal negative marker became only optionally 
available (15). Therefore 17
th Century Dutch counts as a Phase IV language. 17
th Century 
Dutch still exhibits NC (16). 
(15)  Ghy (en) sult niet dooden
7       1653  Dutch   
You  (neg-)shall  not  kill          
  ‘You shall not kill’ 
(16)  Hy vreesde Herkles knods noch Samsons vuisten niet
8   1637  Dutch 
He feared Hercules’ truncheon nor Samson’s fists neg 
‘He feared neither Hercules’ truncheon nor Samson’s fists’ 
Finally the Dutch preverbal negative marker completely disappeared and Modern Dutch, 
being Phase V, expresses sentential negation by means of only a negative adverb. Note that 
Modern Dutch, contrary to previous stages of the language, lacks NC. Two negations in one 
proposition cancel each other out and yield an affirmative. 
(17)  a. Jan  loopt  niet        S t a n d a r d   D u t c h  
     John  walks  neg 
    ‘John doesn't walk’   
 b.  dat  Jan  niet  loopt           
that John neg walks 
    ‘that John doesn't walk’ 
(18)  a.   dat Jan niet met niets tevreden  was        Standard  Dutch 
that John neg with n-thing content was 
  'that John was not pleased with nothing' 
b. dat  Jan  niemand niets  g e e f t          
that John n-body n-thing gives 
    'that John gives nobody nothing' 
This development of Dutch in line with Jespersen’s observation of other languages. Jespersen 
noticed a relation between the status of the negative markers and the occurrence of NC (19).   
(19)  Every language that has a negative marker that is attached to the finite verb is a NC 
language. Every language that lacks a negative marker that is attached to the finite 
verb is not a NC language 
This bidirectional relation is known as Jespersen’s generalization. In the following paragraphs 
I will show that this generalization is too strong however and should be replaced. 
                                                 
7 Grammatica Leupenius 1653 
8 Vondel: Gysbrecht (Act V) 
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3.2  Dutch dialectal variation. 
In this paragraph I will evaluate Jespersen’s generalization against the observation of 267 
different dialects that have been investigated for the Syntactic Atlas of Dutch Dialects 
(SAND)
9. Dutch dialects also vary with respect to the expression of sentential negation. West 
Flemish e.g. is known to be a language that still optionally allows an extra preverbal negative 
marker. Therefore West Flemish counts as a Phase IV language. West Flemish is also known 
to be a NC language (Haegeman 1995). In (21) all negative elements yield only one 
(sentential) negation. 
(20)  a. Valère  (en) meet nie  's  oavens      West  Flemish
10 
    V. (neg) eats neg in the evening 
    ‘V. doesn’t eat in the evening’ 
  b.  da Valère 's oavens nie (en)   e e t           
    that V. in the evening neg (neg) eats  
    ‘that V. doesn't eat in the evening’     
(21)  a.  da Valère me niets ketent (en) was        West  Flemish 
    that V. with n-thing content (en) was 
    'that V. was not pleased with anything' 
b. da  Valère  niemand niets (en) geeft     
    that V. n-body n-thing (neg) gives 
    'that V. does not give anyone anything' 
 c.  da  Valère  nooit van niemand nie ketent (en) was  
    that V. n-ever of n-body neg content (neg) was    
    'that V. was never pleased with anyone' 
However, West Flemish does not always yield NC. In cases in which the n-word appears to 
the right of the negative marker nie, a DN reading is yielded. The occurrence of two possible 
negative markers allows West Flemish, depending on the configuration of negative elements, 
to yield both NC and DN readings. This cannot be the result of different registers of West 
Flemish, as one sentence may contain both NC and DN relations. The sentence in (22)b 
contains three negative elements, but its semantics has only two negations. This is unexpected 
from Jespersen’s generalization: the first clause appears to be too strong. 
(22)  a. da  Valère  nie van niemand tevreden (en-)was
11    West  Flemish 
    that V. neg of n-body content (neg-)was       
    ‘That V. wasn’t pleased with nobody’ 
 b.  da  Valère  nooit nie van niemand tevreden was    
    that V. n-ever neg of n-body content was     
    ‘hat V. was never pleased with nobody’ 
Jespersen’s prediction that all phase IV dialects of Dutch exhibit NC is born out. The 
following table shows that from all 20 dialects that still have a preverbal negative marker, 18 
dialects clearly exhibit NC, and the results are unclear for the other two cases. 
(23)  Results from SAND-project: 
Dialects with en/ne  NC  No NC  Unclear 
20 18  0  2 
                                                 
9 Syntactic Atlas Dutch Dialects (cf. Barbiers 2000): Current project investigating 250 different Dutch dialects at 
Universities of Amsterdam, Leiden, Ghent, Antwerps and the Free University Brussels and Meertens Institute. 
10 Data from Haegeman 1995 
11 Cf. Haegeman 1995, 1998 
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A second observation that is not in line with Jespersen’s generalization is the fact that there 
exist several dialects, especially in the southern parts of the Netherlands and Flanders, that 
lack a preverbal negative marker, but still exhibit NC. This is a crucial counter example 
against the second clause of Jespersen’s generalization.  
(24)  Jan loopt niet         Southern  dialects 
  John walks neg  
  ‘John doesn’t walk’ 
(25)  Er wil niemand niet  dansen       Southern  dialects 
  There wants n-body neg dance 
  ‘Nobody wants to dance’ 
Before drawing a new generalization, I will first discuss the data from the typological 
empirical domain. 
3.3  Cross-linguistic variation 
The distinction between the different Jespersen Phases forms a proper tool to classify 
languages with respect to their way of expressing negation. This makes it possible to evaluate 
Jespersen’s generalization for languages that can be classified in different Phases of the 
Jespersen Cycle. The following table shows the relation between the Jespersen Phase of 
language and the question whether the language exhibits NC, DN, or both. 
(26)  Jespersen Cycle, Negative Concord and Double Negation 
Variety/language Jespersen  Phase  NC  DN 
Italian I  +  - 
Spanish I  +  - 
Portuguese I  +  - 
Romanian I  +  - 
Polish I  +  - 
Czech I  +  - 
Slovenian I  +  - 
Bulgarian I  +  - 
Russian I  +  - 
Serbo-Croatian I  +  - 
Greek I  +  - 
Hungarian I  +  - 
Hebrew I  +  - 
Turkish I  +  - 
Berber I  +  - 
Catalan II  +  - 
Standard French  III  +  + 
West Flemish  IV  +  + 
Colloquial French  IV  +  + 
Quebecois V  +  ? 
Yiddish V  +  + 
Bavarian V  +  + 
Standard English   V  ?  + 
Standard Dutch  V  -  + 
German V  -  + 
Swedish V  -  + 
Danish V  -  + 
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Norwegian V  -  + 
Icelandic V  -  + 
Colloquial English  VI  +  + 
Based on this large set of data, one cane safely conclude that Jespersen’s generalization 
should be replaced by the following generalization:  
(27)  Whenever a language has a preverbal negative marker that is attached on Vfin, it 
exhibits NC. Whenever a language exhibits DN, it is has an adverb as negative 
marker. 
4  Analysis 
The generalization in (27) forms the input for a syntactic and semantic analysis. The 
following two questions will be answered in this section: (i) What is the syntax status and 
position of negative markers in Jespersen Phase I-VI? (ii) What is the semantic status of n-
words and negative operators in NC and DN languages? 
4.1  The syntax status of negative markers 
It has been argued that negative markers that attach to Vfin are synactic heads (X°) (Haegeman 
1995, Hageman & Zanuttini 1996, Rowlett 1998): e.g. preverbal negative markers block 
movement of prepositions or clitics. From the Head Movement Constraint (Travis 1984) it 
directly follows that these preverbal markers are negative heads. 
(28)  a. Jean  la fait manger à Paul
12      F r e n c h  
    John it makes eat to Paul 
    'John makes Paul eat it' 
 b.  *Jean  la fait ne pas manger à Paul 
     John it makes neg neg eat to Paul 
    'John makes Paul not eat it' 
(29)  a. Gianni  li  vuole  vedere       Italian 
    John him wants see 
    'John wants to see him' 
 b.  *Gianni  li vuole non vedere 
    John him wants neg see 
    'John wants not to see him' 
Another argument is presented by Merchant (2001), who shows that negative heads cannot 
form adjunctions with XP’s like why. 
(30)  a .   * G i a t i   d h e n ?         G r e e k
13 
b.  *Perque  non?        Italian 
c.  *Pochemune?        Russian 
   Why  neg 
Application of these tests to the negative markers that are attached to Vfin proves that all these 
markers are syntactic heads X°. Likewise, negative markers that do not block movement of 
                                                 
12 The example is from Richard Kayne. 
13 This test and these data are from Merchant (2001). The test shows that whenever the word for ‘no’ (as opposed 
to yes) is phonologically distinct from the negative marker, the ‘why not’ test distinguishes x° markers from XP 
markers. The XP may adjoin to another XP, not to an X°. The way of saying ‘why not’ in languages with a 
negative head marker is by using the respective word for ‘no’ (as in yes/no). 
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other heads and that allow for why adjunction are not X° and therefore should be XP’s. This is 
the case for all negative adverbs: 
(31)  a. dat  Jan  niet  naar  huis  gaat      Dutch 
    that John neg to home goes 
    ‘that John doesn't go home’ 
 b  Jan  gaat  niet naar huis 
    John goes neg to home 
    'John doesn't go home' 
(32)  a. om  Jan  inte  köpte  boken       Swedish 
    that John neg bought books 
    'that John didn't buy books' 
 b.  Jan  köpte  inte boken 
    John bought neg books 
    'John didn't buy books'   
(33)  a. Why  not?          E n g l i s h  
b. Warum  nicht?         G e r m a n  
c. Hvervor  ekki?        Icelandic 
d. Pourquoi  pas?         F r e n c h  
   Why  neg?   
Now the new generalization can be reformulated in syntactic terms: 
(34)  Whenever a language has a negative marker X°, it exhibits NC. Whenever a language 
exhibits DN, a negative adverb XP is required. 
Ever since Pollock (1989) it has been assumed that the negative head corresponds to the head 
Neg° of a functional projection NegP (either it is base-generated in Neg° or ot forms an 
agreement relation with this projection). This projection is dominated by TP and dominates 
vP (following from the fact Negative Polarity Items (NPI’s) are not allowed in subject 
position). Negative adverbs are base-generated in a vP adjunct position (cf. Zanutinni 2001). 
This follows e.g. from heavy pronoun imperatives in French in which ne is not allowed, but 
pas is. This would be impossible if pas was not base-generated in a lower position than NegP. 
(35)  (*Ne) regarde moi pas      F r e n c h  
  Neg watch me neg 
 ‘Don’t  watch  me’ 
Thus languages without a negative head do not require a NegP (but may have one), languages 
with a negative head do. This leads to the following hypothesis about the connection of NC 
with the presence of a NegP. 
(36)  Every language that exhibits NC expresses negation by means of a functional 
projection NegP. Languages without NC lack a functional projection NegP. 
It is known that functional projections are only required to establish syntactic agreement 
relations. Hence, if NC is the result of the presence of a NegP (or vice versa), NC must be a 
form of (multiple) negative agreement. This means that NC is the results of multiple elements 
carrying uninterpretable [uNEG] features (cf. Ura 1996, Chomsky 1999) that check these 
feature against a single negative operator hosted in NegP. 
4.2  Semantics of n-words and negative markers 
The semantic status of n-words has been subject of long debate throughout the ’90’s. 
Basically, two approaches have been formulated. According to one approach (Zanuttini 1991, 
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Haegeman & Zanuttini 1996,) n-words are inherently (i.e. semantically) monadic negative 
quantifiers that through some process of factorisation and absorption melt together in one 
polyadic quantifier. De Swart & Sag (2002) provide a semantic framework for this proposal. 
This approach however has problems analysing the Paratactic Negation sentences as in which 
non-negative verbs or prepositions (with a negative connotation) license the presence of n-
words in their complement. 
(37)  a.  En lugar de intendar nada      S p a n i s h
14 
    In stead of trying n-thing 
    'In stead of trying anything' 
 b.  Prohibieron  que  saliera  nadie 
    Forbade.3PL that went.out n-body 
    'They forbade that anybody went out' 
Examples like these, and the fact that even under polyadic quantification the loss of negation 
has not been explained from a compositional point of view, led to another approach that takes 
n-words to be non-negative NPI’s that are licensed by some abstract negation that is triggered 
by their own presence (Laka 1990, Ladusaw 1992, Giannakidou 1997, 2000). However such 
an analysis fails to account for the occurrence of fragmentarian answers, which are allowed 
for n-words, but are not allowed for fragmentarian answers (38). Moreover, n-words cannot 
be licensed by a negation in a higher clause, whereas NPI’s can be licensed clause boundary 
(39). Finally contrary to NPI’s n-words are allowed to occur in subject position, whereas this 
is not allowed for NPI’s (40). 
(38)  A quién viste? A nadie  /  *A  un  alma      Spanish 
  To whom saw.2SG? To n-body / to a single soul (NPI) 
  'Who did you see? Nobody / a single soul' 
(39)  Dhen lipame [CP pu piglosa *KANENAN/
√kanenan]    Greek 
  Neg regret.1SG that hurt.1SG n-body/anybody 
  ‘I don’t regret that I hurt anybody’ 
(40)  a.  Nikdo neprisel  na  vecirek     Czech 
    N-body neg-came to party       
    ‘Nobody came to the party’ 
  b.  *Petnik by za to nebyl dan 
    A.nickel.NPI would for it neg.be given 
    ‘A nickel wouldn’t be paid for it’   
Since the dichotomy between inherently negative and NPI like non-negative n-words seems 
too strong and the act that NC is a form of syntactic agreement, I argue that n-words are 
semantically non-negative, but syntactically negative. This means that words can be seen as 
semantically non-negative Heimian indefinites or existential generalized quantifiers, that 
carry an uninterpretable [NEG] feature that has to be eliminated throughout the syntactic 
derivation (41) (cf. Ladusaw 1992, Giannakidou 1997 for similar proposals). 
(41)  [[n-P]] ~~> P’(x)[uNEG] or [[n-P]] ~~> λQ.∃x[P’(x) & Q(x)][uNEG] 
One question remains open: what is the semantic status of negative markers? Are they also 
non-negative markers of negation, or are they the phonological realization of negative 
operators. Given that all operators have to roof n-words, I argue that in languages in which n-
words cannot precede the negative marker, the negative marker is the negative operator. 
These languages are the so-called Non-strict NC languages, like Italian. In languages like 
                                                 
14 Data from Herburger 2001 
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Czech, in which n-words are allowed to occur in a position in front of the negative marker, 
the negative marker cannot be the negative operator itself and has to be semantically non-
negative. The negative marker in these languages is nothing but the phonological realization 
of the [uNEG] feature. 
4.3  Interpreting negative structures 
Now we can explain NC from a syntactic point of view: NC is a form af agreement between a 
negative operator and non-negative elements such as n-words and in strict NC languages also 
negative markers. This checking of [uNEG] features can only take place if a NegP is present 
that contains a negative operator. In those languages that lack NC, there are no n-words, but 
only true negative quantifiers, and since in those languages that negative marker is never 
roofed by an n-word (since n-words only exist in NC languages) the negative marker in a DN 
language is a negative operator itself. Since there are no [uNEG] features to eliminate, there is 
no NegP required to do so. Therefore NegP does not exist in DN languages. This explains 
why all languages with a negative head Neg° are NC languages. 
Hence there are two ways of expressing negation in natural language: semantic negation, 
whereby all negative elements are semantically negative; or syntactic negation, whereby 
negative elements are syntacically marked for negation, and these elements all check there 
[uNEG] feature against a single negative (c)overt operator. 
Now I will explain how this analysis predicts the correct readings of negative sentences in the 
different languages. As all negative elements are [uNEG] in Czech, negation is realized by a 
covert negative operator Op¬, hosted in Spec,NegP (42a). All negative elements check their 
[uNEG] feature against this operator that is an interpretable [iNEG] feature (42b). In case of 
n-words in preverbal subject position, Op¬ forms a compound with the n-word and this 
compound is a negative quantifier (42c). 
(42)  a. Milan  nevidi        Czech
15  
   Milan  neg-sees 
    Milan does not see 
   [ NegP Op¬  Neg° [vP Milan nevidi[uNEG] ]] 
 b.  Milan  nevidi nikoho         
    Milan not-sees n-body 
    'Milan does not see anyone' 
   [ NegP Op¬  Neg° [vP Milan nikoho[uNEG] nevidi[uNEG] ]] 
  c.  Nikdo neprisel  na  vecirek       
    N-body neg-came to party       
    ‘Nobody came to the party’ 
 [ NegP [Op¬+Nikdo[uNEG]] ne[uNEG] prisel na vecirek]   
In Italian, all n-words are licensed by the [iNEG] of non, which is the negative operator (43a-
b). In the case of movement of an n-word to a subject position, non can no longer license 
these n-words. Therefore an abstract operator is introduced that forms a compound with the 
highest n-word. Obviously non cannot be included in this sentence, since then the sentence 
would contain two negative operators (43c). 
(43)  a. Gianni  non  ha  telefonato       Italian 
    G. neg has called 
    ‘G. has not called'     
   [ Neg° non[iNEG]   [vP Gianni ha telefonato]] 
                                                 
15 For typographic reasons diacritics have been left out in all Czech examples. 
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 b.  Gianni  non telefonato a nessuno 
    G. neg calls with nobody 
    ‘G. doesn't call with anybody’ 
   [ Neg° non[iNEG] [vP a nessuno[uNEG] Gianni telefonato ]]  
c.  Nessuno (*non) ha telefonato a nessuno 
    N-body has called to n-body 
    ‘Nobody called anybody’ 
   [NegP  [Op¬ + Nessuno [uNEG]] [vP ha telefonato a nessuno[uNEG]]] 
French expresses negation by means of an [iNEG] pas that raises to Spec,NegP, from which it 
takes scope (44a). In the case that another n-word is involved the negation comes from an 
abstract operator that forms a compound with the raised n-word (44b). However, if pas and 
rien co occur in the sentence the trace of pas precedes rien and therefore blocks the agreement 
relation between NegP and rien. Hence a second operator is needed to eliminate rien’s 
[uNEG] feature and a DN reading is yielded (44c). 
(44)  a. Jean  ne mange pas       French 
    John neg eats neg 
    ‘John doesn’t eat’ 
   [ NegP pas[iNEG]i Neg° [vP ti  Jean ne-mange[uNEG] ]] 
 b.  Jean  ne mange rien 
    John neg eats nothing 
    ‘John doesn’t eat anything’ 
   [ NegP [Op¬+rien[uNEG]i]  Neg° [vP ti  Jean ne-mange[uNEG] ti]] 
 c.  Jean  ne mange pas rien 
    John neg eats neg nothing 
    ‘John doesn’t eat nothing’ = ‘John eats something’ 
   [ NegP pas[iNEG]i Neg° [vP ti Jean ne-mange[uNEG] [NegP Op¬  Neg° [VP rien[uNEG]]]]] 
West Flemish is similar to French, except that the negative marker nie is [uNEG]. Hence 
negation is expressed by an abstract negative operator, that checks all [uNEG] features (45a-
b). However, if nie intervenes between NegP and an n-word, locality constrictions (Chomsky 
1999) block the NC relation between the negative operator and the n-word (45c). The only 
way to escape this is to move over nie to a position that falls within the same phase. Then the 
NC relation is allowed (45d). 
(45)  a. (da)  Valère nie en- e e t        W e s t   F l e m i s h  
    (that) V. neg neg-eats 
    '(that) V. doesn't eat' 
   [ NegP Op¬  Neg° [vP nie[uNEG] Valère en-eet[uNEG] ]] 
  b.  (da) Valère niets en-eet 
    (that) V. n-thing neg-eats 
    '(that) V. doesn't eat anything' 
   [ NegP Op¬  Neg° [vP niets[uNEG] Valère en-eet[uNEG] ]] 
  c.  (da) Valère nie niets en-eet 
    (that) V. neg n-thing neg-eats 
    '(that) V. doesn't eat nothing' 
   [ NegP Op¬ Neg° [vP nie[uNEG] Valère [NegP Op¬ Neg° [VP niets[uNEG] en-eet[uNEG]]]]] 
  d.  (da) Valère niets nie en-eet 
    (that) V. n-thing neg neg-eats 
    '(that) V. doesn't eat anything' 
   [ NegP Op¬  Neg° [vP niets[uNEG] nie[uNEG] Valère en-eet[uNEG] ]] 
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In Bavarian, negation is also expressed by means of an abstract negative operator and n-words 
are [uNEG] and therefore they need to be in an checking relation with NegP. In this respect 
Bavarian is similar to West Flemish (only there is no optional negative head marker.) 
(46)  a.  S’Maral woid an Hans ned hairadn        Bavarian 
    The’Mary wanted the Hans neg marry 
    ‘Mary didn’t want to marry Hans’ 
   [ NegP Op¬  woid [an Hans [vP ned[NEG] S’Maral hairadn]]] 
 b.  daβ’ma koana ned furtgehd 
    that’me n-body neg leaves 
    ‘that nobody is leaving’ 
   [ NegP Op¬  koana[uNEG] ma [vP ned[uNEG] furtgehd]] 
Finally, in Dutch there is no NegP and negation is expressed semantically: every negative 
element corresponds to a negation in the semantics and in the case of two negative elements a 
DN reading is yielded. 
(47)  a. (dat)  Jan  niet  eet        Standard  Dutch 
    (that) John neg eats 
    '(that) John doesn't eat' 
   [Jan  [vP niet[iNEG] eet]] 
   ¬eat(j) 
 b.  (dat)  Jan  niets eet 
    (that) John not eats 
    '(that) John eats nothing' 
   [Jan  [vP [QP niets[iNEG]] eet]] 
   ¬∃x.[eat(j,x)] 
 c.  (dat)  Jan  niet niets eet 
    (that) John neg nothing eats 
    '(that) John doesn't eat nothing' 
   [Jan  [vP niet[iNEG] [QP niets[iNEG]] eet]] 
   ¬¬∃x.[eat(j,x)] ↔ ∃x.[eat(j,x)] 
Apart from these correct predictions, this analysis also accounts for the problems that have 
been raised with the other approaches of NC (37)-(40). Paratactic Negation can be analyzed as 
feature checking against a negative operator that is lexically decomposed into a negative 
operator (carrying [iNEG]) and a postive counter part. 
(48)  Prohibieron que saliera nadie     S p a n i s h  
  Forbade.3SG that went.out n-body 
  'They forbade that anybody went out' 
 [vP  prohieberon[iNEG] [CP C°[uNEG]  [saliera [vP nadie[uNEG]]]]]  
Fragmentarian answers are accounted for by PF movement of the n-word after ellipsis of the 
entire sentence, containing a negation that checks the n-words [uNEG] feature. Since NPI’s 
have to be licensed at surface structure, PF movement of NPI’s is not allowed. 
(49)  A quién viste? A nadie       S p a n i s h  
  To whom saw-you? To n-body 
  'Who did you see? Nobody' 
 [ FocP nadiei[uNEG] [NegP <no[iNEG] vió a ti>]]
16 
                                                 
16 This account is similar to the account presented Giannakidou (2000) and in Merchant (to appear). 
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Finally, the fact that NPI’s can be licensed by a negation in a higher clause and n-words 
cannot follows immediately from the clause-bounded conditions on feature checking (C 
counts as a phase boundary, cf. Chomsky 1999). 
 
(50)  *[NegP Op¬  Dhen[n\uNEG] lipame [vP [CP pu piglosa KANENAN[uNEG]]]] Greek 
  Neg regret.1sg that hurt.1sg n-body   
5  Conclusions 
This analysis predicts correctly the interpretation of negative sentences in a large set of 
languages. Moreover it solves several problems that have been raised by former approaches of 
Negative Concord and it accounts for the differences between Strict and Non-strict NC 
languages. The relation between the syntactic status of negative markers and the occurrence 
of NC is explained, and replaces the incorrect bidirectional relation that has been proposed by 
Jespersen (1917) and adopted by Haegeman & Zanuttini (1996) and Rowlett (1998). 
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348COMPETITION BETWEEN WORD MEANINGS: THE POLYSEMY OF (A)ROUND
1
Joost Zwarts
Joost.Zwarts@let.uu.nl
Abstract
The preposition (a)round can be used to describe a wide variety of spatial paths, ranging from
perfectly  circular  to  slightly  curved.  This  polysemy  is  approached  from  a  formal  semantic
perspective, building on the descriptive work of cognitive semanticists. The different uses are
defined in model-theoretic terms, using a vector-based model, and shown to be entailments, i.e.
weaker versions or supersets, of the prototypical circle meaning of round. The different spatial
senses of round can then be ordered according to strength. The interpretation that is chosen in a
particular context is determined in an optimality-theoretic fashion from the interaction of a small
number of general principles: STRENGTH, FIT and VAGUENESS, of which the last two are more
important than the first. The strongest sense of round is chosen that fits the linguistic context. If
the context does not favour a weaker meaning, a weaker meaning still results because of a
preference for vagueness.
1  Introduction
The polysemy of spatial prepositions is a phenomenon that has hardly drawn any attention
from formal semanticists. They seem to be happy to leave it to the cognitive semanticists, for
whom spatial polysemy is indeed a focal concern, combining as it does the major themes of
space and categorization. In the wake of Lakoff’s (1987) work on over the polysemy of many
spatial prepositions and adverbs has been described in terms of networks of image-schematic
meanings, typically represented by informal little pictures. For example, Hawkins (1984),
Schulze (1991, 1993), Taylor (1995) and Lindstromberg (1998) have done this for (a)round,
covering such diverse readings as in (1), illustrated in:
(1) a. The postman ran round the block
b. The burglar drove round the barrier
c. The steeplechaser ran round the corner
d. The tourist drove round
e. The driver took the long way round
f. The woman came round again
                                                   
1 I gratefully acknowledge the audience of Sinn and Bedeutung and the members of the Cognition project (of
which this research is part) for useful discussion, and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO) for financial support (grant 051-02-070 for the Cognition project Conflicts in Interpretation).
In: C´ ecile Meier, Matthias Weisgerber (ed.) 2004: Proceedings of the Conference “sub8 – Sinn und Bedeutung”.
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a  b  c  d  e  f 
Figure 1: Paths corresponding to round
In this paper I want to approach the polysemy of (a)round from a more formal perspective. In
doing that I hope to demonstrate that more precise definitions of the meanings of polysemous
spatial prepositions are possible and, more importantly, essential for a better understanding of
their semantic structure and use in context. Since a full treatment of the meanings of round
would require far more space than available here, I will restrict myself to a core of spatial uses
of this item.
I will take as my point of departure a strong ‘prototype’ meaning for round based on a circle
(section 1). Section 2 will show that this prototype meaning implies a range of properties that
are characteristic for non-prototypical meanings of round. Then in section 3 I will suggest a
way to select the right meaning of round in a particular context, using an Optimality Theoretic
approach to interpretation Blutner (2000), Hendriks and de Hoop (2001), de Hoop and de
Swart  (2000),  Zeevat  (2000)  that  incorporates  the  Strongest  Meaning  Hypothesis  of
Dalrymple et al. (1994) and Winter (2000).
2
2  The prototype of round
Dictionary entries of round, its etymology (from Latin rota ‘wheel’) and speakers’ intuitions
all suggest that the core meaning of round corresponds to a circle, a circular shape or
movement (Hawkins 1984, Schulze 1993). This is what we could call the prototypical
meaning of round.
I will model this meaning in terms of the set of paths that describe exactly one perfect circle,
with different radii.
3 I will use the label  CIRCLE for this set. There are many ways to model a
path, but Zwarts and Winter (2000) and Zwarts (2003) give good arguments to define a path
as a sequence of vectors located with their starting point in one common origin. This notion of
path can be formalized as a function p from the real interval [0,1] to V, a three-dimensional
vector space. I will require this function to be continuous and dynamic. A path function is
continuous in the standard sense of elementary calculus, i.e. when its graph is an unbroken
curve.
4 A path function is dynamic if it is not a constant function on any subinterval of its
domain. This does not mean that an object traversing a path is not allowed to stand still, but
this possibility is not part of the definition of path, because a path is intended as an a-
temporal, purely spatial entity. It is part of the continuous function that maps a time interval
[t0,t1] onto the domain [0,1] of a path in a homomorphic fashion, representing motion along
                                                   
2 See Wunderlich (1993) for a somewhat different approach to similar phenomena.
3 How the two-dimensional path of  round can apply to three-dimension configurations (e.g.  the skin round the
apple) is something I will not discuss here. See Wunderlich (1993) for discussion of such ‘dimensionality
effects’.
4 A function p from [0,1] to  V is continuous iff for each  i Œ [0,1], limitkÆi p(k) = p(i). See any calculus textbook
for a further explication of the notion of limit.
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the path. In other words, stationariness should be part of the representation of motion, not of
the representation of paths.
The following figure illustrates what a prototypical path for round will look like (in five
snapshots):
  p(0) 
p(0.1) 
p(0.2) 
p(0.6) 
p(1) 
Figure 2: Vectors from a prototypical round path
Notice that the direction of a path is not defined by the vectors but by the ordering of the
domain [0,1]. The vectors serve to locate the positions of the path in terms of their distance
and direction relative to an origin. This origin is determined by the reference object of the
preposition (2a), by a central point in that reference object (2b) or by an implicitly given
reference point (2c):
(2) a. The car drove round the barrier
b. Beatrice walked round the hall
c. They wandered round
The path in Figure 2 is not only used to represent motion, but also extension and rotation:
(3) a. Mary has a necklace round her neck
b. John turned the wine glass round in his fingers
In (3a) the necklace does not move in a circular path round Mary’s neck; it is distributed
along that path (a case of fictive motion in Talmy’s (1996) terms). For (3b) the path describes
the rotation of the wine glass around a vertical axis, with the vector representing one
arbitrarily fixed side of the glass relative to the axis (see Zwarts 2003 for more details).
3  Properties of the prototype
What are the properties of a circular path? We can first of all note that a prototypical round
path has a vector pointing in every direction in a plane, that is, a two-dimensional vector
space. This is what I call COMPLETENESS:
(4) COMPLETENESS
A path p in a plane P is complete iff for every direction D Õ P, there is an i Œ dom(p)
such that p(i) Œ D.
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where a direction is the set of vectors pointing in one direction, i.e. a half line, dom(p) is the
domain of function p, i.e. [0,1], and p(i) is the vector of path p at index i.
5
All paths in the set CIRCLE have COMPLETENESS (i.e. CIRCLE Õ COMPLETENESS), but not all
paths with COMPLETENESS are circles. Spirals and ellipses are complete, but they are not
circles. What distinguishes circular paths from spiralling paths and elliptical paths is that all
the vectors of a circular path are of the same length. This is what the property CONSTANCY
formulates:
(5) CONSTANCY
A path p is constant iff for every i, j Œ dom(p), |p(i)| = |p(j)|.
In this definition |  | is a function that assigns to a vector its length. Notice that an arc has
CONSTANCY but not COMPLETENESS. Only perfectly circular paths have both COMPLETENESS
and CONSTANCY:
 
+Completeness 
+Constancy 
+Completeness 
-Constancy 
-Completeness 
+Constancy 
-Completeness 
-Constancy 
Figure 3: Completeness and constancy in paths
The following property states that a path describes a circle in the most economical way,
without passing any direction twice:
(6) UNIQUENESS
A path p in a plane P has uniqueness iff for every i, j Œ dom(p)/{0,1} and every
direction D, p(i) Œ D and p(j) Œ D iff i = j.
Because of UNIQUENESS a path does not change direction (from clockwise to anticlockwise or
vice versa) and it does not continue beyond one full cycle. Notice that the definition allows
p(0) and p(1) to point in the same direction, because i and j are taken from the open interval
(0,1). Unlike COMPLETENESS and CONSTANCY, UNIQUENESS is a not specific to round, but it
                                                   
5 Because vectors are taken as primitives here, directions are higher order properties, i.e. equivalence classes of
vectors. Simpler definitions of direction and completeness might be possible when vectors are analyzed in terms
of (polar) coordinates.
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characterizes the prototypical meanings of all directional prepositions. The rough intuition
behind this is that normal paths do not touch a place more than once.
In many uses of the word round the path involved will not describe one perfect circle, but
something that has some but not all of the properties of the prototype. The property of
UNIQUENESS is not satisfied by uses that express a repeated circling or rotating, ‘round and
round’:
(7) a. John keeps running round in circles
b. The earth turns round its axis
c. The rope is coiled round a pole
CONSTANCY is absent in the following examples:
(8) a. The earth goes round the sun in one year (elliptical path)
b. There is a wall round the garden (rectangular path)
c. The planet spirals round towards its sun (spiral path)
In the crisscross or aimless path meaning that we saw in The tourist drove round, both
UNIQUENESS and CONSTANCY are missing. Only COMPLETENESS characterizes this reading.
This can be seen as follows: from a central point in the city we can find a point in every
direction where the tourist has been in his tour through the city centre. These points are not all
at the same distance from that central point and they are not ordered in a clockwise or
anticlockwise direction.
Circular paths also satisfy the following two properties, weaker versions of COMPLETENESS:
6
(9) INVERSION
There are i, j Œ dom(p) such that p(i) = -sp(j) with s ≥ 0.
(Two of p’s vectors point in opposite directions, p is at least a half-circle)
ORTHOGONALITY
There are i, j Œ dom(p) such that p(i) ^ p(j).
(Two of p’s vectors point in perpendicular directions, p at least a quarter-circle.)
The following examples illustrate INVERSION:
                                                   
6 There might be a continuous range of such properties, corresponding to smaller or bigger parts of the circle, but
these  two  are  singled  out  because  they  correspond  to  prominent  meanings  in  dictionaries  and  semantic
descriptions and because they correspond to geometrically salient operations.
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(10) a. The burglar drove round the barrier
b. The children sat round the television
c. The car turned right round
In each of these examples the underlying path is semicircular: the path that the burglar takes
in (10a), the arrangement of the children in front of the television in (10b) and the rotation of
the car in (10c). Examples that illustrate the property ORTHOGONALITY are given in (11):
(11) a. The steeplechaser ran round the corner
b. A man put his head round the door
c. John turned round to the woman sitting next to him
In each of the sentences in (11) there is a change of position or direction from one side to an
orthogonal side, not the opposite side.
Note that INVERSION and ORTHOGONALITY only require two vectors in the path to be opposite
or perpendicular, without specifying what the vectors in between are like. A path that passes
through an object from one side to another in a straight line would also have INVERSION.
Hence, if INVERSION were the only condition, then (10a) would even be true if the burglar
drove right through the barrier. The reason that round does not have this use, is because it is
blocked by the more specific directional preposition through. In other words, round means
‘not through’ because of a pragmatic implicature, not because this ‘not through’ element is
part of a lexical semantic property of round.
Schulze (1993) distinguishes a class of uses of round that he calls DETOUR and that can be
defined here as follows:
(12) DETOUR
|p(0) - p(1)| < the length of p
A path p has DETOUR when the direct distance between its starting point and end point is
smaller than the length of p measured along the path.
7 This is true of a prototypical circular
path, but, in fact, every path that does not form a straight line between its starting point and
end point has the property DETOUR. Some uses of round clearly have this property (example
from Schulze 1991):
(13) The bridge is damaged, so you will have to go round by the lower one
                                                   
7 The notion of the length of a path is intuitively clear and working out that notion would involve to much vector
calculus here.
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This sentence can be true in a situation where the normal route would be a straight line from
A  to  B,  and  the  alternative  route  by  the  lower  bridge  somewhat  longer.  There  is  no
requirement for the alternative path to be a half-circle or an arc.
Another property is LOOP, a property that paths have when their starting point and end point
are identical:
(14) LOOP
p(0) = p(1)
A path can have LOOP even when all its vectors point in one and the same direction, as in the
following example:
(15) The woman came round again
when she had been visiting a friend down the road and came back. The same LOOP meaning
can be seen in compounds like a round trip ‘to a place and back again’.
The prototypical meaning of round satisfies all the properties defined above. However, as we
already suggested above, some properties are weaker or implied by others. The properties can
be partially ordered according to strength in a graph as in Figure 4. I have left UNIQUENESS
out of the picture, because it is not characteristic for round and I have included the set of all
paths (PATH) at the bottom because theoretically, the weakest possible meaning of round is
‘any path’, the dual of the prototype in the poset of strength.
  CIRCLE 
LOOP  CONSTANCY  COMPLETENESS 
INVERSION  ORTHOGONALITY  DETOUR 
PATH 
Figure 4: Strength of round properties
When we would only consider paths with CONSTANCY, then the ordering between the other
five properties of round is as follows, from stricter to weaker, or, from longer to shorter paths
along a circle:
(16) LOOP > COMPLETENESS > INVERSION > ORTHOGONALITY > DETOUR
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When  we  assume  CONSTANCY  and UNIQUENESS  the  difference  between  LOOP and
COMPLETENESS disappears and the following ordering results:
(17) LOOP = COMPLETENESS > INVERSION > ORTHOGONALITY > DETOUR
This ordering gives us a scale from a complete circle via a half and a quarter circle to an arc.
4  Optimizing the meaning of round
The strictest, prototypical meaning of round can be defined by a conjunction of properties,
including UNIQUENESS, CONSTANCY and either COMPLETENESS or LOOP. As we saw, there are
non-prototypical meanings that are weaker than this, because they correspond to a wider set
of paths. These meanings are characterized by a conjunction of less or weaker properties. If
round is associated with a range of meanings like this, is there any way of telling which
meaning will be chosen in a particular context? An answer to this question can be found in the
interaction of three principles:
•  STRENGTH: stronger interpretations are better than weaker interpretations
•  FIT: interpretations should not conflict with the (linguistic) context
•  VAGUENESS: the strongest interpretation should be avoided
Both FIT and VAGUENESS conflict with STRENGTH. I will show how this conflict is resolved,
first for STRENGTH and FIT, then for STRENGTH and VAGUENESS.
4.1  The role of the context
We have seen the internal restrictions on the polysemy of round  (stemming from its
prototypical meaning), we also want to know the external restrictions, imposed by conceptual,
pragmatic and contextual considerations. Here I will restrict myself to considering some
restrictions that come from neighbouring words.
I would like to suggest that the meaning of round that is chosen is often preferably the
strongest meaning that is compatible with the context in which it is used (following the
proposals of Dalrymple et al. (1994) for the interpretation of reciprocals and Winter (2000)).
This idea can be made more concrete using Optimality Theory (OT). OT is a theory in which
linguistic objects (pronunciations, syntactic structures, interpretations) can compete with each
other in how good they satisfy a system of ranked constraints (Prince & Smolensky 1997).
The object that best satisfies the constraints wins the competition and is the optimal outcome.
This optimal outcome is not the outcome that satisfies all the constraints, but that incurs less
violations than alternatives. In OT Semantics the competitors are interpretations of a word,
sentence or discourse and the constraints formulate general requirements on semantic
interpretation.
For my limited purposes only two constraints will be relevant: STRENGTH, a constraint that
favours stronger interpretations over weaker interpretations (Blutner 2000, Zeevat 2000), and
FIT, a constraint that favours interpretations that do not give rise to a contradictory or
unnatural reading (similar constraints to FIT are AVOID CONTRADICTION in Hendriks & de
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Hoop (2001) and CONSISTENCY in Zeevat (2000)).
8 FIT is ranked over  STRENGTH, which
means that a weaker non-contradictory meaning wins over a stronger contradictory meaning.
In this way the conflict between FIT and STRENGTH is resolved.
The following example, in the form of a so-called tableau, will make clearer how this works:
round the door FIT STRENGTH
COMPLETENESS or
LOOP
*
F INVERSION *
ORTHOGONALITY **
DETOUR ***
Table 1: An OT tableau for the interpretation of round the door
The upper left corner of the table gives the input, the prepositional phrase round the door.
Underneath this input four possible interpretations are given of that phrase that are relevant
for  the  discussion  (assuming  only  paths  with  CONSTANCY and UNIQUENESS). The two
columns to the right show the two constraints on the interpretation of round the corner in their
ranking and to what extent the candidate interpretations satisfy these constraints. The
COMPLETENESS interpretation violates FIT, as indicated by the asterisk under FIT, because the
fact that a door is usually connected to a wall makes it impossible to have a complete path
round it (see Figure 5). STRENGTH is violated to different degrees by the four candidate
interpretations: less asterisks under STRENGTH means a stronger interpretation. It is the
relative number of asterisks that counts, not the absolute number.
 
COMPLETENESS  INVERSION  ORTHOGONALITY  DETOUR 
Figure 5: Four of the possible interpretations of round the door
The optimal interpretation of round the door is, as indicated by the pointing finger in the
tableau, the interpretation that best satisfies the two constraints FIT and STRENGTH, namely
INVERSION,  the  strongest  interpretation  that  still  fits.  INVERSION is just as good as
ORTHOGONALITY and DETOUR as far as FIT is concerned (no violations), but it wins because
it has less violations on STRENGTH.
The optimum can change if more linguistic context is taken into account, as in the sentence A
man put his head round the door. Now the type of path that we choose for round also has to
                                                   
8  STRENGTH could also be seen as a  faithfulness constraint on the relation between the underlying lexical
meaning and the contextual meaning. Stronger meanings are meanings that reflect the prototypical meaning
more faithfully.
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fit information about the kind of object that moves or extends along the path, a head in this
example. Usually, if someone puts his head round the door he will remain standing on one
side of it. The length and flexibility of his human neck does not allow him to move his head
all the way to the other side of the door. He will just be able to put his head to the side of the
door so that he can see what is outside or speak with someone standing on the other side.
ORTHOGONALITY will then be the strongest interpretation still fitting the sentence meaning as
a whole, because INVERSION gives a violation asterisk under FIT.
A sentence will often contain enough information to show how the strong round prototype has
to be weakened to fit. This information can come from geometric, functional and other
properties of the reference object of round. Words like corner and bend are compatible with
paths that have at most ORTHOGONALITY. A barrier is typically used to block a road, so cars
driving  round  the  barrier  will  typically  be  understood  not  to  describe  a  circular
(COMPLETENESS) but a half circular (INVERSION) path. Children sitting round a television will
also form a half circle, given the fact that the screen is only visible on one side. The shape of
gardens  and  blocks  of  houses  makes  it  unlikely  that  paths  round  these  objects  have
CONSTANCY. The wall round a garden or a walk round a block will typically follow the
contours  of  those  objects  and  therefore  the  strongest  interpretation  does  not  satisfy
CONSTANCY. Similarly, driving round the city centre is not possible in a perfect circle because
the path has to follow the streets of the centre.
The located object (figure) and the verb can also provide information that leads to a
weakening  of  the  prototypes  of  round.  A  necklace  hanging  round  a  neck  satisfies
COMPLETENESS, because any weaker path would not allow the necklace to stay where it is.
Many verbs have a meaning that is incompatible with the UNIQUENESS of the prototype of
round, like wander, spiral, coil. Such verbs force the path to pass a particular side of an object
more than once. Adverbs and other more peripheral elements in the sentence can also
contribute to determining the interpretation of round that is possible or required. The adverb
again strongly suggests LOOP (as in to come round again), the long way points in the
direction of a DETOUR interpretation and next to him in example (11c) to an ORTHOGONALITY
interpretation.
FIT can be formulated as a ban against empty sets: interpreting round as COMPLETENESS leads
to an empty set when the reference object is a door in its normal position. In order to evaluate
FIT we need to derive from the linguistic and non-linguistic context relevant constraints on
paths and intersect these with the candidate constraints derived from the prototype of round to
see if an empty set results. For example:
(18) FIT(round the door,COMPLETENESS)=*
iff CONSTR(round the door) « COMPLETENESS = ∅
Some of the contextual constraints are specific to particular lexical items, others might be
based on general elements of our knowledge of the world. Unfortunately, at this point it is too
early  to  formalize  the  few  things  that  we  understand  about  how  context  restricts our
interpretation of lexical items.
4.2  The role of vagueness
Even though clues from within the sentence and from the non-linguistic context will often
help to determine a unique interpretation, still ambiguity or vagueness is possible. Take the
following example:
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(19) Scrooge walked round his room for hours
The interpretation that we get here is one that involves a path with COMPLETENESS inside the
reference object, but we do not know whether Scrooge walked round in circles or in
rectangles or crisscross. Even though the circular shape is part of the prototype of round, it
does not seem to matter here. There is a convenient kind of vagueness about the use of round
here. This suggests that another important constraint is at work to explain the use of the
preposition round in context: VAGUENESS.
Krifka (2002) argues that for another type of expressions, numerals, that they are preferrably
interpreted in a vague way. One thousand kilometers is not interpreted as referring to exactly
1000 km but to a range of values around 1000 km and the width of that range depends on the
level of precision needed in a particular context. He formulates this preference as a constraint
on interpretation in an Optimality Theoretic framework that favours vague interpretations
over precise interpretations. I would like to suggest that a similar preference is at work in the
interpretation of the spatial preposition round and that it mainly affects the CONSTANCY and
UNIQUENESS aspects of the basic meaning.
9 Even if the context would allow us to interpret an
occurrence of round in the strongest possible way, then the principle of VAGUENESS, ranked
above STRENGTH, would still force us to choose a weaker meaning (without CONSTANCY or
UNIQUENESS or with weaker versions of those properties). VAGUENESS and STRENGTH are
opposite forces in determining how far the interpretation of round can depart from its
prototype. This is the kind of interaction of conflicting principles that we also see in other
domains in which Optimality Theory has been applied.
5  Conclusions
In order to give a (partial) account for the polysemy of the preposition round I have brought
together three lines of research: the empirical lexical semantic work done within the cognitive
semantic  framework,  model-theoretic  approaches  to  spatial  semantics  and  Optimality
Theoretic Semantics.
10 Even though only a fragment of the range of meanings of  round has
been discussed and the OT treatment of the interaction between lexical meaning, context and
preferred vagueness is still rather sketchy, I believe the general direction is promising. Formal
tools help us to define more precisely what the meanings of a polysemous spatial item are and
Optimality Theory gives us a general framework to study how these meanings compete with
each other and which meaning is optimal given a ranked set of general constraints.
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